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Private defence is the civilized remnant of the ancient system of private vengeance as 
redress for wrong done. The Romans, in permitting self-help formulated the principle 
moderatio inculpatae (moderation in self-defence) which the European jurists later 
relied upon to develop a coherent doctrine of private defence. Certain types of 
intentional killings were no longer regarded as unlawful and therefore are not punished 
as murder. South African recognizes that killing is justifiable and therefore not murder. 
Despite the sound rationale underlying the defence, namely the upholding of justice 
theory where people acting in private defence perform acts where they assist in 
upholding the legal order, and despite the fact that the defence is established in both 
criminal law legal theory and practice, there are threshold problems with this rationale 
which has been subject to much academic criticism. Such criticism must be seen in the 
context of the wider debate surrounding the circumstances in which battered women 
kill their abusers - normally in circumstances where the threat is not imminent and 
therefore the need to uphold justice is not necessary.  
 
The purpose of this enquiry is to examine the development and functioning of the 
defence and more particularly to do so in light of a comparison with the means 
currently utilized to criminalize conduct falling outside the bounds of self-defence: one 
of the parent systems of South African law, namely English law and the United States, 
where battered woman syndrome originated and a profound influence on the way in 
which the elements of the defence are interpreted in that jurisdiction. For instance, in 
American law subjective tests for self-defence have been developed such as the  
 
 
particularizing standard. This standard asks whether a reasonable person with the 
accused’s particular non-universal characteristics would have both perceived the 
situation as the accused perceived it and would have reacted to that perception by 
committing the accused’s self-defensive act. If the answer is yes, then the act is 
considered reasonable. It assumes that individuals freely choose how to perceive and 
respond to a threatening situation but also acknowledge that certain kinds of non-
universal characteristics (such as battered woman syndrome) exercise such a powerful 
causal force on individuals perceptions and actions that it would violate the voluntary 
act requirement when holding that individual who possess such a characteristic to a 
standard of conduct that does not take that characteristic into account. The study 
concludes with an assessment of the form the defence ought to take.  
 
In South African law the defence consists of the conditions relating to an attack which 
includes: an attack, and protected interest and the attack must be unlawful. In respect of 
the conditions relating to the defence, the defence must be reasonably necessary to avert 
the attack and the defence must be directed against the attacker. Aspects of these 
elements have proved to be controversial. In particular, the condition of reasonably 
necessary to avert the attack has been called into question. Furthermore the requirement 
of imminence has been rendered especially controversial especially when viewed from 
the battered woman’s perspective where battered woman syndrome plays a role i.e. the 
woman’s internal makeup having an influence on the way she views the situation as 
opposed to an objective test is used to establish if the threat was imminent. While the 
English and American law elements of the duty to retreat, proportionality and 
reasonableness approximate the equivalent condition of reasonably necessary to avert  
 
the attack, the focal point of this defence in these jurisdictions has similarly been the 
imminence requirement and the test utilized for self-defence i.e. objective or subjective 
standard. Prior to evaluating the utility of these elements, the various rationales posited 
as a justification for the defence will be examined. 
 
It is submitted that while various rationales have been posited to form the basis of self-
defence, the autonomy theory (narrowly circumscribed) should be followed in South 
African law and that the traditional elements for self-defence should remain in force. 
Regarding the requirement that the attack be reasonably necessary, it is submitted that 
the traditional mechanism for distinguishing justified from unjustified self-defensive 
acts should remain an objective test. This is so because by taking account of the 
knowledge the defender has of her attacker the legal requirements of private defence 
will eventually be equated with those required for putative self-defence. If putative self-
defence goes to the issue of culpability, which is seen as a particular mental attitude or 
state of mind - South African law will be evincing a move toward a normative concept 
of fault. Such an approach has not proved unproblematic in South African law. 
 
Both early and modern common law as well as modern case law has expounded a 
coherent statement of the elements of self-defence which include imminence as a core 
feature. The problem is that traditional imminence rules do not cater adequately for the 
battered woman’s situation and for this reason theorists have advocated its abolition. 
The obvious problem with such a recommendation is that something must stand in its 
stead to distinguish legitimate cases from illegitimate cases of self-defence. In respect 
of the imminence requirement, the problems created by this standard cannot be solved  
 
by replacing imminence with necessity or by claiming priority for necessity or by 
demanding that imminence means pacifist rather than the libertarian version of 
necessity. These positions pose the question but do not answer it. Furthermore, if the 
imminence question cannot be answered by assuming one side of the necessity debate, 
then it cannot be answered by referring to the distinction between justification and 
excuse. It is submitted that “instead of viewing objectivity as not being able to account 
for battered woman’s situation – the opposite conclusion should be reached – that by 
rethinking certain situational factors as a set of relatively innocuous and perhaps 
necessary normative propositions then the abused woman’s situation is consistent with 
some very standard propositions in the law of self-defence. If the abused women is 
being attacked and the threat is imminent (in the traditional sense), then she should be 
able to avail to herself of self-defence, although it should be noted that the court should 
also consider the fact that the battered women placed herself in this dangerous situation. 
However, the court would also have to take into consideration the difficulty that the 
abused woman faced in extricating herself from this position. 
 
On the basis of a discussion of the various construals that inform the question of 
whether proportionality should form a necessary requirement for self-defence, 
including (i) the liberal aspiration to neutrality, (ii) constitutional norms and (iii) a duty 
of social solidarity to the state, it is submitted that proportionality should form an 
integral part of the requirements for self-defence. The test can be set out as follows: not 
only must the defence be necessary but also the means used by the accused for the 
purpose of averting the attack must be reasonable in the circumstances. This is in 
accordance with the autonomy theory. Therefore, would an “ordinary, intelligent and  
 
prudent person in the accused’s situation would react to establish if the self-defence 
claim was justifiable. However, it is submitted that not all the characteristics of the 
accused should be taken into account. Only those “characteristics which have the most 
(or direct) bearing on the accused’s situation” should be considered.  
 
Despite the rationales underlying self-defence, it has not been entirely clear whether an 
abused woman is expected to flee. It is submitted that there should be a duty to retreat. 
In the case of the abused woman, her situation is adequately catered for within the 
reasonableness neutrality perspective. 
 
In respect of the defence of provocation, Roman and Roman-Dutch law did not regard 
anger, jealousy or other emotions as an excuse for criminal conduct, but only as a factor 
which might mitigate sentence, if the anger was justified by provocation. South African 
law with its parent system in Roman-Dutch law might have followed this lead had it not 
result of the Transkei Penal Code of 1887, it envisaged a type of a partial excuse: even 
if been for the introduction of the mandatory death penalty for murder in 1917. In 1925 
as a killing was intentional, homicide which would otherwise be murder maybe reduced 
to culpable homicide. The test for provocation was thus an objective one. By 1949 in R 
v Thibani it was held that provocation was not a defence but a special kind of material 
from which in association with the rest of the evidence the court should decide whether 
the accused had acted involuntary or without intent to kill. This introduced a subjective 
test for provocation. But a number of crucial issues remained unresolved; could intense 
provocation or emotional stress serve to exclude criminal capacity or voluntary 
conduct. After the decision in Chretien, the question arose, if severe intoxication could  
 
exclude these basic elements of liability then could it not also exclude provocation or 
emotional stress. At this point, the notion of criminal capacity came to the fore. This 
notion was unknown in South African common law and was adopted from Continental 
Legal systems, specifically Germany. 
 
The notion took hold with the Rumpff Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of 
Deranged Persons and Related matters, the recommendations of which gave rise to the 
provision of section 78 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In S v Mahlinza set out that 
criminal capacity of actor is an essential requirement necessary to establish criminal 
liability. Criminal capacity consists of cognitive component i.e. ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong and conative capacity i.e. the ability to act in accordance with 
the distinction. If either was lacking no liability would ensue. In S v Van Vuuren, the 
court expressed in unequivocal terms that the accused could not be held liable where 
failure to comprehend what he is doing is attributable to a combination of factors such 
as provocation or emotional stress. 
 
The very idea of allowing provocation to function as a defence excluding an accused’s 
criminal liability is inherently controversial. From a moral and ethical perspective 
people are expected to control themselves, even under provocation or emotional stress. 
To allow it to function as a complete defence as opposed to mitigating factor means that 
it gives credence to the belief that retaliation is justified in the eyes of the law and this 
is the very thing criminal law guards against. Despite the well established nature of the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity, the law has been thrown into flux by the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Eadie which constituted a serious  
 
erosion of the notion of criminal capacity, with a concomitant “ripple effect” on other 
topics within the general principles of criminal law. The question this case has 
highlighted for South African law of non-pathological incapacity is whether the 
boundaries of the defence have been inappropriately extended. This is so since the court 
held not only that there is no distinction between the defence of automatism and non-
pathological incapacity, and that it would have to be established that the accused acted 
involuntarily in order for her defence of lack of capacity to prevail, but furthermore 
held that the court should assess the accused persons evidence about his state of mind 
by weighing it against his actions and surrounding circumstances, thereby introducing 
an objective test. Theorists such as Burchell have considered this move “bold” and 
“encouraging” for its emphasis on objective norms, and the fact that it brings it into line 
with both the English and American jurisdictions, where not only is an objective 
element introduced into the enquiry, but where loss of self-control is not totally 
excusable since the law assumes that provoked party was not totally incapable of 
controlling anger. If an accused was unable to control himself, a full excuse would be 
defensible.  
 
The notion of capacity has its approximate equivalent in the English and American law 
of provocation where the jury must consider the subjective question of whether the 
accused was actually provoked to lose self-control, the defence requires that a 
reasonable person in the same circumstances would have lost-self control and acted as 
the accused did. The South African notion of capacity is examined with reference to the 
way provocation is treated in these jurisdictions. Should non-pathological incapacity be 
equated with automatism, the established precedent in provocation and other cases of  
 
non-pathological incapacity would have to be revised by implication, and would have 
serious implications for the principle of legality and restricting the scope of the defence 
for battered women. Furthermore, it is submitted that a move towards an objective test 
should not be followed. This is so since such an approach does not extend to encompass 
the battered woman’s mental and emotional characteristics including recognized 
psychological disorder symptoms. This results in the court not having any meaningful 
way to determine whether the battered woman lost self-control and furthermore it will 
lead to increasing attention being directed at how far the objective test be tailored to fit 
the capacity of the accused. The problem with the capacity test is that it has created via 
the Criminal Procedure Act a new element of liability by drawing from both the general 
physical and the mental liability enquiries. Therefore, by duplicating the voluntary act 
requirement under mens rea, the courts have asked the same question twice. Once the 
accused is shown to be acting voluntarily, there will be a measure of goal-directed 
conduct. Where goal-directed conduct is present, it necessarily implies that here must 
be a level of capacity present in the case of the defence of non-pathological incapacity. 
In other words, the question is not whether capacity is present, but to what extent it is 
present. This point is not acknowledged by our courts: the concept of psychological 
fault underlying South African law offers no explanation for the fact that culpability is 
capable of gradation.  
 
The effects of battering could be used to support a defence of diminished capacity, 
which focuses not on mitigating circumstances of the act, but rather on the actor’s 
inability to form the requisite mens rea for the offence charged. However, the 
introduction of such a defence could only be achieved by returning to the rules relating  
 
to provocation followed in South Africa prior to 1971. According to the specific intent 
doctrine, policy considerations require that an accused should not be completely 
acquitted. However, these considerations require that an accused should not be 
completely acquitted. However, these considerations also require that an accused not be 
convicted of murder but of culpable homicide. This compromise solution (of culpable 
homicide) can only be reached by treating provocation as a special defence, one which 
is not strictly adjudicated in terms of the general principles relating to culpability (mens 
rea). Furthermore, it is submitted that a subjective test must be applied, since Snyman’s 
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Reddi places the prevalent problem of domestic violence in context: 
 
“Law is dynamic. It evolves to keep pace with the demands of 
society. One of the demands has been the need to arrest the 
ubiquitous abuse of women. States have been called upon to 
take special cognisance of this pandemic of domestic violence 
which is unencumbered by issues of race, class or age. Most 
jurisdictions throughout the world, including South Africa, 
have responded to the call by creating legislation aimed not 
only at protecting women from domestic abuse but also at 
securing them a status commensurate to that enjoyed by all 
other citizens. Despite these commendable protections, it is a 
trite fact that women continue to be abused at an alarming 
rate. Even more alarming is the fact that many abused women, 
world wide, remain in abusive relationships”.1 
 
As Reddi notes “woman’s rights activists and women’s advocates have over the years 
sought to find reasons to understand this anomaly - hence the advent of the ‘battered 




                                               
1  Reddi “Battered woman syndrome: some reflections on the utility of this ‘syndrome’ to South 
African women who kill their abusers” (2005) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 259 at 259-
260. In South Africa this legislation includes the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 and the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 which secures the position of women through 
various germane sections, namely, section 9 (right to equality), section 10 (right to human dignity), 
section 11 (right to life), section 12 (right to freedom and security of the person), section 13 (right not 
to be subjected to slavery, servitude and forced labour), section 14 (right to privacy) and section 
15(1) (right to freedom of thought, belief, opinion, conscience and religion). According to the 
Domestic Violence Act of 1998 (section 1) domestic violence means: physical abuse, sexual abuse, 
emotional, verbal and psychological abuse, economic abuse, intimidation, harassment, stalking, 
damage to property, entry into the complainant’s residence without consent where parties do not 
share the same residence, or any other controlling or abusive behaviour towards a complainant where 
such conduct harms or may cause imminent harm to the safety, health or well-being of the 
complainant.  
 
2 Reddi supra (n 1) 260. 
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Dr. Lenore Walker, an American psychologist, is credited as a pioneer in this area of 
study. She has identified and defined the essential elements of the “battered woman 
syndrome”: 
 
“A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to 
any forceful physical or psychological behaviour by a man in 
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without 
any concern for her rights. [In] order to be classified as a 
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering 
cycle at least twice”.3 
 
At the core of battered woman syndrome lies the theory of “learned helplessness” 4 
and the cycle of violence theory.5 Learned helplessness is defined as a psychosocial 
theory for lack of response or passive behaviour in the face of the ability to act or 
respond to a threat. This was developed by Martin Seligman as a psychological theory 
based on laboratory experiments conducted on animals. It demonstrated that animals 
and people can learn to be helpless when faced with traumatic and frustrating 
conditions from which there appears to be no escape. For example, caged dogs 
learned to jump a caged partition when given a mild electric shock. If a light was 
switched on just before the shock, they learned to avoid the shock completely. 
However, where the dog was placed in a position where it was unable to avoid the 
shock, it was then extremely difficult for the dog to later learn an avoidance  
 
                                               
3 Walker The Battered Woman (1979) 16. Walker’s book is regarded as the seminal piece on the study 
of battered women. In this book, Walker only made use of 110 test subjects for her research. This 
definition of “battered woman syndrome” which constitutes the original model for “battered woman 
syndrome” is problematic since it excludes from its operation, cases of men, children and same-sex 
relationships. For a general discussion on this topic see Toffel “Crazy Women, Unharmed Men, and 
Evil Children: Confronting the Myths about Battered People Who Kill their Abusers, and the 
Argument for Extending Battering Syndrome Self-Defenses to All Victims of Domestic Violence” 
(1996) Southern California Law Review 337. The criticisms relating to gay relationships in respect 
of “battered woman syndrome” applies mutatis mutandis to lesbian relationships. 
 
4 Walker supra (n 3) at 16; 42-54; 187. 
 




response.6 When such an analogy was applied to battered women, the correlation 
becomes evident: learned helplessness is a psychological paralysis that battered 
women experience and which contributes towards keeping them in abusive 
relationships.7 It is a psychosocial learning theory,8 whereby women, after repeated 
abuse, come to believe that they cannot control the abusive situation they find 
themselves in: “once the women are operating from a belief of helplessness, the 
perception becomes reality and they become passive, submissive and helpless”.9 A 
battered woman’s cognitive perceptions and motivation to act are altered: 
 
“Repeated batterings… diminish the woman’s motivation to 
respond. She becomes passive. Secondly, her cognitive ability 
to perceive success [in the relationship] is changed. She does 
not believe her response will result in a favourable outcome, 
whether or not it might… She cannot think of alternatives”.10 
 
According to Walker, the cycle of violence theory posits that battering generally 
involves an identifiable pattern. This pattern has three phases “a tension-building 
phase”; 11  “a release through acute battering”; 12  and “a final cycle of apparent 
contrition and remorse by the abuser”.13 
                                               
6 In this respect see Seligman Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death (1975) 15-17. 
 
7 Walker The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984) 43. Walker conducted a more extensive study with 
over 400 women, which led to the publication of this book. Although a larger sample group would 
give more credence to her theories, it did little to stifle criticism of her research. In this respect see, 
e.g., note 70. 
 
8 Walker supra (n 7) 45-47. 
 
9 Walker supra (n 7) 47. 
 
10 Walker supra (n 7) 49-50. 
 
11 Walker supra (n 3) 56-59. In this phase relatively minor emotional, physical and verbal abuse 
escalates. 
 
12 Walker supra (n 3) at 59-65 notes that at this stage the abuser loses control of his emotions and the 
battering will progress in severity. 
 
13 Walker supra (n 3) at 65-70 notes that this phase consists of calm, loving behaviour where the abuser 
is remorseful and this period is marked by a break from physical abuse. 
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Walker has noted that the last phase (“honeymoon” phase) offers a further reason why 
the battered woman remains with her abuser: she does not recognize the abuse as a 
pattern of behaviour but rather views these acts as generally unpredictable or due to 
her own fault. The battered woman believes this phase to accurately represent the 
present relationship.14 
 
Walker’s battered woman syndrome is considered a sub-category of the generic Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) - an anxiety disorder 15 which is included within 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 16  Battered women 
experience psychological changes after repeated exposure to the trauma of being 
abused.17 Symptoms experienced by these women include: high arousal symptoms, 
including a heightened sense of danger; cognitive disturbances, such as intrusive 
memories; and high avoidance symptoms such as depression or repression.18 
 
Rosen suggests that “the need for legislation 19  and the development of ‘battered 
woman syndrome’20  has developed as a result of the inability of the courts and 
criminal justice officials to deal with cases of battered women because they often  
                                                                                                                                       
 
14 Walker supra (n 3) 68. 
 
15  Cf Walker “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Women: Diagnosis and Treatment of Battered 
Woman Syndrome” (1991) Psychotherapy 20 at 21. This psychiatric condition was first outlined in 
the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1987) 247. 
 
16 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994) 424-429. 
 
17 Walker supra (n 7) 326-330. 
 
18 Walker supra (n 7) 327-330. But as Roberts in “Between the Heat of Passion and Cold Blood: 
Battered Woman’s Syndrome as An Excuse for Self-Defense in Non-Confrontational Homicides: 
Introduction” (2003) Law and Psychology Review 135 at 139 has noted: “critics have pointed out 
that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders does not recognize the battered 
woman syndrome as a distinct mental disorder”.  
 
19 For instance, the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, as discussed in n 1. 
 
20 As discussed at pages 2-4 supra. 
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involve sympathetic accused who cannot fairly be blamed for their conduct but who 
would have no defence if the law were strictly applied”.21 
 
In terms of South African law, a woman who is being attacked by her abuser may 
defend herself by means of self-defence using any means which are reasonable. This 
can include the use of deadly force. But where the battered woman kills her abuser in 
anticipation of a future attack,22 she will be acting unlawfully.23 The conduct thus 
opens itself up to being interpreted as an act of punishment or vengeance, neither of 
which is justifiable as self-defence. 24  Textbook writers have thus focused their 
criticisms on the elements of the defence,25 on the basis that they are not grounded in 
the reality faced by battered women. 
 
In respect of criminal incapacity,26 a battered woman can introduce evidence of the 
abuse to show the absence of criminal capacity as a result of non-pathological causes.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
21 Rosen “The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women 
who Kill” (1986) American University Law Review 11 at 13. 
 
22 As Rosen supra (n 21) at 13 notes: “despite the accused’s long-term victimization, she most likely 
would not have been killed or subjected to serious bodily injury on the occasion when she killed her 
abuser. Sometimes the problem arises because the woman perceived actual or threatened force to be 
deadly, when, objectively, it was not. In other cases, the accused killed in response to verbal threats 
unaccompanied by any contemporaneous overt physical aggression. The most difficult cases arise 
when the accused killed a sleeping or resting victim, or when the accused engaged in other behaviour 
inconsistent with self-defense”.  
 
23 For a discussion of the imminence requirement of self-defence in South African law, see chapter 2 at 
46-48 infra. 
 
24 Reddi supra (n 1) 270. 
 
25 See for example Snyman Strafreg 5th ed (2006) 105-106. 
 
26 Writers such as Burchell and Milton in Principles of Criminal Law 2 ed (1997) at 281 create the 
impression that there is no distinction between provocation and emotional stress, instead stressing 
that what is of importance is that provocation or emotional stress can serve to exclude criminal 
capacity. (citing S v Van Vuuren 1983 (1) SA 12 (A) at 17g-h). Furthermore, Reddi supra (n 1) has 
noted that : “in terms of South African law, since ‘battered woman syndrome’ is not a mental illness, 
defect or disease, a woman claiming to be suffering from battered woman syndrome will not be able 
to successfully raise the defence of absence of criminal capacity as a result of pathological causes. 
 6 
 
Reddi notes that “it would have to be shown that the incapacity was of a temporary 
nature, of a relatively brief duration, and originated from a cause such as severe 
emotional stress, provocation or similar emotional response which is not a result of a 
disease of the mind”.27 This defence has been criticised not only on the basis of its 
very existence, 28 but also on its completely exculpatory nature. 29  
 
In the United States, the stringency of self-defence law has been circumvented by 
finding that the battered woman should be acquitted because of temporary insanity.30 
Furthermore, to avoid the imminency problem, the courts introduced “battered woman 
syndrome” to inform the objective analysis required in self-defence law. This would 
show that a reasonable battered woman with battered woman syndrome, subjectively 
believed that her abuser, even in non-confrontational circumstances, represented an 
immediate threat to her life.31 
 
Introducing syndrome evidence to satisfy this feature is undesirable. Self-defence is a 
justification defence, not an excuse.32 Dressler notes that the claim of a battered  
                                                                                                                                       
But there is no bar to such a woman introducing evidence of the abuse that she had suffered to 
indicate absence of criminal capacity as a result of non-pathological causes” (at 277). 
 
27 Reddi supra (n 1) 277. For a discussion of the defence of non-pathological incapacity in South 
African law, see chapter 2 at 65-102 infra. 
 
28 Louw “S v Eadie: Road rage, incapacity and legal confusion” (2001) South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 206 at 210-211. 
 
29 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2005) 431-432.  
 
30  Dressler “Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections” (2006) Ohio State Law 
Journal of Criminal Law 457 at 461-462, citing McNulty The Burning Bed (1980) 269: (“When the 
battering victim Francine Hughes poured gasoline over her sleeping husbands bed and set him 
ablaze, her defense counsel successfully obtained an acquittal on insanity grounds, thanks in part to 
the testimony of a clinical psychologist that Hughes ‘experienced a breakdown of her psychological 
processes so that she was no longer able to utilize judgment…no longer able to control her 
impulses…[and] and unable to prevent herself from acting in the way she did”. 
 
31 Dressler supra (n 30) 463. For a discussion of the variations of the subjective standard of self-
defence in American law see chapter 4 at 181-187 infra. 
 
32 For a discussion of self-defence as a justification in American law see chapter 4 at 179-180 infra. 
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woman pleading self-defence is that she has acted properly or at least not wrongfully, 
in doing what she did. She is not claiming, as she would if she were asserting the 
defence of insanity or any other excuse defence, that her conduct was wrongful but 
that she should not be blamed for her conduct. Therefore, justifications focus on the 
act; excuses focus on the actor. 33  But as Dressler has noted, battered woman 
syndrome evidence, (and indeed any syndrome evidence) speaks to the actor’s state of 
mind, and not the act itself. It explains why the battered woman should be treated 
differently and therefore not blamed for her conduct, when others who commit the 
same act would be held liable.34 
 
This leads us to the question posed by Dressler: “how can we say that the belief is 
reasonable when we are judging the reasonableness from the perspective of someone 
who, by definition, is experiencing a set of symptoms that renders her state of mind 
abnormal?”. Dressler goes on to note: 
 
“The battered woman defence defines the woman as a 
collection of mental symptoms, motivational deficits, and 
behavioural abnormalities; indeed, the fundamental premise of 
the defence is that women lack the psychological capacity to 





                                                                                                                                       
 
33 Dressler supra (n 30) 463. For a general discussion of the American law of self-defence see chapter 
4 at 178-187; 194-204 infra. 
 
34 Dressler supra (n 30) 463. 
 
35 Dressler supra (n 30) 464. For a criticism of these subjective standards of self-defence see chapter 5 
at 249-259 infra. But see also the discussion in chapter 5 at n 1035 infra (where some theorists such 
as Kinports are of the view that battered woman syndrome was not necessarily meant to connote a 




In respect of provocation,36 since the provocation defence mirrors the prototypically 
male pattern of behaviour; when applied to battered women, it does not fit the criteria. 
Furthermore, it is inadequate since it assumes that the natural response to provocation 
is an immediate one. If the battered woman does not kill at the moment of the threat to 
her, a voluntary manslaughter instruction is inappropriate. In the provocation defence, 
the evidence often indicates that the actual provocation to the battered woman 
occurred earlier than the killing, and that she had sufficient time to cool. This 
contradicts her heat of passion claim. A jury may treat a battered woman more 
leniently, but if the prosecution can show that the abused woman did not in fact suffer 
from “learned helplessness,” then the battered woman is without a paradigm that 
defends her against being punished disproportionally.37 
 
In English law, the Law Commission in its Partial Defences to Murder Consultation 
Paper,38 considered the availability of self-defence to battered women who kill their 
abusers. The defence is only available if the force used by the woman is reasonable 
and necessary to protect her from an imminent attack. For this reason it is not 
available to an abused woman who fears violence in the future and kills her abuser 
while he is asleep. McColgan notes that that the law discriminates against abused 
women in such a context: 
 
“The relative scarcity of female killers has resulted in a 
paradigmatically male ideal model and this, together with the 
incompatibility of aggressive force with stereotypical 
femininity, means that the apparently gender-neutral concept  
 
                                               
36 For a general discussion of the defence of provocation in American law see chapter 4 at 204-224 
infra. 
 
37 Milgate “The Flame Flickers, but Burns on: Modern Judicial Application of the Ancient Heat of 
Passion Defense” (1998) Rutgers Law Review 193 at 216.  
 




of reasonableness is actually weighted against the female 
defendant”.39 
 
For the defence of provocation, women who kill their abusers are at a disadvantage if 
they do not act in a state which can legally be described as one of “sudden and 
temporary loss of control”. Furthermore, until recently in England, the cumulative 
effects of years of abuse were not taken into consideration. Until Smith (Morgan),40 
the mental characteristics arising from an abusive relationship (including BWS) could 
not be taken into account in respect of the ability to exercise self-control, but only if 
relevant to the gravity of provocation. The abused woman is unlikely as a matter of 
fact to kill in self-defence (as the term is understood in law). Due to her limited 
physical strength, it is uncommon for women to respond lethally when facing an 
immediate attack by her abuser. Battered women, therefore are compelled to rely on 
the defence of diminished responsibility.41 
 
Noting these problems, in English law it has been argued for either the abolition 42 or  
 
                                               
39 McColgan “In Defence of Battered Women who Kill” (1993) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 508 at 
515. For a discussion of the English law of self-defence see chapter 3 at 113-124 infra. 
 
40 [2001] 1 AC 146. 
 
41 Ormerod Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law 11th ed (2005) 461. Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 
sets out the defence of diminished responsibility. For a discussion of the English defence of 
diminished responsibility see chapter 3 at 160-168. For a discussion of the English law defence of 
provocation see chapter 3 at 127-159 infra. 
 
42  This is supported by theorists such as Edwards “Abolishing Provocation and Reframing Self-
Defence-the Law Commission’s Options for Reform” (2004) Criminal Law Review 181 at 191 
(moral indignation or temper can only properly be considered in mitigation of sentence, and is in 
agreement with Horder on this point); and Horder Provocation and Responsibility (1992) at 197; as 
well as Law Reform Commissions such as the Victoria Law Reform Commission Defences to 
Homicide: Issues Paper (2002) 20. Cf the Law Commission Consultation Paper, Partial Defences to 
Murder No. 290 of 2004 where powerful arguments were made for both the abolition and retention 
of the provocation defence at par 3.36 and 3.37. For a discussion of these points see chapter 3, 147 at 





modification of the defence of provocation. 43  Neal and Bagaric submit that “the 
defence of provocation is frequently criticized on the grounds that it is redundant;44 
confusing in relation to both the objective 45  and subjective 46  elements, invokes 
fictitious concepts (the ordinary person); 47  is male orientated, 48  and favours the 
dominant Anglo-Saxon-Celtic culture 49 to the exclusion of minority groups”.50 
 
On the basis of the above criticisms, a range of avenues for reform have been 
identified from abolishing or redefining the defence of provocation to the wholesale  
                                               
43 Editorial “Retaining Partial Defences to Murder” (1994) Journal of Criminal Law 5 at 6. Cf the Law 
Commission Consultation Paper No. 290 of 2004 at par 1.13 for a modified version of the 
provocation defence. For a discussion of this modified defence see chapter 3, 130 at n 686. 
 
44 Neal and Bagaric “The Ongoing Subservience of Principle to Tradition” (2003) Journal of Criminal 
Law 237 at n 11: “The defence is redundant because with the abolition of capital punishment, the 
reason for the development of the defence no longer exists, namely as a concession to human frailty 
when death was the penalty for murder”.  
 
45 See Yeo “Recent Australian Pronouncements on the Ordinary Person Test in Provocation and 
Automatism” (1992) Criminal Law Quarterly at 1 at 5 (noting that the test is inconsistent with the 
rationale of the defence as a concession to human frailty). 
 
46 See Bradfield “Domestic Homicide and the Defence of Provocation: A Tasmanian Perspective on 
the Jealous Husband and Battered Wife” (2000) University of Tasmania Law Review 5. 
 
47 See for example Finkel “Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of 
the Murder/Manslaughter Distinction” (1995) Nebraska Law Review 742 at 767. 
 
48 See Yeo “Sex, Ethnicity, Power of Self-Control and Provocation Revisited” (1996) Sydney Law 
Review 304 at 313 (noting that differentiating the capacity for self-control according to sex promotes 
the contentious stereotypes which depict women as the gentler sex who are normally passive and 
submissive in the face of provocation while men are normally active and aggressive). See also Forell 
“Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United States, Canada and Australia” 
(2006) American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law 28 at 65, citing the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide Final Report XV (Oct 2004) at 30: 
“Provocation is most often raised by men in the context of a relationship of sexual intimacy in 
circumstances involving jealousy or an apparent desire to retain control. The continued existence or 
availability of provocation in these circumstances may therefore be seen as sending an unacceptable 
message - that men’s anger and use of violence against women is legitimate and excusable. Some 
people have questioned how, in a supposedly ‘civilised’ society, can the desire to leave a relationship 
constitute behaviour which would provoke anyone to kill?”. 
 
49 Australian Law Reform Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law, Report No. 57 (1992) 183-184. 
See also Yeo supra (n 45) at 11-13 (noting that the standard for self-control should be set by 
reference to members of the accused’s own ethnic community). 
 




review of partial defences to murder. The English Law Commission 51 recognized that 
judges alone could not cure the defects of the defence and for this reason legislation 
was required. 52 However, it was decided to narrow the scope of provocation rather 
than abolish the defence completely.53 Possible solutions have included adopting one 
of the approaches in Smith (Morgan),54 to the recommendations of the New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission,55  to adopting an extreme emotional disturbance 
requirement.56 Furthermore, the Law Commission considered the creation of a new 
partial defence to murder of self-preservation.57 
 
In the United States many commentators assert that the current provocation doctrine 
whether based on the Model Penal Code (MPC) or not needs to change.58  
                                               
51 Law Commission Consultation Paper supra (n 38). 
 
52 Ibid at par. 12.4. 
 
53 Elliot “What Future for Voluntary Manslaughter?” (2004) Journal of Criminal Law 253 at 260. 
 
54 The approach of either the majority in Smith supra (n 40) or the minority. For a discussion of these 
two approaches see chapter 3 at 144-146 infra. 
 
55  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Partial Defences to Murder: Provocation and 
Infanticide: Report 83 (1997) par 2.81.  
 
56 Law Commission Consultation Paper supra (n 38) par 12.35, thus replacing the requirement of 
sudden loss of temper. But see further par. 12.35 where it recognized that: “acting under ‘extreme 
emotional disturbance’ is a formulation which could be given a very wide interpretation. Many, if not 
most, people who kill are in a heightened state about something”. 
 
57 Law Commission Consultation Paper supra (n 38) at par 9.25 and 10.95. The Criminal Law Revision 
Committee recommended the introduction into English of a new partial defence to murder where 
excessive force was used in Self-Defence: Criminal Law Revision Committee, 14th Report, Offences 
Against the Person, CMND 7844 (1980) par. 288. The Law Commission would prefer this defence 
be known as “pre-emptive use of force in self-defence” (at 9.25 and 10.95) This defence would be 
available to abused women who kill, but it would not be limited to such offenders. As Elliot supra (n 
53) at 262 notes: “the exact scope of any new defence is not made clear by the Law Commission and 
it does not at this stage proffer a possible definition”. See further Elliot supra (n 53) 262-263 who 
offers her own proposal of the form this defence should take. 
 
58 Dressler “Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject” (2002) 
Minnesota Law Review 959 at 984-987 (finding fault with the Model Penal Code’s extreme 
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Commentators have proposed three possible options: modifying existing doctrine,59 
creating certain categorical exclusions 60 and abolition of the defence.61 In respect of 
self-defence in the United States, commentators have argued for the expansion of the 
traditional elements of self-defence.62 
 
In respect of South African law, various solutions have been posited for the law of 
self-defence’s failure to adequately cater for battered women. This includes allowing 
battered woman to be allowed to pre-empt the anticipated attack.63 This could result in  
                                                                                                                                       
emotional disturbance method of addressing provocation). For a discussion of the American Model 
Penal Code method of addressing provocation, see chapter 4 at 216-219 infra. 
 
59 See for example Dressler’s version of a proper provocation defence (supra (n 58) at 994-997). It 
contains components of the Model Penal Code, the English Homicide Act of 1957 and American 
common law. It is consistent with the underlying rationale of the defence as a partial excuse based on 
partial loss of self-control, but one that does not undermine the normative anti-violence message of 
the criminal law. 
 
60 See for example Nourse “Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense” 
(1997) Yale Law Journal 1389 at 1394-1396 who argues for the idea of a “warranted excuse” 
According to Nourse, it is by focusing on emotion, rather than the act that her proposal distinguishes 
itself from the traditional model of provocation as partial justification. The law should see the 
accused’s state of mind as something that in some cases, it should strive to protect. Unlike the partial 
justification model, Nourse’s approach allows the defence to retain many features associated with 
excuse. Furthermore, the law need not impose an “objective standard” (at 1395). It may continue to 
focus on the accused’s perception of the triggering act, rather than its quality in the abstract - 
something which the partial justification model rejects. Furthermore, the law may provide for cases 
in which emotion builds over time - a position that traditional models have typically rejected (at 
1395). The options mentioned in n. 59-60 do not contribute to the value of the final analysis in 
chapter 5 infra and for this reason have been included here for the sake of completeness. 
 
61 Miller “Comment, (WO)manslaughter: Gender and the Model Penal Code” (2001) Emory Law 
Journal 665 at 670-671. See also Howe “More Folk Provoke Their Own Demise (Homophobic 
Violence and Sexed Excuses - Rejoining the Provocation Debate, Courtesy of the Homosexual 
Advance Defence)” (1997) Sydney Law Review 336 at 337: “provocation operates as a deeply sexed 
excuse for murder and therefore should be abolished”). See further at 356 (where the writer notes 
that nowhere except in rape cases is the gendered or more accurately sexed nature of law more 
apparent that in so-called domestic homicide cases in which men kill women and then claim 
provocation). 
 
62 This has included a move towards more subjective standards of self-defence. In this respect see 
chapter 4 at 181-187 infra. Other commentators have argued for replacing the traditional element of 
imminence with other alternatives. For an exposition of these other alternatives see chapter 5 at 277-
290 infra. 
 




the legal requirements of private defence being equated with putative self-defence.64 
Further, in respect of non-pathological incapacity, theorists have advocated a trend 
towards a more objective, or normative evaluation of the defence. 65 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the defences available to battered women are 
problematic, whether these defences explicitly recognize battered woman syndrome 
or not. The question thus remains: is BWS a convenient label or a real syndrome? 66 
Furthermore, if battered woman syndrome relates to a collection of mental symptoms, 
battered women should not rely on the defence of insanity 67 or diminished  
                                               
64 See chapter 5 at 189-191 infra. 
 
65 For a discussion of a move towards an objective approach see chapter 5 at 270-281 infra. 
 
66 Morse in his article “The ‘New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome” (1995) Criminal Justice Ethics 3 at 3-
4 notes: “Behavioural science is on the march. Psychiatrists and psychologists are identifying an 
ever-proliferating and often bewildering array of new syndromes or disorders. Some have received 
the clinical and scientific imprimatur of actual inclusion the American Psychiatric Association’s 
official diagnostic manual. Examples of the diagnostically respectable disorders include: ‘Antisocial 
Personality Disorder’, ‘Post-traumatic Stress Disorder’, ‘Intermittent Explosive Disorder’, 
‘Kleptomania’, and ‘Pathological Gambling’. DSM-IV characterizes other categories as in need of 
further study because their existence as discrete psychopathological entities is not yet sufficiently 
validated to warrant inclusion in the manual. Examples include ‘Postconcussional Disorder’, 
‘Caffeine Withdrawal’, and ‘Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder. Finally, and least respectably, some 
alleged syndromes have not received general provisional recognition as valid, but are advocated with 
varying degrees of success by clinicians and researchers who have supposedly identified them. 
Examples from the last group, which have been chosen from the mental health and legal literatures 
and from legal cases, where they often arise, include ‘Battered Woman Syndrome’; ‘Vietnam 
Syndrome’, ‘Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome,’ ‘Holocaust Survivor Syndrome’, ‘Urban Survival 
Syndrome’, ‘Rotten Social Background’, ‘ and ‘Adopted Child Syndrome’”. Morse supra at 4 goes 
on to note: “Many people now suffer from yet another new syndrome that I have identified, or at 
least given a name: the ‘New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome’ The primary diagnostic criterion for the 
syndrome is an almost irresistible impulse to use the alleged discovery of mental abnormality as 
good reason to alter the criminal law”. Morse supra at 4 states: “Why should this be when there are 
two good, extant doctrinal means to use evidence of mental abnormality or other background 
variables to mitigate or avoid criminal liability? These two are the negation of the mens rea required 
by the definition of the offence, usually improperly called diminished capacity, and the insanity 
defence”. 
 
67  Goldman “Nonconfrontational Killings and the Appropriate use of Battered Child Syndrome 
Testimony: The Hazards of Subjective Self-Defense and the Merits of Partial Excuse” (1994) Case 
Western Reserve Law Review 185 at 219-220 notes: “[battered women] may meet the standard for 
legal insanity in those jurisdictions applying the stricter M’Naughten test, as Post-Traumatic Stress 
Syndrome has been held to qualify as a ‘disease of the mind’ under this standard. It should be noted, 
however, that such cases typically involve chronic PTSD in its most severe form, with extreme 
symptoms involving hallucinations, reality delusions and dissociative reactions with episodes of 
depersonalization and/or derealization. During such a dissociative reaction, the individual lacks the 
‘substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of their conduct or to conform their conduct 
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responsibility 68 instead? This would result in very different outcomes for battered 
women. 69  
                                                                                                                                       
to the requirements of [the] law.” Goldman supra at 221 goes on to note: “For the [battered woman] 
who successfully raises an insanity defense, there is the troubling issue of precisely what the post-
acquittal outcome will be. Although there is no criminal culpability for the act, commitment to a 
mental institution typically follows. Commitment is designed to incapacitate the acquittee for the 
protection of society, and presumably to provide some sort of treatment for the underlying mental 
disease or defect. Forced incarceration is imposed because the acquitted [woman] has committed 
what would ordinarily be a serious criminal offence. Although commitment to an institution furthers 
the purpose of the criminal law by ensuring that there will be no further offences by the particular 
actor, it is neither intended nor considered to be criminal punishment because it is not imposed to 
express community condemnation of the acquittee’s original offence”. 
 
68 In respect of American law, Littman in “Adequate Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the 
Deconstruction of Free Will” (1997) Albany Law Review 1127 at 1159-1160 notes: “Diminished 
responsibility seems to be a more appropriate substitute for heat of passion adequate provocation. 
The doctrine of diminished responsibility is ‘functionally equivalent to the rule of provocation, 
because it reduces the degree of murder (or murder to manslaughter), but involves the proof of the 
accused’s mental abnormality or defect’. This doctrine is more subjective than the adequate 
provocation test because it determines whether or not the accused should be held to the reasonable 
person standard in the first place”. Littman supra at 1160 goes on to note: “The notion of 
premeditation, which concerns the amount and extent of time the accused had to reflect upon the 
criminal act, is a distinguishing feature between the various degrees of murder. Diminished 
responsibility brings to this moment of mental self-reflection the requirement that the individual’s 
mind was mature and capable of understanding the seriousness of the action the individual was about 
to choose”. In respect of English Law section 2 (1) of the Homicide Act of 1957 stipulates: “where a 
person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was 
suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded 
development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially 
impaired his mental responsibility in doing or being a party to the killing”. See further Byrne [1960] 
2 Q.B. 396 at 303: “Abnormality of mind, which has to be contrasted with the time-honoured 
expression in the M’Naughten Rules, ‘defect of reason’, means a state of mind so different from that 
of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal. It appears to us to wide 
enough to cover the mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and 
matters and the ability to form a rational judgment whether an act is right or wrong, but also the 
ability to exercise will-power to control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment”. 
Mackay in “The Abnormality of Mind Factor in Diminished Responsibility” (1999) Criminal Law 
Review 117 at 118 notes: “This dictum has had a profound effect on the development of diminished 
responsibility, thereby permitting psychiatric evidence of sexual psychopathy to be admitted as a 
form of abnormality of mind, irresistible impulse was introduced into English law. Since the Byrne 
decision, courts have been willing to accept a whole range of less serious mental conditions as falling 
within ‘abnormality of mind’ in order to ensure a lenient sentence or disposal”. But in South African 
law Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) at 295 note: “Where provocation (or emotional stress) does not 
succeed as a defence, the existence of some provocation or emotional stress experienced by the 
accused at the time of the commission of the crime or before may constitute a factor which 
diminishes the accused’s responsibility and leads to a reduction in the sentence or punishment”. See 
further S v Laubscher 1988 (1) SA 163 (A) at 168B-C; S v Smith 1990 (1) SACR 130 (A) at 135F-
G; S v Shapiro 1994 (1) SACR 112 (A) and S v Di Blasi 1996 (1) SACR 1 (A). 
 
69 But Morse supra (n 66) notes five reasons why battered women cannot rely on the insanity defence:  
“(1) First, many of those accused suffering from the syndrome are not legally insane by virtue of any 
of the traditional tests, even if the syndrome has been generally accepted as valid. For example, many 
accused diagnosed with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder are not sufficiently out of touch with reality 
to convince the fact finder that they are legally insane. (2) Many of the new syndromes have not been 
recognized, and therefore courts rejects them or juries are wary of them because there is no 
recognized mental disorder to support it. (3) There is no generic partial responsibility doctrine, a type 
of lesser insanity defence, applicable at trial that would allow a less than fully normal but legally 
sane accused at least to mitigate guilt and punishment. Certain traditional doctrines, such as the 
provocation/passion formula or the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance provision, 
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Furthermore, if “battered woman syndrome” is not a mental illness, this raises the 
issue of whether the courts are treating evidence 70 of such abuse in the correct way.71 
                                                                                                                                       
both of which reduce intentional homicides from murder to manslaughter, are in fact partial 
responsibility doctrines that syndrome sufferers could utilize. (4) In some cases, advocates claim that 
the syndrome sufferer’s conduct should be justified, rather than excused, and the insanity defence is 
clearly an excuse” (at 7-8). Furthermore, Morse supra (n 66) at 5-6 notes two reasons why a battered 
woman cannot rely on the negation of mens rea: “(1) Contrary to popular belief and the misguided 
belief of many clinicians who do not understand the legal meaning of mens rea, mental abnormality 
including severe mental disorder, rarely negates the mens rea required by the definition of the 
offence. Many disorders may give people crazy reasons for doing what they do, but it virtually never 
negates the accused’s intention, knowledge, conscious awareness of the risk and other required 
mental states. (2) As a result of fears for public safety and other concerns, those states that permit the 
admission of evidence of mental abnormality to engage mens rea typically place strict restrictions on 
the accused’s ability to do so. The classic example of this is the distinction between so-called specific 
intent, which the law allows to be negated, and general intent, which the law does not allow to be 
negated”. 
 
70 It should be noted that “battered woman syndrome” has not always been well supported. For 
example, Faigman and Wright “The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science” (1997) 
Arizona Law Review 68 at 69 note: “The battered woman syndrome ultimately fails because it was 
never a matter of science to begin with, and yet it was treated as a ‘scientific fact’ by courts”. 
Faigman and Wright go on to criticize Walker’s cycle theory of violence and learned helplessness 
(see 2-4 supra for an explanation of these terms). In respect of learned helplessness they note: “First, 
the application of the psychological concept of learned helplessness to battered women who kill 
demonstrates a basic confusion in Walker’s understanding of this phenomenon. In the original 
research, dogs that were rendered helpless by being subjected to noncontingent electric shocks 
proved to be extremely resistant to learning to control their environment. From a theoretical 
perspective, therefore, one would predict that if battered women suffered from learned helplessness 
they would not assert control over their environment (at 78-79). Moreover, Walker failed to employ a 
control group, so any statement about the ‘helplessness’ of the battered women cannot be placed in 
any context. Finally, most of Walker’s subjects did not kill anyone” (at 79). In respect of the cycle 
theory of violence Faigman and Wright’s criticism can be summarized as follows (at 77): (1) 
Walker’s interview technique allowed the subjects to easily guess what the researchers hoped to 
verify in the study. Most scientists avoid this dilemma by disguising their hypothesis. (2) Walker’s 
interviewers not only knew the correct outcome, but reported their estimation of whether the subject 
substantiated that outcome, the subjects responses were not recorded, only the interviewers 
interpretation of the subjects answers were documented. Most scientists avoid this by employing 
interviewers who are not informed about the hypotheses being tested. (3) The cycle theory was 
posited in absence of any time frame that might give it legal meaning. The research does not indicate 
whether the elapsed time, - or the time between cycles is a few minutes, several hours etc. Walker’s 
study also omits any discussion of whether a period of normality occurs between the third phase and 
the onset of a new cycle. If this is the case, then cycle contains four phases. (4) Walker fails to 
empirically relate the cycle theory to the ‘cumulative terror’ that purportedly groups the accused in 
the interim between the batterer’s attack and her response. (5) Walker claims that her data indicates 
the existence of a distinct behaviour cycle. If the cycle is to have coherence, it must refer to the 
occurrence of all three stages-tension building, leading to the acute battering incident, followed by 
loving contrition - as a single relationship. Walker relates her data as follows: “In 65% of all cases… 
there was evidence of a tension-building phase prior to the battering, in 58% of all cases there was 
evidence of loving contrition afterward. In general, then, there is support for the cycle theory of 
violence in a majority of the battering incidents described by our sample” (supra (n 7) at 96-97). But 
as Faigman and Wright supra at 77 suggest: “Walker’s data does not support her conclusion. She 
proves data on tension building and loving contrition phases separately. This division offers little 
evidence regarding the number of women who experienced all three phases as a cycle. If sixty-five 
percent of all subjects experienced tension building before an acute battering incident and fifty-eight 
percent of all subjects experienced loving contrition after an acute battering incident, then it is likely 
that only about thirty-eight percent of the women actually experienced the entire cycle as studied”.  
 
71 Schneider in “Resistance to Equality” (1996) University of Pittsburgh Law Review 477 at 512 noted 
that although some U.S. trial and appellate courts articulate the relevance of evidence of battering 
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As a result of the issues highlighted above, it is proposed to assess the defences 
available to battered women in light of a comparative study of both the English and 
American defences of self-defence and provocation. The study will conclude with an 
assessment of the findings in the context of their practical implications: the form that 
the defences should take. However, it is necessary to briefly examine the justification 
for using the particular systems employed and to facilitate an understanding of the 
way in which cases are prosecuted in the different jurisdictions. 
 
1.1 Justification for choice of comparative systems 
The underlying rationale for the legal systems chosen for the comparative analysis 
may be found in the historical development of South African criminal law. It is this 
author’s intention to illustrate the primary features of such development, in order to 
describe in detail the influences of Roman-Dutch and English law upon South African 
criminal law culminating in the present position. 
 
The roots of the South African criminal law (as the majority of South African 
common-law) can be found in Roman-law. The Twelve Tables 72  for wrongful 
conduct to be punished by public authority can be considered the initial source of  
 
                                                                                                                                       
correctly, many judges are confused. Some courts have employed a hybrid defence (citing Banks v 
State, 608 A. 2d 1249, 1252 (Md. Ct. spec. App. 1992): defence at trial was “an amalgamation of 
self-defence, hot-blooded response to provocation, and battered spouse syndrome”). Other have 
expressed confusion about defence strategy or ‘specialized’ application of traditional self-defence 
law to battered women, indicating that in practice there may well be a “battered woman syndrome 
defence”. Schneider supra at n 57 cites the following case law to support her conclusion: State v 
Scott, 1989 WL 90613 (Del, Super, July 19, 1989) (defence attorney referred to client’s defence as 
“battered woman’s defence”); State v Vigil, 794 P. 2d 728, 729 (N.M 1990) (referring to a battered 
woman theory of self-defence). 
 




Roman provisions which provided for the modern conception of criminal law. 73 
Delictual rules at this stage (with a penal character punishing wrongdoers) remained 
up until the Justinian rule, resulting in criminal law only gathering momentum in the 
Republic under the Principate.74 
 
Towards the end of the Republican period laws were enacted proscribing certain 
offences and setting out punishment for such offences. This became the basis of 
substantive criminal offences which developed out of Roman law (“crimina publica”). 
During the first five centuries AD the “crimina extraordinaria” came into existence 
incorporating all behaviour which was punished through the tribunals.75 
 
Justinian ordered the collection of various legal texts into one work: Corpus Juris 
Civilis.76 Roman jurists did not directly advance the systematic study of criminal law. 
This was due to little attention paid to contemporary status and customs.77 Due to the 
fall of the Western part of the Roman Empire to Germanic tribes, the customary laws 
of these tribes were introduced into Western Europe. But as a result of the 
introduction of Roman law, little remained of these customary laws which are 
significant for Roman-Dutch criminal law. 
                                               




75 Snyman Strafreg 3ed (1992) 9. 
 
76 De Wet De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg 4th ed (1985) 5. This work is broad authority for all currently 
recognized common-law crimes in South Africa. 
 




Roman law did not disappear completely (at the fall of the Roman empire) and while 
Roman law and Canon law exercised an influence on the customary law of Western 
Europe (in early Middle Ages) the Roman law only began to exercise its influence 
after the revival of the study of the Justinian compilation at the end of the eleventh 
century.78 
 
Both the Glossators and Commentators contributed to the rediscovery of Roman law. 
This was the direct result of these two groups writing longer commentaries on the 
Justinian texts. Their intention was to systematize and link them with prevailing 
statutory, customary and canon law.79 
 
After the revival of the study of Roman law (developed by medieval Italian jurists) 
the Justinianic compilation of Roman law became the “jus commune” of Continental 
Europe. As a result of the similarity between the common law of the various Western 
European countries, Dutch writers relied on legal sources not only from within their 
own province but also from other provinces of Netherlands and Italy, France, Spain 
and Germany.80 
 
In 1652 Van Riebeeck on orders of the Dutch East India Company established a 
settlement at the Cape of Good Hope. Its purpose was to provide water and victuals  
                                               
78 De Wet supra (n 76) 8. 
 
79 Burchell and Hunt supra (n 73) 19. 
 




for Dutch ships making their way to the Dutch East Indies. The law of the Cape 
Colony was specifically that of the Province of Holland. The law in force in that 
province was Roman law.81 
 
In 1795, during the Napoleonic wars, the English seized the Cape in order to secure 
sea links with India and took it over as a British Colony in 1806. The “Roman-Dutch” 
law which then obtained in the colony remained in force. Roman-Dutch law survived 
only in those areas which had come under British rule and had left the Dutch Empire 
before it adopted a civil code based on the French Model.82 
 
Despite this, English Common law made its presence felt. This took the form of 
organizing and modernizing the structure of the court system of the new colony as 
well as its administration. The law of evidence and procedure (in both criminal and 
civil law) were restructured on the patterns of the Common law.83 
 
During this time the courts had to settle the classification of common-law crimes and 
also create exact definitions of their essential elements. In some cases courts achieved 
this with little help from English law. As a result of bringing order to Roman-Dutch 
authority, conflicts between writers were resolved, or attention was given to a  
                                               
81 It had been received into Holland in the form given to it by Glossators and Commentators, and in the 
17th and 18th centuries Dutch legal scholars adapted it with an admixture of Dutch Customary law: 
Grotius (1583-1645); Vinnius (1588-1657); Voet (1647-1713); Bynkershoek (1673-1743) and Van 
der Keessel (1738-1816). 
 
82 Zweigert and Kotz An Introduction to Comparative Law 3ed (1998) 232. 
 




particular problem of definition, or a “manageable” crime was crystallized out of 
wide-ranging, amorphous Roman-Dutch ones. However, in respect of most common-
law crimes, there was a degree of English influence.84 Further reasons for English 
influence included the fact that most judicial appointments came from three United 
Kingdom Bars, most were educated in English law, judges and practioners were not 
familiar with Dutch, few had a command of Latin, and many old authorities were 
inaccessible and were poorly indexed.85  Furthermore, there was uncertainty and a 
want in uniformity in the writings of Dutch jurists and also a preoccupation with 
punishment at the expense of the substantive law.86 
 
Despite the establishment of two independent Boer Republics (Orange Free State and 
Transvaal), these were incorporated into British Empire after winning Boer war in 
1902. In 1910 they joined the Cape Colony forming the Union of South Africa, whose 
constitution was laid down by the British Parliament in the South Africa Act, 1909. 
After the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the progressive anglicization 
of the law came to a stop.87 
 
 
                                               
84 Burchell and Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure General Principles of Criminal Law 




86 Burchell and Hunt supra (n 84) 24. 
 
87 Zweigert and Kotz supra (n 82) 233. Several factors contributed to this including a sense of political 
independence from Britain, the recognition of English and Afrikaans as equal languages, training of 
native jurists, greater attention being paid to the texts of old Dutch writers and to the rules which 




In conclusion it is clear that South African law is a hybrid legal system i.e. Roman-
Dutch and English law have been fused together.88 This stems from the fact that 
English influence is considerably greater in regard to the “pigeon-holing” and 
definition of the common-law crimes than in regard to the general principles of 
criminal liability. South African criminal law is stronger than its parent systems, its 
strength lying in a discriminatory and wide use of comparative sources available to 
it,89 and because of its nature as a mixed system, South Africa can accommodate 
contributions from a greater variety of legal systems.90 
 
Due to the fact that English law has played a vital role in the development of South 
African criminal law, it is clear that modern English cases, writings, and 
developments in this area provide an important comparative source since: 
 
 
                                               
88 Zweigert and Kotz supra (n 82) submit that since Roman-Dutch and English law are so intermixed 
that it cannot without distortion be put into one or other pigeonhole: “Like a jewel in a brooch, the 
Roman-Dutch law in South Africa today glitters in a setting that was made in England. Even if it 
were true that the whole of South Africa’s private and criminal law had remained pure Roman-Dutch 
law, the South African legal system as a whole would still be a hybrid one, in which civil and 
common-law elements jostle each other” (at 235, citing Hahlo and Kahn The South African Legal 
System and its Background (1968) 218). 
 
89 Burchell and Hunt supra (n 84) 37 state: “While creating order out of chaos of Roman-Dutch 
criminal law, by introducing detail and precision of the English law of crimes, and while avoiding 
most of the peculiar eccentricities of the English criminal law, including its needless proliferation of 
finely divided or overlapping offences, the courts have created general principles of criminal liability 
more logical, coherent and just than those of English Law”. 
 
90 Burchell and Hunt supra (n 84) 37. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 
dictates that the common law should be developed with a view to giving effect to constitutional 
values. Section 39 (2) states: “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights”. Furthermore, the Constitution now mandates that the courts must look to other 
legal systems when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Section 39 (1) states: “When interpreting the Bill 
of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the values that underlie an open democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) 




“ South African criminal law is a hybrid system (one of the 
forbearers which is English law); and secondly because it is 
the plain truth that a code and the decisions under it cannot 
provide the kind of practical assistance to our courts which the 
English, American and Scottish law reports can and do 
provide” 91. 
 
Burchell and Hunt, note Hahlo and Kahn’s argument in this respect: 
 
“Modern continental systems are codified, whereas the 
Roman-Dutch law is not. Continental judgments inevitably 
argue on specific code provisions, whereas courts in non-
codified systems argue on abstract non-verbalised principles. 
This explains why our judges in the past derived greater 
assistance from the judgments of English, Scottish and 
American courts than from judgments of Continental 
tribunals, and will continue to do so in the future”. 92 
 
It is this author’s contention that it is appropriate to undertake a detailed comparative 
analysis of South African law with one of the systems which acted as a parent system: 
English law. Furthermore, an analysis of American law will be undertaken since prior 
to its independence, those who settled in America agreed that the law of the several 
colonies should in principle be English Common law plus any statutes passed 
specifically for them. A further reason for the use of American law in this 
comparative analysis is the fact that the theory underlying BWS was first framed 93 in 
that jurisidiction.94 
                                               
91 Burchell and Hunt supra (n 84) 38. 
 
92 Ibid, citing Hahlo and Kahn supra (n 88) at 38. 
 
93 As developed by Dr. Lenore Walker. In this respect see pages 2-4 supra. 
 
94 See further Roberts supra (n 18) at 143 setting out a historical exposition of the use of expert 
testimony in cases where an abused spouse kills her abuser. In 1977, the Supreme Court of 
Washington case of State v Wanrow 559 P. 2d 548 (Was. 1977) (holding that a woman in self-
defence case was entitled to have the jury consider her actions in the light of her own perceptions of 
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While both English and American systems have developed and changed from the 19th 
century, it is this author’s view that they add to the value of the enquiry as the two 
regimes may be compared to the South African regime which developed in part from 

























                                                                                                                                       
the situation (at 559), the court held that to not allow the jury to consider this would violate equal 
protection (at 559). Roberts supra (n 18) at 143 notes that this case is the first step towards an 
objective reasonable-man standard in battered woman cases. Roberts at 143 notes that the first court 
ruling to admit expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was Ibn-Tamas v United States, 407 
A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) The court reasoned that the admission of the evidence was “relevant to 
establish the accused’s credibility and helpful to the jury in their understanding of the accused’s 
rationalization of her actions” (at 631). Roberts supra (n 18) at 143 goes on to state that: “since Ibn-
Tamas supra decision, appellate courts in twenty-six states have addressed the admissibility of expert 
testimony on battered woman syndrome. Seventeen states have concluded that the testimony is 
admissible, with varying requirements for foundation evidence and extent of admissibility. Only 
three states have excluded the testimony on the merits”. Roberts supra (n 18) at 143 notes that “the 
watershed moment for battered woman syndrome as a buttress to self-defence claim appeared in 
State v Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984). The New Jersey Supreme Court found an expert’s 
testimony on the subject of battered spouse syndrome essential to rebut the general misconceptions 
regarding battered women because the testimony, is aimed at an area where the purported common 
knowledge to the jury may be very much mistaken, an area where juror’s logic drawn from their own 
experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where expert knowledge would enable 






The Battered Woman and South African Law 
2. Introduction 
The idea that unlawful conduct may be justified arises from the recognition that there 
may be circumstances that deprive the unlawful conduct of its blameworthiness 
(remove the social need to punish the accused for the performance of the conduct in 
question.) 95  Viewed from a narrow perspective unlawfulness can be seen as the 
absence of a defence excluding unlawfulness.96  
 
Recently, reference to the legal convictions of the community as the basis of criminality 
has appeared in various South African judgments.97 In addition, the Constitution has 
had the effect of reducing the number of common-law and statutory crimes in its “facial 
attack” on offences which derive from a discredited morality. While the principle of 
legality still operates as a cautionary rule to prevent crimes being re-defined through the 
“back door”, the courts have harnessed the flexibility in this are to the task of dealing 
with the evolving nature of society. Therefore, it is clear that the definition of  
 
 
                                               
95 Burchell supra (n 29) 226. 
 
96 Burchell supra (n 29) 227. 
 
97 Burchell supra (n 29) 228. These cases include S v T 1986 (2) SA 112 (O) at 131F-H; S v Banda 1990 
(3) SA 466 at 484A-B; S v Collet 1991 (2) SA 854 (A); S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A) 1103D-F 
and 1105F-G; S v Gaba 1981 (3) SA 745 (O) 751 and Clarke v Hurst NO 1992 (4) SA 630 (D) at 
625G-H. Flack in “The South African Criminal Law under analysis in our new Constitutional 
Dispensation: Are we looking for an ‘Excuse’? An Exposition of S v Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (A)” 
(1999) Responsa Meridiana 78 at 81 notes that in the case of Clarke v Hurst No supra at 653A-C 
where it was held: “despite the fact, that by authorizing the removal of artificial medical support of a 
patient in a permanent vegetative state, the applicant curator would be intentionally killing another 
human being, action was held not to amount to murder. Notably, instead of bringing the conduct under 
the established justification ground of consent, as the patient concerned had made a Living will, the 
courts recognized a clearly demarcated situation in which prima facie criminal behaviour would be 
acceptable. The question of unlawfulness turned on the quality of life of such patients, examine from 
the perspective of the legal convictions of the community, which dictated that quality of life includes 




unlawfulness as conduct which cannot be justified, which “hinges unlawfulness on the 
legal convictions of the community has found favour with the South African Courts.98 
Furthermore, the concept of the legal convictions of the community must be informed 
by the norms entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 99 
 
One of the justification grounds excluding unlawfulness is that of self-defence. It is an 
extraordinary measure which permits the victim of an unlawful attack to take the law 
into her own hands where there are no other reasonable options available to her at the 
time of the attack but to act on her own initiative in order to avert or minimize the 
danger faced. For self-defence to be successfully raised, certain conditions need to be 
met in relation to both the attack, and the defensive measures taken. Of relevance is the 
requirement that the threat must be imminent or must have commenced. Therefore, an 
individual may not respond to an attack once it has ceased nor may one defend oneself 
in anticipation of being attacked at some future point. In terms of South African law, a 
battered woman who is being attacked by her abuser may defend herself against such 
an attack using any reasonable means necessary. The problem with this requirement is 
that in most cases abused women often defend themselves after the attack was 
completed against her.100 This conduct opens itself up to being construed as an act of 
vengeance. Another difficult hurdle that a battered woman faces in self-defence claims  
 
                                               
98 Flack supra (n 97) 81. 
 
99 In this respect, Flack supra (n 97) at 82-83 goes on to note: “It is submitted that the concept of legal 
convictions of the community, while arguably more vague and uncertain, has a certain objective 
minimum. The judge may not impose his own subjective preferences onto the case but must seek the 
solution in the sentiments of all informed persons in society. Whatever the focus, the notion of legal 
convictions of the community has acquired a ‘constitutional dimension.’ The values to be taken into 
account have thus been articulated and set out in the Bill of Rights and operate as a clear guide to the 
exercise of judicial discretion. The Constitutional Court has indicated that the role of the judge in 
respecting constitutional values differs markedly from that of adhering to public opinion. Indeed, the 
legal convictions of the community consist of those values laid down in the constitution, which operate 
as a counterweight to majoritarian sentiment.” 
 




relate to the objective components of the defence i.e. the reasonableness of the 
accused’s conduct is judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances. 101  
 
 
The enquiry into reasonableness in the context of unlawfulness can accommodate only 
the generic facts or the physical act, assessed in terms of the constitutional rights, where 
the “reasonable man” test has become increasingly subjectivized to take into account a 
number of the personal characteristics of the accused. While it is important to accept 
the need for flexibility in the area of the justification ground, 102 and although this 
makes objectivity more elusive, it is clear that there needs to be some sort of limit. This 
is one of the important questions which needs to be addressed in respect of battered 
women and self-defence: whether the limits of the objective test have been exceeded by 
taking her personal circumstances into account.103 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine each condition relating to self-defence in 
respect of both the attack and the defence, with specific attention focused on the 
imminence requirement and the objective test for self-defence. Furthermore, it needs to 
be established whether South African law, like other jurisdictions such as the United 
States, recognizes “battered woman syndrome” 104 and if this is not the case, then  
                                               
101 Flack supra (n 97) at 85 notes that: “greater use of a flexible definition of unlawfulness yields the 
ability to balance the need for an objective standard of behaviour with a need to temper the 
harshness of criminal conviction as society changes. It does not threaten the importance of creating a 
uniform, objective standard of behaviour for South African citizens. It serves to provide a minimum 
of judicial discretion, based as it is on the constitutional values, in the context of substantive law, 
which can obviate the frustration of having to depend on the bureaucratic machinery of the state 
legislative process.” 
 
102 Reddi supra (n 1) 269. 
 
103 Flack supra (n 97) 83. 
 




whether the factors taken into consideration by the courts adequately take into account 
the perspective of the battered woman when evaluating the reasonableness of her 
conduct. If such factors do not adequately support a claim of self-defence then it is 
necessary to consider what impact these factors will have in informing the availability 
of relying on putative self-defence. 
 
In South African law, the defence of non-pathological incapacity based on provocation 
and emotional stress has developed into a defence which excludes an accused person’s 
liability. This development is founded on the principle-based approach to liability, 
which essentially holds that “unless a man has the capacity and fair opportunity or 
chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties ought not to apply to him.” 105 
Despite the well-established nature of the defence of non-pathological incapacity, the 
law has been marred by some controversial decisions of the courts which have 
“constituted a serious erosion of the notion of criminal capacity, with concomitant 
“ripple effects on other topics within the established general principles of criminal 
law.” 106 This chapter sets out the following objectives. It is first necessary to trace the 
development of the defence of non-pathological incapacity by means of examination of 
various case law. This will include a discussion of the notion of 
“toerekeningsvatbaarheid” (criminal capacity), as well as the position leading up to the 
controversial Eadie 107 decision as well as the decision itself and its judgment. It will 
also include consideration of the most recent case law on the topic, namely S v Marx.108  
 
                                               
105 Hart Punishment and responsibility (1968) 181. It should be noted that the law makes no distinction 
between provocation and emotional stress. In this respect see the case of S v Laubscher supra (n 68). 
 
106 Snyman “The tension between legal theory and policy considerations in the general principles of 
criminal law” (2003) Acta Juridica 1 at 22. 
 
107 S v Eadie 2002 (1) SACR 663 (SCA). 
 




A brief analysis will be done throughout the text, illustrating some of the main 
problems experienced with the provocation defence and whether it should in fact 
continue to remain a complete defence. Lastly, it will be necessary to consider whether 
the so-called “battered woman syndrome” is to be applied in relation to the defence of 




2.1.1 Development of the defence 
Private defence is the civilized remnant of the ancient system of private vengeance as a 
redress for wrong done. The Romans, in permitting self-help formulated the principle 
“moderatio inculpatae” (moderation in self-defence) which the European jurists later 
relied upon to develop a coherent doctrine of private defence. Therefore, persons who, 
as a result of private defence, caused harm to another did not incur criminal liability if 
they had observed the principle of moderation.109 
 
Private defence was treated in a casuistic fashion by Roman-Dutch writers. It was only 
considered in relation to certain crimes such as homicide, assault, theft and malicious 
damage to property. Scholars began to expound private defence only at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century as a general defence relating to all crimes. Coherent 
statements of the elements of the defence only emerged in 1932.110 
 
 
                                               
109 Code 841; cited in Burchell supra (n 29) 232. 
 
110 Steyn “Noodweer” (1932) South African Law Journal 462. Burchell supra (n 29) at 233 notes that 
writers such as Gardiner and Lansdown South African Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd ed) (1921) 
Vol I at 63-64; and Vol II at 1005-1009 followed the casuistic model of the Roman- Dutch writers, 
hardly mentioning “self-defence” as a general defence, reserving comprehensive discussion of the 




Jurists such as Steyn 111 were concerned with determining the bounds of moderation. 
According to him, this was to be tested according to the criteria of tempus (time), 
modus (method) and causa (cause). Steyn was of the view that the attack must have 
commenced and that the defence should have occurred at the time of the attack and not 
subsequently as retaliation (ad defensionem, non ad vindictam).112 For this reason the 
means used to repel the attack had to be proportionate. 113  Jurists held that where 
possible the victim of the unlawful attack should retreat rather than resort to force to 
defend himself.114 
 
Finally the defence had to be in respect of a recognized interest. While some jurists 
restricted the scope of private defence to the protection of life and chastity; others 
extended the protection to include property 115 and honour.116 
 
 
                                               
111 Steyn supra (n 110) 462. See also Van Warmelo “Noodweer” (1967) Acta Juridica 5. 
 
112 Steyn (n 110) at 470: “Self-defence cannot be relied on when the attack has already been completed 
or where the attack is to occur in the future. In respect of an attack which is yet to occur, only rules 
relating to protection are allowed. Defence against an already completed attack is revenge and falls 
outside the parameters of self-defence.” (own translation) 
 
113 Steyn (n 110) at 471: “There must be a measure of proportionality in respect of the attack and the 
defence. The requirement of proportionality must have a bearing only on the nature and means of the 
attack and the defence. The question to be answered in each case is whether the means used to avert 
the attack under the circumstances was necessary.” Steyn at 471-472 goes on to state: “Notice should 
be taken of: (i) the time and place of the attack, (ii) the weapons or means used for the defence, (iii) 
the environment in which the attack took place and (iv) the relative strengths of the attacker and the 
defender”. See also Van Warmelo supra (n 111) at 22: “The reaction must have been the only 
reasonable means to protect themselves. The attack must have occurred immediately and must be 
linked to the defence, therefore it must have been imminent. The attack must have been unexpected, 
and the means used to defend themselves must not be out of proportion to the attack” (own 
translation). 
 
114 See also Van Warmelo supra (n 111) at 22. This requirement was authoritatively stated by jurists 
such as Morkel and Verschoor “Oor die ‘bedoeling om te verdedig’ by noodweer” (1981) Tydskrif 
vir Regswetenskap 73. 
 
115 Steyn supra (n 110) 466. 
 





The structure of the South African law of homicide has been derived from two traditions. 
Roman law (and less obviously Roman-Dutch law) is structured on the premise that only 
intentional killing is unlawful. On this basis the distinction between dolus and culpa is 
important since it distinguishes murder from other types of homicide. In respect of this 
approach, culpable homicide is not a lesser form of murder but constitutes a distinct 
crime with a separate basis of liability. English common law had as a premise the 
proposition that all homicides, whether intentional or unintentional, negligent or 
accidental, were unlawful. This approach only attached small significance to the 
distinction between dolus and culpa since such a distinction did not express the 
differences in English law between murder and manslaughter. For this reason English law 
saw no inherent objection to the premise that murder could be reduced to manslaughter 
regardless of whether X acted with dolus or culpa, since manslaughter is merely 
mitigated murder. 117  South African law after a lengthy flirtation with the English 
structure 118 has now firmly opted for the Romanistic form.119 
 
Certain types of intentional killing are no longer regarded as unlawful and therefore are 
not punished as murder. South Africa recognizes that killing in self-defence is justifiable 
and therefore not murder.120 
 
Burchell offers the following definition of private defence: 
 
 
                                               
117 Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure Common-Law Crimes Vol II 3rd ed (1996) 311. 
 
118 Milton supra (n 117) 312. In the form of the “partial excuse” cases which allowed murder to be 
reduced to culpable homicide. 
 
119 Milton supra (n 117) 312. By rejecting the position that dolus could constitute the mens rea of 
culpable homicide. 
 




“A person who is the victim of an unlawful attack upon 
person, property or other recognized legal interest may 
resort to force to repel such attack. Any harm or damage 
inflicted upon an aggressor in the course of such private 
defence is not unlawful.” 121 
 
Burchell has noted that two important and yet somewhat conflicting themes shape the 
structure of the law of private defence. One is that private defence involves a choice 
between two evils, and that in choosing, the lesser evil is to be preferred. The evils are set 
out as follows. First, the harm threatened by an attack upon the interests of an individual. 
Secondly, harm perpetrated against the legal interest of the attacker, in the process of 
repelling the attack. The doctrine of the lesser evil requires that the defender should not 
inflict greater harm than that threatened by the initial attack. As Burchell notes “the 
central organizing principle of this approach is thus the comparative assessment of the 
harms involved”.122 
 
The opposing approach is one which justifies private defence using the concept of the 
autonomous individual. The theory underlying this approach is that every person has the 
right to protect her legal interests and is under no obligation to surrender these rights in 
order to avoid inflicting some evil on another person. According to this approach an 
individual who chooses to infringe the rights of another individual is the author of the 
harm that she suffers in the course of a defensive response to her attack.123 
                                               
121 Burchell supra (n 29) 230, who goes on to state at note 2: “This description refers to the fact that the 
citizen has been unable to rely upon the agencies of the state (the police and the courts) to protect his 
legal interest, and has been compelled to take the law into his own hands to defend his interests 
privately”. Furthermore, the term private defence is to be preferred to that of self-defence because 
the latter implies that the only issue is the defence of the physical self or person but the defence is in 
actual fact also available for the protection of other persons and interests such as property, chastity 
and liberty.  
 
122  As Burchell supra (n 29) at 231 submits, the choice of evils doctrine also gives rise to the 
requirement that the person who is attacked should retreat, avoid or flee from the attack before 
resorting to force, since flight is the lesser evil. For an exposition of the various rationales used to 
explain the justification for defensive killings see chapter 5 at 231-238 infra. 
 
123 See further Burchell supra (n 29) 231: “This being so, there is no obligation on the person attacked to 




Snyman refers to two justifications for the existence of private defence. The protection 
theory emphasizes the individual and her right to defend herself against an unlawful 
attack.124 Secondly, in respect of the upholding of justice theory, people acting in private 
defence perform acts whereby they assist in upholding the legal regime. Private defence 
is meant to prevent justice from yielding to injustice.125 These acts are now subject to the 
Constitution. 126  
 
Private defence forms part of South African common law. The courts are guided by the 
Constitution as to which approach is to be followed when a common-law principle, rule 
or doctrine appears to be in conflict with the Constitution. Section 39(2) 127 provides: 
“when interpreting any legislation and developing the common-law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and, objects of the Bill of 
Rights”. This essentially means that the common law must be “adapted or corrected, 
where applicable, to reflect constitutional values”.128 Van Dijkhorst J gave the following 
summary of the meaning of the section: 
 
“Section 35 (3) [now 39 (2)] is intended to permeate our 
judicial approach to interpretation of statutes and the  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
124 Snyman “The two reasons for the existence of private defence and their effect on the rules relating to 
the defence in South Africa” (2004) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 178 at 180.  
 
125 Snyman supra (n 124) 180-181. 
 
126 Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996. As was held in S v Walters 2002 (7) BCLR 663 (CC): 
“Self-defence is treated in our law as a species of private defence...Until now, our law has allowed 
killing in defence of life, but also has allowed killing in defence of property, or other legitimate 
interests, in circumstances in which it is reasonable and necessary to do so...What is material is that 
the law applies a proportionality test, weighing the interest protected against the interest of the 
wrongdoer. The interests must now be weighed in light of the Constitution” (at par [53] n 66). 
 
127 Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996. 
 
128 Ally and Viljoen “Homicide in defence of property in an age of constitutionalism” (2003) South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 121 at 129-130. See section 1 of Constitution of Republic of 




development of the common law with the fragrance of the 
values in which the Constitution is anchored. This means 
that whenever there is room for interpretation or 
development of our virile system of law that is to be the 
point of departure. When in future the unruly horse of 
public policy is saddled, its rein and crop will be that value 
system.” 129 
 
This assessment calls for a two-stage approach to be adopted. In respect of the first 
stage, the content and scope of the rights protected, including the meaning and objects 
of the challenged conduct, must be determined to establish if there is such deprivation 
or limitation.130 If there is such a limitation, the enquiry would then proceed to the 
second stage of the inquiry. This stage entails a balancing process by applying a 
proportionality test, provided for in section 36 (1) of the Constitution. The party 
(abused woman) relying on the disputed conduct should demonstrate that the limitation 
is justifiable under the Constitution.131  
 
While the Constitution does not establish a hierarchy of rights, judges and academics 
have acknowledged that some rights are more foundational, constituting a core of rights 
from which others are derived. O’Regan J, in S v Makwanyane 132 earmarked the right 
to life as “antecedent to all other rights in the Constitution”.133 The same is true of the  
                                               
129 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1995(2) SA 40 (T) at 501I-J.  
 
130 S v Walters supra (n 126) at par [26].  
 
131 Ally and Viljoen supra (n 128) 130. 
 
132 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC).  
 
133 Ibid at par [326]. Ex parte Minster van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 (1) SA 488 (A) is the 
benchmark decision for the proposition that killing in defence of property is justifiable. In this case 
the Minister of Justice reserved two questions for the Appellate Division: (a) May a person rely on 
private defence where he kills or wounds another to protect property? (b) If so were the bounds of 
private defence exceeded bearing in mind the circumstances of S v Van Wyk? While three separate 
judgments were delivered, the court was unanimous in its affirmative answer to the first question (at 
501H; 504B and 509A). But as Ally and Viljoen supra (n 128) at 127 have noted, section 24 and 
section 37 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 relied on by Steyn CJ were declared 
unconstitutional in Walters supra (n 126). According to section 24, a civilian is authorized to arrest a 
suspect, including someone suspected of property crimes such as theft and robbery. Section 37 (1) 
allows the civilian so authorized to use deadly force to prevent the escape of the suspect when the 
suspect flees and it is clear that an attempt is being made to arrest him. Steyn concluded his 
reasoning in Van Wyk supra by emphasizing that the suspect could be lawfully killed despite the fact 
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right to dignity, especially when taken together with the right to life.134 To this should 
be added the right to bodily integrity. Ally and Viljoen note De Waal’s discussion of 
the meaning of the right to bodily integrity: 
 
“Violence against an individual is a grave invasion of personal 
security. Section 12 (1) (c) requires the state to protect 
individuals, both by refraining from such invasions itself and 
by discouraging private individuals from such invasions.” 135 
 
To meet constitutional muster, the limitation must be closely linked to its purpose.136 
Abused women are entitled to protect their life therefore, can kill to achieve this. But an 
important factor in such an evaluation is whether less restrictive means are available to 
achieve the stated objectives. As Ally and Viljoen note, one way of posing this question 
is to reformulate some of the case law at common-law: “the use of violence especially 
lethal force, can only be justified if it is necessary (that is, if it is the only means to 
avoid death or grievous bodily harm).” 137 While it could be said that the battered 
woman could have left the abusive relationship, the law does not require the abused 
woman to leave her home, nor does it expect ordinary persons to display acts of  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
that he posed no harm or threat of harm to the citizen. Steyn CJ noted that an arrest, was not private 
defence, but justified his analogy by asserting that both instances form part of the societal interests in 
the protection of property. The judge concluded: “Consequently in our law it is not preposterous idea 
to assert that a person can kill in defence of a right other than life or limb” (at 497H) (own 
translation). Ally and Viljoen supra (n 128) at 128 note that no judicial pronouncement has as yet 
been given about the constitutionality of the common law as enunciated in S v Van Wyk. 
 
134 S v Makwanyane supra (n 132) at par [144]. The constitutional values protected by these rights are 
described in Makwanyane supra (n 132): “Together they [the right to life and human dignity] are the 
source of all other rights. Other rights may be limited, and may even be withdrawn and then granted 
again, but their ultimate limit is to be found in the preservation of the twin rights of life and dignity. 
These twin rights are the essential content of all rights under the Constitution. Taken away, all other 
rights cease” (at par [84]). 
 
135 Ally and Viljoen supra (n 128) 132, citing De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 3ed (2000) 233.  
 
136 Section 36 (1) (d) of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
 




heroism. Thus harm (death or serious bodily injury of the abuser) caused as a result of 
the limitation can be justified when section 36 is applied.138 
 
Private defence is an extraordinary remedy that involves the infliction of harm upon 
another individual. To escape criminal liability for this act, the defender must be able to 
show that her resort to private defence conformed to the social and legal norms that 
result in the use of self-help by citizens. In respect of self- defence the norms that apply 
require that the defender be able to provide evidence that her resort to force was 
necessary in the circumstances she found herself in and that she used means appropriate 
to the danger that confronted her. These requirements for successfully invoking the 
defence are expressed as conditions that must have been present or complied with. Such 
“triggering” conditions relate to the nature of the attack and the nature of the defender’s 
response (the defence).139 For a situation of private defence to arise, evidence must 
show (1) an attack upon a (2) legally protected interest and (3) that the attack was 
unlawful. However, it is necessary to first consider the test used for private defence, 
before engaging in a discussion of the elements. 
 
2.1.2. The test for private defence 
2.1.2.1 The objective test 
Since 1947, it has been held that the question as to whether an accused, who relies on 
self-defence, has acted lawfully must be judged by objective standards. In applying this 
objective standard, it was held in S v Motleleni 140 that: 
 
                                               
138 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
 
139 Burchell supra (n 29) 233. 
 
140 S v Motleleni 1976 (1) SA 403 (A). For a discussion of the test utilized for self-defence in English 
law see chapter 3 at 113-116 and for the American law see 179-180 infra (objective test) and 181-




“The question whether an accused, who relies on self-defence, 
has acted lawfully must be judged by objective standards. In 
applying these standards one must decide what the fictitious 
reasonable man, in the position of the accused and in light of 
all the circumstances would have done.” 141 
 
Snyman suggests “reasonableness is a relative concept, depending on the circumstances 
of each case”.142 Generally, it has been accepted that the “reasonableness” test is a 
vehicle to ascertain the legal convictions of the community or the community’s sense of 
equity and justice (boni mores). This has been described as an instrument of judicial 
policy.143 
 
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Basdeo and Another 144 it was held 
that “the value judgment on which the application of the general criterion of 
reasonableness is based, are on considerations of morality and policy and the court’s 
perception of the legal convictions of the community, and entails a consideration of all 




                                               
141 Ibid at 406C. This finding is in accordance with established precedent: R v Koning 1953 (2) SA 220 
(T) 225: “A person is entitled to kill in self-defence if they can show that they had a bona fide belief 
as well as reasonable grounds for believing that they were being attacked” (own translation). In R v 
Bhaya 1953 (3) SA 143 (N) 149 the court stated that “the standard to be applied is that of a 
reasonable man both as regards the belief entertained by the appellant as to the imminence of an 
assault...” See further R v Hele 1947 (1) SA 272 (E) 297-298; R v Pope 1953 (3) SA 890 (C) 894-
895; S v Mnguni 1966 (3) SA 776 (T) 778; R v Ndara 1955 (4) SA 182 (A); S v Ntuli 1975 (1) SA 
429 (A) 436; S v De Oliviera 1993 (2) SACR 59 (A) 63I; S v Ferreira 2004 (2) SACR 454 (SCA) at 
par [38] 467C-D. Snyman supra (n 124) suggests that the test (reasonably believed that she was in 
danger) leads to the test of private defence (unlawfulness) being confused with the test of negligence 
(where one similarly has to enquire how the reasonable person would have acted) (at 111).  
 
142 Snyman supra (n 124) 111.  
 
143 As per Satchwell J in S v Engelbrecht 2005 (92) SACR 41 (W) at par [330]. For a general criticism 
of the objective test for self-defence see chapter 5 at 273-275 infra. 
 
144 1996 (1) SA 355 (A). 
 




In conducting such an enquiry, the court must be guided by values and norms underlying 
the Constitution.146 The Constitution, being the supreme law of the land, is a system of 
objective, normative values for legal purposes. An approach to the “legal convictions” 
test would be informed by the foundational values of the Constitution, namely “human 
dignity, equality and freedom.” 147  Such an approach will have as its basis the 
circumstances and perceptions of the accused. Section 9 of the Constitution requires that 
courts have regard to the particular circumstances of the accused.148 
 
Although it has been noted that the objective test (reasonable person test) is subject to 
the qualification that the person acting in self-defence may not benefit from prior 
knowledge that he has of his attacker, which the reasonable person would not have,149 it 
would appear as if the courts are moving towards a more qualified objective test of self-
defence. This point is made clear by Holmes JA in S v Ntuli 150 where the learned judge 
noted that South African courts have always insisted that they must be careful to avoid 
the role of armchair critics, wise after the event, weighing the matter in the secluded 
security of the court-room. The approach is that “in applying these formulations [the 
triggering conditions] to flesh and blood facts, the courts adopt a robust attitude, not  
                                               
146 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
 
147 As per section 39 (2) of Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996. Recognizing equality as “our 
constitution’s focus and organizing principle” (per Kriegler J in President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Hugo 1997 (1) SACR 567 (CC) (1997) (4) SA 1; 1997 (6) BLCR 708) in par [74] does not 
mean identical treatment or uniformity (National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and 
Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1998 (2) SACR 556 (CC), 1999 (1) SA 6, 1998 (12) BLCR 
1517 in par [60]-[64]). In Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [339] Judge Satchwell noted: “The result 
is that the concept of equality must be understood in a substantive rather than a formal sense. 
Promoting substantive rather than a formal sense requires an acute awareness of the lived reality of 
people’s lives and understanding of how the real life conditions of individuals and groups have 
reinforced vulnerability, disadvantage and harm” (citing Daniels v Campbell NO and Others, 
unreported (PD Case No 1646/01). 
 
148 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
 
149 Burchell and Hunt (n 73) 331. 
 




seeking to measure with nice intellectual calipers the precise bounds of legitimate self-
defence” 151  
 
This trend is being followed in battered woman cases as well. It would appear as if the 
courts are more willing to take into account the context in which an abused woman kills 
her abuser, having regard to her experiences, as well as the impact of the abuse upon 
her.  In S v Ferreira 152 the court held that: 
 
 “(h)er decision to kill and to hire others for that purpose is 
explained by the expert witnesses as fully in keeping with 
what research has shown that abused women do. It is 
something which has to be judicially evaluated not from a 
male perspective or an objective perspective but by the 
Court’s placing itself as far as it can in the position of the 
woman concerned, with a fully detailed account of the abusive 
relationship and the assistance of expert evidence such as that 
given here. Only by judging the case on that basis can the 
offender’s equality right... be given proper effect. It therefore 
means treating an abused woman accused with due regard for 
gender difference in order to achieve equality of judicial 
treatment.” 153  
                                               
151 Ibid at 437E.Thus the test must be applied by the court by putting itself in the position of the accused 
at the time of the attack. See further R v Jack Bob 1929 SWA 32; R v Cele 1945 NPD 173 at 276; R 
v Zikalala 1953 (2) SA 568 (A) at 573; R v K 1956 (3) SA 353 (A) at 359 and R v Hele supra (n 
141). 1986 (2) SA 112 (O). In the case of S v T 1986 (2) SA 112 (O) the courts went so far as to say: 
“The actions of both the attacker and the defender leading up to the attack are relevant with 
reference to the question of whether the boundaries of self-defence have been exceeded. A person 
who is prone to violence can as a last resort rely on the defence whereby the question will be not 
what the reasonable person would have thought but what the defender knows about his attacker” (at 
132) (own translation). 
 
152 S v Ferreira supra (n 141). 
 
153 Ibid at par [40]. Critiques of the gendered nature of justification defences argue that such defences 
were developed from a male perspective and were shaped by the context and life experiences of 
men, hence, the “reasonable man” test. In this respect, it is important to note the comments in 
Lavallee v The Queen [1990] 55 CCC (3d) at 97: “(i)t strains credulity to imagine what the ‘ordinary 
man’ would do in the position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not typically find 
themselves in that situation. Some women do, however. The definition of what is reasonable must be 
adapted to the circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by the 
hypothetical reasonable man”. The gendered dimension of domestic violence has been recognized by 
the Constitutional Court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Center for 
Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2002 (1) SACR 79 (CC) (2001 (4) SA 938; 2001 (10) BCLR 
995) where it was stated in par [62]: “sexual violence and the threat of sexual violence goes to the 
core of women’s subordination in society. It is the single greatest threat to the self-determination of 
South African women.” See also S v Baloyi 2000 (1) SACR 81 (CC) (2000 (2) SA 425; 2000 (1) 
BCLR) 86 at par [11] and [12]: “To the extent that it is systematic, pervasive and overwhelming 
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In S v Engelbrecht 154 Satchwell J held that self-defence is to be evaluated objectively, 
and is based on a consideration of what would have been reasonable in the situation the 
accused found herself in.155 The judge went on to state that “the reasonable woman must 
not be forgotten in the analysis and deserves to be as much part of the objective standard 
of a reasonable person as does the reasonable man” 156 Therefore, on this basis it was 
held that: 
 
“There is indeed compelling justification for focusing not only 
on the specific form which the abuse may have over time and 
in particular circumstances, but pertinently on the impact of 
abuse upon the psyche, make-up and entire world view of an 
abused woman.” 157 
 
By taking into account the accused’s situation, the traditional requirements for self-
defence have been relaxed. Furthermore, Satchwell J went on to state that in determining 




                                                                                                                                       
gender specific, domestic violence both reflects and reinforces patriarchal domination, and does so 
in a particularly brutal form.” 
 
154 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). In this case the accused was a victim of domestic violence for a 
number of years. This included not only physical but also psychological abuse. On the day of the 
deceased’s death, he had been drinking and watching pornography. The deceased indicated to his 
wife that he wished to act out a scene in the video that he was watching. He told the accused that she 
should go into the bedroom so that he could shave her pubic region. While the deceased was 
submitting to the deceased’s demands, the accused’s daughter walked into the bedroom (at par 
[128]). Later that night the accused’s daughter accidentally knocked the deceased in the face (at par 
[130]). He screamed at her and hit her, and forbade the accused to talk to her daughter. If she failed 
to heed his instructions, she would be killed. The accused then proceeded to kill her sleeping 
husband by locking his thumbs in thumb cuffs behind him and tied a plastic bag around his head 
which subsequently caused him to suffocate (at par [10]-[11]). 
 
155 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [327]. 
 
156 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [358]. The judge went on to quote R v Malott [1998] 1 SCR 123 
(SCC) at par [40]. For a discussion of this case see chapter 5 at 251-253. 
 
157 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [343]. By doing so, it could result in the circumstances being 




“one individual incident of abuse, a series of violations or an 
ongoing cycle of maltreatment.” 158 
 
Furthermore, in regard to the imminence requirement, the court followed the finding in 
Lavallee 159 where it was held that requiring a systematically abused woman to wait until 
the commencement of an attack to defend herself is “tantamount to sentencing her to 
murder by installment.” 160 Satchwell J decided to reinterpret the common law to address 
this shortcoming: 
 
“where abuse is frequent and regular such that it can be 
termed a ‘pattern’ or ‘cycle’ of abuse then it would seem that 
the requirement of imminence should extend to encompass 
that which is inevitable.” 161 
 
 
The judge went on to explain that in order to determine whether the action taken was 
necessary, it must be established to what extent the normal legal channels were 
ineffective.162 While Mrs. Engelbrecht’s efforts to leave her husband were taken into 
consideration, Satchwell J adopted a cautionary approach in this regard:  
 
“[I] am of the view that the court must, in this context, be 
extremely cautious in seeking to rely upon examination of the 
efforts taken by an abused woman to extricate herself from the 
abusive situation or to escape the abusive spouse or partner. 
Judgment should not be passed on the fact that an accused 
battered woman stayed in the abusive relationship. Still less is  
 
                                               
158 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [344]. 
 
159 R v Lavallee supra (n 153). For a discussion of how self-defence is dealt with in Canadian law, see 
chapter 4 at 188-194. 
 
160 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [348]. 
 
161 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [349].  
 
162 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [352]. In this respect it should be noted that the accused went to 
great lengths to get away from her abuser: she instituted divorce proceedings against him (at par 
[91]); she left her husband a number of times (at par [70]); she tried to find work in another town (at 
par [99]; laid criminal charges against him (at par [67]-[69]) and tried to get protection orders against 




the court entitled to conclude that she forfeited her right to 
self-defence for having done so.” 163 
 
In discussing the proportionality requirement, Satchwell J noted that in the case of an 
abused woman her particular circumstances should be taken into account: 
 
 
“the parties respective ages; relative strengths, gender 
socialization and experiences; the nature, duration and 
development of their relationship; the content of their 
relationship, including power relations on an economic, 
sexual, social, familial, employment and socio-religious level; 
the nature, the extent, duration, persistence of the abuse; the 
purpose of and achievements of the abuser; the impact upon 
the body, mind, heart, spirit of the victim; the effect on others 
who are aware of or implicated in the abuse; the extent to 
which it is possible for State-legislated, formal institutional, 
informal personal bodies and individuals to intervene to 
terminate the abuse; the extent two which it is possible for the 
abused victim to access and utilize any of the above channels 
in the event that they previously fail to unilaterally intervene 
to impose constitutional protections.” 164 
 
Satchwell J went on to state that in evaluating whether the actions taken by the accused 
were reasonable, the analysis is partly objective and partly subjective.165  Surely by 
placing emphasis on the accused’s individual circumstances, this will have the effect of 
subjectivizing the test for self-defence. 166 If this is correct, then Engelbrecht 167 case 
would have been better dealt with as an instance of putative self-defence. It is now 
necessary to consider the doctrine of putative self-defence, before returning to a 
consideration of the elements of self-defence.  
                                               
163 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [356]. For similar commentary in respect of the Lavallee supra 
(n 153) case see chapter 4 at 188-194. 
 
164 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [357]. 
 
165 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [358].  
 
166 However, theorists such as Burchell supra (n 29) at 243 suggest that such an approach does “not 
introduce an element of subjectivity, it means only that the matter is considered objectively in the 
particular circumstances of the case”. 
 




2.1.2.3 Putative private defence 
In Roman law it would appear as if no distinction was drawn between self-defence and 
the current notion of criminal fault. 168 In earlier cases, South African courts found that 
mistake of fact could only be excusable if it was reasonable.169 In R v Mbombela 170 De 
Villiers JA held that: 
 
“A reasonable belief, in my opinion, is such as would be 
formed by a reasonable man in the circumstances in which the 
accused was placed in the given case. The ‘reasonable man’ is 
in this connection the man of ordinary intelligence, knowledge 
and prudence. It follows that mistake of fact is not reasonable 
if it is due to lack of such knowledge and intelligence as is 
possessed by an ordinary person, or if it is due to such 
carelessness, inattention and so forth, as an ordinary person 
would not have exhibited. The particular point, however, 
which is raised by the question reserved, is whether there is 
only one type of ‘reasonable man’ who is to be taken as the 
legal standard, or whether in a case like the present, another 
type of reasonable man is to be conceived of, viz, ‘an ordinary 
native aged 18 years and living at home in his kraal’. I have no 
doubt that by the law of this country there is only one standard 
of the ‘reasonable man’.” 171 
 
Over time, the courts did away with the reasonableness requirement.172 In S v Sam 173 
Myburgh J held: 
 
“On the authority of the decided case law, it is my opinion that 
where intention (dolus) is a requirement for the offence 
charged, the state must prove knowledge of unlawfulness  
                                               
168  Labuschagne “Putative Noodweer: Opmerking oor ‘n Dadersubjektiewe Benadering to 
Misdaadomskrywing” (1995) Tydsrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeinse Hollandse Reg 116 at 119. See 
also Van Warmelo supra (n 111) 16. 
 
169 Labuschagne supra (n 168) 119. 
 
170 1933 AD 269. 
 
171 Ibid at 273. 
 
172 Labuschagne supra (n 168) 119. In this respect see R v Z 1960 (1) SA 739 (A) at 743. 
 




beyond a reasonable doubt. The question as to whether the 
mistake of fact was reasonable or not, is not an issue here 
because the test is subjective. The notion of reasonableness or 
unreasonableness, and the degree thereof, in the circumstances 
and the facts of the case, only come into play when it has to be 
proved that the accused did indeed have a bona fide belief or 
not. It does not affect the legal concept in that capacity. It 
applies in either common law or statutory crimes where dolus 
is a requirement.” 174 
 
In R v Ndara 175 the question as to whether the accused acted in putative self-defence 
was answered by Schreiner J: 
 
“Now if full effect is given to these findings, there is a good 
dealt to be said for the view that they amount to holding that 
the appellant believed that the conditions required for self-
defence existed in his favour; if so it would be arguable that 
even though he was mistaken he should be treated as if those 
conditions did in fact exist. It should, however, be observed 
that there is no finding by the trial court that the appellant 
could reasonably have entertained more than a fear, perhaps a 
strong fear that his pursuers would not only hand him over to 
the police but would also themselves assault him. For a 
mistaken belief to operate in favour of the accused person it is 
commonly said that the belief must be reasonable… and the 
circumstances of this case provide a strong argument in favour 
of this view.” 176 
 
In terms of current South African law, if a battered woman is not able to successfully 
plead self-defence due to the fact that the court found that her conduct was unlawful, 
objectively assessed,177 then she may be acquitted of murder on the basis of putative 
private defence, which is subjectively assessed.178  
 
                                               
174 Ibid at 294. 
 
175 R v Ndaru supra (n 141). 
 
176 Ibid at 185. This is in accordance with R v Sile 1945 WLD 134 135 and R v De Ruiter 1957 (3) SA 
361 (A) 364. 
 
177 S v De Oliviera supra (n 141).  
 




In S v De Oliviera 179  it was held that such a defence will be of assistance to an 
accused: 
 
“who honestly believes his life…[is] in danger, but objectively 
viewed [it is] not.” 180 
 
This honest, but incorrect belief would eliminate the necessary intention to commit 
such an unlawful act. Furthermore, the test for intention is subjectively assessed: 
 
“The focus of attention in ascertaining whether or not 
intention existed is the woman’s subjective state of mind. The 
fact that her belief may have been unreasonable or even 
foolish under the circumstances is of no consequence at all as 
this enquiry does not concern itself with what a reasonable 
person would have done under the same circumstances.” 181 
 
This raises two points. Firstly, the issue here relates not to lawfulness but culpability.182 
Secondly, if the abused woman does not have the requisite intention to commit murder, 
she will be acquitted. However, as Reddi notes, the abused woman will not necessarily 
escape liability: 
 
“[t]his does not save the accused woman from possibly being 
convicted of culpable homicide. This is because negligence, 
not intention, is the fault element required for a culpable 
homicide conviction. To establish liability for this crime the 
test is whether the reasonable person would have foreseen that 
the remedy of self-defence was not lawful. The position at law 
is that if a reasonable person would have foreseen that the 
resort to self-defence was unlawful, then the accused is 
negligent for failing to foresee this. She would accordingly be 
guilty of culpable homicide.” 183 
                                               
179 S v De Oliviera supra (n 141). 
 
180 Reddi supra (n 1) 275. Cf S v Ngomane 1979 (3) SA 859; S v Ntuli supra (n 141). 
 
181 Reddi supra (n 1) 275. 
 
182 S v De Oliviera supra (n 141) 163I-J. 
 
183 Reddi supra (n 1) 275. 
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Reddi however notes that in the case of an abused woman, the “social framework or 
circumstances that may have impacted on the woman’s conduct would have a bearing 
on the determination of the woman’s culpability.” 184 Evidence of the “cyclical nature 
of abuse” 185 as well as the woman’s failed attempts at leaving her abuser would be 
highly relevant to inform putative self-defence. 186  For this reason, if a reasonable 
person, located in the extraordinary circumstances of the accused, would not have 
foreseen that the resort to self-defence was unlawful, then the abused woman cannot be 
expected to have such foresight. Reddi notes that “in these circumstances, her lack of 
foresight would not be regarded as negligent and a charge of culpable homicide would 
fail.”  
 
It is submitted that putative private defence is highly relevant to the battered woman 
who kills her abuser in circumstances that fall outside the parameters of private defence 
as it may represent the difference between a conviction of murder and one of culpable 
homicide in South African law. At its most extreme it even may prove the difference 





                                                                                                                                       
 
184 Reddi supra (n 1) 276. 
 
185 For a discussion of the cyclical nature of violence referred to in the Engelbrecht supra (n 143) see 40-
41 op cit. From the battered woman’s viewpoint, the abuse would be inevitable, therefore prompting 
her to act. 
 
186 In this respect see n 161. 
 
187 Thus the result attained in the case of Lavallee supra (n (153) through self-defence can be achieved in 
South African law through the use of putative self-defence. For a discussion of this case, see chapter 




2.2 Requirements of the Attack 
2.2.1 An Attack 188 
Fear alone is not sufficient to justify a defence.189 Private defence may only be utilized 
where there is an attack which has already commenced or is imminent. Generally, the 
attack will involve some positive act, but this is not an essential requirement and private 
defence can be resorted to in respect of an attack that has already begun.190 
 
2.2.1.1 Commenced or imminent 
The term “commenced” means that private defence may only be resorted to where the 
attack has already begun and there is no time to seek other forms of protection.191 As 
Burchell has noted, “imminent means that the attack is about to begin immediately – 
what is important here is not so much the imminence of the threat, but rather the 
immediacy of the response required to avoid the attack. If the nature of the attack is 
such that the threatened harm cannot be avoided, the victim should be entitled to act 
with such anticipation as is necessary for effective protection”.192  
                                               
188 Although the attack must be unlawful (see R v Ndara supra (n 141) at 184; S v Kibi 1978 (4) SA 173 
(E) at 183 states that although temporary use of someone else’s property without consent is not a 
crime, the owner may invoke private defence to remove the offender. However, participation in a 
duel cannot allow the parties to rely on private defence. See S v Jansen 1983 (3) SA 534 (NC). Only 
if one gives up the fight then the other party has no right to continue (Snyman supra (n 124) at 188). 
 
189 However, fear alone may be relevant to establishing the existence of “putative” private defence. 
 
190 Steyn supra (n 110) 470. See also 2.4.1.2 infra. 
 
191 Burchell supra (n 29) 234. For a discussion of the imminence requirement in English law, see chapter 
3 at 122-125 infra and American law, see at chapter 4 at 194-198 infra. 
 
192 Burchell supra (n 29) 234. This does not mean, however, that the defender “must wait until the blow 
has fallen.” In respect of the attack see further R v Hope 1917 NPD 145 at 146; S v Mokgiba 1999 
(1) SACR 534 (O) 550D-E: “The appellant was reasonable in his belief that his attacker did not 
come to visit him or to look for work. The actions of the attacker posed an immediate threat to the 
bodily integrity and the life of the man and his wife. The appellant was entitled to use all his strength 
and all the remedies he had at his disposal, even if these remedies meant that his attacker would die 
in the process. There was no duty on the appellant to wait until his attacker first physically harmed 
him, or to ask him what the purpose of his visit was, before he defended himself” (own translation). 
Further, the attacker must bear the risk because it is he who initiated the whole set of events by 
resorting to unlawful aggression. See R v Zikalala supra (n 151) 573A-B: “But the observation 
places a risk upon the appellant that he was not obliged to bear. He was not called upon to stake his 
life upon ‘a reasonable chance to get away.’ If he had done so he may well have figured as the 
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The attack must not have been completed and any measure taken after the attack has 
ended 193 would be retaliatory rather than defensive and therefore unjustified.194 This is 
problematic as battered women normally kill in instances where their abuser is asleep 
or incapacitated and there is no imminent threat of harm. Although South African 
courts have not been called upon to decide whether an anticipatory defence on the part 
of an abused woman to an expected attack could be justified, our law has recognized 
the setting up of lethal mechanisms as precautionary measures in protection of 
commercial property. 195  While Burchell suggests that victims of battered woman 
syndrome ought to be allowed to pre-empt the anticipated and inevitable attack of the 




                                                                                                                                       
deceased at the trial instead of the accused.” See also S v Teixeira 1980 (3) SA 755 (A) at 765C: 
“Even on an armchair approach, it appears that with the deceased being less than a metre away from 
him, it would have been ‘an act of folly on the appellant’s behalf to have attempted to seek safety in 
flight.” 
 
193 S v Mogohlwane 1982 (2) SA 587 (T). Y after being robbed by X, went home, collected a weapon, 
returned to the scene of the robbery and used force against X to recover his property. It was held that 
he had acted in lawful private defence in so far as his actions had been part of the res gestae of the 
original attack. 
 
194 R v Hayes 1904 TS 383; R v Kantolo 1912 EDL 154. 
 
195 Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk supra (n 133). 
 
196 See further Burchell supra (n 29) at 234. Howie P in S v Ferreira supra (n 141) regarded evidence of 
spousal abuse as admissible in mitigation of sentence but also referred to the substantial body of 
international writing on such evidence as relevant to a self-defence plea (at par [37]). As a result of a 
cycle of physical and emotional abuse the accused in Ferreira felt “unable to escape by any other 
route than by homicide” (at par [35]). Howie P regarded the evidence on the abusive background to 
which Ferreira was subjected as “subjectively ... justifiable in mitigation of sentence” (at par [38]). 
 
197 It would seem that a defence undertaken after the attack has commenced and continued after the 
attack had ceased is not necessarily an unjustifiable defence. This view was expressed in S v 
Moloisana 1984 (1) PH H 16 (O). The court held that in assessing the “defence” after the attack had 
ceased was necessary to consider all the circumstances including the ease with which the “defence” 
once commenced could be terminated. However, this principle should be applied restrictively and 
with circumspection lest people take the law into their own hands on an unacceptable scale. (Cited in 





In S v Engelbrecht 198 Satchwell J was of the view that where abuse can be termed a 
“pattern” or “cycle” of “abuse” then it would seem that the requirement of ‘imminence’ 
should extend to encompass abuse which is inevitable.199 This would clearly dispense 
with the requirement that an attack be imminent and thus a person can defend themselves 
at any time. 
 
2.2.1.2 Protected interest 
Private defence may be resorted to only in respect of a legally recognized and protected 
interest in law.200 Many legal systems have approached the question of what interests 
may be protected by private defence in a casuistic fashion. This results in not all legal 
interests being recognized as the subject of the private defence.201 
                                               
198 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 
199 Ibid at par [349].  
 
200 In S v Kamffer 1965 (3) SA 96 (T) it was held that a parent did not have the additional remedy of 
self-help in order to obtain access to a child. See also chapter 5 at 230 infra. 
 
201 Burchell supra (n 29) 235. It is universally agreed that a person is entitled to protect life (see R v Jack 
Bob supra (n 151); R v Manuele Sile 1945 WLD 134; R v Hele supra (n 141); R v Zikalala supra (n 
151); R v K supra (n 151); R v Segatle 1958 (1) PH H 125 (A)); limb (see R v Cele supra (n 151); R 
v Patel 1959 (3) SA 121 (A) at 123; S v Jackson 1963 (2) SA 626 (A); S v Mtetwa 1967 (2) PH H 
273 (N)); freedom (see R v Hayes supra (n 194); R v Mahomed (1906) 27 NLR 396; R v Kantolo 
supra (n 194); R v Mfuseni (1923) 44 NLR 68; R v Jackelson 1926 TPD 685; R v Kleyn 1937 CPD 
288; R v Karvie 1945 TPD 159); sexual integrity (see R v Nomahleki 1928 GWL 8); chastity (see S 
v Mokoena 1976 (4) SA 162 (O) at 163C-D to the effect that a man may use force to defend the 
chastity of his wife or sister); dignity (see S v Van Vuuren 1961 (3) SA 305 (E). In S v Ndlangisa 
1969 (4) SA 324 (E) X was charged with insulting Y’s dignity by spitting in her face. He said he did 
so because Y was insulting him and he wished to stop her from doing so. This defence of private 
defence did not succeed, the court holding that X had “taken the law into his own hands when there 
were other remedies open to him”). Lastly, other persons can be protected (see R v Patel supra R v 
Mhlongo 1960 (4) SA 574 (A); S v Van Vuuren supra; (although it has been suggested by Gardiner 
and Lansdown supra (n 110) at 112 that the defence of third parties is only lawful where there is a 
relationship in which it is the defender’s moral or legal duty to act in defence of a third party, this 
view is not generally favoured, see Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol I 3rd ed 
(1997) 80); and property (see S v Van Wyk supra (n 133); S v Mogohlwane supra (n 193), although 
Mogohlwane should not be understood to unequivocally support the provision that killing in defence 
of property is justifiable as in this case the defences of property and life were closely linked: “…his 
life or body were under threat… [be]cause his attacker wanted to injure him, the accused fatally 
stabbed him” (at 594B-C)). The issue which has yet to be determined by our courts is whether the 
Constitution allows for the use of lethal force to protect property when life or bodily integrity not 
threatened in process (see S v Walters supra (n 126) at par 53 n 66). As Ally and Viljoen supra (n 
128) note: “the development by our courts of rules of the common law, which may entail a limitation 
of rights, must comply with section 36 of the Constitution. The common-law rule in S v Van Wyk 
violates at least the rights to life, human dignity and bodily security. In our view these deprivations 
are not in accordance with section 36. Applying the proportionality test, in principle means weighing 
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Section 7(2) of the Constitution requires the State to “respect, promote and fulfill the 
rights in the Bill of Rights”.202 Foundational values of the Constitution include those of 
“equality” and “dignity”. Section 9(1) and (2) provide that “everyone is equal before the 
law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law” and that “equality 
includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms”, while section 10 
provides that “everyone has an inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected”.203 The protected rights include those in section 12 “to freedom 
and security of the person” which cover the rights “not to be deprived of freedom 
arbitrarily or without just cause; to be free from all forms of violence either from public 
or private sources; not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way” as 
also “to bodily and psychological integrity” which cover the rights “to make decisions 
concerning reproduction; to security in and control over their body”.204 In addition to 
common-law and statutory provisions for the protection of these rights, the legislature has 
enacted the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, of which the Preamble states:  
 
“Recognizing that domestic violence is a serious social evil; 
that there is a high incidence of domestic violence within 
South African society; that victims of domestic violence are 
among the most vulnerable members of society; that domestic 
violence takes on many forms; that acts of domestic violence 
may be committed in a wide range of domestic relationships; 
and that the remedies currently available to the victims of 
domestic violence have proved ineffective; and having regard 
to the Constitution of South Africa; and in particular, the right 
to equality and to freedom and security of the person; and the 
international commitments and obligations of the State 
towards ending violence against women and children,  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
the nature, importance and extent of the limitation of the right against the nature and importance of 
the objective of the limitation, which are the protection of property and prevention of crime (at 135). 
 








including obligations under the United Nations Conventions 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and the Rights of the Child; it is the purpose of this 
Act to afford the victims of domestic violence the maximum 
protection from domestic abuse that the law can provide; and 
to introduce measures which seek to ensure that the relevant 
organs of State give full effect to the provisions of this Act, 
and thereby to convey that the State is committed to the 
elimination of domestic violence.” 
 
The Domestic Violence Act 205 has comprehensively defined “domestic violence” as 
including physical and non-physical forms of violence, all of which fall under the 
rubric of “controlling and abusive behaviour... where such conduct harms, or may cause 
imminent harm to, the safety, health or well-being of the complainant”. It would appear 
that the Legislature has chosen to emphasize the effect of abusive conduct upon the 
victim as opposed to the specific form taken by such conduct.206  
 
In S v Baloyi 207  the Constitutional Court noted that domestic violence compels 
constitutional concern in a number of important respects. On the one hand, the 
Constitution: 
 
 “has to be understood as obliging the State directly to protect 
the right of everyone to be free from domestic violence. 
Indeed, the State is under a series of constitutional mandates 
which include the obligation to deal with domestic violence; 
to protect both the rights of everyone to enjoy freedom and 
security of the person and to bodily and psychological 
integrity, and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected, as well as the defensive rights of everyone to be 
subjected to torture in any way and not to be treated or 
punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.” 208 
 
On the other hand: 
                                               
205 Domestic Violence Act supra (n 1). 
 
206 As per Satchwell J in S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [157]. 
 
207 S v Baloyi supra (n 153). 
 




“(t)o the extent that it is systematic, pervasive and 
overwhelmingly gender-specific, domestic violence both 
reflects and reinforces patriarchal domination, and does so in a 
particularly brutal form... The non-sexist society promised in 
the foundational clauses of the Constitution, and the right to 
equality and the non-discrimination guaranteed by section 9, 
are undermined when spouse-batterers enjoy immunity.” 209 
 
The Constitutional Court endorsed the view that domestic violence is “systematic, 
pervasive and overwhelmingly gender-specific”. It “both reflects and reinforces 
patriarchal domination and does so in a particularly brutal form”. It thus also implicates 
the core values of equality.210 
 
In Engelbrecht 211  it was held that all those rights which were enshrined in the 
Constitution 212  constituted the interests which were deserving of protection in this 
defence of justification. It followed that the interests which were attacked and which an 
abused woman could protect, include her life, bodily integrity, dignity, quality of life, 
her home, her emotional and psychological wellbeing, her freedom as well as the 
interests of her children. In short, the accused defended her status as a human being 
and/ or mother.213 
 
2.2.1.3 Unlawful 
Private defence can only be resorted to in respect of an attack that is unlawful.214 The 
fact that the attacker is insane and lacks criminal capacity does not cause the attack to  
                                               




211 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 
212 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
 
213 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [345]. 
 
214 Ntanjana v Vorster and Minister of Justice 1950 (4) SA 398 (C) at 404-405, R v Ndara supra (n 175) 
at 184. Furthermore, a person cannot defend himself against lawful arrest (see R v Ndara supra (n 
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be lawful and thus defence against such an attack is lawful.215 However, private defence 
cannot be raised against the spontaneous attack of an animal because the law recognizes 
the fact that an animal cannot act unlawfully.216 
 
In the case of battered women the unlawful attack against which she defends herself or 
others may be one individual incident of abuse, a series of violations or an ongoing 
cycle of maltreatment. Not all attacks are required to be directed at the abused woman 
herself but obviously there must have been some assault upon her for her to be 
considered abused. The attack may, but need not necessarily, be physical in nature and 
may include psychological and emotional abuse, degradation of life, diminution of 
dignity and threats to commit any such acts.217 
 
2.2.2 Requirements of the defence 
2.2.2.1 The defensive act must be necessary to avert the attack 
The defence employed by the abused woman must be necessary to protect the 
threatened interest: performing the defensive act must be the only way in which the 
abused woman can avert the threat to her rights or interests. This is decided on the facts  
 
                                                                                                                                       
141) at 184; S v Aleck 1973 (1) PH H7 (R). Where the arrestor has used more force than necessary, 
it becomes unlawful and may, therefore be resisted. See S v Aleck supra. So too when the arrest 
itself is unlawful (see R v Hayes supra (n 194); R v Mahomed supra (n 201); R v Jackelson supra (n 
201); R v Thomas 1928 EDL 401 (unlawful search). See also chapter 5 at 241 infra. 
 
215 Burchell supra (n 29) 237. Although the point did not arise for decision, private defence against an 
insane person succeeded in R v K supra (n 151). But see how this requirement is dealt with in 
English law at n 430 infra. 
 
216 Burchell supra (n 29) 237. It is true that instances of the use of force to avoid damage to property by 
animals have been treated as cases of private defence (see R v Staalmeister 1912 EDL 308; R v West 
1925 EDL 80; Du Plessis v Van Aswegen 1931 TPD 332; R v Pope supra (n 141); S v Wassenaar 
1966 (2) PH H 351 (T); S v Dittmer 1971 (3) SA 296 (SWA)). Strictly speaking, the defence in these 
cases is that of necessity, provided that the animal concerned is not being used as an instrument to 
commit harm by the attacker - if so, then it will constitute private defence. 
 




of each case.218 The basic idea underlying private defence is that a person is allowed to 
“take the law into her own hands”, as it were, only if the ordinary legal remedies do not 
afford her effective protection. The rationale underlying this defence has been stated as 
ensuring that “justice should not yield to injustice”.219 As Snyman has submitted, “(t)he 
defence deals with nothing less than the protection of justice in the circumstances in 
which the police are unable because of their absence, to perform this task”. For this 
reason it is essential that the court critically examines the extent to which the “ordinary 
law of the land” was effective in preventing the precipitating unlawful attacks and 
freeing the abused from the attacks and their impact.220 
 
The underlying and often unarticulated question is whether an abused woman has a duty 
to flee the attack(s) rather than defend herself by killing. Snyman argues that there is no 
duty upon the attacked person to flee because “this is a negation of the whole essence of 
private defence [which deals]... with the upholding of justice... not a capitulation to 
injustice”.221 Burchell states that the South African courts seem to adopt the view that, 
where it is not dangerous to do so, the attacked person should flee.222  However, he 
submits that “there is no absolute duty to retreat and that the approach of our law ought to 
be that the question of whether or not the battered woman could or should have retreated 
is merely one of the issues taken into account when assessing whether the abused 
woman’s defensive act was allowed by law.” 223 
                                               
218 Burchell supra (n 29) 238; S v Van Wyk supra (n 133) at 497H, 509C-D.  
 
219 In respect of the justifications for the existence of private defence see pages 31-32 supra. 
 
220 Snyman supra (n 25) 102.  
 
221 Snyman supra (n 25) 107. 
 
222 Burchell supra (n 29) 238-239. 
 
223 Burchell supra (n 29) 239; S v Mguni supra (n 141) at 779. Snyman supra (n 124) 184 n 21 is of the 
view that it is unclear whether South African case law expects the attacked party to flee in cases 
where the defender will not be exposed to harm by doing so or jeopardizing another’s interests. 
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In Engelbrecht 224 Satchwell J was of the view that bearing in mind the “hidden” or 
“concealed” nature of domestic violence which is frequently confined to the privacy of 
the home, she was cautious about requiring the abused woman (and her child(ren) to 
vacate their home leaving the abusive spouse in full occupation.225 The judge further held  
                                                                                                                                       
Remarks made by our courts suggest that the defender should flee: R v Zikalala supra (n 151) 571-
572; R v K supra (n 151) at 358H; R v Patel supra (n 201) at 123F; R v Mguni supra (n 141) at 
779A; S v Dougherty 2003 (2) SACR 36 (W) at 50. The last-mentioned case provides an example 
where the line between retaliation and defence had become blurred. At the accused’s birthday party, 
guests had been seriously injured by unknown assailants outside his home on the night of the party. 
The accused held that since he feared for the safety of his guests, he took a firearm and went looking 
for the assailants. He came across two men whom he questioned concerning the earlier attack, and 
when they did not respond to his questions he pointed the firearm at them. One of the men, who was 
unarmed said “you will not use that” and started coming towards the accused, who, according to his 
evidence, fired “downwards in the direction of the deceased” but the deceased continued coming 
towards him. The accused then fired in the general direction of the deceased, killing him. The 
accused raised the defences of private and putative private defence. The court was of the view that in 
the circumstances he had acted unreasonably in not first aiming a non-fatal shot. The court, however, 
held that he lacked knowledge of unlawfulness required for murder in that he genuinely thought he 
was about to be attacked, but convicted him of culpable homicide as his reaction was negligent. 
Snyman supra (n 124) is of the view that the court should have upheld the accused’s plea of private 
defence. This was a classic case of private defence. Had the accused not shot at the deceased, he 
might have been overpowered and killed by his two attackers. To have expected him to run away 
would have amounted to expect him to “gamble with his life”. He was outnumbered two to one. He 
was no longer a young man (he was 63) whereas the two attackers were aged about 25 and 31 years 
(at 184 n 21). Snyman supra (n 124) at 185 goes on to state: “where the threat is one of personal 
injury the obvious possible way of avoiding the attack is to flee. Thus if harm can be avoided by 
flight, the accused should flee”. In respect of the question whether an attacked person is expected to 
flee in English law see chapter 3 at 116-117 infra; American law chapter 4 at 190-191 infra. 
However Burchell supra (n 29) at 245 does not agree with Snyman infra: “One cannot help 
wondering whether the accused was to some extent author of his own predicament by assuming the 
role of the police and searching for the culprits after the initial assault had already taken place. He 
could easily have alerted the police to the assault - leaving it to them to apprehend the wrongdoers. 
There would seem to be an element of retaliation about the accused’s conduct in Dougherty supra 
and perhaps a conviction of culpable homicide was the most pragmatic solution of those facts. What 
if the persons the accused had confronted had not been part of the original assault? Surely they could 
have defended themselves legitimately against his pointing a loaded gun at them? To regard his 
conduct as lawful, as Snyman does, would lead to the anomaly that they could not defend themselves 
against the accused’s attack. Where X and Y agree to engage in an unlawful fight (such as a duel) 
the combatants cannot invoke private defence to escape liability for the harm inflicted one upon the 
other, since their agreement cannot render the fight lawful”. 
 
224 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 
225 Ibid at par [354]. See further Lavallee v The Queen supra (n 153) 97: “(t)raditional self-defence 
doctrine does not require a person to retreat from her home instead of defending herself: a man’s 
home may be his castle but it is also the woman’s home even if it seems to her more like a prison in 
the circumstances.” In the case of Engelbrecht supra (n 143) Judge Satchwell held that domestic 
violence was mainly enacted in a ritualistic form by Mr. Engelbrecht in two places  which Mrs. 
Engelbrecht could call her own: her home and her place of work. Everyone’s home should be their 
castle and it was here that Mrs. Engelbrecht should have had a place of rest and a place to bring up 
her daughter. The deceased destroyed any possibility of peace in the flat they shared or where Mrs. 
Engelbrecht sought independent refuge from him as well as her place of work in the hospital where 
she had status as an individual and professional person quite independently of him. In this context, 
Judge Satchwell was of the view that it would be invidious for any court to expect Mrs. Engelbrecht 
to flee by leaving her home and abandoning her place of employment. Not only was this impractical 
and unfairly onerous upon her in the view of the court, but it failed to acknowledge who is the 
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that flight may be thought to encompass efforts made, not only to leave the home but also 
to approach State authorities such as the South African Police Service, the family 
violence courts, shelters, family and friends and so forth. The response to the 
unarticulated question as to why, if the violence was so intolerable, the abused woman 
did not leave her abuser long ago, should be that this question does not go to whether or 
not she had an alternative to killing the deceased at the critical moment. Nevertheless, as 
was stated in Lavallee,226 to the extent that her failure to leave the abusive relationship 
earlier may be used in support of the proposition that she was free to leave at the final 
moment, expert evidence can provide useful insights.227 
 
Satchwell J was further of the view that the court must, in this context, be extremely 
cautious in seeking to rely upon examination of the efforts taken by an abused woman to 
extricate herself from the abusive situation or to escape the abusive spouse or partner. 
Judgment should not be passed on the fact that the battered woman stayed in the abusive 
relationship. Still less is the court entitled to conclude that she forfeited her right to 





                                                                                                                                       
perpetrator of the wrongdoing and who deserved to be removed from those places and from society 
(at par [400]-[401]. 
 
226 Lavallee v The Queen supra (n 153) 96. 
 
227 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [355]. 
 
228 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [356]. While it is true that the right to act in private defence is 
subsidiary in nature, it takes effect only where the state is not there to protect a particular person. 
Thus where help is available from the State in the form of the SAPS, to protect a person, such a 
person should not, simply proceed to act in private defence. It would have been another matter if the 
SAPS did not perform their duties. The crux of the case in Engelbrecht supra (n 143) was whether 
Mrs. Engelbrecht gave the legal system and the SAPS a fair chance of helping her. The majority of 




There must be a certain balance between the attack and the defence.229 The limits of 
private defence are difficult to describe with any degree of precision since everything 
depends on the particular circumstances of the case. The approach to be favoured 230 
which was adopted by the court in S v Van Wyk 231 is whether the defender acted 
reasonably when he defended himself or his property. Put another way, the court will 
look at what may reasonably be expected of the attacked party in the circumstances of 
each case: 
 
“This test allows the court to assess the defence in the 
context of factors such as the nature of the attack, the interest 
threatened, the relationship of the parties, their respective age, 
sex, size and strength, the location of the incident, the nature 
of the means used in the defence, the result of the defence.” 232 
                                               
229 As Snyman supra (n 124) at 189 notes: “The upholding-of-justice principle plays an important role in 
the rule that there must be a reasonable relationship between the attack and the defensive act - that is, 
the requirement of proportionality in private defence. The harm occasioned by the defensive action 
must be proportional to the legal interests of the defender that are endangered and that are being 
protected by him or her”. But as Snyman goes on to note at 189-190: “If one accepts the individual-
protection theory as the only basis for private defence, it may be argued that the defending party may 
fend off imminent infringement of his or her rights without the defensive action necessarily being 
restricted in any way”. However, Snyman supra (n 124) at 190 goes on to conclude: “The legal order 
does not tolerate a gross disproportion between the interest protected by the defender and the interest 
he or she is attacking…. Disregard of the requirement of proportionality leads to law abuse - that is, 
disregard of the upholding-of-justice principle underlying the right to private defence”. In respect of 
whether there is a requirement of proportionality between the attack and defence in English law see 
chapter 3 at 157-159 infra; American law see chapter 4 at 200 infra. 
 
230 South African law had previously evolved a version of proportionality: whether the means used was 
commensurate with the danger. The problem with the proportionality rule, however, lies in 
determining between which two elements this “certain balance” must exist. For example must the 
balance between the interest the defender is trying to protect and the interest he harms; or must a 
balance exist between the attacker’s and defender’s weapons? See Snyman supra (n 25) 109-110. 
 
231 S v Van Wyk supra (n 133). Steyn CJ held: “It must be conceded, in my view, that such a balancing 
is not acceptable as a general yardstick. Generally, as regards private defence, the interests of the 
attacker and the victim are seldom similar or equivalent. It is true that a slap cannot without more 
justify killing, but the avoidance of a serious non -deadly wound... can be balanced against the life of 
the attacker; and how does one measure the dignity or bodily integrity of a woman who has been 
raped against the life of the rapist? Proportionality will not do as a general basis for private defence. 
One who invades another’s rights, who defiantly ignores the prohibition, warning and resistance of 
the defender so that he can only be prevented by the most extreme measures, can with good reason 
be seen as the author of his own misfortune. It is he who is the outlaw, and he is prepared to risk 
death in violating another’s rights, why should the defender, who is unquestionably entitled to 
protect his rights, be viewed as the one reacting unlawfully if he uses deadly force rather than 
sacrifice his rights?” (at par [49] own translation). 
 
232 Burchell supra (n 29) 241. Most of these factors are mentioned in S v Trainor 2003 (1) SACR 35 
(SCA) at 41-42, where it is acknowledged that there is a difficulty in determining the relevant 
factors. See also R v N’Thauling 1943 AD 649 at 654; R v Ndara supra (n 141) 184; S v Marert 
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When considering the proportionality between attack and defence, note should be taken 
of the surrounding circumstances, such as relative strength of the parties concerned, 
their gender, their age, the means they have at their disposal, the nature of the threat, 
the value of the interest that is threatened, and the persistence of the attack.233 No 
precise proportionality is required.234 
 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the court in Engelbrecht 235  took into 
account factors which were relevant to the situation of the accused and which could be 
used to show that her actions were reasonable in light of her circumstances.236 While 
these factors noted by the court suggested that proportionality between the attack and 
defensive action on her part had played an important role, the assessors in the 
Engelbrecht 237  case chose to emphasize help-channels which they felt Mrs. 
Engelbrecht had not utilized sufficiently, 238  thus undermining the court’s previous 
statements.239 However, had the court applied the coercive-control model, it would  
                                                                                                                                       
1967 (1) PH H167 (A). Although the approach in South African law has involved a version of the 
proportionality principle, namely whether the means used were commensurate with the danger 
apprehended (R v Jack Bob supra (n 151); R v Zikalala supra (n 151)); some cases have favoured the 
test of reasonableness (see S v Ntuli supra (n 141) at 436D, 436E; S v Motleleni supra (n 140) at 
406). 
 
233 Snyman supra (n 124) 190. See also S v Van Wyk supra (n 138) at 496-497; S v Trainor supra (n 
232) 41-42. 
 
234 As Snyman supra (n 124) at 190 notes: “it need only be approximate proportionality”. In S v Van 
Wyk supra (n 138) Steyn CJ held “Unlawful recompense does not serve as a fixed basis for self-
defence” (at 497B) (own translation). See also S v Ntuli supra (n 141) at 437E: “The court adopts a 
robust approach, not seeking to measure with nice intellectual calipers the precise bounds of 
legitimate self-defence.” 
 
235 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 
236 For a description of the factors taken into account see 42 above. 
 
237 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 
238 Ibid at par [418] and [448] at 151B-C and 157E-F. 
 
239 Namely that proportionality between the attack and defence was important. See further the factors to 
be taken into account in determining such proportionality in respect of the abused woman in 




become clear that she did not leave because the abuser controlled every aspect of her 
including the extent to which she obtained help and what would happen if she did.240 
 
2.2.2.2 Defence directed against the attacker 
The right of private defence can only be exercised against the attacker, not against a 
third party.241 
 
2.3 Provocation  
2.3.1 Development of the defence  
Roman-Dutch law did not recognize provocation as a complete defence but rather 
viewed anger as a mitigating factor. 242 De Wet argues that in Roman law, this issue 
was closely linked to the distinction that was drawn for sentence purposes between 
“premeditated” crimes and crimes committed “on impulse”. The latter category of 
crimes was not considered as serious as that of “premeditated” crimes.243 
 
De Wet submits that, of the Roman-Dutch writers, only Matthaeus and Van der Keessel 
comprehensively discussed the issue of provocation. De Wet noted Matthaeus’ view 
that nature requires a person to control his passions and impulses. But where a person 
committed a crime while in a “reasonable” state of anger, that crime would be more  
 
                                               
240 For a discussion of the coercive control theory see chapter 5  n 916 infra. 
 
241 Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) 142. See also chapter 5 at 315 infra. 
 
242 The discussion of' the early development of the law of provocation as well as the development of 
non-pathological incapacity as a defence has been based on the structure adopted from Hoctor A 
Peregrination through the Law of Provocation, in Joubert (ed) Essays in honour of CR Snyman 
(2008) 110-133. Cf S v Mokonto 1971 (2) SA 319 (A) where Holmes JA held: “Provocation and 
anger are different concepts, just as cause and effect are. But in criminal law, the term provocation 
seems to be used as including both concepts, throwing light on an accused’s conduct” (at 324). In S 
v Mandela 1992 (1) SACR 661 (A) at 665 b-d the terms “provokasie” (provocation) and “toorn” 
(anger) appear to be used interchangeably. For a discussion of the English law of provocation see 
chapter 3 at 127-159 infra; American law chapter 4 at 204-224 infra. 
 




leniently punished than a “premeditated” one. 244 In a similar vein, De Wet noted that 
the views of Moorman and Van der Keessel on the issue of anger corresponded closely 
with those of Matthaeus.245 The dominant view in Roman-Dutch law was thus that 
anger, could, at most, operate as a mitigating factor, rather than a ground excluding 
capacity, and then this was only where the anger was justified. 246 
 
2.3.1.1 The objective test  
South African law might have followed the Roman and Roman-Dutch law, were it not 
for the introduction of the mandatory death penalty 247 in 1917. Initially, under the 
influence of section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code of 1886, the South African 
courts adopted the stance that provocation could never be a complete defence to killing. 
At most it could be a partial defence. Therefore, homicide which would otherwise be 
murder, could be reduced to culpable homicide if the individual who caused the death 
did so in the heat of passion occasioned by sudden provocation.248 It appears that the 
“crucial factor in the courts not adopting the Roman-Dutch approach to provocation 




                                               
244 De Wet supra (n 76) 131, citing Matthaeus De Criminibus ad Lib XLV III Dig Commentarius (1644) 
Prol 2 14. 
 
245 De Wet supra (n 76) 132, citing Moorman Verhandeling Over de Misdaden en der selver Straffen 
(1764) Inl 2 31; Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Jus Criminale Vol 3 at 998 ff.  
 
246 Hoctor supra (n 242) 111, citing De Wet supra (n 76) 131-132. 
 
247 Burchell supra (n 29) 427. 
 
248 The court’s adoption of the “specific intent” approach is evident in relation to provocation. See for 
example R v Potgieter 1920 EDL 254 where Gane AJ states “One of the circumstances under which 
a charge of murder may be reduced to culpable homicide is where there has been great provocation, 
resulting in a justifiable heat of mind which prevents the accused from forming an actual intention 





ruthless sentencing regime, in terms of which the death penalty was mandatory with no 
provision made for extenuating circumstances”.249 
 
Section 141, which was based upon English law,250 envisaged a type of partial excuse 
situation: even if the killing was intentional “homicide which could otherwise be 
murder [it] may be reduced to culpable homicide.” 251 By requiring the provocation to 
be sufficient to deprive an “ordinary person” of self-control, an objective test of 
provocation was introduced into South African law.252  
 
In 1925 section 141 was accepted by the Appellate Division in R v Butelezi 253 as 
reflecting the South African law on this subject.254 To determine whether intention was 
present, section 141 embodied an objective test: the question was not whether the 
accused lacked intention for murder but whether a fictitious, ordinary person would as a  
                                               
249 Hoctor supra (n 242) 112; Burchell supra (n 29) 427. This is in terms of Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act of 1917. See also Hoctor supra (n 242) at 112 noting De Wet’s supra (n 76) statement 
that, there was temptation for judges to ensure, in circumstances where the killing was less 
blameworthy, that the death penalty was not in question by handing down a verdict of culpable 
homicide rather than murder (at 134). 
 
250 Burchell supra (n 29) at 427 has noted that the Transkeian Penal Code was strongly influenced by the 
Indictable Offences Bill of Sir James Stephen, which was drafted as a code of English criminal law 
and the draft code of June 1879 differed little from Stephen’s original code. However, neither code 
was passed into law. In R v Pascoe 2 SC 427 where the accused was charged with the murder of his 
wife and her suspected lover (upon finding them together in the bedroom), Lord de Villiers 
instructed the jury that whilst killing in circumstances where a couple were caught in adultery was 
not justified, that this would be a case of culpable homicide, and not murder. A similar approach was 
adopted in R v Udiya 1890 NLR 222. In R v Tsoyani 1915 EDL 380, the accused were held to have 
exceeded the bounds of defence, but as a result of the provocation which they endured, it was held 
that the verdict should be one of common assault, rather than assault with intent to do grievous 
bodily harm.  
 
251 Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) 280. Cf R v Hercules 1954 (3) SA 826 (A) at 352F-H: “The law 
recognizes a hybrid or middle situation where there is an intention to kill but where that intention is 
not entirely but to some extent excusable”. 
 
252 Cf Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol II 1st ed (1970) at 374: “The reasonable 
person is the embodiment of all qualities which we demand of a good citizen, a device whereby to 
measure the criminals conduct by reference to community values”. 
 
253 1925 AD 160 at 162.  
 




result of provocation have lacked intention.255 Thus, an objective test of provocation 
was established in South African law.256 The objective test remained in force, 257 until 
the case of R v Thibani.258  
 
By 1949 the position regarding mens rea had been considerably altered. A move 
towards a more subjective approach for provocation was followed. In the case of R v 
Thibani 259 Schreiner JA held provocation had assumed its proper place as “a special 
kind of material from which in association with the rest of the evidence, the decision 
must be reached whether or not the crown has proved the intent, as well as the act, 
beyond reasonable doubt.” 260 In terms of such an approach, provocation is merely a 




                                               




257 R v Attwood 1946 AD 331; R v Blokland 1946 AD 940; R v Tshabalala 1946 AD 1061; R v Zwane 
1946 NPD 396. This was the case, despite the courts occasionally applying a subjective test, holding 
that the accused was guilty of culpable homicide rather than murder on the basis that the provocation 
excluded intent, rather than because the accused was considered less blameworthy: cf R v George 
1938 CPD 486 and R v Cebekulu 1945 (2) PH H 176 (A). See further the minority judgment of 
Stratford JA in R v Ngobese 1936 AD 296 at 306 and Rhodesian case of R v Maloko 1949 (2) Ph H 
110. 
 




260 Ibid at 731. Hoctor supra (n 242) at 113 notes that Schreiner JA followed the developments of 
English case of R v Woolminton 1935 AC 462 and the South African cases of R v Ndhlovu 1945 
AD 369. Despite a move towards a subjective test for provocation, the case of R v Kennedy 1951 (4) 
SA 431 (A) at 438h (the court in this case following the case of Attwood supra (n 257) demonstrated 
a move towards an objective approach. In R v Molako 1954 (3) SA 777 (O) support was shown for a 
subjective assessment of the effect of provocation on the accused. But the court was careful to point 
out that there should be no weakening of the principle that a sane person is responsible for the 
ordinary consequences of his acts (at 781B-G). 
 




In R v Tenganyika 262 the Federal Supreme Court was of the view that provocation had 
been given a restricted role in the Thibani 263 case. The court was of the view that 
provocation could not only be used in the way suggested by the court, but also that it 
could be used in the way indicated in section 141. This comprised a two-stage test. 264 
 
First it should be enquired whether, despite the provocation, the accused, had the intent 
to kill, subjectively assessed. If the intent to kill was absent, the accused would be 
acquitted of murder, but found guilty of culpable homicide. However, if the accused did 
have the intent to kill, the second stage of the test would be whether the reasonable 
person would have lost his self-control in the circumstances (objective test). If this was 
the case, then the court would reduce the offence to one of culpable homicide, despite 
the presence of intention. 265 
 
In R v Krull 266 the suggestion that provocation could be utilized in the way not only set 
out by the court but indicated in section 141 was rejected by the Appellate Division. 
The court was of the view that these two roles were incompatible with one another and 
that the approach in Thibani 267 was the correct one. The role of the court in Krull 268 
was: 
 
                                               
262 1958 (3) SA 7 (FSC). 
 
263 R v Thibani supra (n 258). 
 
264 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 114, discussing R v Tenganyika supra (n 262) at 12 and 11G; H; 13A, E. This 
would cater for principle (subjective approach to mens rea) and policy (to ensure that the accused 
would not be acquitted). 
 
265 Hoctor supra (n 242) 114. 
 
266 1959 (3) SA 392 (A). 
 
267 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 114-115, discussing R v Thibani supra (n 258). 
 
268 R v Krull supra (n 266) and in the process dismissing the Tenganyika supra (n 262) approach for its 




“...to examine all the evidence which throws light on the 
mental state of the accused at the time of the killing in order to 
see whether, having regard to the effect of provocation and 
intoxication on his powers of understanding self-control, but 
excluding mental abnormalities short of insanity and 
excluding normal personal idiosyncrasies [sic], he had the 
intention to kill.” 269 
 
Schreiner JA emphasized that an objective dimension to the examination of provocation 
was essential for practical purposes. The argument went that hot-headed individuals 
should not be allowed to give free reign to their emotions.270  
 
2.3.1.2 The subjective test of intention 
The subjective test is usually applied to a murder charge. The question to be asked is 
whether or not the accused had the intention to murder. In Mangondo 271 it was held 
that since criminal intention was now subjectively assessed, as opposed to the previous 
objective test applied, it was necessary to revise the law relating to provocation.272 In 
Lubbe 273  the question to whether the accused’s state of mind arose from “normal 
personal idiosyncrasies” would have to be determined by either a subjective or 





                                               
269 Ibid at 400A. 
 
270 Ibid at 396FF. But as Hoctor supra (n 242) at 114 notes, if Schreiner JA’s intention was to set out a 
test without the conflation of both objective and subjective elements, this was not necessarily the 
result and therefore cannot necessarily be reconciled with Thibani supra (n 258). 
 
271 1963 (4) SA 160 (A). 
 
272 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 115, discussing S v Mangondo supra (n 271) at 162E-F. The court went on to 
note that an objective test had been applied in the cases of Kennedy supra (n 260); Attwood supra (n 
257) and Butelezi supra (n 253). 
 
273 1963 (4) SA 459 (W). 
 




“...provocation seems to have assumed its proper place, not as 
a defence but as a special kind of material from which, in 
association with the rest of the evidence, the decision must be 
reached whether or not the Crown has proved the intent, as 
well as the act, beyond reasonable doubt.” 275 
 
Jansen J was of the view that the dictum favoured a subjective test. Furthermore, he 
was of the view that the phrase “excluding normal personal idiosyncrasies” from the 
Krull 276 case did not reintroduce the objective test but meant rather that in a subjective 
consideration of the intention to kill, evidence of the accused’s personal idiosyncrasies 
must not be considered.277 The problem with this statement is that a subjective test of 
intention includes all subjective factors, idiosyncratic or not. Therefore, such factors 
must be taken into account, or the test for provocation will include an objective 
component.278  
 
In S v Dlodlo,279 the Appellate Division approved the subjective test for the intention to 
kill where the defence of provocation 280 was raised and in Delport 281 it was held that 
where the presence of intent was in question: 
 
“…it is self-evident that the trier of a fact is required to have 
regard to all the evidential material which, in the light of our  
                                               
275 Ibid at 731. 
 
276 R v Krull supra (n 266). 
 
277 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 115, noting Burchell’s argument in “Provocation: Subjective or Objective” 
(1964) South African Law Journal 27 at 28-29. 
 
278 Burchell supra (n 277) 29, cited in Hoctor supra (n 243) at 115. 
 
279 1966 (2) SA 401 (A). 
 
280 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 115. Botha JA stated that the onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused caused the injury “as a fact appreciated subjectively, the 
possibility of death resulting there from. The judge further noted: The subjective state of mind of an 
accused at the time of the infliction of fatal injury is not ordinarily capable of direct proof, and can 
normally only be inferred from all the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the infliction of 
that injury” (at 264). 
 




available knowledge of how the human faculty of volition 
functions, is relevant to the determination of the state of mind 
of the accused concerned”. 
 
In the Mokonto 282 case the Appellate Division came to the decision that provocation is 
a material factor to be taken into account in ascertaining whether the accused 
subjectively had a particular intention. The court also held that provocation may 
sometimes have a contrary effect to that provided for in section 141 of the Transkeian 
Penal Code: instead of negativing the intention to murder, it may in fact confirm the 
presence of such intention.283 The court also noted that section 141 of the Transkeian 
Penal Code reflected an objective approach to provocation which was inconsistent with 
the “subjective approach of modern judicial thinking” 284 which eschewed doctrines 
such as the presumption that an individual intends the reasonable and probable 
consequences of his act, 285 and the versari in re illicita doctrine.286 
 
2.4 Non-pathological incapacity 
2.4.1 Introduction 
From 1967, the notion of criminal capacity was introduced into South African law.287 
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged  
                                               
282 1971 (2) SA 319 (A). In this case, the accused, a young tribal Zulu, had been found guilty of murder 
with extenuating circumstances, of a woman whom he considered to be a witch. According to the 
accused’s evidence, the woman had on the fateful day told him: “You will not see the setting of the 
sun”. The accused had reason to take this threat seriously, since about a month previously the 
deceased had informed him and his two brothers that they were all going to die. This proved to be 
accurate as regards the two brothers, and with a view to averting such fate for himself, the accused 
killed the witch. He decapitated her with a cane-knife in order, so he explained, to prevent her from 
rising again, and he chopped off her hands since these had handled the “muti” (the medicine with 
which she allegedly caused the death of the two brothers. 
 
283 S v Mokonto supra (n 282) 327B-C; 325D. 
 
284 S v Mokonto supra (n 282) 325F-G. 
 
285 S v Mokonto supra (n 282) 325G-H.  
 
286 S v Mokonto supra (n 282) 324G-H, discussed in Hoctor supra (n 242) at 116.  
 
287 Cf Snyman “Die verweer van nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid in die strafreg” (1989) 
Tydskrif vir die Regwetenskap 1 where the author notes that the notion of “criminal capacity” was 
adopted from the Continental legal systems, specifically German Law.  
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Persons and Related Matters 288 investigated this notion and its findings gave rise to the 
provisions of section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.289 This section sets out the 
defence of mental illness. In the case of S v Mahlinza,290 the court was of the view that 
the criminal capacity of the accused was an essential requirement necessary to establish 
criminal liability.291 
 
According to the Rumpff Commission Report, criminal capacity consists of both the 
cognitive capacity and conative capacity. Cognitive capacity refers to the actor’s 
intellectual abilities such as the ability to distinguish between right and wrong as well 
as the ability to perceive, to reason and to understand.292 Conative capacity refers to the 
actor’s ability to control her behaviour. In other words, to set a goal and decide whether 
or not to pursue it. 293  Furthermore, the Rumpff Commission Report defined self-
control as: 
 
“..a disposition of the perpetrator through which his insight 
into the unlawful nature of a particular act can restrain him 
from, and thus set up a counter-motive to, its execution. Self 
control is simply the force which insight into the unlawfulness 
of the proposed act can exercise in that it constitutes a 
counter-motive. In normal non-criminal persons the idea of 
committing an unlawful act arouses aversion. Only where very 
strong motives are present to promote the execution of such an 
act, is a crime actually committed. But where insight into the 
unlawfulness of the act, even though present, arouses no  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
288 RP 69/1967. 
 
289 Act 51 of 1977. 
 
290 1967 (1) SA 408 (A). 
 
291 Ibid at 414G-H. 
 
292 Rumpff Commission Report supra (n 288) at par 9.9. 
 




aversion at all, so that insight cannot operate as a counter-
motive, there is no self-control.” 294 
 
Where either of the two capacities are absent, the actor will be found to be lacking 
criminal capacity and therefore will not be held criminally liable for her actions.295 
 
The Rumpff Commission 296  identified a third type of mental function: affective 
functions. This relates to the actor’s emotions or feelings. The Rumpff Commission 297 
was of the view that such affective emotional disturbances should not exclude criminal 
liability,298 especially where the accused evidences “insight and volitional control in her 
conduct”.299 
 
2.4.2 Development of the defence of non-pathological incapacity  
Since the decision in S v Chretien,300 a new approach to provocation has been followed. 
The question now asked is whether provocation (that is, the accused’s angry response) 
could exclude the basic “elements” of liability - in the same way as intoxication can. In 
this case the Appellate Division dealt with the decision in S v Johnson.301 The court 
held that the latter case was incorrectly decided due to its policy-driven conviction of  
                                               
294 Rumpff Commission Report supra (n 288) at par 9.33. 
 
295 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 118; Snyman supra (n 287) at 2. 
 
296 Rumpff Commission Report supra (n 288). 
 
297 Ibid at par 9.19. 
 
298 It should be noted that a distinction needs to be made between voluntary conduct and criminal 
capacity, and between criminal capacity and fault. In respect of the voluntary conduct and criminal 
capacity distinction see R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 (N) at 265E-F; S v Mahlinza supra (n 289) at 
414H-415A. In respect of the distinction between criminal capacity and fault see Van der Merwe’s 
summary of the positions in “Toerekeningsvatbaarheid v ‘Specific Intent’ - die Chretien-beslissings” 
(1981) Obiter 142 at 148. 
 
299 Rumpff Commission Report supra (n 288) at par 9.19, discussed in Hoctor supra (n 242) at 118. 
 
300 S v Chretien supra (n 97). 
 




the accused. This was despite a finding that the accused did not know what he was 
doing. For this reason the court held that the decision was “juridically impure”.302 The 
court went on to note that the specific intent doctrine was contrary to the precepts of 
South African law.303 
 
The court went on to apply a principled approach to the issue of voluntary intoxication, 
namely that intoxication could exclude liability by negating various elements of 
liability. These include the requirement that the act must be voluntary;304 the accused 
had the necessary criminal capacity at the time of acting,305 and the requirement of fault 
in the form of intention (for crimes requiring intent).306 
 
In S v Van Vuuren 307 the question whether provocation could exclude basic “elements” 
of liability, in the same way intoxication can was addressed. In this case the judge also 
made a broader statement in respect of what is meant by provocation: 
 
“I am prepared to accept that an accused should not be held 
criminally responsible for an unlawful act where failure to 
comprehend what he is doing, is not attributed to drink alone, 
but to a combination of drink and other factors such as 
provocation and severe mental or emotional stress. In 
principle there is no reason for limiting the enquiry to the case 
to where a man is too drunk to know what he is doing. Other 
factors which may contribute towards the conclusion that he  
                                               
302 S v Chretien supra (n 97) at 1103D, discussed in Hoctor supra (n 242) at 120. 
 
303 S v Chretien supra (n 97) at 1104A. 
 
304 S v Chretien supra (n 97) 1104E-F; 1106E-F. 
 
305 S v Chretien supra (n 97) 1104; 1106F-G. 
 
306 Hoctor supra (n 242) 121. It is important to note that the court qualified its wholesale acceptance of 
the principled approach to liability by qualifying his judgment. Rumpff CJ held that such an 
approach necessarily excluded those accused who made use of alcohol to commit the crime (at 
1105G-H). The judge went on to note that any problem in adopting the principled approach lay more 
in the application as opposed to the legal principle (at 1105H). 
 




failed to realize what was happening or to appreciate the 
unlawfulness of his act must obviously be taken into account 
in assessing criminal liability”. 308 
 
In S v Lesch 309 the traditional approach to provocation was expanded to include not 
only the loss of self-control caused by provocative words or conduct but also some 
emotional disturbances such as emotional stress. Although the accused was convicted 
of murder, it is important to note that the court adopted the same approach as in 
Chretien:310 establishing the existence of the elements of voluntary conduct, criminal 
capacity and intention.311 Furthermore, the court was of the view that provocation, far 
from eliminating the intention to kill, actually contributed to the forming of such 
intent.312 
 
In S v Arnold 313 strong authority was laid down for the viewpoint that emotional 
factors could lead to an acquittal as a result of provocation. Arnold suffered from severe 
emotional stress to such an extent that when he shot his wife: 
                                               
308 Ibid at 17G-H, per Diemont AJA. 
 
309 1983 (1) SA 814 (O). 
 
310 S v Chretien supra (n 97). 
 
311 S v Lesch supra (n 309) at 825F-826A (per Hattingh AJ), discussed in Hoctor supra (n 242) at 123. 
 
312 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 123, citing S v Lesch supra (n 309) 826A. See further 823G-824B where the 
terminology of the Rumpff Commission report (specifically para’s 9.30, 9.32 and 9.33) are referred 
to in discussing the notion of criminal capacity. 
 
313 1985 (3) SA 256 (C). In this case the accused was charged with killing his twenty-one year old wife. 
Prior to the day of the killing the accused had been subjected to a good deal of emotional stress. One 
of his sons from a previous marriage suffered from a serious hearing disability and because his 
second wife (the deceased) developed a hostile attitude to the boy, the accused had to place the child 
in a special home. The accused was very attached to the boy. The deceased’s mother had moved in 
with the couple and she suffered from a hysterical condition. The relationship between the accused 
and the deceased was strained. Now and again she left the house to stay somewhere else but he 
managed to encourage her to return. On the day in question the accused had just taken his disabled 
son to the home after arguing with the deceased. Returning his son to the home was a traumatic 
event for the accused. On his arrival at this house, he encountered his wife. He had a pistol in his 
possession which he claimed he needed because his job involved handling large sums of money and 
sometimes his work took him into areas where there had been riots. When he encountered his wife 
on his return, he claimed that she was so positioned in the room that he was unable to put the gun in 
a secure place. He held the gun in his hand and during their discussions he hit it against the Couch to 
emphasize a point. The accused was upset because his wife did not tell him where she was staying 
and what work she was doing. During their conversation the gun went off, the bullet going in the 
 70 
 
“…[H]is conscious mind was so flooded by emotions that it 
interfered with his capacity to appreciate what was right or 
wrong and, because of his emotional state, he may have lost 
the capacity to exercise control over his actions”. 314 
 
The court was of the opinion that: 
 
“…it is not only youth, mental disorder, or intoxication which 
could lead to a state of criminal incapacity, but also incapacity 
caused by other factors such as extreme emotional stress”.315 
 
At variance with this outcome was the fact that while the court accepted that it was 
reasonably possible that the accused was lacking capacity at the time of the death of his 
wife,316 the court had prior to this found it reasonably possible that the accused was 
acting in a state of sane automatism at the time of the shooting.317 Although the court 
was aware of the need to be cautious of accepting that the accused lacked capacity,318 
the judge was of the view that due to the most unusual facts of the case, the killing “was 
at variance with the whole conduct of the accused both before and after” were 
indicative of uncontrolled conduct. In other words the accused had been acting in a 
state of automatism.319 
                                                                                                                                       
opposite direction to where the deceased was standing. The accused admitted that he could not 
recollect reloading the pistol, but also conceded that he must have done so. Apparently the deceased 
then bent forward “displaying her bare breasts” and referred to her desire to return to her work as a 
stripper. The second shot was fired and the deceased was struck and killed. The court noted that this 
was obviously an act of provocation on the part of the deceased (at 261). 
 
314 S v Arnold supra (n 313) 263C-D (per Burger J). 
 
315 S v Arnold supra (n 313) 264C-D. 
 
316 S v Arnold supra (n 313) 264D. 
 
317 S v Arnold supra (n 313) 263G-H. It should be noted that psychiatric testimony was led on behalf of 
the accused, to the effect that at the time of the shooting the accused’s mind was so flooded with 
emotions that he may have acted subconsciously or may have lost the capacity to exercise control 
over his actions (at 263C-E). Thus both the voluntariness of the accused’s conduct and his capacity 
were placed in issue. 
 
318 S v Arnold supra (n 313) 264G-H.  
 




S v Campher 320  confirmed the principle in Arnold. 321  The majority of the court 
accepted a general test for criminal capacity in South African law – a test wide enough 
to include provocation as a complete defence. In this case the three judges all delivered 
differing judgments resulting in separate majority findings on the facts and on the law. 
The accused’s case was rendered more complicated due to the fact that her counsel in 
the court a quo failed to raise the possibility that her conative capacity may have been 
lacking at the time of the killing, and further by the failure by defence counsel to 
adduce any expert psychiatric evidence. Two of the three judges agreed that the defence 
of incapacity is not limited to section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 322 Jacobs JA 
held that in terms of the recommendations of the Rumpff Commission,323 section 78 of  
                                               
320 1987 (1) SA 940 (A). In this case the deceased (husband) of the accused had assaulted her and 
mocked her religion, forced her to send her children from a previous marriage to live with her former 
husband, forced her to clean his pigeon coops, on occasion compelled her to use the toilet outside the 
house at night, compelled her to arm herself with a firearm and investigate noises at his pigeon coops 
at night, and often insisted that she sit at his bedside throughout the night to protect him against evil 
spirits. On the day of the attack the accused had started the day in an exhausted state. The deceased 
had forced her to stay awake at his bedside throughout the night, to ward off the spirits he believed 
endangered him. He started the day in a characteristically bad mood; he quarreled offensively with 
all and sundry. He busied himself fitting a bolt-lock to his pigeon coop. The accused had to help him 
by holding a metal fitting while he bored a hole in the wooden door frame. She was in an extremely 
uncomfortable position and did not hold the fitting as requested; as a result the hole was not drilled 
straight and the screw intended for it would not fit. This enraged the deceased, who threatened the 
accused with a screwdriver. She fled to their house, but he followed her and prevented her from 
locking him out, she armed herself with a pistol. The deceased was too enraged to be deterred by 
this. He forced her back to the pigeon coop. She went there still armed with the pistol. There the 
deceased berated her on her knees to pray for the hole to become straight. The accused then shot the 
deceased. 
 
321 S v Arnold supra (n 313). 
 
322 According to Viljoen JA, the decision in S v Chretien supra (n 97) opened the door to the recognition 
of a defence of non-imputability even where the non-imputability stemmed from a temporary mental 
aberration. Viljoen adopted the view that the accused had laboured under an impulse which she 
could not resist, namely to destroy the “monster” (husband) that was threatening her (at 958I). As a 
result, she had been unable to act in accordance with a distinction between right and wrong, and was 
thus not imputable at the time of the fatal incident (at 960D-E). It is important that Viljoen JA was 
prepared to make this finding despite the fact that no expert evidence regarding the accused’s mental 
condition when she killed the deceased had been led. Viljoen concluded that, since the accused’s 
condition did not stem from a “mental illness or mental defect” she was to be acquitted without 
being declared a State President’s patient in terms of section 78 (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act (S 
v Campher supra (n 320) at 958). Viljoen JA also noted that the enquiry into capacity was a separate 
enquiry to that into intention, and must therefore precede it. Only once the accused has been found to 
have capacity would the court be required to assess intention (at 955C-F) Boshoff AJA shared the 
view adopted by Viljoen JA that a defence of non-imputability is not restricted to conditions 
stemming from a mental illness or defect, but includes cases where an accused suffers from a 
temporary mental aberration as a result of fear or emotional stress (at 965H-966B). 
 
323 Act 51 of 1977. 
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the Criminal Procedure Act was so worded as to provide for criteria for the 
determination of the criminal accountability of someone who suffers from a “mental 
illness” or a “mental defect”.324 
 
Ferreira notes that the fact that the application of section 78 has been so restricted does 
not mean that the criteria which have developed in the South African law and have now 
been embodied in the section cannot be applied to temporary impairment of person’s 
mental state. The principle of criminal accountability ought to apply regardless of 
whether the mental disorder or the change in the emotional condition was caused by 
liquor or severe emotional stress.325 As Ferreira goes on to note, “the different mental 
conditions should not be compartmentalized; a general principle should be followed by 
applying the criteria for accountability irrespective of whether the accused’s aberration 
was of a temporary or permanent nature”.326 
 
The recognized psychological characteristics of criminal capacity were set out in S v 
Laubscher:327 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
324 Hoctor supra (n 242) 124. Jacobs JA noted that since the accused’s defence counsel had failed to lead 
psychiatric evidence and had failed to properly plead lack of capacity, it was impossible to determine 
if the accused lacked capacity at the relevant time (at 960D-E). He regarded the accused’s defence as 
one of “irresistible impulse”. He argued that such a defence only exists within the provisions of 
section 78 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and concluded that, since the accused had not suffered 
from a mental illness or defect and since this was not the case, (at 960E-962B) the conviction of 
murder was to be upheld (at 963H-I). 
 
325 Ferreira Premenstrual Syndrome and Criminal Justice (1994) LLM 175.  
 
326 Ibid. Du Plessis in “The extension of the ambit of ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid to the defence of 
provocation - a strafregwetenskaplike development of doubtful practical value” (1987) South 
African Law Journal 539 at 545 states that the Campher supra (n 320) decision can be criticized on 
the ground that, although the appeal was dismissed by a majority of the court (Boshoff AJA and 
Jacobs JA), a majority (Viljoen JA and Boshoff AJA) adopted the view that a general defence of 
non-imputability exists in our law outside the provisions of section 78 (1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act. The ultimate decision is thus not based upon a majority view of the law.  
 




“To be criminally liable, the perpetrator must at the time of the 
commission of the alleged offence have criminal capacity. 
Criminal capacity is a prerequisite for criminal liability. The 
principle of criminal capacity is an independent subdivision of 
the doctrine of mens rea... .To be criminally accountable, a 
perpetrator’s mental faculties must be such that he is legally to 
blame for his conduct. The recognized psychological 
characteristics of criminal capacity are: (1): the ability to 
distinguish between the wrongfulness or otherwise of his 
conduct. In other words, he has the capacity to appreciate that 
his conduct is unlawful. (2) The capacity to act in accordance 
with the above appreciation in that he has the power to refrain 
from acting unlawfully; in other words, that he had the ability 
to exercise free choice as to whether to act lawfully or 
unlawfully. If either one of these psychological characteristics 
is lacking, the perpetrator lacks criminal capacity, [for 
example] where he does not have the insight to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his act. By the same token, the perpetrator 
lacks criminal capacity where his mental powers are such that 
he does not have the capacity for self-control.” 328 
 
In S v Laubscher 329 a distinction was drawn between statutory criminal incapacity 330 
and non-pathological criminal incapacity of a temporary nature. The latter can be a 
result of non-pathological condition that is not attributable to a mental illness or mental 
defect in the form of a pathological condition that is not attributable to a mental illness 
or mental defect in the form of a pathological disturbance of the conscious mind. The 
court held that it was not necessary to specify the condition which could lead to non-
pathological criminal incapacity.331 
 
                                               
328 Ibid at 166D-167A (own translation). Ferreira supra (n 325) at 173-174 notes that consequently any 
factor, such as fear would be legally relevant if it led to the disruption of the cognitive and/or 
conative functions of the conscious mind. In this respect see S v Bailey 1982 (3) SA 772 (A) at 
796C: “It is possible that the accused could be so afraid that he is not able to foresee the 
consequences of his actions, or that what he is doing is unlawful. In certain instances, he can in fact 
lack criminal capacity”.  
 
329 S v Laubscher supra (n 68). 
 
330 In terms of section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. See also S v Calitz 1990 (1) 
SACR 119 (A) where the court recognized the existence of a general test for criminal capacity, 
despite the fact that the defence did not succeed in this case. 
 
331 Ferreira supra (n 325) 175. Cf Bergenthuin “Die algemene toerekeningsvatbaarheidsmaatstaf” (1985) 
De Jure 273 where the author has noted that it is unnecessary to define a “numerus clausus” of 




The issue of emotional stress constituting a complete defence was again considered in S 
v Smith 332 and S v Wiid. 333 In Smith 334 it was held that: 
 
“I assume for the present purposes that what was described as 
an ‘emotional storm’ or ‘emotional flooding of the mind’ can 
result in loss of criminal capacity, that is that such an 
emotional disturbance could result in a person being, in the 
words of section 78, incapable of appreciating the 
wrongfulness of her act or of acting in accordance with 
appreciation of such.” 335 
 
As a result, provocation or severe emotional distress may deprive an individual of the 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct or to act in accordance with this 
appreciation, and for this reason it appears to constitute a complete defence to criminal 
liability.336 
 
After the decision in S v Wiid 337 it is clearly established that a general test for criminal 
capacity is finally accepted in South African law. Not only was the defence of non- 
                                               
332 S v Smith supra (n 68). 
 
333 1990 (1) SACR 561 (A). 
 
334 S v Smith supra (n 68). 
 
335 Ibid at 134J-135A, discussed in Ferreira supra (n 325) at 175. 
 
336 Ferreira supra (n 325) 175.Cf Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) 239. 
 
 
337 S v Wiid supra (n 333). In this case at 563F-J, the dictum in Laubscher supra (n 68) at 166F-167A 
was cited as a statement of the law relating to the defence of non-pathological incapacity in the only 
case in which the Appellate Division/Supreme Court of Appeal has upheld the defence. In this case 
the accused, who killed her abusive husband, was acquitted on the basis that she lacked criminal 
capacity as a result of the abuse that she had suffered. However, in this case, just before shooting her 
husband several times, the accused had been seriously assaulted by him, and there was some 
evidence compatible with the conclusion that she might have been concussed. But see further 
chapter 5 at 295-296 discussing the possibility that this case was wrongly decided. If this criticism of 
Wiid supra (n 333) is correct, then it limits the number of cases where the accused could successfully 
rely on the defence and for this reason it could be said that the existence of the defence borders on 
the theoretical. Cf S v Potgieter 1994 (1) SACR 61 (A) where Kumleben JA emphasized the need to 
subject the evidence adduced by the appellant in support of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity with circumspection (citing S v Kensley 1995 (1) SACR 646 (A) at 658j; S v Van der 
Sandt 1998 (2) SACR 627 (W) at 636B-C); and that such a defence must be subjected to careful 
scrutiny by the courts (citing S v Goitsemang 1997 (1) SACR 99 (O) at 103I-104A; S v Gesualdo 
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pathological incapacity acknowledged but on appeal the defence also succeeded as a 
result of the application of this principle. It is clear that the cause of the dysfunction of 
the accused’s conscious mind is irrelevant to determine liability – it only concerns the 
capacity of the accused to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct or to act in 
accordance with it.338 
 
In Nursingh 339  the accused, a university student, shot and killed his mother, 
grandmother and grandfather. The issue which the court had to decide was whether 
when committing these crimes, he had the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct and whether he had the capacity to act in accordance with such an 
appreciation. Defence counsel for the accused placed emphasis on the prolonged sexual 
abuse that his mother had subjected him to and the fact that the accused had “a 
personality make-up which predisposed him to a violent reaction”. Furthermore, his 
conduct on the night in question was “so clouded by an emotional storm” that he lacked 
criminal capacity. Evidence led by both a psychologist and psychiatrist gave evidence 
that the circumstances faced by the accused had triggered off a state of “altered 
consciousness” in the accused which deprived him of awareness of normality. The 
psychiatrist described the condition as: 
 
                                                                                                                                       
(1997) (2) SACR 68 (W) at 74G-H). In this case it was held that the accused’s own words that the 
conduct was uncontrolled in nature should be accepted, unless it can be said that such evidence 
“cannot be reasonably true” (at 73D-I). While the court correctly set out the principles to be taken 
into account when examining cases of non-pathological incapacity, it should be noted that Potgieter 
deals with automatism: despite this it proceeds to cite cases such as Kalogoropoulos 1993 (1) SACR 
12 (A); Mahlinza supra (n 289) and Wiid supra (n 333) which deal with non-pathological incapacity. 
 
338 Ferreira supra (n 325) 175-176. The trial court held that it may have been reasonably possible that the 
accused may have been concussed after the assault and during the time she fired the fatal shots thus 
accounting for the fact that she could not remember pulling the trigger of the pistol. The Appellate 
Division clearly emphasized that where a foundation for the defence of temporary non-pathological 
incapacity is laid, the State bears the burden of disproving this defence beyond reasonable doubt. 
Here the State was held not to have discharged this burden and the defence of temporary non-
pathological incapacity succeeded. 
 




“...a separation of intellect and emotion, with temporary 
destruction of the intellect, a state in which, although the 
individual’s actions may be goal-directed, he would be using 
no more intellect than a dog biting in a moment of response to 
provocation”. 340 
 
The psychologist testifying on behalf of the accused went on to describe the “emotional 
storm” experienced by the accused as “an acute catathemic crisis resulting in an 
overwhelming of the normal psychic equilibrium by an all-consuming rage, resulting in 
the disruption and the displacement of logical thinking manifesting itself in an 
explosion of aggressiveness that frequently leads to homicide”.341  
 
Both the medical experts testified that “conflict in a particular relationship, which leads 
to unbearable tension... is released in this violent way by some trigger event”. 342 Such 
an occurrence was not a pathological one and “ordinary motor movements of the body 
can take place with normal efficiency”.343  
 
The accused was acquitted due to the absence of any psychological evidence led by the 
prosecution to challenge the defence raised by the accused. Squires J acquitted the 
accused on all charges on the basis that the counsel for the accused had laid a factual 
foundation which at least established a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had 
the necessary criminal capacity.344 
 
 
                                               
340 S v Nursingh supra (n 339) 333D-E. The court thus accepted that the accused’s series of goal-directed 
acts constituted only one act in each case. 
 
341 Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) at 285, citing S v Nursingh supra (n 339) at 333E-H. 
 
342 S v Nursingh (n 339) at 333H. 
 
343 Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) at 285-286, citing S v Nursingh supra (n 339) at 333I. 
 




Burchell and Milton state that “this case leads to a measure of disquiet about the 
conclusion that an intelligent person, albeit under a good deal of stress, can shoot his 
mother and grandfather by firing three bullets into their bodies and his grandmother by 
firing four bullets into her body, and escape criminal liability completely. In the past, 
evidence of behavioural scientists regarding the unfortunate background circumstances 
faced by an accused would have been led, more appropriately, in mitigation of 
sentence. Even if this evidence should be led on the issue of liability was Nursingh 345 
under any more stress or pressure than the accused in Campher?” 346  
 
In Moses 347 the accused was acquitted of killing his homosexual lover. Three months 
after meeting, they engaged in their first act of unprotected sexual intercourse. 
Immediately after this act, the ‘deceased’ informed the accused of his ‘HIV-positive’ 
status. The accused flew into a rage beating and stabbing the deceased with various 
weapons. The deceased died as a result of the attack. Expert testimony regarding the 
accused’s mental state at the time of the killing was led by defence counsel. Both a 
psychiatrist and psychologist concluded that “due to the accused being in an 
annihilatory rage, he experienced a collapsing of controls, which resulted in him 
lacking the necessary capacity to be held liable for the fatal conduct.” 348 
 
De Vos is of the view that this case leaves South African law with dangerous precedent. 
Moses was clearly in a rage and emotionally disturbed for a brief period before and 
during the act. However, a volitional element was present in the series of acts. This 
indicates that the court failed to distinguish between uncontrollable actions and actions  
                                               
345 S v Nursingh supra (n 339). 
 
346 Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) 286; S v Campher supra (n 320). 
 
347 1996 (1) SACR 701 (C)  
 




which are controllable, but which the accused failed to control. Rage may mean that he 
decided not to control his actions, but it doesn’t mean that they were uncontrollable.349  
 
Louw notes that a further problem with the Moses 350 case is that “the conceptual 
foundation of the defence’s case is the psychological contention that the accused’s 
controls ‘collapsed’. Although this does suggest a lack of self-control, the defence’s 
witness implied elsewhere that the accused’s controls might only have been 
diminished”.351 The court did not draw this distinction and either result leads to an 
acquittal: 
 
“Dr. Gittleson testified that he believed Mr. Moses knew what 
he was doing at the time of the killing. He would have had the 
capacity to foresee that Gerhard would be killed. However, his 
capacity to exert normal control over his actions and also to 
consider his behaviour in the light of what was wrong, was 
significantly impaired at the time of the killing”.352 
 
The court went on to note: 
 
“Dr. Gittleson testified further that in a state of rage one’s 
capacity to retain control is definitely impaired. With specific 
reference to the accused, it was possible for a state of rage to 
have continued to such a degree that the loss of control or 
partial loss of control, lasted throughout the time that the 
killing took place. Despite the killing, the accused’s capacity 
to control his behaviour in accordance with what he knew was 
right and wrong, was impaired. While he knew that it was  
                                               
349 De Vos “S v Moses: Criminal Capacity, provocation and HIV” (1996) South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 354 at 358. Cf Rumpff Commission Report supra (n 287) at par 9.26. Cf Louw 
supra (n 28) at 215 where the author notes that Moses is the first “in which a provocation defence 
has resulted in an acquittal where there was no long term abuse of the accused preceding the killing, 
either by the deceased or at all. In all previous judgments, the final provocative act, was 
metaphorically speaking, the last straw in a long history of abuse”. Cf Moses supra (n 347) at 703F-I 
where it was a single and isolated provocative act that sent the accused into a rage. 
 
350 S v Moses supra (n 347). 
 
351 Louw supra (n 28) at 215, citing Moses supra (n 347) at 714H-I. 
 




wrong in principle, his awareness of the wrongfulness of what 
he was doing at the time was also impaired”.353 
 
Furthermore, it is clear that diminished capacity has no influence on criminal liability. 
At best it serves as a mitigating factor during sentencing.354 
 
In Eadie 355 the accused killed the deceased in circumstances which are commonly 
referred to as road rage. His defence was that at the time of the incident he lacked 
criminal capacity specifically in that he was unable to control his actions despite his 
ability to know what he was doing was wrong.356 Griesel J convicted the accused of 
murder. The judge was of the view that the accused while succumbing to road rage “did 
not lose control, but simply lost his temper”.357 What was of importance was that 
Griesel J indicated the difference between automatism and capacity, which was a 
distinction without difference.358 
 
                                               
353 S v Moses supra (n 347) at 710H-I. 
 
354 Speirs “Should provocation/emotional stress be regarded as a complete defence to criminal liability” 
(2002) Responsa Meridiana 65 at 72. 
 
355 2001 (1) SACR 172 (C). In this case, the accused under the influence of alcohol, drove home after 
spending the evening at a sports club. The accused was harassed by another driver who either drove 
behind the accused with his headlights on brightly or overtook the accused and then slowed down. 
When the two vehicles stopped at a set of traffic lights, the accused proceeded out his vehicle, with a 
hockey stick in his hand. When he approached the other vehicle, the driver’s door was opened and 
he struck the door with the hockey stick and broke it. He attempted to pull the door open at which 
time the deceased kicked it back at him. The accused then kicked the driver with both feet and 
punched him on the head. The driver then slumped towards the passenger’s seat. The accused 
punched him repeatedly on his face, pulled him out the vehicle and stood on his face with the heel of 
his shoe and then kicked the bridge of his nose (at 174C-175G). The driver died as a result of this 
assault. 
 
356 S v Eadie supra (n 355) 177C-D. 
 
357 S v Eadie supra (n 355) at 182I-J. For a criticism of this conflation of the notions of automatism and 
incapacity. See further Hoctor “Road rage and reasoning about responsibility” (2001) South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice 195, Louw supra (n 28) at 206-207. 
 
358 S v Eadie supra (n 355) at 178A-B: “There appears to be some confusion between the defence of 
temporary non-pathological incapacity, on the one hand, and sane automatism, on the other. The 
academic writers…point out that they are in fact two distinct and separate defences. At the same 
time, however, it is clear that in many instances the defences of criminal incapacity and automatism 
coincide. This is so because a person who is deprived of self-control is both incapable of a voluntary 




The conviction was taken on appeal “to establish whether the boundaries of the defence 
in question were inappropriately extended, particularly in decisions of Provincial or 
Local Divisions of the High Court, so as to negatively affect public confidence in the 
administration of justice”.359 
 
The court 360 attempted to gain clarity by dealing with its previous decisions relating to 
the defence of non-pathological incapacity. However, it proceeded to cite the cases of 
Potgieter,361 Cunningham 362 and Henry,363 which deal with sane automatism to come 
to the conclusion that non-pathological incapacity has been equated with automatism.364 
The court went on to critique the cases of Arnold,365 Moses 366 and Gesualdo,367 as 
being out of line with existing case law. Thus the approach “adopted by this court in the 
decisions discussed earlier was not followed in these three cases”.368 The issue that the 
court had with these three cases was the fact that it is possible for a person to act 
consciously but at the same time not be able to act in accordance with one’s 
appreciation of what is right and wrong.369 Conduct is voluntary where it is subject to  
                                               
359 S v Eadie supra (n 355) at par [3]. 
 
360 S v Eadie 2002 (1) SACR 663 (SCA) at par [29]. 
 
361 S v Potgieter supra (n 337), cited at par [36]. 
 
362 1996 (1) SACR 639 (A), cited at par [39]. 
 
363 1999 (1) SACR (SCA), cited at par [38]. 
 
364 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 134, citing S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [42]. The court also cited the cases 
of Francis 1999 (1) SACR 650 (SCA), cited at par [40] and Kok [2001] 4 All SA 291 (A), cited at 
par [41] in which terminological imprecision of the court added to the confusion. 
 
365 S v Arnold supra (n 313), discussed at par [46]. 
 
366 S v Moses supra (n 347), discussed at par [49]. 
 
367 S v Gesualdo supra (n 337), discussed at par [50]. 
 
368 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [51], discussed in Hoctor supra (n 242) at 135. 
 
369 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 135, citing the cases of S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [46], referring to 
Arnold supra (n 313). 
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the conscious will of the accused, and therefore involuntary when not subject to the 
conscious will. There are numerous instances of conduct which may be involuntary but 
generally these are indicated by a lack of “goal-directed” behaviour. In other words, 
where an accused is able to direct his actions towards specific tasks, his actions must 
have been subject to her conscious will. Capacity appears to be similar to conduct in 
one respect. This relates to the second leg of the capacity enquiry: whether the accused 
was able to control herself in accordance with his appreciation of right and wrong. 
Therefore, capacity is absent where the accused lacks self-control. This is a source of 
confusion in respect of the provocation defence.370 The following statement in Eadie 371 
illustrates this problem:  
 
“There appears to be some confusion between the defence of 
temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity, on the one 
hand, and sane automatism, on the other. The academic 
writers, such as Snyman…point out that they are in fact two 
distinct and separate defences. At the same time, however, it is 
clear that in many instances the defences of criminal 
incapacity and automatism coincide. This is so because a 
person who is deprived of self-control is both incapable of a 
voluntary act and at the same time lacks criminal capacity.” 372 
 
The problem with the above formulation is that either the two defences are distinct or 





                                                                                                                                       
 
370 Louw supra (n 28) 207. 
 
371 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
372 Ibid at 178A-C, discussed in Louw supra (n 28) at 207-208. 
 




Automatism has been defined 374 as involuntary behaviour 375 that occurs in an altered 
state of consciousness and which is compulsive and repetitive and simple. More simply, 
it is the lack of concomitant or controlling will over the act 376 (due to diverse causes) 
377 rather than a lack of consciousness which decides criminal liability.378 Despite the 
law’s clear exposition on the law of automatism, the court in Eadie 379 came to the 
conclusion that there is no distinction between conative capacity and automatism and 
that the two tests have now merged: 
 
 “Logic... dictates that we cannot draw a distinction between 
automatism and lack of self-control. If the two were distinct, it 
would be possible to exercise control over one’s actions (the 
automatism test) while simultaneously lacking self-control 
(the incapacity test)”.380 
 
                                               
374 Cf Hoctor “Just a spoonful of sugar’: Glycaemia, Insanity and Automatism” (2001) Obiter 241 at n 
48 (citing Padfield “exploring a Quagmire: Insanity and Automatism” (1989) Cambridge Law 
Journal at 356 who points out that (like self-control) the legal definitions of both automatism and 
insanity bear little relationship to their medical counterparts – insanity is not a medical concept. 
Interpretation by the courts has served to limit the type of conditions that could give rise to the 
cognitive defence of insanity and automatism only exists in medical texts in relation to some forms 
of epilepsy.  
 
375 South African courts have described involuntary conduct in the following terms – “mechanical 
activity” (Dhlamini 1955 (1) SA 120 (T) at 121); “unconsciousness” (R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 
(N) at 265); “automatic activity” (Ngang 1960 (3) SA 363 (T) at 365); R v H 1962 (1) SA 197 (A) at 
209); “onwillekeurige handeling” (Johnson supra (n 301) at 205) and “involuntary lapse of 
consciousness” (Trickett 1973 (3) SA 526 (T) at 531.) (444H-445B): after a finding (at 445H) that 
the accused acted consciously and voluntarily (i.e. not in a state of automatism), the court concluded 
that in the absence of further evidence establishing a factual foundation to disturb such finding, the 
accused’s defence of non-pathological incapacity could not succeed (at 445H-I). 
 
 
376 Burchell and Miton supra (n 26) at 103 who define it as “controlled by conscious will.’” See also De 
Wet and Swanepoel supra (n 76) at 49-50 and S v Chretien supra (n 97) at 104. 
 
377 S v Van Vuuren supra (n 26) at 17G-H; S v Lesch supra (n 309); S v Arnold supra (n 313) and S v 
Campher supra (n 320) where it was held that automatism can be caused by provocation; and S v 
Mahlinza supra (n 289) at 161; R v Mawonani 1970 (3) SA 448 (RA) where it was held that 
automatism can be caused by dissociation. 
 
378 McSherry “Critique and Comment, It’s a man’s world: claims of provocation and automatism in 
‘intimate homicides’” (2005) Melbourne University Law Review 921, citing R v The Queen (1967) 
121 CLR 205, 214. 
 
379 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 




Navsa JA went on to state: 
 
 
“I agree with Ronald Louw that there is no distinction between 
sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity due to 
emotional stress and provocation”. 381 
 
The effect of this approach is that it would have to be established that an accused was 
acting involuntarily in order for her defence of lack of conative capacity to prevail: 
 
“It appears logical that when it has been shown that an 
accused has the ability to appreciate the difference between 
right and wrong, in order to escape liability, he would have to 
successfully raise involuntariness as a defence...In the present 
context [sic] the two are flipsides of the same coin’.382 
 
Uniting the two tests would result in the “mental element” in the crime forming part of 
the inquiry into the existence of a voluntary act: 383 
 
“[t]he insistence that one should see an involuntary act 
unconnected to the mental element, in order to maintain a 
more scientific approach to the law, is with respect, an over-
refinement.” 384 
 
The court conceded that such an approach would require a fundamental reinterpretation 
of the formulation of the defence of non-pathological incapacity set out in Laubscher: 385 
                                               
381 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [57], discussed in Hoctor supra (n 242) at 137. 
 
382 Ibid. In a more recent case of S v Scholtz 2006 (1) SACR 442 (E), Froneman J interprets the Eadie 
(supra (n 360)) court’s comments at para’s [57] and [58] as a warning against the tendency to 
interpret the two legs of the test as separate defences. 
 
383 Snyman supra (n 106) 17. This approach is unsustainable since “Does the judge mean that the 
conduct requirement (voluntary act) and the culpability requirement merge into one vague, 
amorphorous requirement called the ‘mental element?’” (at 16). 
 
384 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [58]. 
 




“It appears to me to be clear that Joubert JA was concerned to 
convey, in the second leg of the test set [out] in the Laubscher 
case, that the State has to prove that the acts which are the 
basis for the charges against an accused were consciously 
directed by him. Put differently, the acts must not be 
involuntary”.386 
 
Such an approach flowed from previous decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal. The 
court came to the conclusion that: 
 
“...it is clear that in order for an accused to escape liability on 
the basis of non-pathological criminal incapacity he has to 
adduce evidence, in relation to the second leg of the test in 
Laubscher’s case, from which an inference can be drawn that 
the act in question was not consciously directed, or put 
differently, that it was an involuntary act”. 387 
 
Therefore, if the accused is not acting in a state of automatism, due to lost self-control, 
how can he be acting voluntarily, yet still not be able to control himself? The Eadie 388 
court acknowledged this point and held that the dissenting view – that automatism and 
conative capacity are distinct concepts is flawed and moreover, this view: 
 
“...followed by an explanation that the former defence is based 
on a loss of control, due to an inability to restrain oneself, or 
an inability to resist temptation, or an inability to resist one’s 
emotions, does violence to the fundamentals of any self-
respecting system of law...[n]o self-respecting system of law 
can excuse persons from criminal liability on the basis that 




                                               
386 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 138, citing S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [58]. 
 
387 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 138, citing S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [42]. 
 
388 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 




The conclusion reached in Eadie 390 is problematic for battered woman since it limits 
the decision of Wiid. 391  This is so since the court failed to distinguish between 
uncontrollable actions, and actions which are controllable, but which the accused failed 
to control. 392  The result of this is that the court comes close to eliminating 
provocation/emotional stress as a defence for battered woman altogether.393  Hoctor 
notes that what the court had in mind with the Eadie 394 case was the narrowing of the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity policy grounds.395 The result of this would be 
that: 
 
“Established precedent in both provocation and other cases of 
alleged non-pathological incapacity would have to be revisited 
by implication – an approach that would have severe 
implications for the principle of legality by restricting the 
scope of the defence (for battered women) and so increasing 
the scope of criminality.” 396 
 
Should lost self-control equate with automatism, then a further problem arises. 
Goldman suggests that should the battered woman suffer from severe post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), battered woman syndrome (BWS) being a subcategory of this,  
 
                                               
390 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [3]. 
 
391 S v Wiid supra (n 333).  
 
392 Any goal-directed actions taken by the battered woman would prove to be a major obstacle to relying 
on the defence. This is so since persons acting in a state of automatism, do not take complex series 
of goal-directed actions. See 75-79 for a discussion of the cases of Nursingh supra (n 339) and 
Moses supra (n 347) in this respect. 
 
393 Pather “Provocation Acquittals provoke a rethink” (2002) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
337 at 348. This is particularly salient if the facts of the case do not support self-defence. 
 
394 S v Eadie supra (n 360).  
 
395  Hoctor supra (n 242) 138. The stated objective of the judgment was to consider whether the 
boundaries of the defence had been inappropriately extended so as to negatively affect public 
confidence in the administration of justice (S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [3]). 
 
396 Burchell “A provocative response to subjectivity” (2003) Acta Juridica 23 at 38. This point was also 




she should be declared “insane” since PTSD qualifies as a disease of the mind. Does 
this mean that since non-pathological incapacity is no longer available as a defence 
that: (a) the accused should be declared a state president’s patient 397 or (b) as McSherry 
notes “evidence of dissociation is generally raised to negate the element of voluntary 
behaviour. This could be problematic since the division between sane and insane 
automatism is complex one and depends upon whether or not the condition is a mental 
disorder.” 398 
 
The court in Eadie 399 went on to note that although in principle, the test of capacity 
might remain subjective, the test had to be approached with caution. Navsa JA held: 
 
“I agree that the greater part of the problem lies in the 
misapplication of the test [of capacity]. Part of the problem 
appears to me to be a too ready acceptance of the accused’s 
ipse dixit concerning his state of mind. It appears to me to be 
justified to test the accused’s evidence about his state of mind, 
not only against his prior and subsequent conduct but also 
against the court’s experience of human behaviour and social 
interaction. Critics may describe this as principle yielding to 
policy. In my view it is an acceptable method for testing the 
veracity of an accused’s evidence about his state of mind and 
as a necessary brake to prevent unwarranted extensions of the 
defence”.400 
 
Navsa JA went on to note that while accused persons will continue to raise the defence 
of provocation, the “law, if properly applied, will determine whether that claim is 
justified”.401 Burchell is of the view that the Judge of Appeal was not talking about  
                                               
397 Goldman supra (n 67) 220. 
 
398 McSherry supra (n 378) 921. 
 
399 S v Eadie supra (n 360). The structure for the possible tests arising out of the Eadie supra (n 360) 
decision relating to the defence of provocation is adopted from both Hoctor supra (n 243) 148-159 
and Burchell supra (n 396) at 28-42. 
 
400 Burchell supra (n 396) at 28, citing S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [64]. 
 
401 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [65]. 
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“revising the test of capacity but rather applying it correctly using permissible 
inferences from objective facts and circumstances”.402 
 
The Eadie 403 case recognized that it was important for the law to move away from a 
subjective approach to fault (which the court had followed in previous cases such as De 
Blom, 404  Chretien, 405  Campher 406  and Wiid) 407  to a more objective approach in 
establishing the accused’s fault: Navsa JA stated that the accused’s conduct should be 
weighed against “human experience, societal interaction and societal norms.” 408 The 
judge went on to state: 
 
“[N]o self-respecting system of law can excuse persons from 
criminal liability on the basis that they succumbed to 
temptation. It is absurd to postulate that succumbing to 
temptation may excuse one from criminal liability.” 409 
 
Such a statement suggests the acceptance of an objective approach to non-pathological 
incapacity. Navsa JA went on to state: 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
402 Burchell supra (n 396) at 28; Burchell supra (n 29) at 431. For example, Navsa JA is critical of the 
fact that, in one of the first instances where a South African court completely acquitted an accused 
who raised the defence of provocation (S v Arnold supra (n 313), the judge “readily accepted the 
accused’s ipse dixit, and did not give enough weight to his focused and goal-directed behaviour 
before, during and after the event”  
 
403 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
404 1977 (3) SA 513 A. 
 
405 S v Chretien supra (n 97). 
 
406 S v Campher supra (n 320). 
 
407 S v Wiid supra (n 333). 
 
408 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [45], and previous cases such as Henry supra (n 363); Kensley 1995 (1) 
SACR 646 (A); Kok supra (n 364). 
 




“It appears to me to be justified to test the accused’s evidence 
about his state of mind, not only against prior and subsequent 
conduct but also against the court’s experience of human 
behaviour and social interaction. Critics may describe this as 
principle yielding to policy. In my view it is an acceptable 
method for testing the veracity of an accused’s evidence about 
his state of mind and as a necessary brake to prevent 
unwarranted extensions of the defence.” 410 
 
The court should too easily accept the accused’s own evidence regarding provocation 
or emotional stress and is therefore entitled to draw “legitimate inferences, from what 
hundreds of thousands 411  of other people would have done under the same 
circumstances” (i.e. looking at objective circumstances). The Eadie 412  judgment 
“signals a warning that in future the defence of non-pathological incapacity will be 
scrutinized most carefully. Persons who may in the past have been fortunate enough to 
be acquitted in circumstances where they killed someone who had insulted them, will 
now find the courts ready to evaluate against objective standards of acceptable 
behaviour, the evidence adduced by them to support their defence of 
provocation/emotional stress”.413 Therefore, such an inference could lead the court to 
disbelieving the accused when she says that she lacked capacity or acted 
involuntarily.414 
                                               
410 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [64]. 
 
411 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [23]. 
 
412 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
413 Burchell supra (n 396) at 28; Hoctor supra (n 242) 150. 
 
414 Burchell supra (n 396) at 29 has noted that a comprehensive examination of the judicial precedent on 
provocation supports the view that the essence of the Eadie supra (n 360) judgment challenges only 
those few judgments of the courts in the past where too much deference has been paid to the 
accused’s version of the facts and not enough weight is given to a broader evaluation of this 
evidence in light of surrounding circumstances. Cf Burchell supra (n 396) n 19 where Burchell goes 
on to discuss this point: for instance, Navsa JA is critical of the fact that, in one of the first instances 
where a South African court completely acquitted an accused who raised the defence of provocation 
(S v Arnold supra (n 313), the judge “readily accepted” the accused’s ipse dixit, and did not give 
enough weight to his “focused and goal-directed behaviour before, during and after the event” (at par 
[46]). Although Navsa JA found that the case of S v Nursingh (n 339) (a High Court judgment 
acquitting an accused who had alleged tat he had fatally shot his mother and grandparents as a 
consequence of severe, ongoing emotional stress resulting form sexual abuse) left him with a “sense 
of disquiet”, he cold nevertheless explain the decision in terms of a combination of factors that were 
“extreme and unusual” (at par [48]). In S v Moses supra (n 347) (where an accused was acquitted of 
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Burchell submits that “it would be easy to focus on the objective norms and conclude 
that the test of capacity is now an objective one. Rather, the author is of the view that 
this passage refers to a process of inference, from what the accused’s mental processes 
ought to have been, to what they in fact were, that is crucial”.415  
 
In Eadie 416 Navsa JA goes on to explain why he thinks the accused “should be held 
responsible;’’ namely, the accused’s “goal-directed and focused behaviour, before, 
during and after the incident in question as indicating presence of mind,” and has the 
intention to be “violent and destructive”. 417 
 
The Judge of Appeal’s conclusion indicates that the objective standards came into play 
when determining whether the accused’s ipse dixit is to be believed: 
 
“How can we believe him when he says that his directed and 
planned behaviour was suddenly interrupted by a loss of 
control over his physical actions when those actions are 
consistent with the destructive path he set out on when he was 
admittedly conscious?” 418 
 
In terms of such an approach it would follow that the court would eliminate the second 
element of the capacity test, namely the enquiry into conative capacity. However,  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
killing a gay partner who, after engaging in unprotected anal intercourse with the accused, had 
announced that he had AIDS was “[l]ess easy to explain”, per Navsa JA at par [49]). 
 
415 Burchell supra (n 396) 30. 
 
416 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
417 Ibid at par [66]. 
 
418 Ibid. Burchell supra (n 396) at 31 n 27 notes that this passage does allude to the actio libera in causa 
rule, whereby, if prior voluntary conduct, accompanied by the attendant mens rea and leading to the 
unlawful consequence exists, then liability can result even if at the time the consequence comes 




Navsa JA maintained that the enquiry should remain, and that “whilst it may be 
difficult to envisage a situation where a person is able to distinguish between right and 
wrong, but is unable to control her actions, this is notionally possible”. 419 
 
Burchell notes the reasons why he thinks the test of capacity remains subjective: 
 
“otherwise, Navsa JA would have had to specifically over-rule 
all of the provocation cases since the early 1980’s including 
not only those cases where the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity (tested subjectively succeeded) but also those 
where the defence failed.” 420 
 
Burchell is of the view that a realistic way for a court to “rein in the application of the 
purely subjective concept of capacity, short of engaging in overt judicial legislation to 
make the test objective in nature, would be to fall back on the drawing of legitimate 
inferences of the presence or absence of subjectively-assessed capacity from objective 
circumstances.” 421 The author goes on to note the potential advantage of adopting such 
an approach: 
 
“The potential problem with the relentlessly subjective 
approach to provocation is that it could be interpreted to 
reverse the appropriate rule so that it becomes – provocation 
of a sufficient degree will exclude capacity but in exceptional 
circumstances it will not. The drawing of legitimate inferences 
(using objective criteria) helps to place the rule in its true 
perspective: every person is presumed to act voluntarily and 
should control their emotions but, in very special 





                                               
419 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [59]. 
 






abuse might escape liability by leading evidence of non-
pathological incapacity or automatism, sufficient to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to the existence of criminal liability. This 
evidence would have to be tested, at the outset, against the 
court’s expectations drawn from experience.” 422 
 
 
Burchell goes on to note that: 
 
“Implicit in the judgment of Navsa JA is a distinction between 
instances of provocation (or emotional stress) that have built 
up over a period of some time and those instances where a 
sudden flare-up results from particular insulting conduct. 
Naturally, gradual disintegration of powers of self-control is 
more condonable than a sudden flare-up of temper kills 
someone, would have to be sufficiently cogent create a 
reasonable doubt in his favour, before a court would consider 
acquitting him. Furthermore, the court would be entitled to 
factor into the sequence of inferential reasoning, leading to its 
conclusion on the credibility of the accused’s evidence, an 
evaluation of the accused’s version against judicial 
expectations of behaviour.” 423 
 
Such an approach would be beneficial for battered women: 
 
“For instance, in an exceptional case of reaching to persistent 
and brutal spousal abuse over a fairly lengthy period of time, 
an inference could more readily be drawn that capacity was 
lacking or at least not proven beyond reasonable doubt, than 
would be the case in regard to a person who claimed to have 
suddenly and unexpectedly flared up and assaulted another 
who had insulted him.” 424 
                                               
422 Burchell supra (n 396) 33; Hoctor supra (n 242) 151. Burchell supra (n 396) at 34 notes a further 
advantage of such an approach: “Inferential reasoning from the facts, as opposed to altering the test 
of capacity to reflect objectivity, allows the court to treat every defence in its own special way. For 
instance, X who kills Y but raises the defence that he genuinely, albeit mistakenly, believed that he 
was about to be attacked by Y, who had approached him with an upraised baseball bat, might more 
readily be believed than X who claims he lost control and killed Y, who had insulted him. Of course, 
inferential reasoning is resorted to most frequently where there is an absence of direct evidence and a 
reliance on circumstantial evidence. Evidence of a state of a person’s mind or his or her mental 
capacity is most frequently circumstantial, or not able to be substantiated by direct evidence, apart 
from that of the person himself or herself. In fact, psychiatric or psychological evidence as to state of 
mind or criminal capacity is notoriously unreliable, because it is essentially based purely on the 
accused’s ipse dixit. Hence, the need for inferential reasoning.” 
 
423 Burchell supra (n 396) 29. 
 




The practical result of drawing legitimate inferences of the presence or absence of 
subjectively-assessed capacity from objective circumstances is therefore not only to 
“rein in the application of the purely subjective concept of capacity,” 425 but also to 
counteract the inherent dangers in accepting the ipse dixit of the accused.426 
 
Disquiet with the practical effect of providing an accused with an acquittal has led to 
theorists suggesting a move towards an objective or normative assessment of capacity 
and intention: 
 
“Was Navsa JA in Eadie, in fact, simply unearthing an 
objective aspect of the capacity enquiry, which had always 
been implicit in the concept of capacity but not until now 
judicially acknowledged?” 427 
 
Burchell has thus proposed a new test for conative capacity, consisting of both a 
subjective and objective criterion: 
 
“If it is correct to regard the second leg of the capacity enquiry 
as the capacity to act differently then this enquiry must be an 
evaluation of the accused’s conduct against some other 
standard of conduct, extrinsic to the accused himself or 
herself. In other words, the test for capacity must have a 
normative or evaluative dimension, as well as the subjective 
aspect of determining the accused’s conduct in the 
circumstances and against the standard of persons falling in a 
particular grouping.” 428 
 
                                               
425 Burchell supra (n 396) 33; Hoctor supra (n 242) 150-151. 
 
426 Burchell supra (n 396) 34. See also Hoctor supra (n 242) at n 323 notes that Burchell supra (n 396) at 
30 refers to cases such as Henry supra (n 363) and Kok supra (n 364) in explaining that this 
approach relates to the inherently objective process of proof, as opposed to the introduction of an 
objective test. 
 
427 Burchell supra (n 396) at 26; 39. 
 
428 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 155, discussing Burchell supra (n 396) 40. In respect of the Eadie supra (n 
360) cases discussion of the importance of moving away from a subjective approach to fault see 263-
264 supra. This discussion is perhaps what prompted Burchell supra (n 396) to come to the 




Such an approach, (even in cases where intention is the fault element required), would 
be closer to the Rumpff Commission approach (that severe emotional tension or 
impulsiveness should not be regarded as excluding volitional control) and the Roman-
Dutch Law. This would lead to some of the finer distinctions drawn in English law.429 
 
A move towards a more objective approach to establish loss of control would not only 
mark a turning point in the courts emphasis on subjectivity, but would also ensure a 
better balance between subjectivity in the construction of criminal liability.430 Burchell 
elucidates the purpose of such an approach: 
 
“This approach might also provide an antidote for the 
untenable, and yet arguably logical, conclusion reached in 
certain South African judgments that extreme provocation (or 
even emotional distress) can serve to exclude criminal 
capacity. Surely everyone is capable of restraining his or her 
emotions and so provocation should not be permitted to 
exclude criminal capacity? However, if provocation impairs 
the actual exercise of free will to such an extent that a 
reasonable person in the circumstances would not have been 
able to control his emotions, then the accused could be 
acquitted.” 431 
 
The practical result of a move towards a more objective approach is that: 
 
                                               
429 Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) 293. 
 
430 Hoctor supra (n 242) 158, citing Snyman supra (n 106) 22. See also Burchell “Criminal justice at the 
crossroads” (2002) South African Law Journal 579 at 587 n 44; 592 n 73 who viewed the Eadie 
supra (n 360) judgment as “bold” and “most encouraging” for its emphasis on the “objective norms 
of behaviour as a barometer against which to test…lack of criminal capacity.” 
 
431 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 148, citing Burchell “Heroes, poltroons and persons of reasonable fortitude-
juristic perceptions on killing under compulsion” (1988) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
18 at 30. Cf Snyman “Is there such a defence in our criminal law as ‘emotional stress?’” (1985) 
South African Law Journal 240 at 250: “There is a real danger that excessive emphasis on the 
subjective approach may undermine the very nature of criminal law as a set of norms applicable to 
everybody in society: the ignorant are judged by their own subjective view of what the law is and 
this results in their being treated more leniently than those other unfortunate members of society who 
happen to know the law.” See also Speirs supra (n 354) at 79 (citing Louw) who suggests, that it 
results in punishment losing its reformative and deterrent functions because an unstable criminal is 




“capacity would seem to remain in principle, subjectively 
tested but the practical implementation of this test would 
accommodate the reality that the policy of the law, at least in 
regard to provoked killings, must be one of reasonable 
restraint.” 432 
 
This approach would also invoke a constitutional protection of dignity “by emphasizing 
norms of reasonable and level headed behaviour, and could further the respectful 
treatment of others, especially in limiting the scope of legitimate force permissible 
against even the provoker.” 433  However, theorists such as Speirs notes that “by 
insisting on objective criteria in the capacity inquiry, the battered woman’s defence is 
made weaker than when taking a purely subjective approach.434 In addition, the almost  
                                               
432 Burchell supra (n 396) 28. As Burchell supra (n 201) at 201 further explains these policy concerns: 
“Since it is a fundamental principle of modern systems of criminal justice that vengeance for harm 
suffered must be sought through the public criminal process and not by personal self-help, the 
criminal law is precluded from admitting the provocation should be a justification for unlawful 
conduct.” 
 
433 Burchell supra (n 396) 38.  
 
434 Speirs supra (n 354) 73-74. The psychiatric skepticism regarding the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity is illustrated in S v Kensley supra (n 408) at 652I-653B. One of the problems could be 
that it would be difficult for the court to determine which characteristics to take into account in the 
battered woman’s case. For a criticism of the objective test see chapter 5 at 338-350. Furthermore, 
the case of S v Ferreira supra (n 141) indicates that the courts have avoided the use of the term 
“battered woman syndrome” although the accused’s appeal was based mainly on the abuse that she 
suffered at the hands of the deceased prior to the contract killing. The case did however, refer with 
approval to Walker’s theory on “battered woman syndrome” called “the Cycle Theory of Violence”. 
For a discussion of this theory see chapter 1 at 2-4. In S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at para’s [342] 
and [343] at 132H-I the court accepted that fact that domestic violence, in all manifestations of 
abuse, was intended to and could establish a pattern of coercive control over the abused woman, 
such control being exerted both during the instances of active or passive abuse as well as the periods 
when domestic violence was in abeyance. There was compelling justification for focusing, not only 
on the specific form which the abuse could have taken over time and in particular circumstances, but 
pertinently on the impact of abuse upon the psyche, make-up and entire world-view of an abused 
woman. Thus as a result of Ferreira supra (n 141) and Engelbrecht supra (n 143) cases the courts 
while taking cognizance of the battered woman’s circumstances, have not explicitly recognized 
“battered woman syndrome”. While courts in other jurisdictions have acknowledged a battered 
woman’s defence based on “battered woman syndrome” (see for example chapter 4 American law at 
204-206 infra), it is submitted that South African courts have not followed this trend since they do 
not really believe that the battered woman’s circumstances are sufficient to cause her to lack 
capacity. Cf Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [456] where the court held that: “it has not been argued 
that she (the accused) does not have criminal capacity. However, relevant for purposes of 
sentencing, the State has accepted the opinion of its own psychiatrist witness that she was, at the 
time of the killing, suffering from diminished criminal capacity”. Further problems would face the 
court should they accept “battered woman syndrome”: cf Ferreira supra (n 141) at 466B-C: “The 
court also held that the accused’s decision to have the deceased killed by persons hired for that 
purpose instead of leaving him, was explained by the expert witnesses, ‘a social worker’ and a 
gender co-coordinator as being in keeping with what experience and research has indicated to occur 
with abused women”. The problem with a generalization on the way battered women respond to 




‘cautionary rule’ approach taken to evidence given by her and by skeptical psychiatrists 
makes her defence seem completely hopelessness”.435 
 
One of the more recent cases following in the wake of Eadie 436 and dealing with the 
problematic issue of determining whether the accused acted lacked criminal capacity is 
that of S v Marx.437 The area of disagreement in this case is the contention by the 
defence that the murder was committed by the accused while in a state of “diminished 
responsibility”. In his statement, the accused admits firing the shots that killed his wife, 
but alleges at the time of the shooting that he suffered “very strongly from serious 
diminished responsibility” caused by months of taunting swearing and humiliation and 
that his marriage with the deceased was falling apart because of the deceased’s extra- 
                                                                                                                                       
 
435 Speirs supra (n 354) 74. 
 
436 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
437 S v Marx supra (n 108). In this case the accused was convicted of murdering his wife, Marieta Marx, 
by shooting her with a .38 special caliber revolver. On the day of the murder, the deceased came 
back from work and was irritable and aggressive, rude and abusive towards the accused. She 
confronted the accused with her intention to get divorced and acknowledged that she had slept with 
Basson. This left the accused depressed and he informed the deceased that he may commit suicide. 
He pled with the deceased to reconsider her decision to divorce him. The response from the deceased 
was that of encouraging him to commit suicide and to forget about her. At one stage he swallowed a 
small amount of Temic, a poisonous substance used for growing potatoes. The deceased, on 
realizing that he had taken the substance, called Mrs. Terblanche, a neighbour, to assist him. Initially 
he prayed to God not to punish the deceased for what she was doing to him. Later he changed, 
praying that God should punish her for her infidelity. He could then not perceive any indication of 
her repenting. The accused began to feel drowsy but was determined to remain awake so as to check 
whether the deceased would not leave and visit her lover during the night (at par [24]). He then fell 
asleep. When he awoke it was 3 am and when he went to check on his wife, she was dressed in a 
tracksuit. He asked for a reconciliation but was met with abuse. He left the room a number of times 
and repeated this procedure (at par [26]). After his approaches to the deceased were rejected “he 
remembered seeing his revolver lying on his bed and he recalled thinking that he would then commit 
suicide.” The accused remembers kneeling on the floor adjacent to the end of her bed with the 
weapon in his hand. The wife encouraged him to shoot himself (at par [27]). His memory was 
interrupted. His next memory was a vague recollection of feeling as if someone was pulling the 
revolver from his head. The accused interpreted that episode to mean that God was stopping him 
from committing suicide. According to the defence psychiatrists report, the next fragment of 
memory was of him standing on the left hand side of the bed and he saw Mia (one of his daughters) 
sleeping in the deceased’s bed and Chante-lee (another daughter) in a cot adjacent to the bed. His 
last fragment of memory was seeing a flash from the gun and hearing the first shot. He does not now 
whether that was personal recall, part of a dram or reconstruction. He was unable to recall the 
subsequent two shots. When he came to his senses both children had woken up from their sleep and 
they asked what was happening. He responded that he did not know. He took them out of the house 




marital affair with Mr. Basson. In the words of Mr. Meyer, a clinical psychologist, who 
testified in support of the defence: 
 
“Based on the accused’s reconstruction of his functioning at 
the time of the crime, his mental state would have affected his 
cognitive, emotional and conative functioning to a point where 
under extreme provocation, it is probable that his judgment 
would have been impaired. However, just prior to the offence, 
he appears to have been able to differentiate between right and 
wrong and to act in accordance therewith having attempted to 
rationalize with the deceased shortly prior to the fateful 
shooting in the early hours of 3 May 2007.” 438 
 
He further concluded that: 
 
“…the examiner is of the opinion that at the time of the 
execution of the crime the accused was able to differentiate 
between right and wrong and able to act in accordance with an 
appreciation thereof, albeit to significantly diminished extent, 
owing to synergistic interaction of internal and external 
forces.” 439 
 
Currently, South African criminal law does not recognize a defence of diminished 
responsibility. The only point at which the courts are willing to take account of factors 
relating to any type of diminished responsibility is at the sentencing stage.440 Defence 
counsel nevertheless went on to state that previous admissions should not stand as proof 
of allegations against the accused,441 and that if they were valid i.e. standing as proof of 
what they purport to say, the second leg of criminal responsibility had not been 
covered: that leg is to the effect that after it has been established that the accused was  
 
                                               




440  Speirs (n 354) 75. It is this author’s submission that such a defence of diminished capacity as 
suggested by defence counsel in S v Marx supra (n 108) should be recognized in South African law. 
For a discussion of how such a defence would operate, see chapter 5 at 350-366. 
 




able to appreciate the unlawfulness of the act in accordance with such an appreciation. 
Counsel for the prosecution responded by saying that the admission by the accused of 
the first leg of criminal capacity, does not stand alone, it weighs together with and 
against some other pieces of evidence before the court, for instance, that of the clinical 
psychologist. Sangoni J went on to quote the remarks made by Navsa JA in S v 
Eadie,442 which he was of the view adequately addressed the issue: 
 
“I agree with Ronald Louw that there is no distinction between 
sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity due to 
emotional stress and provocation. Decisions of this court make 
that clear. I am, however, not persuaded that the second leg of 
the test expounded in Laubscher’s case should fall away. It 
appears logical that it has been shown that an accused has the 
ability to appreciate the difference between the right and 
wrong, in order to escape the liability, he would have to 
successfully raise involuntariness as a defence.” 443 
 
Sangoni J went on to note that the decision in Eadie 444 does not make any distinction 
between sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity. The judge correctly noted 
that this decision is strongly criticized from some quarters.445 What was troubling about 
this decision was that the judge went on to state that the court felt itself bound by this 
decision and made reference to the following statement in Eadie: 446  
 
“At the same time, however, it is clear that in many instances 
the defences of criminal incapacity and automatism coincide. 
This is so because a person who is deprived of self-control is 
both incapable of a voluntary act and at the same time lacks  
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criminal capacity.” 447 
 
The problem with this case is not only the fact that the court endorsed the finding in 
Eadie,448 but furthermore, Sangoni J held that the defence counsel did not raise a proper 
factual foundation for the defence of sane automatism which it alleged that the accused 
acted under. However, prior to this, the defence counsel asserted that the accused was 
acting in a state of diminished responsibility. Surely, these two issues are completely 
different and relate to different issues in law: in the case of automatism, the issue is 
unlawfulness and regarding diminished responsibility, the issue goes to culpability, which 
is dealt with in sentencing. Nevertheless, Sangoni J acknowledged the fact that what 
constitutes the core of a defence of sane automatism is the fact that the accused blacked 
out: 
 
“Putting aside for a while what the clinical psychologist says 
about criminal capacity, he himself says he had a ‘black out’ 
resulting from non-pathological causes and does not know 
what happened. It is apparent that the said causes, whatever 
they are, as they are not specifically mentioned by him, 
emanate from emotional stress he has endured for some time. 
The effect is that he accepts that he acted but not voluntarily. 
In the heads of argument the defence contends that ‘the 
accused raises the defence known as sane automatism’. That is 
the defence relating to criminal liability (culpability) and not 
criminal capacity. The latter would have the leg that deals 
with ability to act according to his appreciation (conative 
function). The lack of the ability has not even been suggested 
in the evidence by the defence whereas it would be required to 
do so. Instead it has raised involuntariness as a defence. As a 
comment, it sounds inappropriate to plead guilty to murder 
with diminished responsibility, yet the accused relies on sane 
automatism as a defence. With either defence, the accused 
should lay some basis for it. If the accused does not, the 
general presumption of criminal capacity in favour of the State 
becomes decisive.” 449 
 
                                               
447 S v Marx supra (n 108) at 508, citing S v Eadie supra (n 355) at 178B. 
 
448 For a criticism of this particular point see 81-84 above. 
 




Sangoni J noted numerous discrepancies in statements made by the accused. For 
instance, why would the deceased get under a blanket or get into pajamas in the first 
place if she intended to visit her boyfriend. The accused also stated that on the last 
occasion he visited the deceased’s bedroom, before the shooting, he had picked up his 
firearm from his bed and walked with it to the deceased’s room. He remembers 
standing on the left side of the bed where his daughter Mia was lying with deceased. 
The next thing he remembers was a flash from the revolver and he heard a shot. He 
does not recall the other two shots. He does not explain what triggered or could have 
triggered the loss of memory at that point. 450  The accounts of events via the 
psychologist, Mr. Meyer, are very different. On this last occasion when the accused 
went to the room of the deceased he cannot recall whether he was carrying the weapon 
or not. This is a material discrepancy for a person who claims to have lost 
consciousness. Mr. Meyer also advises that when the accused saw the flash on the gun 
and heard the first shot he was unable to say whether that was a personal recall, part of 
a dream or a reconstruction. Having said that he was unable to recall the subsequent 
two shots, the question which arises is how the accused knew that he fired three shots 
and how he would have known that two out of the three were fired subsequently, that is 
after the one he heard. It also makes it difficult to conclude that it could reasonably 
possibly be true that the accused was not conscious of what was happening around him 
at the time of the shooting. It is also improbable that when seeing the flash of light from 
what he even then recognized as a firearm and hearing the loud bang that would not 
have brought him to his senses before the other shots were fired.451 
 
 
                                               






Counsel for the prosecution also leveled strong criticism at the conduct of the accused 
after he had regained his senses, that he acted rationally and misrepresented the position 
to his children, telling them that nothing had happened after they had inquired, taking 
them out of the room without being aware that their mother was no longer alive.  
 
Furthermore, if the accused had serious intention to commit suicide, why only take small 
doses of Temic, instead of using it as an instrument to manipulate his wife into believing 
that he was serious when asking her to stop the divorce proceedings. 452 
 
Sangoni J went on to noted that “one could keep on guessing as to whether it was anger, 
provocation, emotional distress, fatigue and so on that resulted in the black-out. The 
intermittent restoration of senses during the period of shooting makes it difficult to 
accept that the accused was candid.453 
 
What one is left with is a very confusing case dealing with different issues. Counsel for 
the accused should have set out its defence as sane automatism. As Sangoni J noted, 
any evidence of a black-out would suggest the possibility of automatism.454 Had they 
set out a proper factual foundation for the case, they would have realized that the 
evidence they relied on did not adequately support this defence and therefore should 
have plead non-pathological incapacity instead. Whether the evidence of diminished 
responsibility was meant to be introduced as part of a defence of non-pathological 
incapacity is unclear. In this respect it is significant that the accused did not at any point 
in his testimony say that he was “under acute emotional distress and subjective  
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provocation” nor did he allege that he acted in a “state of rage.” The accused said 
nothing about rage and provocation nor does he specifically link the emotional stress he 
apparently suffered from to his loss of memory or loss of self-control. 
 
As to the contention that defence counsel was trying to introduce a new defence based 
on diminished responsibility, it would appear that this is indeed the case: while 
diminished responsibility is hardly a matter related to conviction, the defence insisted 
that the finding regarding this issue be decided at verdict stage. While Sangoni J is 
correct in the assertion that the accused did not act in a state of automatism, it is 
submitted that the court “passed the buck” in attempting to answer the difficult question 
as to what amounts to lost self-control by simply stating that it was bound by the 
decision of Eadie. 455 With such confusing case law in its wake, it is not surprising that 
the court did not come to any other conclusion. The Eadie 456 decision is fraught with 
inconsistencies. For instance, there are statements in this case implying that the 
conative leg of the test for criminal capacity is unnecessary as it amounts to the same as 
the test to determine the presence of a voluntary act.457 Other statements again amount 
to the exact opposite, namely that the second leg of the test to determine criminal 
incapacity is taken into consideration.458 Furthermore, in one passage the court alleges 
that the “phenomenon of sane people temporarily losing cognitive control is rare.459 In 
South African law there is no such thing as cognitive control. Control is by definition  
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refers to the conative leg of the test for criminal capacity, and not to the cognitive 
leg. 460  Elsewhere, Navsa JA agrees with a person who declares that “the only 
circumstance in which one could lose control is where one’s cognitive functions are 
absent.” 461 This is not correct since it is one’s conative functions that fall apart when 
control is lost, not cognitive functions. 462  To quote Snyman “one cannot help but 
wonder whether [South African] court[s] in fact know what the concept criminal 
capacity really means.” 463 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
One of the justification grounds excluding unlawfulness is that of self-defence. It is an 
extraordinary measure which permits the victim of an unlawful attack to take the law 
into her own hands where there are no other reasonable options available to her at the 
time of the attack but to act on her own initiative in order to avert or minimize the 
danger faced. For self-defence to be successfully raised, certain conditions need to be 
met in relation to both the attack, and the defensive measures taken. Of relevance is the 
requirement that the threat must be imminent or must have commenced. Therefore, an 
individual may not respond to an attack once it has ceased nor may one defend oneself 
in anticipation of being attacked at some future point. In terms of South African law, a 
battered woman who is being attacked by her abuser may defend herself against such 
an attack using any reasonable means necessary. The problem with this requirement is 
that in most cases abused women often defend themselves after the attack was  
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completed against her.464 This conduct opens itself up to being construed as an act of 
vengeance. Another difficult hurdle that a battered woman faces in self-defence claims 
relate to the objective components of the defence i.e. the reasonableness of the 
accused’s conduct is judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances. 465  
 
The enquiry into reasonableness in the context of unlawfulness can accommodate only 
the generic facts or the physical act, assessed in terms of the constitutional rights, where 
the “reasonable man” test has become increasingly subjectivized to take into account a 
number of the personal characteristics of the accused. While it is important to accept 
the need for flexibility in the area of the justification ground, 466 and although this 
makes objectivity more elusive, it is clear that there needs to be some sort of limit. This 
is one of the important questions which needs to be addressed in respect of battered 
women and self-defence: whether the limits of the objective test have been exceeded by 
taking her personal circumstances into account.467 
 
By taking such subjective factors into account, it has placed more emphasis on battered 
women relying on putative self-defence. In terms of current South African law, if a 
battered woman is not able to successfully plead self-defence due to the fact that the 
court found that her conduct was unlawful, objectively assessed,468 then she may be  
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acquitted on the basis of putative private defence, which is subjectively assessed.469 In 
S v De Oliviera 470 it was held that such a defence will be of assistance to an accused 
“who honestly believes his life…[is] in danger, but objectively viewed [it is] not.” 471 
 
This raises two points. Firstly, the issue here relates not to lawfulness but culpability.472 
Secondly, if the abused woman does not have the requisite intention to commit murder, 
she will be acquitted. However, as Reddi notes, the abused woman will not necessarily 
escape liability but could be convicted on the basis of culpable homicide. This is 
because negligence not intention is the fault element required in this case. Evidence of 
the “cyclical nature of the abuse” 473 as well as the woman’s failed attempts at leaving 
her abuser would be highly relevant to inform putative self-defence.474 
 
In respect of provocation, Roman and Roman-Dutch law did not regard anger, jealousy 
or other emotions as an excuse for criminal conduct, but only as a factor which might 
mitigate sentence, if the anger was justified by provocation. South African law with its 
parent system in Roman-Dutch law might have followed this lead had it not been for 
the introduction of the mandatory death penalty for murder in 1917.475 In 1925 as a 
result of the Transkeian Penal Code 1887, it envisaged a type of partial excuse: even if 
killing was intentional, homicide which would otherwise be murder maybe reduced to  
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culpable homicide.476 The test for provocation was thus objective.477 By 1949 it was 
held that provocation was not a defence but a special kind of material from which in 
association with the rest of the evidence the court should decide whether the accused 
had acted involuntary or without intent to kill. This introduced a subjective test for 
provocation.478  But a number of crucial issues remained unresolved; could intense 
provocation or emotional stress serve to exclude criminal capacity or voluntary 
conduct. After the decision in Chretien,479 the question arose, if severe intoxication 
could exclude those basic elements of liability then could it not also exclude 
provocation or emotional stress. At this point, the notion of criminal capacity came to 
the fore. This notion was unknown in South African common law and was adopted 
from Continental Legal systems, specifically Germany. 
 
This notion took hold with the Rumpff Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility 
of Deranged Persons and Related Matters, the recommendations of which gave rise to 
the provision of section 78 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.480 S v Mahlinza 481 set 
out that the criminal capacity of an actor is essential requirement necessary to establish 
criminal liability. 
 
Criminal capacity consists of a cognitive component i.e. ability to distinguish between 
right and wrong and conative capacity i.e. the ability to act in accordance with the  
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distinction. If either was lacking no liability would ensue.482 In S v Van Vuuren, 483 the 
court expressed in unequivocal terms that the accused could not be held liable where 
the failure to comprehend what he is doing is attributable to a combination of factors 
such as provocation or emotional stress.484 
 
The very idea of allowing provocation to function as a defence excluding an accused’s 
criminal liability is inherently controversial. From a moral and ethical perspective 
people are expected to control themselves, even under provocation or emotional 
stress.485 To allow it to function as a complete defence as opposed to mitigating factor 
means that it gives credence to the belief that retaliation is justified in the eyes of the 
law and this is the very thing criminal law guards against. Despite the well established 
nature of the defence of non-pathological incapacity, the law has been thrown into flux 
not only the Supreme Court of Appeal decision of S v Eadie 486 and S v Marx.487 The 
Eadie 488 case constituted a serious erosion of the notion of criminal capacity, with a 
concomitant “ripple effect” on other topics within the general principles of criminal 
law.489 The question this case has highlighted is whether the boundaries of the defence 
have been inappropriately extended.490 This is so since the court held not only that there  
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is no distinction between the defence of automatism and non-pathological incapacity,491 
and that it would have to be established that the accused acted involuntarily in order for 
her defence of lack of capacity to prevail,492 but furthermore held that the court should 
assess the accused persons evidence about his state of mind by weighing it against his 
actions and surrounding circumstances, thereby introducing an objective test into 
capacity, which is otherwise subjectively assessed. 493 
 
Should non-pathological incapacity be equated with automatism, established precedent 
and other cases of non-pathological incapacity would have to be revised by implication, 
and this would have serious implications for the principle of legality and thereby 
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A successful plea of self-defence is the legal acknowledgment that the accused’s 
conduct was justified i.e. that is taken to have been correct under the circumstances. 
The focus is not on the personality of the accused but rather on her actions. The 
problem is that an examination of case law relating to self-defence suggests that very 
few battered women who kill their abusers have been able to successfully rely on self-
defence. Therefore, if aspects of the doctrine of self-defence are examined from the 
standpoint of the battered woman, then certain questions emerge. These relate to the 
attack, the force used in response, and the requirement of reasonableness. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to examine each element of self-defence, focusing on the 
development of case law in this regard, and whether such law takes into account the 
experiences of battered women. Such an examination will answer the question as to 
whether any alteration or extension of the defence is required, or rather a rethinking of 
the way in which the requirement that the abused woman’s use of force be reasonable is 
applied to cases other than those involving the traditional model of a once-off 
adversarial meeting between strangers.  
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to offer an account of the partial defence of provocation as 
it operates in English law. Following an outline of the distinction between manslaughter 
and its history, the main problems surrounding the doctrine of provocation and how 
such a defence would be applied to battered women is highlighted as they emerge from 
the discussion of important cases. The current test for provocation will also be 





possibility of setting up a combined defence of provocation and diminished 
responsibility when evidence suggests that the abused woman was suffering from an 
abnormality of mind. 
 
3.1 Self-Defence 
3.1.1 Development of the defence  
In the 16th century, theorists such as Coke were of the view that self-defence applied to 
voluntary killings which were done as a result of an “inevitable cause”. Such killings 
did not constitute a felony.495 An accused who claimed self-defence, was required to 
retreat safely, if possible. The exception to this rule was if a third party who was killed, 
offered to rob or kill for the accused.496 Coke did not recognize a justification defence 
of private self-defence as it is currently understood. He noted that an accused could be 
justified in killing another person only in circumstances that constituted a case-specific 
expression of the government’s law enforcement authority. Killings which were 
committed in self-defence were still subject to forfeiture of goods to the crown.497 Coke 
held that killings in self-defence of a third party who offered to murder or rob for the 
accused did not require forfeiture.498 The reason for this was that such killing advanced 
a law enforcement purpose and not because it was justified by private self-defence.499 
 
In 1676, Hale noted acts that were necessary for maintaining peace in the kingdom:  
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those done where there was no necessity to perform such acts and which were felonies, 
and those acts based on self-preservation.500 He drew a distinction between the two, the 
former provided a public benefit defensive theory based on justification, while the latter 
a private necessity defensive theory based on excuse.501 Hale argued that pursuant to 
the public benefit theory, where a person is indicted on felony charges and flees from 
arrest, killing him is not considered a felony.502 Killing a resisting felon would also be 
justified under the public benefit theory. This is so since even a private individual doing 
this would be viewed as acting on behalf of the state.503 But in contrast, while private 
necessity also excused an accused from criminal liability, when relying on this defence, 
the accused could still be required to forfeit goods as a result of the killing. This was 
not the case with killings which were justified as a public benefit.504 Furthermore, those 
claiming private necessity had to retreat, if safe to do so, from the imminent attack.505 
 
In 1765 Blackstone distinguished between justification and excuse in the law of 
homicide.506 He held that homicide was divided into three groups: justified, excused 
and felonious.507 Homicide was justified if it was committed due to some unavoidable 
necessity. Furthermore, it had to be without any will, intention or desire and without  
 
                                               
500 Hale The History of the Pleas of Crown Vol 1 (1971) (reprint of 1736 edition) 53. 
 
501 Hale supra (n 500) 478. 
 
502 Hale supra (n 500) 489. 
 
503 Hale supra (n 500) 489-492. 
 
504 Hale supra (n 500) 478. 
 
505 Hale supra (n 500) 481. As Hale supra (n 500) 481 notes: “This is so since the king and his laws are 
vindices injuriarum and private persons are not trusted to take capital revenge on one another”. For a 
general discussion of this requirement see Hale supra (n 500) at pages 479-485. 
 






inadvertence or negligence and therefore without any blame.508 Blackstone went on to 
separate justifiable homicide into those that were authorized by the law, and those that 
were justified by permission rather than the command of the law.509  
 
Homicides that were authorized included the execution of criminals and the killing of 
individuals who resisted arrest or assaulted law enforcement officers.510 In other types 
of cases, the killing was justified because the law permitted rather than commanded it. 
Such killings were allowed for the following reasons: the advancement of public 
justice, or where it is committed for the prevention of some horrific crime. 511 
Blackstone noted that a uniform principle which ran through the law was that where a 
crime (which was capital) was to be committed by force, it was lawful for an individual 
to repel such force by causing the death of the attacker. 512 
 
Blackstone was of the view that justifiable and excusable homicide differed. In the case 
of excuse, there was a degree of fault, although it was trivial. The law excludes guilt 
from a felony in such a case. However, Blackstone noted that in strictness, it was 
deserving of some degree of punishment.513 Examples of excusable homicide included 
misadventure and self-defence.514  He held that in all cases of accidental death the 
accused must have had fault on his part. Consistent with this reasoning, excusing self- 
 
                                               
508 Blackstone supra (n 506) 178 
 






512 Blackstone supra (n 506) 181. 
 






defence was accorded to an individual who killed another defensively during an 
altercation, rather than the justification doctrine of private necessity, since in an 
altercation, both parties may and usually have some degree of fault, and for this reason 
would not hold the survivor entirely guilt-free.515 
 
Blackstone classified self-defence as a form of excuse rather than justification against 
an innocent aggressor. He was of the view that when such an aggressor unjustly 
threatened another person’s life, the universal principle of self-preservation which 
prompts every person to save his own life rather than save another person’s makes it an 
excusable though unavoidable necessity.516 
 
Force that caused injury, death or damage to property, could be justified or excused 
since the force used was reasonable in defence of certain public or private interests. 
Private defence was a general defence to any crime of which the use of force is an 
element or which is alleged to have been committed by the use of force.517 The burden 
of disproving claims of private defence rested with the prosecution.518 The law was 
found in a variety of sources. Defence of person or acting in defence of a third party, is 
still regulated by the common law.519  
 
The general principle is that the law allows the accused to use force as is objectively  
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reasonable in the circumstances as she believes them to be.520 Further, the accused’s 
belief in the need to use force is subjectively assessed while the reasonableness of the 
accused’s response and the amount of force used are objectively assessed on the facts 
as the accused believed them to be. The duty to retreat is a factor which is taken into 
account in establishing whether the use of force was reasonable. It is now necessary to 
consider these factors in detail. 
 
3.2 Test for self-defence 
Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act of 1967 regulates self-defence previously governed 
by common law.521 It states: 
 
“(1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the 
circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting 
in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders of persons 
unlawfully at large. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of common law on 
the question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the 
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The question, “was the force used reasonable in the circumstances as the accused 
supposed them to be,” is a question which is to be answered by the magistrates or 
jury.522 
 
The authority for the proposition that the accused is to be judged on the facts as she 
believed them to be (subjective) is that of Gladstone Williams,523 repeatedly applied by 
the Court of Appeal 524 and by the Privy Council in Beckford.525 In Williams 526 it was 
held: 
 
“In a case of self-defence, where self-defence or the 
prevention of crime is concerned, if the jury come to the 
conclusion that the accused believed, or may have believed, 
that he was being attacked or that a crime was being 
committed, and that force was necessary to protect himself or 
to prevent the crime, then the prosecution have not proved  
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their case. If, however, the accused’s alleged belief was 
mistaken and if the mistake was an unreasonable one, that 
may be a powerful reason for coming to the conclusion that 
the belief was not honestly held and should be rejected…Even 
if the jury come to the conclusion that the mistake was an 
unreasonable one, if the defendant may genuinely have been 
labouring under it, he is entitled to rely on it”.527 
 
The court held that the statement represented the common law, as stated in Morgan 528 
and Kimber.529 The reasonableness of the accused’s response and the amount of force 
used are to be assessed objectively on the facts as the accused believes them to be.530 
The accused’s belief that what she was doing was reasonable may be evidence, but no 
more, that it was reasonable. In Palmer 531 Lord Morris held: 
 
“If there has been an attack so that defence is reasonably 
necessary it will be recognized that a person defending 
himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his  
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asked: (1) Was the accused under actual or threatened attack by the victim? (2) If yes, did the 
accused act to defend himself against this attack? (3) If yes, was his response commensurate with the 
degree of danger created by the attack? In answering this question allowance must of course be made 
for the fact that the accused has to act in the heat of the moment and cannot be expected to measure 
his response exactly to the danger… There are however, occasions where a further question must be 
asked: (1a) Even if the accused was not in fact under actual or threatened attack, did he nevertheless 
honestly believe that he was? … If this question is answered in the affirmative (or more correctly, 
the prosecution does not establish that it should be answered in the negative), then the third question 
must be modified, so as to read: (3a) Was the response commensurate with the degree of risk which 
the accused believed to be created by the attack under which he believed himself to be?”. 
 
530 Owino (1996) 2Cr App 128 (A) 132. 
 




necessary defensive action. If a jury thought that in a moment 
of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what 
he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that 
would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive 
action had been taken. A jury will be told that the defence of 
self-defence where the evidence makes it’s raising possible, 
will only fail if the prosecution show beyond doubt that what 
the accused did was not by way of self-defence”.532 
 
3.3 Elements of self-defence 
3.3.1 Reasonableness 
The issue may arise as to what circumstances the accused genuinely believed to exist, 
especially where the accused’s claimed belief, viewed objectively, is an unreasonable 
one. In such a case evidence of the accused’s personal characteristics should, in 
principle, be admissible in so far as they bear upon his ability to be aware of, or to 
perceive the circumstances. But Martin (Anthony),533 decided, on policy grounds, that 
psychiatric evidence that the accused would have perceived the supposed circumstances 
as being a greater threat than would a normal person were not admissible. The court 
rejected an analogy with provocation 534 since provocation applied only to murder and  
 
                                               
532 Ibid at 1078, applied in Shannon (1980) 71 Cr App R 192, [1980] Crim LR 438 and Whyte [1987] 
3 All ER 416. Chan is of the view that: “This definition may not be broad enough to ensure that 
self-defence is available to battered women who eventually retaliate. Many decades of reasonable 
men shooting and clubbing each other to death produced a common law of self—defence which 
adequately speaks to men’s needs. The difficulty arises when a woman, who is on average of 
smaller size than men and less likely to have any training in defending herself, is expected to fend 
off her attacker using reasonable force as deemed appropriate by the jury. This equal force rule is 
predicated on the assumption of two male adversaries, of equal size, strength and physical 
training. Is it, therefore, possible to apply this defence to the experiences of battered women who 
kill their abusers? If a woman kills with a lethal weapon, she may be acting outside the boundaries 
of the test and thus loses her right to plead self-defence” (Cited in Chan “A Feminist Critique of 
Self-Defense and Provocation in Battered Women’s Cases in England and Wales” (1994) Women 
and Criminal Justice 39 at 43). Chan goes on to note: “that the argument of proportionality of 
force is based on what Ashworth calls the ‘human rights’ approach to self-defence which affords 
the attacker the right to life and physical integrity. However, in the case of wife abuse, striking a 
balance between the protection of the abuser’s right to life and the abused woman’s physical 
safety presents a dilemma. Since female offenders are more likely to use a knife or sharp 
instrument in their attack because they are not equal strength as their abuser, the result is that the 
woman’s self-defensive action is more likely to be perceived as cold-blooded or premeditated”. 
(Chan supra at 43, citing Ashworth “Self-Defence and the Right to Life” (1975) Cambridge Law 
Journal 282 at 289.  
 
533 [2002] Crim LR 136. See also duty to retreat at 120-122 infra. 
 




was not a complete defence. However, the court did not consider duress which applied 
to almost all crimes with the exception of murder and which was a complete defence. In 
Martin (DP) 535 psychiatric evidence was admitted that the accused was suffering from 
a schizoid affective disorder which predisposed him to regard things said as being 
threatening, as opposed to an ordinary person, and to believe that threats would be 
carried out. Ormerod poses this question: “whether the policy considerations for private 
defence and duress are really different, or the cases are wrong?”. The court in Martin 
(Anthony) 536 conceded that evidence of the accused’s physical characteristics could be 
admissible. Circumstances which would not be considered threatening by a robust 
young man may appear so to a frail elderly woman.537 The Criminal Law Revision 
Committee was of the view that the question as to when the use of force is reasonable 
could be answered as follows: “reasonable force, would take into account all the 
circumstances, including in particular the nature and degree of force used, the 
seriousness of the evil to be prevented and the possibility of preventing it by other 
means”.538 It could not be reasonable to cause harm unless (i) it was necessary to do so  
                                               
535 [2000] 2 Cr App R 42. 
 
536 Martin (Anthony) supra (n 533). 
 
537 Ormerod supra (n 41) 331. The balancing of characteristics can give rise to difficult issues, especially 
in the case of a slight woman using lethal force against a physically stronger male whom she 
believes is about to attack her. The Law Commission in its recent 2004 consideration of Partial 
Defences to Murder recognized this difficulty. For their Judicial Studies Board Direction see Law 
Commission Consultation Paper supra (n 38) at par. 4.14. 
 
538 Cmnd 2659, par [23]. Wells notes that: “This is an advancement for battered women in that juries 
were previously asked to apply the apparently neutral and neutered concept for reasonableness, but 
as many feminists argue, this is a chimera. It is not neutral but highly gendered. One of the ways in 
which women are perceived differently than men is in their rationality. The whole problem of 
rationality/irrationality is a particularly difficult one in terms of defences of course because 
sometimes rationality is of the essence as here with self-defence, but sometimes lack of control or 
mental abnormality is asserted as with provocation and diminished responsibility. Many cases of 
women retaliating against persistent domestic violence may be channeled into these partial defences 
precisely because they are more appropriate to the implicit gender assumptions made about women”. 
Wells goes on to state: “This is another reason why it is important to consider how well self-defence 
serves women in these situations because, unlike provocation and diminished responsibility, it does 
provide a full defence”. (Wells “Domestic Violence and Self-Defence” (1990) New Law Journal 
127-128). Yeo in Unrestrained killings and the law: Provocation and Excessive Self-Defense in 
India, England and Australia (1998) at 322) submits: “In respect of BWS evidence of this syndrome 
could go to showing response patterns of battered women instead of indicating that they were 
suffering from a mental abnormality. Thus BWS could be used show that battered women did not 
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in order to prevent the commission of a crime or effect an arrest and (ii) the evil which 
would follow from the failure to prevent the crime or effect the arrest is so great that a 
reasonable person might consider himself justified in causing harm to avert that evil. 
Therefore, killing will be justified to prevent unlawful killing or grievous bodily harm, 
or to arrest a person where there is an imminent risk of causing death or grievous bodily 
harm if left at liberty. Ormerod submits that the question as to “what amount of force is 
reasonable in the circumstances?” is for the jury and never a point of law for the judge 
to consider.539 If the prosecution’s case does not provide material to raise the issue, the 
evidential burden then falls on the accused. In deciding whether the use of force is 
reasonable, the jury in Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference 540 asked the 
following question: 
 
 “Are we satisfied that no reasonable man (a) with knowledge of 
such facts as were known to the accused or... believed by him to 
exist (b) in the circumstances and time available to him for 
reflection (c) could be of the opinion that the prevention of the risk 
or harm to which others might be exposed if the suspect were 
allowed to escape [or the defence of himself or another, or the 
prevention of crime or the defence of property] justified exposing 
the accused’s victim to the risk of harm to him that might result 
from the kind of force that the accused contemplated using.” 541 
 
In self-defence the use of force must satisfy the test of reasonableness or 
proportionality.542 If the harm caused is grossly disproportionate to the harm prevented  
                                                                                                                                       
always respond proportionally to attacks, they used weapons due to strength differences, due to their 
knowledge of the batterer, they may anticipate future attacks and thus may strike out pre-emptively 
against their abuser etc”.  
 
539 Ormerod supra (n 41) 334.  
 
540 [1977] AC 105. 
 
541 Ibid at 137. 
 
542 In Owino supra (n 530) it was held: “The jury has to decide whether an accused honestly believed 
that the circumstances were such as required him to use force to defend himself from an attack or a 
threatened attack. In this respect an accused must be judged in accordance with his honest belief, 
even though that belief may have been mistaken. But the jury must then decide whether the force 
used was reasonable in the circumstances as he believed them to be” (at 132-133). See also DPP v 
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the defence should fail.543 In so far as the reasonableness of the accused’s response to 
an attack is assessed by reference to his state of mind in the circumstances, the 
justification of self- defence would appear to hinge on considerations that are 
excusatory in nature. If the accused was acting in a state of fear, panic or extreme 
anger, no blame is attributable to her for exceeding the limits of necessary force in self-
defence.544 A more coherent approach to the this matter would be to treat as justified 
only those cases of self-defence where the degree of defensive force employed was 
actually necessary and proportionate to the threat posed by the attack. Cases of putative 
self-defence,545 including those in which the accused due to stress or fear uses more  
                                                                                                                                       
Armstrong-Braun [1999] Crim LR 416 (QB); Shaw v R [2002] 1 Cr App R 77 (PC) 84-87; Leverick 
in the article “Mistake in Self-defence After Drury” (2002) Juridical Review 35 at 38 submits that: 
“The approach taken by English law is, then something of a logically confused one. A mistake about 
the existence of an attack does not need to be reasonable but a mistake in relation to the amount of 
force required to repel that attack does require a reasonable basis”. Leverick notes that the Law 
Commission attempted to justify this position by arguing that: “: “…[i]t is not for the defendant 
himself to adjudicate upon the reasonableness of the steps that he takes to prevent [an attack], 
because that would unfairly and dangerously exculpate defendants who had an irresponsible, 
irrational or anti-social notion of the extent to which it is acceptable to react when threatened with 
attack” (at 38, citing Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences Against the Person and General 
Principles Law Com No 128, 1993 66-67). Leverick supra at 39 goes on to state the English law 
position: “In English law, then, the position is that an unreasonable mistake in relation to the 
existence of an attack can lead to an acquittal on the basis of self-defence, provided the other 
requirements of the defence are made out. If, however the defendant honestly but mistakenly 
believes that a certain (excessive) degree of force is necessary to repel that attack, an acquittal on the 
basis of self-defence is ruled out”.  
 
543 Questions of proportionality need to be resolved in a broad and liberal manner eschewing the benefits 
of hindsight. Only in the plainest case should a judge, after finding that some force was necessary, 
remove a defence from the jury on the grounds of disproportionality.  
 
544 In the case of putative self-defence where the accused mistakenly believes he is being attacked and 
uses force in self-defence it has been argued that contrary to the current approach in Anglo-
American law the accused’s defence should be regarded as excuse- rather than as justification-based. 
Thus her action remains wrongful but the accused may be excused on the grounds of mistaken 
belief. (Mousourakis Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuse (1998) 187; Fletcher Rethinking 
Criminal Law (1978) 696). For a discussion of the proportionality requirement in South African law 
see chapter 2 at 56-58 supra; American law, chapter 4 at 200-202 infra. 
 
545 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 188. The traditional Common law position that putative self-defence 
operates as a justification has been adopted by the drafters of the American Model Penal Code. Par 
3.04 provides that the right of self-defence arises when “the actor believes that such force is 
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force”. Par 
3.09 (2) provides further, that in cases of putative self-defence, for the plea of self-defence to be 
accepted the accused’s mistake must be reasonable. Fletcher supra (n 544) remarks that “the 
Common law and now the Model Penal Code and its progeny interweave criteria of justification and 
excuse in cases in which the defending actor reasonably, but mistakenly believes that he is being 
attacked. Those situations, which we shall call putative self-defence, are regularly called cases of 
justification. Assimilating putative justification to an actual justification undermines the matrix of 
legal relationships affected by a claim of justification (at 762-763). Leverick supra (n 542) at 43 
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force than is actually necessary should be dealt with under the excuse theory.546 
 
3.3.2 Duty to retreat 
In determining whether the use of force was reasonable, the court will first consider 
whether her use of force was necessary. Part of the requirement for the use of deadly 
force is the duty to retreat. Ashworth is of the view that the goal of this principle is 
“when an individual’s purpose in a threatening situation is to save himself from injury 
or death, it cannot be necessary for him to inflict harm on his assailant if there is a safe 
avenue of withdrawal open to him”.547 However the case of Semayne 548 established the 
idea that “a man’s home is his castle and fortress, as well as for his defence against 
injury and violence, as for his repose.” 549 Chan is of the view that “the duty to retreat 
from one’s home becomes a paradoxical situation for battered women since the attacks 
normally occur within the home and her attacker is not a stranger but a loved one. Yet,  
                                                                                                                                       
submits that “it is not necessary to redefine mens rea of murder in a way that includes the absence of 
self-defence in order to avoid the attribution of criminal liability to the self-defender. An alternative 
is available to accommodate self-defence: to view self-defence not as part of the offence definition, 
but as a separate and supervening defence in its own right. As Leverick submits: “The defence of 
self-defence can be premised on two different bases: that of justification or that of excuse. In both 
instances, the defendant accepts that she has done something wrong (intentionally taken the life of 
another human being) but offers a reason for her conduct. The justification form of the defence 
applies where the accused correctly perceives that she is being attacked. The reason she offers up for 
killing the attacker is the fact that the attacker was threatening to kill her” (at 43). 
 
546 Leverick supra (n 542) at 46-47 states that while punishment serves a conduct-guiding function, “this 
is not to suggest that the law should require long and drawn-out checks to be made in the face of an 
immediate life-or death situation. Allowance, of course must be made for the panic that someone is 
likely to experience in the heat of the moment if she becomes the subject of an unexpected 
attack…Requirements of reasonableness ‘can be sensitive to the fact that people may make mistakes 
under the pressure of circumstances’. But where the consequences of a mistake are as serious as the 
death of an entirely innocent human being, there is surely a duty on us, as far as is possible or 
reasonable in the circumstances, to take steps to check the accuracy of our beliefs. I would argue that 
we are all under an obligation as responsible citizens in society, to control our behaviour in this 
way”. 
 
547 Ashworth supra (n 532) 285. See also the discussion on reasonableness at 116-118 supra. For a 
discussion of the duty to retreat in South African law see chapter 2 at 53-57 supra; and the duty to 
retreat in American law see chapter 4 at 198-199 infra. 
 
548 [1605] 77 E.R. 194 (K.B.) 
 
549 Ibid at 195. In Hussey (1924) 18 Cr App R 160 the right to stand fast in defending one’s home is 




she is expected to retreat from the supposedly safe haven of her home and from an 
attacker who lives with her”.550 Furthermore, although there is no absolute duty to 
retreat 551 before using force in self-defence,552 “[I]t may in some cases be only sensible 
and clearly possible to take some avoiding action” 553 and a “demonstration by [the 
accused] at the time that she did not want to fight is the best evidence that she was 
acting reasonably and in good faith in self-defence”. 554 
 
Where avoiding action is “sensible and clearly possible” the use of force by the accused 
will not be “reasonably necessary” and will for this reason not meet the requirements of 
self-defence.555 In Bird 556 the court held that: “the duty to retreat is not strict; however, 
it is not premised on persistent, systematic, relational violence either”.557  As Chan 
notes, “the question is whether it should be expected of these women to go on 
defending themselves indefinitely, or on the occasion when she chooses, for whatever  
 
                                               
550 Chan supra (n 532) 46. 
 
551 Bird [1985] 1 WLR 816. 
 
552 Bird supra. The Court of Appeal overruled previous dicta to the contrary. 
 
553 Palmer supra (n 531) 1080 per Lord Morris. 
 
554 Palmer supra (n 531) 1080-1081. 
 
555 Chan supra (n 532) 46. 
 
556 Bird supra (n 551). 
 
557 Ibid at 513. The duty to retreat is now simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether it 
was necessary to use force, and whether the force was reasonable. (McInnes [1971] 3 All ER 295 at 
302). Wells suggests that domestic violence is chronic, cyclical and often inescapable. The idea that 
a woman can leave and seek help is demonstrably untrue (“Battered woman syndrome and defences 
to homicide: where now?” (1994) The Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 266 at 272). 
See further Raeder “The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome by and 
Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence” (1996) University of Colorado Law 
Review 789 at 793 where it is held that coercion, control and domination are at the heart of domestic 
violence. While violence is instrumental in maintaining control, it is not the actual goal. Thus, 
emotional and financial coercion, as well as destruction of property together with physical battering 





reason, not to retreat, ought we not to take into account the fact that she has retreated 
before”.558 
 
3.3.3 Imminence of the attack 
It has been accepted that an accused need not wait for the attacker to strike the first 
blow before she defends herself. In Devlin v Armstrong 559   the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that a “plea of self-defence may afford a defence not merely to counter 
an actual attack, but to ward off or prevent an attack which he honestly anticipated. In 
that case however the attack must be imminent”.560 The imminence requirement may 
appear to deny a self-defence claim to a woman who uses force other than in expiation 
of an attack which she believes is just about to occur, and is perhaps why many such 
killings are not readily perceived as being by way of self-defence.561 
 
In Palmer 562 Lord Morris did not lay down inflexible criteria but simply held: 
 
 
                                               
558 Chan supra (n 532) 46. As was held in Field [1972] Crim LR 435 where the court rejected the 
argument that a victim had to avoid places where she knew, because of experiences of previous 
threats, that she might be attacked. 
 
559 [1971] NI 13. 
 
560 Ibid. Per Lord MacDermott LCJ at 33. In Beckford supra (n 524) it was held that a man about to be 
attacked does not have to wait for his assailant to strike the first blow, circumstances may justify a 
pre-emptive strike (at 144). The imminence requirement is based on the assumption that the situation 
is a one-time violent encounter most common when the adversaries are male, or in attacks by 
strangers. The possibility of repeated violence in the future, or the cumulative effects of repeated 
violence in the past, are into taken into account. Yet many battered women become aware when the 
violence is likely to escalate, having been repeatedly assaulted, and may retaliate during a lull in the 
battering incident or when their abuser is asleep. Chan supra (n 532) at 44 states: “the battered 
woman learns to recognize the small signs that precede periods of escalated violence. She learns to 
distinguish subtle changes in tone of voice, facial expression, and levels of danger, She is in a 
position to know, perhaps with greater certainty than someone attacked by a stranger, that the 
batterer’s threat is real and will be acted upon”. For a discussion of this requirement in South African 
law see chapter 2 at 46-48 supra, American law chapter 4 at 194-198 infra. 
 
561 McColgan supra (n 39) 517. 
 




“[I]f the moment is one of crisis for someone in imminent danger he 
may have to avert the danger by some instant reaction. If the attack 
is all over and no sort of peril remains then the employment of force 
may be by way of revenge or punishment or by way of paying off 
an old score or may be pure aggression. There may no longer be 
any link with a necessity of defence.” 563 
 
This passage, while not necessarily requiring that the accused be under threat of 
immediate force before being allowed to use force in self-defence, makes it evident that 
the proximity of the expected attack is merely one factor to be considered in 
determining whether the accused’s use of force was necessary, or whether it was the 
result of revenge.564 
 
A strict view of “imminence” then, should not, on the authority of Palmer 565 cause an 
otherwise arguable plea of self-defence to be jettisoned where there is no realistic 
alternative open to the person threatened. The lack of immediate physical threat would 
not prevent a hostage’s use of force from being necessary and therefore potentially 
reasonable, although the requirement of proportionality would still have to be met.566 
McColgan notes that “the same reasoning applies in the case of the battered woman 
who like the hostage is caught within a potentially life-threatening situation and who 
believes that an attack will occur before she is able to effectively escape and she must 
strike while her attacker is vulnerable. Alternatives such as seeking police protection or 
of flight may not constitute adequate alternatives to the use of force as she knows from 
experience that either of these measures is simply a temporary one”.567 Furthermore,  
 
                                               
563 Ibid 1080-1081. 
 
564 McColgan supra (n 39) 518. 
 
565 Palmer supra (n 531). 
 






abusive men tend to use the threat of even greater violence to prevent their partners 
from leaving the abuse and one recognized aspect of continued abuse is the perception 
it creates in the abused person of the abuser as all-powerful, and inescapable. Even 
without expert evidence about the psychological effects of abuse the courts have 
accepted that an accused’s failure to seek police protection in the context of duress will 
not necessarily prevent her from relying on the defence.568 The jury must have regard to 
any threats made by the abuser to the accused.569 
 
If the jury is satisfied that the accused’s use of force may have been necessary in the 
circumstances as they appear to her to exist, they should then consider whether the 
response was proportionate to the extent of the threat as it appeared to her to exist. 
Where the force used is judged excessive in relation to the harm threatened, neither 
section 3 of the Criminal Law Act nor the common law will assist her and she is liable 
to be convicted of murder in the absence of any other defence. The harshness of this 
rule is mitigated in practice by the recognition that “a person defending himself cannot 
weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his defensive action.” 570 While the accused’s 
belief in the level of force required is not conclusive of the question, the jury should be 
instructed to treat as “the most potent evidence” of the reasonableness of such force the 
fact that ‘in a moment of expected anguish a person attacked had done only what he 
honestly and instinctively thought was necessary.571  
                                               
568 McColgan supra (n 39) 520. In Hudson & Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202 Widgery LJ stated that the jury 
should “have regard to his age and circumstances, and to any risks to him which may be involved in 
the course of action relied upon in deciding whether such an opportunity was reasonably open to the 
accused ‘so as to render the threat ineffective as a defence” (at 207). The Court of Appeal refused to 
deny the accused the defence of duress on the ground that the threat to them was not immediate. 
 
569 McColgan supra (n 39) 520. 
 
570 Per Lord Morris in Palmer supra (n 531) 1077. This mitigation was introduced since it is clear that 
the rule developed largely through cases concerning male accused. 
 




While Lord Morris’s reference to “a moment of unexpected anguish” appears to 
privilege the traditional concept of self-defence in the context of a sudden, one-off 
attack, its importance lies in the recognition that the objective question of whether the 
accused’s use of force was reasonable must be assessed in light of her circumstances, a 
recognition which is as valuable to the woman whose reaction is the product of months 
or years spent under threatened violence, as it is to the man whose ability to rationally 
assess the measure of response required to a sudden attack is adversely affected by the 
unexpected nature of that attack.572 
 
3.4 Excessive self-defence 
Where the accused is under no mistake of fact and uses force in self-defence, she either 
has a complete defence, or, if she uses excessive force, no defence. Even if she believed 
the force was reasonable, but even if, by the relaxed standard applied in this context, it 
was not, she made a mistake of law. This is not a defence and she will be guilty of 
murder. This is the English law position, affirmed by the House of Lords in Clegg.573 
The accused, a soldier on duty in Northern Ireland, fired four shots at a car which did 
not stop at a checkpoint. The judge accepted that the first three shots had been fired, as 
the car had passed the soldiers and was already 50 feet down the road. The accused’s 
murder conviction was affirmed by the House of Lords, holding that it is established 
law that killing by excessive force in self-defence is murder and that if a change is to be 
made, it is for Parliament, not the courts, to take. There is no partial defence resulting in 
a manslaughter conviction, as with provocation and diminished responsibility. The 
possibility was considered and rejected immediately after the Clegg decision.574  
                                               
572 McColgan supra (n 39) 520. 
 
573 [1995] 1 All ER 334, [1995] Crim LR 418. 
 




Although there have been cases in early English law where the partial defence of 
excessive self-defence was adopted,575 this defence was clearly rejected by the Privy 
Council in Palmer.576 In Australian law for instance, for such a defence to apply the 
following conditions would have to be met: (a) the accused must have honestly and 
reasonably believed that she was being attacked; (b) the accused must have honestly 
believed that the degree of force used was necessary in the circumstances to protect 
herself; (c) the accused’s action would have been fully justified if excessive force 577 
had not been used.578  
 
In Zecevic 579 the High Court of Australia reversed its own earlier decisions, bringing 
Australian law into line with the law of England as expressed in Palmer.580 It was held 
that this change was needed to facilitate the jury’s task of applying the law and not 
because the previous approach was wrong.581 The defence of force, is open only to the  
                                               
575 See, e.g. Cook (1639) Cro Car 537; Whalley (1835) 7 C & P 245; Patience (1837) 7 C & P 775. In 
the cases of Whalley and Patience, for example, the accused used deadly force to resist an unlawful 
arrest; in both cases the accused were found guilty of manslaughter. 
 
576 Palmer supra (n 531). In this case it was held that “If in any of the above cases there is a suggestion 
that a measure of dispensation or tolerance, where a death is intentionally and unnecessarily caused, 
is to be found in the circumstances that someone is acting on a illegal warrant or is executing process 
unlawfully (Cook) it is not one that commended itself to their lordships..” (at 1083D).  
 
577 In Viro (1978) 141 CLR 88 the High Court of Australia once more confirmed the doctrine of 
excessive defence, refusing to follow the decision of the Privy Council in Palmer supra (n 531). 
 
578 Palmer supra (n 531) 1083. 
 
579 (1987) 71 ALR 641. 
 
580 Palmer supra (n 531) was followed despite the Australian courts previous recognition of the partial 
defence  in the case of McKay [1957] ALR 648: “...if the occasion warrants action in self-defence or 
for the prevention of felony or the apprehension of the felon but the person taking action acts beyond 
the necessity of the occasion and kills the offender the crime is manslaughter – not murder” (at 649, 
per Lowe J) and was confirmed by the High Court of Australia in Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448.  
 
581 According to Mason C.J., “The doctrine enunciated in Howe (supra (n 580)) and Viro (supra (n 577)) 
expressed a concept of self-defence which best accords with acceptable standards of culpability, so 
that the accused whose only error is that he lacks reasonable grounds for his belief that the degree of 
force used was necessary for his self-defence is guilty of manslaughter not murder” Zecevic supra (n 
579) 646. In the same case Gaudron J. stated: “The proposition that it is manslaughter, not murder, 
where self-defence in relation to homicide fails by reason only that disproportionate force was used, 
is consonant...with the definitional difference between murder and voluntary manslaughter involving 
the presence or absence of malice aforethought” (at 669). 
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accused who acted under an honest mistake as to the degree of force needed to repel the 
attack. On the other hand, such a partial defence was not recognized in cases of putative 
self-defence where the accused honestly but unreasonably believed that he was being 
attacked. In terms of Australian law, in the latter cases the accused may be entitled to a 
complete defence only if her mistake was reasonable. The High Court referred to this as 
a “basic and complicating conceptual anomaly,” 582 an inconsistency that had to be 
removed. Another problem with the doctrine of excessive defence had to do with the 
difficulty the courts had in applying an objective test such as the one that applies in the 
context of provocation. The court recognized that although the doctrine of excessive 
defence no longer applies, the jury is still entitled to return a compromise verdict of 
manslaughter in such cases.583 
 
3.5 Provocation  
3.5.1 Development of the defence  
In the later thirteenth century, culpable homicide was a single undivided offence. Its 
mens rea consisted of an intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm.584 In 1390  
                                                                                                                                       
 
582 Zecevic supra (n 579) 666. 
 
583 “There is no rule which dictates the use which the jury must make of the evidence and the ultimate 
question is for it alone” Zecevic supra (n 579) 653. The English Criminal Law Revision Committee 
has seemed to adopt the position that the doctrine of excessive defence as expressed in Howe supra 
(n 580) was right in principle and recommended its introduction in the context of self-defence and 
other defences. 
 
584 Cal. Inq. Misc., vi 95, cited in Kaye “The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter” (1967) Law 
Quarterly Review 370. In 1310 the Commons complained that pardons for larcenies, homicides and 
robberies had been too freely granted, and secured a promise, which was not kept that pardons would 
not be granted except in the cases in which they had come to be regarded as unexceptionable: in the 
case of homicide, self-defence and misadventure. ( Rotuli Parliamentorum ii, 171 a, 172, cited in 
Kaye supra at 378.) In 1347 the Commons complained that the too frequent issue of pardons had 
greatly encouraged murderers, robberies, homicides and felonies and seem to have asked parliament 
to remedy the matter by statute. The king returned an evasive answer: no charter was to issue sil ne 
soit a l’honour & profit de lui & de son people, thus concealing whatever distinction had been 
intended to be drawn between murderer and homicide (Kaye supra at 378). It is clear that by 
homicide the Commons cannot have intended to denote justifiable or excusable killings, for which 
pardons were admitted to lie of course, and the only interpretation of these terms consistent with 
previous use of the term is that murder secret or stealth killing was intended, and by homicide all 
other culpable killings. 
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the Commons petitioned against the practice of issuing pardons. Their complaint was 
that the issue of pardons for murder, treason and rape had been granted too freely and 
also that general pardons i.e., for all felonies and pardons under the Statute of 
Gloucester, were entitled to pardons for homicide in self-defence and by misadventure, 
should not be granted in cases where culpable homicide had been committed.585 The 
Crown granted the petition but for obvious reasons defined the crimes for which 
pardons were not lightly to be granted with more precision than the Commons had 
utilized. Parliament’s intention was to make the same divisions of culpable homicide as 
had been made on the earlier occasion: killings by secrecy or stealth, killing from 
ambush, and, as a residuary category, all other killings which gave rise to no recognized 
defence. The Statute thus introduced a new element in assault. The definition of 
murder, and the categorization of culpable homicide generally, adopted by the Statute 
of 1390 does not appear to have survived the fifteenth century.586 
 
Within 30 years of the Statute the categories of assault became obsolete. Since the 1390 
Statute had failed its purpose, as well as the fact that the degree of overlapping between 
the 1390 divisions had proven to be an unnecessary obstacle to framers of indictments, 
and since culpable homicide was equally capital, there seems to have been a 
consolidation of the two remaining divisions, murder and homicide par malice 
prepense.587 Furthermore, the word murder reverted to the broad general descriptive 
term for culpable homicide of any kind: in which sense it had sometimes been used 
before, in 1380 and 1390, a narrower interpretation had been put on it.588 
                                                                                                                                       
 
585 Rot. Parl., iii, 268, cited in Kaye supra (n 584) 391. 
 
586 Kaye supra (n 584) 568. 
 






The distinction between murder and manslaughter was redefined following the 
enactment of a statute in 1547, which excluded the benefit of clergy 589 from those 
found guilty of manslaughter.590 
 
An important step towards the formulation of the modern doctrine of provocation came 
in the 19th century in the form of the concept of the reasonable person. This provided a 
universal standard of self-control by which an accused’s response to the provocation 
would be assessed.591 But, it was not until the early 20th century that the role of the  
                                               
589 This related to the right of clerks in holy orders to be tried for crimes by ecclesiastical courts thus 
improving their chances of avoiding conviction. As this was deemed unfair, a number of statutes 
were enacted which removed the benefit of the clergy. 4 Hen. VIII, C.2; 23 Hen. VII, C. I, s. 3. 
Mousourakis supra (n 544) at 63-64 notes that through these statutes a tripartite classification of 
homicide was introduced. These included homicides committed with malice aforethought, punished 
by death; and homicides committed without prior malice (chance medley manslaughters) and 
homicides subject to royal pardon (excusable homicide) and the last category is that of justifiable 
homicide resulting in a full acquittal. 
 
590 Edw. 6, C. 12. Mousourakis supra (n 544) at 64-65 is of the view that this statute resulted in murder 
being distinguished from manslaughter on the basis of the presence or absence of premeditation. 
Thus manslaughter would mean deliberate killing on the spur of the moment as understood by Coke 
and other commentators of the 16th and 17th centuries. The basis of the distinction resulted from the 
assumption that premeditated killing was more reprehensible than a killing which is unpremeditated. 
However the distinction between killing with malice aforethought and chance medley manslaughter 
proved problematic as it was difficult to prove malice. Gradually chance medley was abandoned and 
the test for manslaughter was the presence or absence of provocation. This development was brought 
about by the enactment of the Statute of Stabbing 1604 which removed the benefit of clergy from 
those who killed another by stabbing; where the victim had not drawn his weapon, even though the 
killing was committed without premeditation (Stat. 2 Jac. VI, C.8 (1604), (cited in Mousourakis 
supra (n 544) 66). The narrow scope of the Statute of Stabbing made its application difficult in 
certain cases. Thus to deal with such cases the judges in the 17th and 18th centuries laid down criteria 
to determine which conduct amounted to provocation. Further it was reconfirmed that provocation 
was not available to those who killed out of revenge. The emphasis on the wrongfulness of the 
provocative conduct exercised a large influence on the development of the provocation defence. The 
real basis of the defence was the law’s compassion to human frailty. Thus it was believed that the 
accused as a result of provocation becomes so subject to passion that his ability to reason and 
exercise judgment is temporarily suspended. It was also recognized that that if the accused’s 
response is out of proportion to the provocation, the presumption of malice would be negated. 
Mousourakis supra (n 544) at 67 is of the view that this approach is reflected in cases decided in 
18th and 19th centuries such as Ayes (1810) R&R 166; Lynch (1832) 5C & P 324; 325; Hayward 
(1883) 6 C P 157; 159; Fisher (1837) 8 C & P 182 and Kelly (1848) 2 C & L 814. During this time, 
there was a shift in emphasis from the wrongfulness of the provocative conduct to the requirement of 
loss of self-control, although the courts continued to recognize and apply the categories of legal 
provocation as laid down by 17th and 18th century authorities. See Mousourakis supra (n 544) 66-67 
for examples of these categories. 
 
591 Ashworth “The Doctrine of Provocation” (1976) Criminal Law Review 290. Welsh (1869) 2 Cox CC 
336 is regarded by Ashworth as the starting point in the development of the modern law of 
provocation. In this case it was held that “...[I]n law it is necessary that there should be a serious 
provocation in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter, as for instance, a blow, and a severe blow 
- something which might naturally cause an ordinary and reasonable minded person to lose his self-
control” (at 338). Mousourakis is of the view that there was no immediate recognition of the 
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Reasonable person in provocation received full recognition. In Lesbini 592 the court 
rejected the view that a lower standard of provocation applied to those suffering from 
mental disabilities. This showed that in all cases of provocation, it must be serious 
enough to affect the mind of a reasonable person.593 Until the passing of the Homicide 
Act 1957, the question of whether the conduct amounted to provocation was not a 
question of law but was for a judge and not the jury to decide? 594 
 
In 1949, the common-law definition of provocation was set out in Duffy: 595 
“Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused, which 
would cause in any reasonable person, and actually in the defendant, a sudden and 
temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make 
him or her for the moment not the master of his mind.” This definition was modified by 
section 3 of the Homicide Act of 1957. According to this section: 
 
“Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the 
jury can find that the person charged was provoked (whether 
by things done or by things said or by both together to lose 
self-control, the question of whether the provocation was 
enough to make a reasonable person do as they did shall be  
                                                                                                                                       
reasonable person in provocation since the objective standard is not mentioned by Stephen in his 
Digest of the Criminal Law (1877) and A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883). Stephen 
simply laid down the different forms of conduct that amounted to provocation, pointing out that the 
success of the accused’s plea in such cases depended on whether the victims conduct came under 
one of the established categories of provocation and on whether the accused actually lost his self-
control as a result. Only when these conditions were satisfied, was the offence reduced to 
manslaughter (See Mousourakis supra (n 544) 68). See articles 224-226 of Stephen’s Digest for the 
Common law position of the defence of provocation as it was reflected in the late 19th century as 
well as the acts in article 225 which amounted to provocation. 
 
592 [1914] 3 KB 116. See also Alexander (1913) 109 LT 745. 
 
593 Ashworth supra (n 591) 298.  
 
594 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 70. There is early case law which provides for provocation as a defence to 
a charge of attempted murder but this does not represent the present law which recognizes 
provocation as a defence to murder only. For a discussion of how South African law treats the 
provocation/emotional stress defence see chapter 2 at pages 67-102 supra; for a discussion of the 
American defence of provocation see chapter 4 at 204-224 infra. 
 




left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that 
question the jury should take into account everything both 
done and said according to the effect which in their opinion, it 
would have had on a reasonable person.” 
 
Provocation operates as a partial defence to murder reducing murder to voluntary 
manslaughter. Since malice aforethought is defined as an intention to kill or to cause 
grievous bodily harm, provocation does not negative the required malice element of 
murder. 596  Pleading provocation presupposes that the prosecution has provided 
sufficient evidence to justify the returning of a verdict of murder. If it is not proved 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had the mens rea for murder i.e. intention to 
kill, then they must find the accused not guilty of murder, and necessarily of 
manslaughter. However if the jury is of the view that the accused had the requisite 
intention of murder, they must convict her of manslaughter, if they found that she was 
provoked.597 
 
3.5.2 Requirement of sudden loss of self-control 
In dealing with a provocation plea, the jury must first consider the subjective question 
of whether the accused was actually provoked to lose her self-control. 598  English 
common law has traditionally only catered for cases that involved an “immediate loss 
of self-control”.599  
                                               




598 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 80. The jury is entitled to consider all relevant circumstances, the nature 
of the provocative act and the manner in which the accused reacted, the sensitivity of the accused or 
otherwise and the time, if any, which elapsed between the provocation and the act which caused 
death. See also Davies [1975] QB 691 at 702. For a discussion of the American law treatment of this 
requirement of loss of self-control see chapter 4 at 219-224 infra. 
 
599 Duffy supra (n 595). In R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834 where it was held that although the House of 
Lords stated that the Homicide Act 1957 abolishes all previous rules as to what can or cannot 
amount to provocation, the courts held that the requirement of sudden and temporary loss of self-
control had not been changed by section 3 of the Act. Furthermore, the English courts have yet to 
define loss of self-control with any precision. The law does not require a total deprivation of self-
control otherwise the accused would have been in a state of automatism, a condition which results in 
a complete acquittal. It would be more in line with human reality to suggest that loss of self-control 
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In Ibrams,600 Thornton,601 and Ahluwalia 602 the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that there  
 
                                                                                                                                       
is not a single mental condition but can vary in intensity over a spectrum. See Phillips v R [1969] 2 
AC 130 (where Lord Diplock held that “there is an intermediate stage between icy detachment and 
going berserk” (at 137).  
 
600 [1981] 74 Cr App Rep 154. In this case the accused, who had been terrorized by the deceased over a 
period of time, killed the deceased following an agreement between them to do so. There was no 
evidence that on the day of killing the victim, that the victim had done anything to provoke him. The 
last provocation on the deceased’s part having been committed a few days earlier. The Court of 
Appeal held that the view that the formulation of a plan to kill and the lapse of time between the last 
act of provocation and killing negated the accused’s claim of loss of self control (Mousourakis supra 
(n 544) 63). 
 
601 [1992] 1 All ER 306, [1992] Crim LR 54. In this case the accused killed her husband who was an 
alcoholic and had been violent towards her on several occasions. The accused’s appeal was based on 
the argument that requiring a sudden and temporary loss of self-control was inappropriate 
particularly in a case where the accused was subjected to a long course of provocative conduct, 
which may sap the resilience and resolve to retain self-control when the final confrontation erupts (at 
313). However, the Court of Appeal took the view that the requirement of loss of self-control has so 
long been an essential part of the provocation defence, that it could only be removed by legislative 
enactment. The court held that the distinction between acting while in control of oneself and acting 
under a sudden and temporary loss of self-control as drawn in Duffy supra (n 595) remained an 
important element of provocation: “[t]he distinction is just as, if not more, important in [this] kind of 
case...It is within the experience of each member of the court that in cases of domestic violence 
which culminate in the death of a partner there is frequently evidence given of provocative acts 
committed by the deceased in the past for it is in that context that the jury have to consider the 
accused’s reaction. In every such case the question for the jury is whether at the moment the fatal 
blow was struck the accused had been deprived for that moment of self-control which previously 
they had been able to exercise... We reject the suggestion that in using the phrase ‘sudden and 
temporary loss of control’ there was any misdirection of the jury” (at 314). Edwards and Walsh are 
of the view that: “while this ruling accepts the materiality of cumulative provocation, BWS and its 
place in the law remains to be tested. Little argument on BWS was adduced in this case. On appeal, 
the two psychologists for the defence gave evidence that she suffered from a mental disorder 
equivalent to BWS. The mainstay of arguments was that being the wife of a chronic alcoholic, she 
killed as a result of trying to cope with his volatile, unpredictable behaviour, violent continual 
drunkenness, mood swings, threats to herself and her daughter, drinking away their livelihood and 
his refusal to acknowledge that he needed help. According to Dr. Glatt an authority on alcoholism 
and whose evidence was not available at the first trial, this experience was like living on the edge of 
a volcano. Its effects he said would have been horrendous enough for an ordinary person of normal 
fortitude. But the accused was not ordinary. She suffered from a personality disorder medically 
attested and serious enough to be defined as abnormality of mind for purposes of section 2 of the 
Homicide Act which included vulnerable attention seeking behaviour, histrionic personality, past 
suicide attempts etc. This resulted in admission to hospital under Mental Heath Act of 1983” (“The 
justice of retrial” (1996) New Law Journal 857 at 859). 
 
602 The same approach as was taken in Thornton supra (n 601) was adopted in Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All 
ER 889, [1993] Crim LR 63. The accused, who had endured ten years of violence and humiliation 
from her husband, threw petrol in his bedroom and set it alight. He succumbed to his injuries. 
Counsel for the defence challenged the applicability of the loss of self-control requirement. 
Reference was made to the “cooling off” period which has sometimes been applied to an interval of 
time between the provocation and the fatal act. Counsel held that although such an interval may 
indeed be a time for cooling and regaining control, in others the time lapse has an opposite effect (at 
893). The court held that the loss of self-control is an essential element of provocation serving “to 
underline that the defence is concerned with the actions of an individuals who is not, at the moment 
when she acts or acts violently master of her own mind” (at 895). It has been submitted that women 
who have been subjected to long periods of violent treatment may react to the final act or words by a 
“slow-burn” reaction rather than by immediate loss of self-control. See Clarkson and Keating 




must be a “sudden and temporary loss of self-control,” as Devlin put in Duffy,603 and 
approved that judge’s further words: 
 
“Indeed, circumstances which induce a desire for revenge are 
inconsistent with provocation, since the conscious formulation of a 
desire for revenge means that a person has had time to think, to 
reflect, and that would negative a sudden temporary loss of self-
control, which is of the essence of provocation.” 604 
 
In Ahluwalia 605 counsel asked the court to consider “slow-burn” anger, an example of 
where there is no immediate trigger. The question was whether a person who killed 
during a state of slow-burn anger could really be said to be acting without self-control, 
since it amounted to abandoning not only the “sudden and temporary” element but also 
the requirement that there must be “loss of self-control”.606 The assumption that the act 
of provocation was in the circumstances foreseeable, or that the accused was used to the 
victim’s untoward behaviour may militate against a loss of self-control requirement of 
provocation.607 
 
In contrast to the view that the courts may return to their earlier, broader conception of 
anger, their Lordships in Ahluwalia 608 took the view that the phrase “sudden and  
 
                                               
603 Duffy supra (n 595). 
 
604 Ibid at 932. 
 
605 Ahluwalia supra (n 602). 
 
606 Clarkson and Keating supra (n 602) 692. 
 
607 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 157. This position has been adopted in subsequent cases. See Ibrams 
supra (n 600) at 155 and Thornton supra (n 601) at 313.The over-rigid legal conceptualization of 
“heat of the moment” suggested only one psychological and/or physiological possibility or reaction. 
This oversimplified model of mechanistic man is a legal fiction. Lord Diplock in Camplin [1978] 
AC 705, [1978] 2 All ER 168 expressed some lurking doubts and found the “reasonable man” test a 
somewhat “inapt expression,” “since powers of ratiocination bears no obvious relationship to powers 
of self-control” (at 173). 
 




temporary loss of self-control” did not imply that an accused’s reaction to the 
provocation had to be immediate; it implied only that the accused’s act of killing must 
not be premeditated. Thus a delay between the provocation could be fatal to an 
accused’s plea since: 
 
“[t]ime for reflection may show that after the provocative 
conduct made its impact on the mind of the accused, he or she 
kept or regained self-control. The passage of time following 
the attack may also show that the subsequent attack was 
planned or based on motives, such as revenge or punishment, 
inconsistent with the loss of self-control and therefore with the 
defence of provocation.” 609 
 
 
Thus the English Court of Appeal in Ahluwalia 610 had transformed the suddenness 
requirement in Duffy 611 to a requirement which accommodated the slow-burn type of 
response to provocation. Such a move could be considered good policy since it 
presupposed judicial activism in that women who experienced slow-burn would also 
have lost their self-control suddenly at the point in time when their emotions erupted or 
boiled over. Thus a long history of provocation could be used to explain why the 
accused lost her self-control as a response to provocation, which when considered in 
the abstract, would not seem to warrant such a response. However, their Lordships in 
Ahluwalia 612  further took the view that any change to the principles governing 
provocation would have to come from Parliament. Section 3 of the Homicide Act of 
1957 is understood not to have altered the traditional position that provocation requires  
 
                                               
609 Ibid at 895. 
 
610 Ahluwalia supra (n 602). 
 
611 Duffy supra (n 595). 
 




a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. For this reason, where there is no evidence 
suggesting that the accused was provoked to lose her self-control, the judge is still 
entitled to withdraw the defence from the jury. 613 
 
3.5.3 The objective test of provocation 
The accused must not only have lost self-control as a result of provocation, but a 
reasonable person in the same circumstances must have lost self-control and acted as 
the accused did. This objective condition is known as the reasonable person test.614 DPP 
v Camplin 615 set out the test as follows:  
 
                                               
613 Ibid at 895. For the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s recommendation in this regard see CLRC, 
14th Rep. Para 84. As Wasik puts it: “Cases of cumulative provocation should fall outside the scope 
of ‘new murder.’ The law should recognize that there are degrees of culpability even in deliberate 
killings. Whilst evidence of forethought and premeditation must always tell against the accused on 
sentence, the more lenient approach evident in some sentencing cases, which regards cumulative 
provocation as mitigating the offence rather than making it more serious, is recommended. The 
traditional view of provocation as ‘concession to human frailty’ is clearly important both on liability 
and on sentence, but in cases [of cumulative provocation] there must be proper weight given to the 
justificatory as well as the excusative element.” (“Cumulative Provocation and Domestic Killing” 
(1982) Criminal Law Review 29 at 34-35). 
 
614 Yeo supra (n 538) 56. The subjectivizing of the objective test began in the case of Camplin supra (n 
607). Prior to this, the test was purely objective with none of the accused’s characteristics being 
attributable to the reasonable person. See Bedder [1954] 2 All ER 801, [1954] 1 WLR 1119 which 
provides a good example of this purely objective test. In Bedder ibid the jury was instructed to 
ignore the fact that the accused was impotent in deciding whether the victim’s conduct amounted to 
provocation. The House of Lords held that this was a correct decision stating that the considerations 
regarding any physical or mental peculiarities of the accused lie outside the scope of the objective 
test: “It was urged on your Lordships that the hypothetical reasonable man must be confronted with 
all the same circumstances as the accused, and that his could not be fairly done unless he was also 
endowed with the peculiar characteristics of the accused. However, the House held that that this 
makes nonsense of the test: “Its purpose is to invite the jury to consider the act of the accused by 
reference to a certain standard or norm of conduct and with this object the ‘reasonable’ or the 
‘average’ or the ‘normal’ man is invoked. If the reasonable man is then deprived in whole or in part 
of his reason, or the normal man is endowed with abnormal characteristics, the term ceases to have 
any value...It would be plainly illogical not to recognize an unusually excitable or pugnacious 
temperament in the accused as a matter to be taken into account but yet to recognize for that purpose 
some unusual physical characteristic, be it impotence or another... It is too subtle a refinement for 
my mind or, I think for that of a jury to grasp that the temper may be ignored but the physical defect 
taken into account” (at 803-804). The decision in Bedder ibid was reversed, following the 
introduction of section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, under which a judge cannot direct the jury as to 
what characteristics the reasonable person should be endowed with. However, it was not until the 
decision in Camplin supra (n 607) that the effect of section 3 on the issue of characteristics was 
recognized. For a discussion of the move towards an objective test in South African law of non-
pathological incapacity see chapter 2 at 86-94 supra. For a discussion of a move towards an 
objective test in the American defence of provocation see chapter 4 at 211-213 infra. 
 




“The reasonable man is a person having the power of self-
control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age 
of the accused, but in other respects sharing such of the 
accused’s characteristics as they think would affect the gravity 
of the provocation to him; and that the question is not merely 
whether such a person would in like circumstances be 
provoked to lose his self-control but also whether he would 
react to the provocation as the accused did.” 616 
 
Cockrell is of the view that “the above statement suggests that the jury should make a 
distinction between matters going to the gravity of provocation and matters going to the 
standard of self-control. For the former they should be able to take into account all 
characteristics of the accused (subjective), whereas for the latter the accused should 
have to exercise ordinary powers of self-control that would be exercised by an accused 
of the same age and sex (objective)”.617 
 
In Newell 618 the Court of Appeal in explaining what characteristics may be taken into 
account in deciding whether the provocation offered was enough to make a reasonable 
person do as the accused did, referred with approval to a passage from McGregor,619 a 
case decided by the New Zealand Court of Appeal: 
 
                                               
616 Ibid at 718. Allen is of the view that “where provocation is at large (not being confined to specific 
categories of conduct as it was in the past) it is important that the provocative conduct or words be 
seen in context, that context involves looking at them through the eyes of the accused in light of his 
or her characteristics, attributes, history, relationships and circumstances, in order to understand the 
meaning and significance which they attributed to the conduct or words .The ordinary person, is for 
the purposes of the objective test, provided with contextual information but remains a ordinary 
person of ordinary powers of self-control. These are not to be diminished by reason of the accused’s 
proclivities or deficiencies”. (“Provocation’s Reasonable Man – A Plea for Self-Control” (2000) 
Criminal Law Review 216 at 231) According to Green v R (1997) 148 ALR 659: “If this were to 
happen it would raise the danger of ‘jury verdicts and outcomes which would seriously offend the 
communities’ sense of justice by apparently indulging, or condoning, unrestrained ‘human ferocity’. 
It would sanction excessive conduct which allowed head-strong, violent people to take the law into 
their own hands in a way which no civilized society could permit. In effect, it would allow each 
individual to set the standards of his or her self-control that could be expected in face of any 
provocation”. 
 
617 Cockrell “Provocation: Characteristics relevant to Objective Test” (2004) Journal of Criminal Law 
368 at 370. 
 
618 (1980) 71 Cr App Rep. 
 




“It is not every trait or disposition of the offender that can be 
invoked to modify the concept of the ordinary man. The 
characteristic must be something definite and of such significance 
to make the offender different from the ordinary run of mankind, 
and have also a sufficient degree of permanence to warrant its being 
regarded as something constituting part of the individual’s character 
or personality...[It includes] not only...physical but also mental 
qualities and as such more indeterminate attributes as colour, race 
and creed...Moreover...there must be some real connection between 
the nature of the provocation and the particular characteristic of the 
offender by which it is sought to modify the ordinary man test. The 
words or conduct must have been exclusively or particularly 
provocative to the individual because, and only because of the 
characteristic.” 620 
 
In Morhall 621 the question was raised as to whether it is for the judge to decide whether 
a certain characteristic was consistent with the concept of the reasonable person and, 
whether such a characteristic should be taken into account by the jury. The House of 
Lords held that the accused’s addiction should have been taken into account since: 
 
“[It] was a characteristic of particular relevance, since the words of 
the deceased which were directed towards the appellant’s shameful 
addiction to glue sniffing and his inability to break himself of it.” 622 
                                               
620 Ibid 1081-1082. Yeo supra (n 538) at 85 is of the view that it is important to note that Justice North 
had developed this test to determine what characteristics should be permitted to affect the power of 
self-control of an ordinary person. The English Court of Appeal overlooked this important aspect 
and applied the test to assessing what characteristics were relevant to the gravity of provocation.  
 
621 [1995] 3 All ER 659. 
 
622 Ibid at 661. Lord Goff emphasized that things relevant to the gravity of the provocation should not be 
confined to the characteristics but, could include “the accused’s history or circumstances in which he 
was placed at the time, and the history or circumstances did not cease to be relevant because they 
were discreditable. Furthermore, a ‘characteristic’ could be something temporary or transitory if the 
subject of taunts or insults. However, intoxication was not to be taken into account because that, like 
displaying lack of ordinary self-control, is excluded as a matter of policy.” Thus the distinction in 
Camplin supra (n 607) between matters relevant to the gravity of the provocation and matters 
relating to self-control was endorsed in Morhall supra (n 621). Horder in his article “Provocation’s 
Reasonable Man Reassessed” (1996) Law Quarterly Review 35 at 37 is of the opinion that a matter 
of fundamental importance arises out the recent endorsements in the “Camplin distinction”, namely 
the intelligibility of that distinction where “mental” characteristics are in issue. Horder is of the view 
that in McGregor supra (n 619) North J rightly adverted to the fact that “special difficulties...arise 
when it becomes necessary to consider what purely mental peculiarities may be allowed as 
characteristics. Consider the example of drunkenness. In Morhall supra (n 621), Lord Goff thought 
that if a taunt were directed at someone on account of their drunkenness, then their drunkenness 
would have to be taken into account in assessing the gravity of the provocation. He added, however, 
that in such a case the jury would have also to be told that they should ignore the potential impact of 
the drunkenness on the level of self-control expected of the accused. In terms of this application of 
the “Camplin distinction” Lord Goff said at (at 338), “although the distinction is a fine one, it will I 




However, the House noted that North J’s judgment in McGregor 623 must be treated 
with caution in light of the reservations expressed in relation to the judgment in the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal case of McCarthy.624 In this case North J’s position that 
there must be direct connection between the provocation and the characteristic the 
accused seeks to rely upon to modify the objective standard was called into question. In 
McCarthy 625 the accused had suffered brain damage and this affected his personality. 
Although the provocation offered was not aimed directly at this characteristic the court 
was of the view that the accused was entitled to have this characteristic taken into 
account.626 The court stated: 
 
“[a] racial characteristic of the accused, his or her age or sex, a 
mental deficiency or a tendency to excessive emotionalism as a 
result of brain injury are examples of characteristics to be attributed 
to the hypothetical person. In a case where any of them apply, the 
ordinary power of self-control falls to be assessed on the 
assumption that the person has the same characteristics. The 
question is ...whether a person with ordinary power of self-control 
would have retained self-control notwithstanding such 
characteristics.” 627 
 
Yeo is of the view that the decision in Morhall 628 is important for “playing down the 
test devised in McGregor”.629 In McGregor 630 a characteristic qualifies for attribution to  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
623 McGregor supra (n 619). 
 




626 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 92. 
 
627 McCarthy supra (n 624) 67. 
 
628 Morhall supra (n 621). 
 






a reasonable person providing it satisfies three conditions. Regarding the characteristic 
of sufficient degree of permanence, the accused’s gender satisfies this condition since 
an individual normally goes through life in the gender she was born with. However, 
there are certain features of a person’s gender which may be “transitory in nature such 
as pregnancy, menstruation and menopause”.631  Yet these characteristics have been 
judicially recognized as relevant to the gravity of provocation.632 
 
In respect of the condition that there must be a sufficient degree of differentiation from 
the ordinary run of humankind, it is debatable how at a general level it can be said that 
gender sets a person apart from the population, and yet gender has been judicially 
recognized as a characteristic which may be relevant to the gravity of the 
provocation.633 At a specific level, the Court of Appeal in Ahluwalia was prepared to 
regard battered woman syndrome as a characteristic affecting the gravity of the 
provocation because it satisfied this condition of sufficient differentiation.634  When 
seen in isolation; this could be considered a welcome development, since the court was 
acknowledging that a battered woman’s perception of her circumstances might be 
considerably altered by the syndrome. What was objectionable was that the Court of  
 
 
                                               
631 Some may see these characteristics as sufficiently permanent in which case the uncertainty over the 
appropriate degree of permanency required by the test. 
 
632 Camplin supra (n 607) at 177 per Lord Morris and 180 per Lord Simon, Morhall supra (n 621). 
 
633 Camplin supra (n 607) at 180-181 per Lord Simon; Morhall supra (n 621) at 892 per Lord Taylor CJ. 
 
634 Ahluwalia supra (n 602) at 898. But see further Horder supra (n 622) at 38-39: “Consider BWS. 
Suppose the deceased had accused the defendant of being helpless and pathetic, upon which she lost 
self-control and killed him. The provocation seems to bear directly on the defendant’s syndrome, but 
how is a jury to distinguish between the effect of that syndrome on the defendant’s power of self-
control and it’s effect on the gravity of provocation to her? In theory there may be a distinction, but 
could it be drawn in practice? The harsh reality is that mental peculiarities often affect powers of 





Appeal regarded as irrelevant the evidence that the accused suffered grievous ill-
treatment at the hands of the victim if its effects fell short of the syndrome.635 Her 
experience of protracted physical, mental and emotional abuse would be highly relevant 
when evaluating the gravity of the provocation. It is important for the courts to regard 
battered women’s perceptions of provocative conduct as the workings of a normal 
mind.636 
 
A review of McGregor 637  shows that it has problems when applied to determine 
whether accused’s gender is relevant to the gravity of the provocation. The explanation 
for this was that the test was meant to apply to the power of self-control of a reasonable 
person and was not concerned with the gravity of the provocation.638 This was evident 
from reading the justification for prescribing the three conditions in McGregor 639 
which held: 
 
“The offender must be presumed to possess the power of self-
control of the ordinary man, save in so far as his power of self-
control is weakened because of some peculiar characteristic 
possessed by him. It is not every trait or disposition of the 
offender that can be invoked to modify the concept of the 
ordinary man”. 640 
 
Being made aware of their real purpose, it becomes clear why the conditions might all  
 
                                               
635 O’Donovan “Law’s Knowledge: the Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman, and her Syndrome” 
(1993) The Journal of Law and Society 427 at 432 notes that “the recognition of battered women’s 
experiences by means of expert testimony in court will in future depend on the accused showing the 
effect of ‘grievous ill-treatment’ as such that it makes her a different person from the ordinary run of 
[women]”.  
 
636 Yeo “The Role of Gender in the Law of Provocation” (1997) Criminal Law Journal 431 at 440-441. 
 
637 McGregor supra (n 619). 
 
638 Yeo supra (n 636) at 442-443. This point was briefly raised by McColgan supra (n 39) 512. 
 
639 McGregor supra (n 619). 
 
640 Ibid at 1081. 
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be necessary to limit the types of characteristics affecting the power of self-control of a 
reasonable person. North J felt the need to recognize certain characteristics affecting the 
power of self-control since New Zealand does not have a defence of diminished 
responsibility.641 Accordingly, the sooner the test is removed from English law, the 
better.642 Thus the only limitation placed on gender as a characteristic affecting the 
gravity of the provocation is that the provocation must have some bearing on gender 
and this limitation is easily satisfied when the provocation is viewed in connection with 
the gender roles of the accused. 
 
In Luc Thiet Thuan 643 the Privy Council referred approvingly to Ashworth’s view that: 
                                               
641 Since English law does recognize such a plea, the accused with weakened powers of self-control 
should be pleading diminished responsibility instead of provocation. Furthermore, the McGregor 
supra (n 619) test is contrary to the ruling in Camplin supra (n 607) which stipulates that only gender 
and age of the accused are relevant to the power of self-control to be expected of a reasonable person 
(at 175). This was reaffirmed in Morhall supra (n 621) at 665-666. This ruling seems to have been 
overlooked by some commentators who have accepted the McGregor test as applied in Ahluwalia 
supra (n 602) without hesitation: see Nicolson and Sanghvi “Battered Woman and Provocation: The 
Implications of R v Ahluwalia” (1993) Criminal Law Review 728 at 732. 
 
642 The House of Lords in Morhall supra (n 621) noted that the McGregor supra (n 619) test had been 
disapproved of by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in McCarthy supra (n 624) at 558 on the ground 
that “the test goes somewhat too far”. It is interesting to note that English Courts have said very little 
about the relevance of sex to the power of self-control. Apart from sex alongside age as going to the 
power, there is no clear indication in Camplin supra (n 607) that their Lordships meant for sex to 
affect the capacity for self-control. Yeo suggests that judgments contain statements which suggest 
contrary – that men and women are to be held to a single standard of self-control (Yeo supra (n 636) 
at 451). Nicholson and Sanghvi supra (n 641) state that to interpret it otherwise would breach the 
principle of equality before the law promotes contentious stereotypes which depict women as the 
gentler sex who are normally passive and submissive in the face of provocation which men are 
active and aggressive. Furthermore, the view that ordinary women have higher levels of self-control 
perpetuates the image of women who kill as being either aberrational or excessively pathological (at) 
204). Since sex was arguably not intended to affect the capacity for self-control, the House of Lords 
must have had some other purpose in mind. One interpretation is that the House mentioned sex only 
because it realized that to ask a jury to consider a gender-neutral person makes no sense (Yeo supra 
(n 636) at 451). This is supported by Lord Simon in Camplin supra (n 607) when he stated: “[a] 
reasonable woman with her sex eliminated is altogether too abstract a notion for my comprehension 
or, I am confident, for that of any jury... [I]t hardly makes sense to say... that a normal woman must 
be notionally stripped of her femininity before she qualifies as a reasonable woman” (at 180). Yet, in 
the context in which this comment appears shows that his Lordship was discussing the relevance of 
the accused’s sex when assessing the gravity of the provocation and not in relation to the power of 
self-control. More fundamentally the Camplin supra (n 607) direction juxtaposes gender with age as 
going to the issue of a reasonable person’s power of self-control is enhanced with the direction 
demarcating characteristics which relate to the gravity of the provocation. Yeo supra (n 636) is of the 
view that the House of Lords in Camplin supra (n 607) must have intended gender to serve some 
purpose other than merely “humanizing” the reasonable person (at 451). 
 




“[t]he proper distinction is that individual peculiarities which bear 
on the gravity should be taken into account, whereas individual 
peculiarities bearing on the accused’s level of self-control should 
not.” 644 
 
The judgment is of vital importance: it holds that unless the mental abnormality is the 
subject of taunts, it is not a relevant characteristic for the purposes of the objective 
test. 645  Concerning the need for provocation to target a certain characteristic, this 
condition appears to be unduly restrictive. The line drawn between specific and non-
specific references to an accused’s characteristic is too arbitrary. This does not mean 
that provocation need not have some bearing on the characteristic.646 What the law 
requires is a “real connection” between the provocation and the characteristics as  
 
                                               
644 Ashworth supra (n 591) 293. In this case Lord Steyn dissented as he considered the view of the 
majority would lead to injustice. He was concerned, in particular with cases where there was 
evidence of post-natal depression, BWS, or personality disorder, all of which could be considered 
relevant when the jury were considering the subjective question of whether the accused may have 
been provoked to lose her self-control, but which would have to be discounted when considering the 
objective question, namely whether, a reasonable person might have been provoked to do as the 
accused had done. He considered that this position would leave the jury puzzled. Mousourakis supra 
(n 544) is of the view that the danger with Lord Steyn’s approach is that if mental conditions which 
impair the accused’s ability to exercise self-control for the purpose of the objective test, there is the 
danger that this may create the circumstances for injustice for victims by reducing the proscriptive 
sanction of criminal law: “I do not see how mental conditions reducing a person’s powers of self-
control could fit into the provocation defence as characteristics that would modify but not preclude 
the objective test in provocation... Only provocations that are deemed serious enough to enrage an 
ordinary or reasonable person so that he may lose his self-control and kill could furnish a morally 
acceptable basis for a reduction of culpability” (at 235). Mousourakis supra (n 544) is thus of the 
view that there must be some moral basis for reduction of culpability and the basis must relate to the 
gravity of the provocation and not the deficiencies in the accused’s self-control. This maintains a 
link with the origins of the defence and its rationale serves to distinguish it from diminished 
responsibility. If the principle of fair labelling is important, the distinction which parliament enacted 
between manslaughter by reason of provocation (section 3 Homicide Act of 1957) and manslaughter 
by reason of diminished responsibility (section 2 Homicide Act of 1957) must be maintained (at 
135). 
 
645 Ormerod supra (n 41) 453. In this case the accused adduced medical evidence which showed that he 
suffered from brain damage and was prone to respond to minor provocation by losing his self-
control and acting explosively. The Privy Council held that this was not a characteristic capable of 
being attributed to the reasonable man. The council’s reasoning was that to allow characteristics of 
this type was not consistent with the ruling in Camplin supra (n 607) that the reasonable man has the 
power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person and would in effect remove the objective 
condition from provocation altogether. The council was of the view that the proper defence for an 
accused suffering from this sort of mental infirmity is diminished responsibility, not provocation. 
The Court of Appeal held that the English Court of Appeal went astray in Newell supra (n 618) by 
the “wholesale adoption without analysis” of a substantial part of the dictum of North J in the New 
Zealand case of McGregor supra (n 619) (cited in Toczek “The actions of the reasonable man” 
(1996) New Law Journal 835 at 835). 
 




opposed to the provocation having to be “directed at” the characteristic.647  
 
The approach in Luc Thiet Thuan 648 thus challenges the position adopted in a number 
of cases, including Ahluwalia 649 where it was held that mental conditions, such as those  
                                               
647 The Court of Appeal in Newell supra (n 618) at 339 used both these phrases citing McGregor supra 
(n 619) as authority. In support of the former phrase Horder supra (n 42) at 140-141 argues that 
provocation “directed at” a characteristic implies intention or knowledge on the provoker’s part 
whereas “a real connection” between the provocation and a characteristic may additionally 
encompass inadvertent provocations. The Court of Appeal in Dryden [1995] 4 All ER 987 at 998 
applied a different phraseology such as that the characteristic was “specifically relevant” to the 
provocative conduct relied on to constitute a defence. 
 
648 Luc Thiet Thuan supra (n 643). It was felt that the appropriate plea was diminished responsibility 
since mental abnormality was not a relevant characteristic for the objective limb of the test. Thus the 
test for this aspect of provocation seemed at this stage to have moved from a highly objective, 
narrow formulation, to a two-fold test, the first part of which injects an element of subjectivity whilst 
the second retains a suitable degree of objectivity. 
 
649 Ahluwalia supra (n 602). Briggs, citing Horder, who in examining Morhall supra (n 621), concluded 
that for the purposes of voluntary manslaughter, a characteristic is relevant to the gravity of 
provocation only when the provocation given is directed at that characteristic. While it is true that, 
when provocative words are so directed, any such targeting (which extends to striking by unhappy 
accident, as has recently been made clear by the Privy Council in Luc Thiet Thuan supra (n 643)) of 
the accused’s Achilles heel may increase the gravity of that provocation. However, Horder goes on 
to note that this renders “battered woman syndrome”, as recent cases have called it, legally irrelevant 
to the gravity of provocation served in the form of domestic violence. Since Horder wrote, the Privy 
Council in Luc Thiet Thuan supra (n 643) has indeed reconfirmed that an accused who suffers from 
a general shortage of self-control (in casu, “some form of organic brain problem”), or who has a 
general susceptibility to all and any forms of provocation, does not raise an argument which goes to 
the gravity of the provocation, and accordingly cannot ask for it to be included in the analysis of this 
defence. But it is not obvious from this, or from Morhall supra (n 621) that Horder’s particular 
deduction must be correct. Provocative conduct needs a provoking individual. It was reiterated in 
Morhall supra (n 621) and in Luc Thiet Thuan supra (n 643) that characteristics of the accused may 
magnify the seeming gravity of the provocative words or deeds. Briggs is of the opinion that “it 
seems equally possible that a circumstance of the accused may mean that the very identity of the 
provoker himself renders acts or words graver than they would be coming from someone else. Take 
the husband who comes back from the pub shouting at his wife and who will probably be violent to 
her when he wakes from his stupor. Experience has taught her of the inevitability of this. This verbal 
provocation is more terrifying precisely because the accused, having long been abused by this 
individual knows what is coming next. Given the identity of the provoker her syndrome heightens 
the emotion stirred up by his act, not by the provocation in general (which would indicate no more 
than shortness of temper; Luc Thiet Thuan supra (n 643)), but by this specific form of it. Likewise, if 
a father who has sexually abused his child for years lets himself in to the bedroom and sits on the 
edge of the bed, the defendant’s “abused child syndrome” may mean that the act, innocent if 
performed by anyone else or if weighed without reference to this history of abuse, may one day drive 
the child to a loss of self-control. In neither case does the perception of provocation make sense in 
the absence of the “syndrome”; in both cases it gains its unique force from the particular feature of 
the accused. Just as certain taunts maybe sharpened by a characteristic of the accused, provocative 
acts may likewise be. Perhaps Lord Goff had this in mind in Morhall supra (n 621) when warning 
against undue reliance on the concept of the “characteristic”. It is suggested that where 
circumstances such as these heighten vulnerability to provocation which is particular in terms of 
substance, they fall well within the spirit and intendment of the Camplin supra (n 607) principle. If 
so, it should be recognized that there is more than one paradigm for how particular provocation, 
otherwise unremarkable to an officious bystander, conveys a unique horror for its victim. Its being 
directed at a characteristic is not, perhaps, the only way” (Briggs “Provocation Re-Reassessed” 
(1996) Law Quarterly Review 403 at 403-404). 
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relating to post-traumatic stress disorder, or battered woman syndrome, may be a 
relevant characteristic for the purposes of the objective test in provocation. 650 The 
approach taken in these cases suggests that: 651 
 
“[given] the right sort of evidence, reasonableness ought to be 
judged from the perspective of a syndrome sufferer...[In Ahluwalia] 
given the finding on the evidence, and the fact that the issue of the 
required link between the accused’s characteristics and the 
provocation had not been raised, this aspect of the judgment was 
only obiter. Nevertheless it may come to mark an important step in 
the liberalization of the reasonable person test by allowing 
consideration of any characteristic affecting the accused’s power of 
self-control.” 652 
 
The case of Smith 653 (Morgan) casts doubt on the exclusion of individual  
                                                                                                                                       
 
650 Similarly in Dryden supra (n 647) and Humphreys (1995) 145 NLJ 1032 the courts adopted the 
position that eccentric and obsessional personality traits, as well as abnormal immaturity are mental 
characteristics on which the jury should have been specifically directed. Thus, Toczek (supra (n 645) 
is of the view that if Luc Thiet Thuan supra (n 643) is correct, it has important implications for 
defence counsel advising clients charged with killing their abusers. If medical evidence is present 
that they killed their abusers, because their powers of self-control were reduced as a result of a 
condition such as BWS or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, the proper defence to run is diminished 
responsibility not provocation (at 835). 
 
651 Nicolson and Sanghvi supra (n 641) 728. 
 
652 Ibid 732-733. This did not expressly occur in Thornton (No 2) supra (n 601) where the Court of 
Appeal ordered a retrial on the basis of evidence of BWS and a personality disorder which should 
have been left to the jury as characteristics to be attributed to the reasonable person. Lord Taylor CJ 
stated: “The severity of such a syndrome and the extent to which it may have affected a particular 
accused will no doubt vary and is for the jury to consider. But it may be relevant in two ways. First, 
it may form an important background to whatever triggered the actus reus. A jury may more readily 
find there was a sudden loss of control triggered by even a minor incident if the accused has endured 
abuse over a period, on the ‘last straw’ basis. Secondly, depending on the medical evidence, the 
syndrome may have affected the accused’s personality so as to constitute a significant characteristic 
relevant...to the second question the jury has to consider in regard to provocation” (at 1181-1182). 
On the second point, Lord Taylor CJ did not spell out whether BWS was solely relevant to the 
question whether a reasonable person might have been provoked or whether it was further relevant 
to consideration of the degree of self-control to be expected of a reasonable person. 
 
653 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). In this case the accused killed a former friend in a dispute over the 
ownership of tools. The accused suffered from clinical depression which reduced his threshold for 
erupting into violence. The trial judge directed that this was neither here nor there when considering 
whether the reasonable person would have lost self-control. The Court of Appeal held that a 
depressive illness, not amounting to diminished responsibility but which might have reduced the 
accused’s threshold for erupting into violence as a relevant characteristic in considering the loss of 
self-control but certified a question for the opinion of Hoffman CJ. For a discussion of the subjective 
approach in South African law to non-pathological incapacity see chapter 2 at 67-79 supra; for a 




characteristics from the second limb of the test. The Court of Appeal certified the 
following question for the House of Lords to establish: 
 
“Are characteristics, other than age or sex, attributable to the 
reasonable person, for the purpose of section 3 of the 
Homicide Act 1957 relevant not only to the gravity of the 
provocation to him but also to the standard of control to be 
expected?” 654 
 






                                               
654 Ibid at 536. 
 
655 Smith supra (n 40). See further R v Smith [2002] EWCA Crim 2671. In this case there were two 
matters which rendered the verdict of guilty of murder unsafe. The judge in summing up directed the 
jury to consider all the circumstances including the accused’s medical history, panic attacks and 
depression. But one of those occasions was in context of diminished responsibility. Repeatedly 
throughout summing up, the judge in relation to provocation focused on the long quarrel on the day 
of the killing (at [38]). This may well have led the jury to conclude that the accused’s medical 
history, although relevant to diminished responsibility was not relevant to provocation. To this 
extent, it may have been that they were misled. Secondly, the law in relation to provocation as 
clarified by Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40) namely that particular characteristic of the accused are to 
be taken into account by the jury in relation not only to whether the accused was provoked but also 
to whether the reasonable person would have been provoked must be taken to have been the law at 
the time of the accused’s trial. From the terms of the expert witness Dr. Eastman’s reports and in the 
implications of his evidence, the Smith (Morgan) case does not appear to have been in his mind at 
the trial. Eastman was also not asked to consider provocation and did not do so. The effect of his 
evidence before the judges was that he would have expressed the data from the accused’s medical 
history differently in the context of section 3 of the Homicide Act than in context of section 2. The 
essence of section 3 is that provocative conduct and its effect on someone with the characteristics of 
the accused. Further, more minor symptoms are relevant to provocation when they may not be to 
diminished responsibility. In the interests of justice they admitted Dr. Eastman’s evidence without 
embarking on further analysis and allowed quashed the conviction thus allowing the appeal (Per 
Rose LJ and Hughes JJ). In respect of Dr. Eastman’s thoughts that the accused was suffering from 
long-standing moderate depression and learned helplessness arising from BWS and that there was 
substantial impairment of responsibility by reason of consequent distortion of her thinking. Her 
apparent lack of remorse might simply be callousness or could be that her thinking remained 
distorted. A specific aspect of depressive illness is that irritable and lowered threshold for violence 
would in Dr. Eastman’s view have been relevant as a mental characteristic to loss of self-control in 
the context of provocation. Again evidence of cognitive distortion and the true belief in a woman 
such as Mrs. Smith that she did not have any way out, would have heightened effect of provocation 




answered in the affirmative. 656  While an objective element remained 657  in the 
defence,the standard of behaviour to be applied was a matter only for the jury and not 
for direction by the judge.658 Thus the law now requires all mental and physical  
                                               
656 Lord Hoffman in Smith supra (n 40) recognized that in present English law of provocation had 
serious logical consequences and moral flaws (at 159). In particular, he was critical not only of the 
gravity/control dichotomy as posed in Luc Thiet Thuan supra (n 643) which he stigmatized as 
unworkable and impossible to explain to juries (at 166-169) but also of a whole exercise of ascribing 
characteristics to the reasonable person (at 172-174). Lord Hoffman sees this as resulting from an 
attempt to marry two discordant ideas, the first being the old formula that the provocation must be 
such as to cause a reasonable person to act in the same way as the accused, and second the rule that 
section 3 of the Homicide Act of 1957 that no circumstances or characteristics should be excluded 
from the consideration of the jury. It is this, he says, that has given rise to such monsters as 
reasonable obsessive, reasonable depressive alcoholic etc (at 172). 
 
657 Lord Hoffman was of the view that what is unworkable is not the principle of the objective test itself, 
but the traditional way of explaining it: “In my opinion... judges should not be required to describe 
the objective element in the provocation defence by reference to the reasonable man, with or without 
attribution of personal characteristics. They may instead find it more helpful to explain in simple 
language the principles of the doctrine of provocation. First, it requires that the accused should have 
killed while he had lost self-control and that something should have caused him to lose self-control. 
For better or worse, section 3 left this part of the law untouched. Secondly, the fact that something 
caused him to lose self-control is not enough. The law expects people to exercise control over their 
emotions... A tendency to violent rages or childish tantrums is a defect in character rather than an 
excuse. The jury must think the circumstances were such as to make the loss of self-control 
sufficiently excusable to reduce the gravity of the offence from murder to manslaughter. This is 
entirely a question for the jury. In deciding what should count as sufficient excuse, they have to 
apply what they consider to be appropriate standards of behaviour, on the one hand making 
allowance, for human nature and the power of emotions, but on the other hand not allowing someone 
to rely on his own violent disposition. In applying these standards of behaviour the jury represents 
the community and decides as Lord Diplock’s said in Camplin’s case... what degree of self-control 
‘everyone is entitled to expect that his fellow citizens will exercise in society as it is today”. (Smith 
supra (n 40) at 173) Stannard is of the view that: “the difference between the traditional test and 
Lord Hoffman’s test is that the former is factual in nature while the latter is normative. In the 
traditional version the jury is asked to predicate a hypothetical person with certain characteristics and 
ask: do we think that the person would have acted as the accused, but in Lord Hoffman’s version the 
jury makes a value judgment: do we think the circumstances were such as to make the loss of self-
control sufficiently excusable to reduce the gravity of the offence from murder to manslaughter” 
(Towards a normative defence of provocation in England and Ireland” (2002) Journal of Criminal 
Law 528 at 537). Lord Hoffman thus says he is going back to the original philosophy of section 3 of 
the Homicide Act of 1957: commenting on the changes made in section 3 he declares: “I do not 
think it possible to attribute to parliament in making this change any intent other than to legitimate 
the relaxation of the old law in those cases in which justice appeared to require it and to allow the 
jury in good conscience to arrive at a verdict which previously would have been perverse. In other 
words, the jury was given a normative as well as fact-finding function. They were to determine not 
merely whether the behaviour of the accused complied with some legal standard but could determine 
for themselves what the standard in the particular case should be” (Smith supra (n 40) at 163). 
 
658 The reason for doing this was the need for the defence to be interpreted with sufficient sensitivity to 
differences between individual accused. Macklem and Gardiner in their article “Provocation and 
Pluralism” (2001) Modern Law Review 815 discuss the possibility that Lord Diplock in Camplin 
supra (n 607) meant to attribute different “characteristics” to the reasonable person for the purposes 
of different “objective” issues arising under section 3. But, the majority of the House of Lords in 
Smith [1998] 4 All ER at 238 denied that Lord Diplock meant to draw this distinction, the 
application of which would require excessive “mental gymnastics of the jury”. However, Macklem 
and Gardner explored the possibility that Lord Diplock intended to draw exactly such a distinction: 
“There are three different issues in respect of which section 3 requires the jury to set standards by 
which the accused is to be judged, and in respect of each of these issues different facts about the 
accused and her background may bear on what counts as her meeting those standards (at 820). The 
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characteristics of the accused in relation to the gravity of provocation to be taken into 
account.659 Furthermore, all such characteristics are relevant to the level of self-control 
required, 660 with the time-honoured exception of irascibility. 661 
                                                                                                                                       
accused’s cultural milieu may be relevant in determining whether the alleged words or deeds amount 
to provocation. In respect of how grave the provocation really was, it may be relevant whether the 
accused’s actually possessed the characteristic about which she was taunted. In respect of whether 
she should have lost self-control to the point that she killed, it may be necessary to know what the 
role the accused occupied at the time. Facts about the defendant’s background are needed to identify 
what would count as meeting the objective standard of reasonableness” (at 820). 
 
659 Christie is of the view that the latter “substantially weakens the self-control element and thereby the 
objectivity of the partial defence of provocation”. This could allow an accused to escape conviction 
for murder more easily, since having measured the gravity of the provocation through her viewpoint, 
the self-control required of her would only be that of the reasonable person who had all the 
accused’s peculiar characteristics (“Pushing the Reasonable Man too Far?” (2000) Journal of 
Criminal Law 409 at 413). Heaton in his article “Anything Goes” (2001) Nottingham Law Journal 
50 at 55-56 states: “The provocation excuse should be a concession to extraordinary external 
circumstances not to the extraordinary internal make-up of the accused. The moral foundation for the 
extenuation is the necessity or very serious provocation...If the reaction is essentially due to the 
internal character of the accused, his or her excusatory claim, if any, should sound in diminished 
responsibility. That is the proper defence for the abnormal. ‘The defence of provocation is for those 
who are in a broad sense mentally normal’ but who snap under the weight of very grave 
provocation.” Martin holds that: “the view that while certain personality traits listed as unsuitable for 
consideration by jury as they examine the appropriate reasonable man in the circumstances. These 
forbidden traits include jealousy, obsession, possessiveness, and a tendency to childish tantrums. The 
female victim of violent abuse can have her history and experience taken into account, but the 
obsessively jealous woman will be judged by the standard of the reasonable woman who is not prone 
to obsessive jealousy. Any moral distinction between these examples notwithstanding, it is difficult 
to justify this division using legal principle” (“Continuing problems with provocation” (2005) New 
Law Journal 1363 at 1364). 
 
660 See R v Cole [2005] EWCA Crim 1335. While in the accused in this case raised self-defence, the 
high point of this case would be the accused’s statement: “I can’t remember the knife going in or 
seeing blood... I did not feel in control”. This would indicate a possible defence of provocation but 
the court entertained considerable doubt as to whether there was any loss of actual self-control, 
despite the fact that the accused had suffered abuse from the deceased as well as a history of severe 
abuse in Jamaica from a previous partner (at [44]). While the court accepted the account of abuse in 
Jamaica is capable of belief but its relevance to the alleged loss of self-control is a different matter 
(at [45]). There are partly by the reason of lies told by the accused to the police and partly because of 
the history of purporting to demonstrate how such a link exists, grounds for very seriously 
questioning the belief concerning accused’s account of events at the time of the killing. It is to be 
observed that the time of the trial, no basis for post-traumatic stress disorder as having affected the 
accused was contemplated by any of the doctors. Thus in so far as the accused now purports to link 
that history with her state of mind and alleged loss of self-control at the time of the killing, the court 
did not regard her accounts capable of belief not least because there was no reason to think it might 
have affected the jury’s verdict (at [49]). 
 
661 Stannard supra (n 657) posed the question as to whether Lord Hoffman’s test will work in practice. 
The position in English law is complicated by section 3 of the Homicide Act of 1957 and the defence 
of diminished responsibility. Section 3 expressly provides for the jury to decide whether the 
provocation was sufficient to make the reasonable man do as he did and allows them to take into 
account everything both done and said according to the effect it would have had on the reasonable 
man. It could be asked how to avoid describing the objective element in provocation by reference to 
the reasonable person is enshrined in Statute. Lord Hoffman was of the view that the case of Welsh 
supra (n 591) when Keating J decided to borrow the concept from the law of negligence, did not 
imagine that he was changing the law, he merely thought he had hit on a felicitous way of explaining 
it. (Smith supra (n 40) at 172) Furthermore, it does not require them to go through mental 
gymnastics of attributing to that reasonable person the particular circumstances of the accused. A 
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R v Rowland 662 was referred to the Court of Appeal on the basis that there had been a 
change in the substance of the law on provocation following the decision in Smith 
(Morgan).663 In Rowland 664 the accused submitted that he had become upset by his 
wife’s withdrawal from the marital relationship, the couple having experienced a 
number of problems relating to various aspects of their marriage. Moreover, the 
accused suffered from Peyronie’s disease (scar tissue causing a bend in the penis) and 
his wife had taunted him about this matter on various occasions. On the night of the 
incident, during the course of a heated argument, Mrs. Rowland attacked the accused, 
stuck her fingernails into his face; and taunted him about his medical condition, which 
was the last thing the accused claimed to remember until after the stabbing had occured. 
The appeal was based on medical evidence which had not been submitted by the 
accused at the time of the original trial. A psychiatrist, Dr McClelland, examined the 
accused before the trial in 1997 and was then asked in 2001 to clarify his opinions as to 
the effects of the accused’s personality on his actions. Dr. McClelland was of the view 
that, at the time of the stabbing, the accused was suffering from depression and that 
certain recognizable personality traits of the accused lowered his threshold for 
impulsive behaviour. Leading counsel for the accused explained that the reason for not 
introducing such evidence at the trial was that “as the law stood it seemed to me that  
                                                                                                                                       
distinction must be drawn between the original concept and the exersence which have developed 
around it. In respect of this Lord Hoffman pointed out that “the 1957 Act made a miscellany of 
changes to the law of homicide which can hardly be described as amounting to a coherent and 
interlocking scheme” (Smith supra (n 40) at 168). According to him, if the question was asked 
whether Parliament contemplated such an overlap, in all probability, little thought was given to it 
(Smith supra (n 40) at 168). Stannard supra (n 657) states that: “Once we leave aside the particular 
problems caused by differing burden of proof problems and they don’t affect the merits of Lord 
Hoffman’s test, there is nothing unusual or difficult about the criminal law accommodating the 
overlapping of defences. One of the basic skills of lawyers is to argue defences in the alternative” (at 
539). 
 
662 [2003] EWCA Crim 3636. 
 
663 Smith supra (n 40). Subsequent cases continued to apply Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40) test (see Paria 
v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2003] UKPC 36, [2003] All ER (D) 287 (Apr); R v Roberts [2002] 
EWCA Crim 1069, [2002] All ER (D) 210 (Apr); R v Rowland supra (n 562). 
 




much of the helpful comments which Dr. McClelland had provided in his report... were, 
in fact, inadmissible.” 665 
 
It was contended that in the light of the decision in Smith (Morgan),666 the jury should 
have been afforded the opportunity to hear Dr. McClelland’s evidence during the trial 
in 1997. Furthermore there was a strong possibility that the Court of Appeal might 
conclude that “the circumstances were such to make the loss of self-control sufficiently 
excusable to reduce the gravity of the offences from murder to manslaughter.” 667 
 
In R v Rowland 668 the Criminal Cases Review Commission submitted the following to 
the Court of Appeal: 
 
“...had the legal position at the time of trial been that 
determined by Smith (Morgan), it is likely that the defence 
would have sought expert opinion on the issue of provocation, 
the jury being provided with evidence of the appellant’s 
personal characteristics in support of such a defence. If the 
Court of Appeal accepted this submission, then the jury would 
have been able to take into account Mr. Rowland’s clinical 
depression in assessing not only the gravity of the provocation 
he experienced but also the effect this had on his ability to 
maintain self-control.” 669 
 
During its deliberations, the Court of Appeal in R v Rowland 670 concluded that the Judicial  
                                               
665 Ibid at 25. 
 
666 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). 
 
667 R v Rowland supra (n 662) at 25. 
 
668 R v Rowland supra (n 662). 
 
669 Ibid at 20. 
 
670 R v Rowland supra (n 662). This case referred to Weller [2004] 1 Cr App R 1 where it was held that 
the trial judge’s failure to direct the jury to consider the accused’s unduly possessive and jealous 
nature did not render the conviction for murder unsafe provided the characteristics were not 
specifically removed from the jury’s consideration. The trial judge had directed simply that the jury 
should consider “what society expects of a man like this accused in his position”. The Court of 
Appeal suggested that: “The question whether the accused should reasonable have controlled himself 
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Studies Board’s Specimen Direction on Provocation (April 2003) is one on which the 
judges may safely rely. Paragraph (iv) states: 
 
“It is then for you to decide whether or not D’s loss of self-
control was sufficiently excusable to reduce the offence from 
murder to manslaughter. When deciding this, bear in mind that 
the law expects people to exercise control over their emotions. 
If a person has an unusually volatile, excitable or violent 
nature (or is drunk) he cannot rely on that as an excuse. 
Otherwise, it is entirely for you to decide what are appropriate 
standards of behaviour, what degree of control society could 
reasonably have expected of D, and what is the just outcome 
of the case. You should make allowances for human nature 
and the power of emotions. You should take into account 
[here deal with any characteristics of D which may have a 
bearing on the issue].”  
 
Cockrell is of the view that it was the “unequivocal opinion” of the Court of Appeal 
that had the case been tried under present law, the defence would have admitted the 
evidence of Dr. McClelland. Furthermore, in relation to the second stage of the 
provocation test, the judge would have invited the jury to take into account the fact that, 
in the words of Dr. McClelland the “out of control behaviour was made the more likely 
by his [the accused’s] depressive state”. R v Rowland 671  thus provided another 
opportunity for the Court of Appeal to reinforce the increasing subjective nature of the 
second limb of the test for provocation,672 as confirmed by a majority of the House of 
Lords in Smith (Morgan).673 
 
                                                                                                                                       
is to be answered by the jury taking all matters into account. This includes matters relating to the 
accused, the kind of man he is and his mental state, as well as the circumstances in which the death 
occurred. The judge should not tell the jury that they should, as a matter of law, ignore any aspect. 
He may give them some guidance as to the weight to be given to some aspects provided he makes it 
clear that the question is one which, as the law provides, they are to answer, and not him” (at 815). 
 
671 R v Rowland supra (n 662). 
 
672 Cockrell supra (n 617) 371. 
 




Smith (Morgan) 674 does not represent the current state of affairs in English law. The 
question remains as to whether or not the current interpretation of the Homicide Act of 
1957 accurately represents Parliament’s intention? Lord Slynn in Smith (Morgan) 675 
suggests that it does: 
 
“The jury must ask whether he [the accused] has exercised the 
degree of self-control to be expected of someone in his 
situation. It thus seems to me that the particular characteristics 
of the accused may be taken into account at both stages of the 
inquiry. I do not accept that the section intends the rigid 




“In my opinion justice requires that personal characteristics 
should be taken into account in the way I have indicated 
unless the section precludes it. In my view it does not.” 677 
 
Prior to the decision in Holley,678 the Law Commission’s Report No. 290, “Partial 
Defences to Murder” (2004) highlighted some of the major problems inherent in the 
provocation defence. There was widespread dissatisfaction among consultees both with 
the theoretical underpinning of the defence of provocation and with its various 
component parts. The Law Commission was of the view that the defence was not 
underpinned by any clear rationale. It also noted that the rational underlying 
provocation had become to loose, so that a judge may be obliged to leave the issue to  
 
                                               
674 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). 
 
675 Ibid at par [24]-[25]. 
 
676 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40) at par 29. 
 
677 Ibid.  
 




the jury when the conduct and/or the words in question were trivial.679 Furthermore, it 
was noted that the concept of loss of self-control has given rise to serious problems, 
especially in cases of “slow-burn” provocation.680  The Law Commission also took 
cognizance of the fact that controversy continued to exist around the objective test of 
provocation (that the provocation was enough to make a reasonable person do as the 
accused did),681 which has been interpreted by the majority in the House of Lords in 
Smith (Morgan) 682  in a way that may enable an accused to rely on personal 
idiosyncrasies which make her more short-tempered than any other person.683  
 
The Law Commission made powerful arguments for both the abolition 684  and the 
retention 685 of the defence. It also made recommendations 686 to improve the law  
                                               
679 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 290 of 2004 at 3.20. 
 
680 For a discussion of “slow-burn” provocation see 133-135. 
 
681 For a discussion of the factors of the objective test in provocation see 135-144. 
 
682 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). 
 
683 For a discussion of this case see 144-147. 
 
684 These arguments included the fact that a person who is sane and who kills another person unlawfully, 
with the intent required for murder, ought to be guilty of murder, irrespective of how substantial the 
provocation may have been. Provocation should be a mitigating factor taken into account at 
sentencing, not in defining the defence. Assessing sentence requires a balanced appraisal of the 
circumstances of the case, and this is not a jury function, but rather a judicial function. Furthermore, 
there are great difficulties in trying to define what may constitute provocation and how serious it has 
to be order to amount to a partial defence (at 3.36). 
 
685 The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 290 of 2004 at par 3.37 notes that there are moral and 
practical reasons for retaining the provocation defence. Where the accused’s conduct was caused by 
serious provocation, it is morally correct that this should be reflected in the way that society labels 
and sentences the accused. It is desirable that the factual and evaluative question whether the 
accused was provoked should by considered by a jury. A more lenient sentence for murder will be 
more acceptable to society if it results from a conviction by a jury of an offence not carrying the title 
of murder, rather than a decision by a judge after a conviction for murder. A partial defence such as 
provocation is justifiable in the law of murder, although no similar partial defence to non-fatal 
offences of violence exist, not only because the sentence for murder is fixed by law but also because 
of the unique gravity and stigma attached to murder. It would appear that the real problem with the 
provocation defence is not its underlying concept, but rather the way it has developed in law. 
 
686 In an attempt to re-shape and restrict the circumstances in which provocation can be pleaded, the Law 
Commission has proposed reform of the defence (at par 1.13): “(1) unlawful homicide that would 
otherwise be murder should instead be manslaughter if: (a) the accused acted in response to (i) gross 
provocation (meaning words or conduct or a combination of words or conduct which caused the 
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relating to the defence.687 However, it is yet to be seen whether any case law will adopt 
these recommendations.  
                                                                                                                                       
accused to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged); or (ii) fear of serious violence 
towards the accused or another; or (iii) a combination of (a) and (b); and (b) a person of the 
accused’s age and of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the 
circumstances of the accused might have reacted in the same or similar way, the court should take 
into account the accused’s age and all the circumstances of the accused other than matters whose 
only relevance to the accused’s conduct is that they bear simply on her general capacity for self-
control. (3) The partial defence should not apply where (a) the provocation was incited by the 
accused for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence, or (b) the accused acted in 
considered desire for revenge. (4) A person should not be treated as having acted in considered 
desire for revenge if she acted in fear of serious violence merely because she was also angry towards 
the deceased for the conduct which engendered that fear. (5) The partial defence should not apply to 
an accused who kills or takes part in the killing of another person under duress of threats by a third 
person. (6) A judge should not be required to leave the defence to the jury unless there is evidence 
on which a reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude that it might apply. 
 
687 Horder “The Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence” (2005) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
123 at 131 notes that the proposal would restore the law “more-or-less” to the state it was in 1946 
when the House of Lords considered the provocation defence in Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588. 
Viscount Simon held that words “of a most extreme and exceptional character might be sufficiently 
serious to warrant a direction on provocation to the jury” (at 600). The Law Commission is now of 
the view that mere rejection by a former partner is not the kind of provocation that should justify a 
direction to the jury on provocation (at par 3.144). The Report goes on to state: “It is sadly 
commonplace that when relationships break up there are often arguments and mutual recriminations. 
We think that it would be seldom that words spoken in such a situation could legitimately make the 
other party feel severely wronged, to the extent that a person of ordinary tolerance and self-restraint 
in such a situation might have used lethal violence; but there may be cases where one party torments 
another with remarks of an exceptionally abusive kind…there are bound to be borderline cases” (at 
par 3.147). Horder supra (at 132) is of the view that two issues should be noted. First, it is significant 
that, as this passage makes clear, for the Law Commission, ‘gross’ provocation may include 
rejection, confessions of infidelity, or the like, if accompanied by aggravating factors such as 
taunting. It is submitted that these can be situations in which, albeit rarely, ‘one person’s behaviour 
can put exceptional emotional pressure on the other. Second, in the draft proposals cited earlier, the 
Commission deliberately makes no provision for a subjective condition. There is no requirement that 
the accused have lost self-control or even acted in anger. It is enough that the accused did not act ‘in 
considered desire for revenge’ (clause 3 (b)). Horder supra (at 133) is of the view that by eliminating 
the subjective element, the loss of self-control dilemma is escaped, while simultaneously doing 
something to address the immediacy dilemma by excluding calculated revenge killings from the 
scope of mitigation. Horder goes on to note that by placing these two aspects of the reform proposals 
together, it seems that Smith and Hogan’s famous example of how a killing, however, gravely 
provoked must be murder unless there was evidence of loss of self-control, will no longer be 
accurate: “A traditional example of extreme provocation is the finding of a spouse in the act of 
adultery; but if D, on so fining his wife, were to read her a lecture on the enormity of her sin and 
then methodically to load a gun and shoot her…D would be guilty of murder and it would be 
irrelevant that the jury may think that a reasonable man in like circumstances would lose self-
control.” (Criminal Law 9th ed (1999) 356-357) Horder supra at 133 submits that the Law 
Commission may decide to treat such a case as murder either because the judge will withdraw the 
issue from the jury or because the accused will fail to meet the requirement in clause 1 (b) (that a 
person of the accused’s age and of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint 
would have acted in the same way). But this raises two problems: “Surely, though one cannot have a 
situation in which, in the exercise of their discretion, some judges withdraw the issue of provocation 
form eh jury solely because the accused has not acted in anger, however grave the provocation, 
whilst other judges leave the issue to the jury in such cases? Further, it places too much moral 
weight on the question whether the accused might have reacted in the same or similar way, to expect 
the jury to address not only the gravity of the provocation in all the circumstances, but also in Smith 
and Hogan’s example. The abolition of any subjective element, a requirement for which can be dated 
back to the origins of the plea in the 16th century, detaches the plea of provocation from reliance on 
one of the key justifications for its legal recognition” (at 133). 
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The provocation defence took another turn with the Privy Council decision of Attorney 
General v Holley.688 Holley was viewed by the court as an opportunity to resolve the 
conflict between the Privy Council decision in Luc Thiet Thuan 689 and R v Smith 
(Morgan). 690  Following a retrial in the Royal Court in Jersey, the accused was 
convicted of murder. The Court set aside his conviction on the ground that the deputy 
bailiff had misdirected the jury on provocation. A conviction of manslaughter was 
substituted, and the Attorney General appealed to the Privy Council. Jersey law on 
provocation is identical to English law. 
 
Upholding the appeal, Lord Nicholls delivered the majority judgment in Holley.691 Lord 
Nicholls set out the contrasting models of provocation. Both are in two parts, and both 
begin with the subjective question of whether the accused was provoked into losing his 
self-control. It is within the second part, concerning the legislative reference to the 
“reasonable person” that the two models diverge. The Smith (Morgan) 692 model takes 
the view that the standard of self-control required to trigger the defence is not a 
constant standard. The jury should apply the standard one could expect of the particular 
individual in question, taking into account all of the individual’s particular 
characteristics. The Luc Thiet Thuan 693 model on the other hand adopts a constant, 
objective standard of self-control. Having made the initial subjective assessment called  
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
688 Holley supra (n 678). In this case the accused, an alcoholic, killed his girlfriend with an axe after she 
made comments affecting his self-esteem.  
 
689 Luc Thiet Thuan supra (n 643). 
 
690 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40).  
 
691 Holley supra (n 678). 
 
692 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). 
 




for in the first part of the model, the jury must then ask whether a reasonable person 
with ordinary powers of self-control, subject to the same provocation would have 
reacted as the accused did. In this analysis the accused’s particular characteristics are 
not considered. 694 
 
The Privy Council in Holley 695 rejected the Smith Morgan 696 model, but the majority 
did not criticize this model at a conceptual or intellectual level. Rather, they accepted 
that “it is one model which could be adopted in framing a law relating to 
provocation”.697 Rather, the Privy Council employed constitutional arguments to justify 
its return to objectivity. The majority held that in the Homicide Act of 1957, parliament 
had adopted a uniform, objective standard. In Smith (Morgan) 698 the court was said to 
stray too far from the law as set down by the legislature. It is for this reason alone that 
the Privy Council rejected the decision of the House of Lords. Their Lordships 
supported this finding by referencing the partial defence of diminished responsibility, in  
 
                                               
694 Ibid at 293. 
 
695 Holley supra (n 678). In R v Faquir Mohammed [2005] EWCA Crim 188, the accused a devout 
Muslim killed his daughter upon discovering her with a man in her bedroom. The trial judge directed 
the jury could consider his strongly held religious beliefs and depression when considering the 
question of whether the reasonable person would have lost self-control. The Court of Appeal held 
that the correct test was in Holley supra (n 678) namely that such characteristics should be ignored. 
 
696 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). 
 
697 Ibid at par 22.  
 
698 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). In James [2006] EWCA Crim 14, the accused killed his wife with a 
kitchen knife. A psychiatric condition affected his ability to control his behaviour. The judge, 
following Holley supra (n 678) directed the jury that only his sex and age could be attributed to a 
reasonable person. His appeal was dismissed and the case then referred to the Privy Council by the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission. In Karimi [2006] All ER (D) 170 (Jan) the accused killed his 
estranged wife’s lover with a knife, when he had been provoked by insults including the phrase 
“besharef”, which means you have no honour. Karimi was convicted and reconvicted at subsequent 
retrial. He appealed to the Privy Council. Giving judgment, Phillips CJ said: “There is no wish to 
reduce the law on provocation to a game of ping pong” (at 180). It was held that the only relevant 
characteristic in relation to whether a reasonable person would have lost self-control are age and sex. 
This is a retrograde step for those with mental conditions (such as BWS) who kill under provocation 
where the loss of self-control has been affected by the condition (cited in Withey “Provocation Ping 




terms of section 2 of the Homicide Act of 1957. The majority held that an analysis of 
the provocation defence should acknowledge the pertinent role of diminished 
responsibility and in particular the possibility of relying on a defence where the accused 
suffers from an abnormality of the mind.699 Therefore, where the accused suffers from 
an abnormality 700  of the mind, this renders inappropriate the application of the 
objective standard. 701 
 
 
                                               
699 Martin supra (n 659) at 1364 notes that certain inconsistencies manifest themselves in Luc Thiet 
Thuan supra (n 643) as expounded in Holley (n 678). In Holley supra (n 678) the majority cited with 
approval Lord Diplock’s finding in R v Camplin supra (n 607) that a jury can take into account the 
age and sex of the accused. The obvious arguments against this present themselves, particularly the 
complaint that if some subjective, variable traits can be relied on, it becomes arbitrary to allow these 
two factors to be considered by jury but not any others. In theory, by allowing sex and age to be 
bestowed upon the reasonable man, the so-called objective standard enables a scenario in which a 
middle-aged woman is judged to a significantly stricter standard than a young man. In this context, 
victims of battered woman syndrome who kill may receive scant consolation from Lord Nicholls 
proclamation that diminished responsibility is apt to embrace some cases where it is inappropriate to 
apply to the accused the standard of self-control of an ordinary person (at par [16]). 
 
700  Elliot supra (n 53) at 258 notes that diminished responsibility is being used on occasion 
pragmatically, where the court feels sympathy for the accused and the requirements of the defence of 
provocation are not satisfied. Consider for example the case of Ahluwalia (supra (n 602). The 
defence was applied to an abused woman who killed her abusive partner. But such cases put strain 
on the law of diminished responsibility because, strictly speaking, the requirements for this defence 
may not have been satisfied. The Law Commission in its Consultation Paper, Partial Defences to 
Murder 2003 observes: “There appears to be some inconsistency in the willingness of psychiatrists 
to testify on the diagnoses of the accused’s mental health. Some experts may be uncomfortable with 
classifying as an ‘abnormality of mind’ what essentially may be ordinary reactions to a highly 
stressful situation such as an abusive and violent relationship. This element of arbitrariness is far 
from ideal. Labelling such women as mentally ill also plays up to negative stereotypes of vulnerable 
women. This, in effect, pathologises woman’s actions and implies that had her mental faculties not 
been impaired she would have continued to be a happy punch bag. There is further irony that the 
more robust the accused is, the less likely it is that she will succeed on a defence of diminished 
responsibility” (at par [10.778]-[10.78]). Reliance on diminished responsibility in this context places 
the focus of the defence on the woman’s state of mind, when it would have been more appropriate to 
emphasize the abuse she suffered. 
 
701 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40) at par 16. Martin supra (n 659) is of the view that post-Holley supra (n 
678) the situation is no clearer: “Juries must again grapple with the counterintuitive distinction they 
are required to make between subjectivity in relation to whether the accused actually lost her self-
control and objectivity as to the standard of self-control against which the accused is to be judged” 
(at 1364). Thus both the Luc Thiet Thuan (supra (n 643)) and the Smith (Morgan) (supra (n 40)) 
models are beset by inconsistencies, the arbitrary application of principles and an absence of clear 
logic”. As Elliot supra (n 53) states: “The reasonable person does not kill and there is no moral 
reason why a person who has lost their temper should benefit from a defence. The courts are trying 
to achieve justice by taking into account the ‘right’ characteristics of the accused in applying the 
reasonable person test. But there are, in fact, no characteristics which can justify a partial defence 




3.5.4 Proportionality and the reasonable person 
According to the Homicide Act 1957, if there is evidence that the accused was 
provoked to lose her self-control; the judge is under a duty to put the defence to the 
jury. This is the case even where the accused’s reaction may be disproportionate.702 
Lord Diplock in Camplin 703 held that Mancini 704  is no longer to be treated as an 
authority on the law of provocation. Ormerod is of the view that “it would be wrong to 
tell the jury that fists might be answered with fists but not with a deadly weapon”.705 
This is so since if fists were answered with a deadly weapon, such a direction would 
take out of the jury’s jurisdiction a question which is exclusively for their determination 
and on which their opinion is decisive. 
 
In terms of section 3 of the Homicide Act of 1957, in applying the objective test, the 
jury should consider whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable person 
do as the accused did.706 Thus even when acting under the heat of passion, the  
                                               
702 At common law the judge could withdraw the defence of provocation from the jury if he believed that 
there was no evidence suggesting that a reasonable person would have been provoked to lose her 
self-control and do as the accused did. (See Mousourakis supra (n 544) at 98). 
 
703 Camplin supra (n 607). 
 
704 [1942] AC 1, [1941] 3 All ER 272. In this case the accused’s, a manager of a club, stabbed the victim 
to death with a knife-like instrument during a fistfight. In his appeal the accused argued that 
although he did not himself plead provocation, the judge should have directed the jury on the issue. 
The appeal was rejected since the judge does not have to direct the jury on provocation unless the 
mode of retaliation bears a “reasonable relationship” to the provocation. (See Ormerod supra (n 41) 
at 458). Thus in Mancini Lord Simon held: “The test to be applied is that of the effect of provocation 
on a reasonable man...so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely 
on provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did. In applying the test, it 
is of particular importance...to take into account the instrument with which the homicide was 
affected, for to retort, in the heat of passion induced by provocation, by simple blow, is a very 
different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a concealed dagger. In short, the mode 
of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation is the offence reduced to 
manslaughter” (at 9 & 27). This has come to be known as the “reasonable relationship rule”, a 
restatement of the early law’s proportionally requirement.  
 
705 Per Devlin J in Duffy supra (n 595) at 932n. 
 
706 Brown [1972] 2 QB 229 In this case Talbot J held: “[W]hen considering whether the provocation was 
enough to make a reasonable man do as the accused did, it is relevant for the jury to compare the 
words or acts or both of these things which are put forward as provocation with the nature of the act 
committed by the accused. It may be, for instance, that a jury might find that the accused’s act was 
so disproportionate to the provocation alleged that no reasonable man would have so acted. We think 
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provocative act must retain a degree of self-control. This is so because only on such an 
assumption is the requirement of proportionality in provocation meaningful.707 
 
In terms of section 3 of the Homicide Act, the objective and subjective differ. The 
questions to be asked are: (1) did the accused lose her self-control? and (2) was the 
provocation enough to make the ordinary person in the accused’s shoes do as the 
accused did. It could not have been intended, that the jury should consider whether a 
reasonable person in full control of herself would have done what the accused did for 
the logical effect of that would be to eliminate the defence from the law. 708  The 
objective test should be construed as it was in Phillips v R: 709 
 
“...the question...is not merely whether in their opinion the 
provocation would have made the reasonable man lose his 
self-control but also whether, having lost his self-control, he 
would have retaliated in the same way as the person charged 
in fact did”.710 
 
                                                                                                                                       
therefore that a jury should be instructed to consider the relationship of the accused’s acts to the 
provocation when asking was it enough to make a reasonable man do as he did?”(at 234). 
 
707 Ormerod supra (n 41) 457. See Phillip v R supra (n 599) at 137 where Lord Diplock rejected the view 
that loss of self-control is an all or nothing concept. Reilly in “Loss of Self-control in Provocation” 
(1997) Criminal Law Journal 320 at 328 is of the view that the problem with the proportionality 
requirement is that it makes the provocation defence reliant upon the assessment of the accused’s 
conduct after she lost her self-control rather than on giving in to her passion and losing control in the 
first place. See also Fletcher supra (n 544) 247-248. Reilly states that: “while on the one hand, a 
proportional response by a battered woman requires an ability to assess the gravity of provocation 
and to respond accordingly even up to the point of homicidal violence. On the other hand, loss of 
self-control suggests the possibility of a proportional response up to the point at which self-control is 
lost, after which the person is no longer capable of acting with any restraint whatsoever, regardless 
of how unreasonable the response might be. The incidence of loss of self-control inhibits the courts 
attempt to limit the scope of the defence through a requirement of proportionality. Balancing the 
competing demands of delimitation and congruity, the courts have obscured the application of a test 
of proportionality. See further the Criminal Law Revision Committees proposed reformulation of the 
test in provocation recommending that the jury should be invited to consider whether, from the 
viewpoint of the accused, the provocation offered can reasonably be regarded as providing sufficient 
ground for loss of self-control leading the accused to react against the victim with intent to kill 
(CLRC par [81]-[83]). 
 
708 Ormerod supra (n 41) 459. 
 
709 Phillips v R supra (n 599). 
 




This makes the assumption that a person who has lost his self-control has acted with 
more or less ferocity according to the degree of provocation which caused the loss of 
self-control. The Privy Council rejected the argument: 
 
“...that loss of self-control is not a matter of degree but is 
absolute, there is no intermediate stage between icy 
detachment and going berserk. This premise, unless the 
argument is purely semantic, must be based upon human 
experience and is, in their Lordship’s view false. The average 
man reacts to provocation according to its degree with angry 
words, with a blow of the hand, possibly, if the provocation is 
gross and there is a dangerous weapon to hand, with that 
weapon”. 711 
 
3.5.5 Self-induced provocation 
The question whether an accused could rely on the defence of provocation where it 
appears that the provocation has been induced by the accused’s conduct towards the 
victim has been settled by section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957.712 In terms of section 3 
the judge cannot withdraw the defence from the jury in such cases, but he may still 
draw the jury’s attention to the fact that the provocation was self-induced as a factor 
militating against the accused’s plea. It is for the jury to decide whether the accused’s 
claim that she was provoked is acceptable by taking into account everything done and 
said according to the effect which it would have on a reasonable person.713 
 
                                               
711 Ibid. 
 
712 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 107. 
 
713 In Edwards [1973] AC 648, [1973] 1 All ER 152, PC the Privy Council adopted that position that in 
principle, the accused cannot rely on provocation when they caused the provocation. Further the 
condition that provocation must not have been a predictable result of the accused’s own actions does 
not seem to accord with section 3. However in Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 740, the accused was allowed 
to rely on the provocation defence although the provocation was a predictable result of the accused’s 
own offensive behaviour. the Court of Appeal expressed its disapproval of the position in Edwards 
stating: “In view of the express wording of section 3...we find it impossible to accept that the mere 
fact that an accused caused a reaction in others, which in turn led to him losing self-control, should 
result in the issue of provocation being kept outside a jury’s consideration. Section 3 clearly provides 
that the question is whether things done or said or both provoked the accused to lose his self-control. 




3.6 Diminished responsibility 
3.6.1 Introduction 
Diminished responsibility may provide the legal basis for dealing with cases of 
cumulative provocation that cannot be treated under the provocation defence. This 
could be the case where the accused was subjected to a long course of cruel and violent 
behaviour. She may then claim that she is experiencing such grave distress or 
depression so as to substantially diminish her capacity for self-control and, therefore, 
her moral responsibility for her actions. Pleading diminished responsibility instead of 
provocation in such cases would seem more appropriate where there is no final 
provocative incident occurring immediately prior to the killing, or where the battered 
woman’s retaliation was preceded by planning and deliberation. Furthermore, such an 
approach might be adopted in a case where the conduct that triggered the battered 
woman’s fatal response is not regarded as being capable of amounting to provocation 
(i.e. on the basis of the objective test as it applies in the circumstances of cumulative 
provocation). 714  In such a case the circumstances of cumulative provocation may 
provide a sufficient basis for supporting the battered woman’s plea of diminished 
responsibility, even in those cases where no clear evidence of an abnormality of mind 
(in a strict medical sense can be brought forward).715  
 
In the case of Ahluwalia,716 the Court of Appeal took the view that the trial judge’s 
direction was correct in law and ordered a retrial on the basis that expert evidence of  
 
                                               
714 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 170. See also the Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 290 of 2004 
at par 5.22 (stating that diminished responsibility is often the only defence to murder available to 
abused women “driven to kill”.)  
 
715 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 170-171. Cf Mousourakis supra (n 544) at 164 citing Williams Textbook 
of Criminal Law (1983) at 544: “If they [abnormal people] want their abnormality to be taken into 
account, they must raise a defence appropriate to them – insanity or diminished responsibility.” 
 




the accused’s been considered not in the context of provocation but in relation to 
diminished responsibility,which had not been pleaded at the first trial. McColgan notes 
that the case of Ahluwalia 717 has been hailed as a landmark in that “[f]or the first time, 
in a case where a battered woman kills her husband the court has taken on board as of 
legal relevance evidence of the psychological effects on her state of mind living in a 
battering relationship. Such a declaration of the admissibility of psychiatric evidence 
may enable future accused to mount challenges to juror’s perceptions of domestic 
violence.” 718 
 
3.6.2 Development of the defence 
The defence of diminished responsibility is provided for by section 2 of the Homicide 
Act 1957. According to section 2: 
 
 “(1) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of 
another, he shall not be convicted of murder if she was 
suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising 
from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind 
or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as 
substantially impaired her mental responsibility for her acts 
and omissions in doing or being party to the killing.” 
 
 
The accused is required in terms of section 2(2) to prove diminished responsibility 719 
on the balance of probabilities.720 If successful, the accused will be convicted of  
 
                                               
717 Ibid. 
 
718 McColgan supra (n 39) 513. 
 
719  Mousourakis supra (n 544) at 164 notes that this defence was introduced in response to the 
recommendation of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment for a broader insanity defence. Cf 
Cmnd 88932, 1949-1952. 
 
720 R v Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1; R v Ahmed Din (1962) 46 Cr App Rep 269; R v Bathurst [1968] 2 QB 





manslaughter.721 The Law Commission 722 noted that the main rationale which underlies 
the body of opinion favouring retention of diminished responsibility defence (even if 
the mandatory life sentence were to be abolished) is “fair and just labelling.” The Law 
Commission expressed the view that it is unjust to label as murderers those who are not 
fully responsible for their actions. The Commission made reference to the stigma which 
attaches to a conviction for murder, which is considered the most serious of all crimes. 
The reason why it is unjust is that the accused’s culpability is diminished.723 There is a 
clear moral distinction between murder and diminished responsibility killing, despite 
the presence of mens rea of the former offence. The Law Commission acknowledged 
that what was required is a new plea which appropriately reflects this moral 
distinction.724 
 
In terms of section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, it must first be proved that at the time 
of the killing, the accused suffered from an abnormality of mind. In Byrne 725 Lord  
 
                                               
721 Mousourakis supra (n 544) at 166 notes that medical evidence must be submitted to support the claim 
that the accused was in fact suffering from an abnormality of mind arising from one of the causes 
specified in section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957. Cf Dix v R (1981) 74 Cr App R 306.  
 
722 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 290 of 2004.  
 
723  Ibid at par 5.18. Such a rational merits two comments. (1) Firstly, reference to culpability is 
problematic since English law has traditionally employed the concept of mens rea (in conjunction 
with actus reus) and in particular the distinction between intention and subjective recklessness, as a 
means of assessing culpability and labelling conduct. Murder stands at the apex of offences of 
physical violence because of the requirement of intent attached to actus reus of unlawful killing. 
Partial defences represent an exception to the general approach since they only come into operation 
if a jury is satisfied that the accused committed the conduct element and had the mens rea of murder. 
Therefore, such partial defences are anomalous and owe their existence solely to the mandatory 
sentencing regimes, which have always existed for murder (at par 5.19). 
 
724 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 290 of 2004 at 5.20. Furthermore, the Law Commission 
noted at 5.22 that the defence may enable a merciful but just disposition of certain types of cases 
where all parties consider it meets the justice of the case. 
 
725 Byrne supra (n 68). In this case the accused killed a young woman and then mutilated her body. 
Medical evidence showed that he suffered from sexual urges which he found extremely difficult to 
resist, and furthermore that he had committed the killing while under the influence of such urges. 
Despite evidence that the accused knew what he was doing and that he was fully ware of the 
wrongful nature of his actions, the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed his conviction for murder and 




Parker CJ defined the term abnormality of mind as follows:  
 
“ ‘Abnormality of mind’, which has to be contrasted with the 
time-honoured expression in the M’Naughten Rules, ‘defect of 
reason’, means a state of mind so different from that of 
ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it 
abnormal. It appears to us to be wide enough to cover the 
mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of 
physical acts and matters, and the ability to for a rational 
judgment whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability 
to exercise will-power to control physical acts in accordance 
with that rational judgment.” 726 
 
In Byrne,727 the court accepted that the accused’s condition was correctly described as 
“partial insanity” or “a condition bordering on insanity.” 728 Mackay notes that the 
court’s dictum had a profound effect on the development of the defence of diminished 
responsibility: 
 
“(by) allowing psychiatric evidence of sexual psychopathy to 
be admitted as a form of abnormality of mind, the concept of 
irresistible impulse was introduced into English law.  
 
                                               
726 Byrne supra (n 68) at 403. Griew “The Future of Diminished Responsibility” [1988] Criminal Law 
Review 75 at 82 notes that for the defence of diminished responsibility to be accepted: “the accused 
had to have an abnormality of mind (of appropriate origin). This had a substantial effect upon one or 
more relevant functions or capacities (of perception, understanding, judgment, feeling, control). In 
the context of the case this justifies the view that her culpability is substantially reduced. Her 
liability is on that account to be diminished. More shortly: her abnormality of mind is of such 
consequence in the context of this offence that her legal liability for it ought to be reduced.” 
Furthermore, the Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 290 of 2004 at 5.22 took cognizance of 
the out-dated nature of the insanity defence as contained in the M’Naghten Rules. The narrowness of 
the rules, in the sense of their preoccupation with cognitive understanding, is seen to be reinforcing 
the need for a partial defence of diminished responsibility. In addition the stigma which attaches to 
being labeled insane makes the accused reluctant to plead insanity. In this respect Nicolson and 
Sanghvi supra (n 641) at 734 note: “But even if battered woman syndrome is developed to address 
the pertinent issues, it will always actively shift the emphasis from the reasonableness of the 
accused’s actions to her personality in a way which confirms existing gender stereotypes. 
Furthermore, battered woman syndrome suggests reliance on personal incapacity. This might lead 
not only to battered accused being treated as mentally abnormal, but also to the therapeutisation of 
domestic violence.” 
 
727 Byrne supra (n 68) 406. 
 
728 But cf Seers (1984) 79 Cr App Rep at 261 where the Court of Appeal adopted the position that judges 
should avoid comparing diminished responsibility to insanity for there may be cases in which the 
abnormality of mind upon which the defendant’s defence is based has nothing to do with an any of 




Furthermore, the courts have been willing to accept a whole 
range of less serious mental conditions as falling within 
‘abnormality of mind’ in order to ensure a lenient sentence or 
disposal.” 729 
 
Mousourakis notes that although no clear description is given of the causes referred to 
in section 2 of the Homicide Act of 1957, it would appear that “disease or injury” 
would in all likelihood pertain to physical injury or illness. Furthermore, the term 
“inherent cause” would encompass “functional mental disorders”. 730  Examples of 
abnormalities of mind that were sufficient for the defence of diminished responsibility 
to be placed before a jury ranged from arrested intellectual development combined with 
psychopathic tendencies,731  personality disorder induced by psychological injury,732 
reactive depression caused by marital difficulties,733 chronic alcoholism, 734 and Othello 
syndrome.735 
 
For a defence of diminished responsibility to succeed, it is required that the accused’s 
difficulty in exercising control over her conduct was substantially greater than that of a 
reasonable or normal person. To determine whether the accused’s responsibility was 
substantially impaired, the jury must adopt a broad, common sense approach.736 
 
 
                                               
729 Mackay supra (n 68) 118. 
 
730 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 168. Cf Sanderson (1993) 98 Cr App Rep 325; Fenton (1975) 61 Cr App 
Rep 261. 
 
731 Egan v R [1992] 4 All ER 470. 
 
732 Gittens [1984] QB 698. 
 
733 Sanders (1991) 93 Cr App Rep 245. 
 
734 Tandy [1989] 1 WLR 350. 
 
735 Vinagre supra (n 720) 104. This term describes a morbid jealousy for which there is no cause. 
 




Pleading diminished responsibility is not without practical difficulties. For a diminished 
responsibility plea to be successful, the accused’s mental abnormality has to fall within 
the scope of section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957.737 The qualifying words in this 
section can be traced back to the Mental Deficiency Act 1927. Although the 1927 
formulation was intended to mean “however arising or caused” the 1957 version was 
clearly designed to have the opposite effect. In this respect, Mackay notes Griew’s 
remarks in this regard: 
 
“The terms ‘inherent causes,’ ‘disease’ and ‘injury,’ which 
need no explanation in the 1927 context, thus acquire a crucial 
significance in 1957. If the scope of the new defence is to 
depend on careful reading of the section, it becomes vital to 
know what kinds of causes are ‘inherent’, what kinds of 
trauma will count as ‘injury’ and what, indeed, is meant by 
disease’. None of these questions is easy or assured of a 
confident judicial answer.” 738 
 
This could prove problematic since: 
 
“It is perhaps not surprising that doctors should vary among 
themselves in how they used the four specified aetiologies, for 
they have no defined or agreed psychiatric meaning, and the 
phrase ‘inherent causes’ in particular is obviously capable of 
being interpreted in many different ways. More surprising was 
the fact that the reports frequently omitted any reference at all 
to the cause of the abnormality, thereby leaving the court 
without any written evidence as to the applicability of section 
2(1). However, to ignore or overlook the bracketed clauses in 
this manner is far from satisfactory.” 739 
 
 
In respect of battered women it should be noted that: 
 
                                               
737 See 161-162 for a discussion of section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957. 
 
738 Mackay supra (n 68) at 120, citing Griew supra (n 726) at 79. 
 




“Section 2 of the Homicide Act requires that the impairment 
of mental responsibility relied upon in a diminished 
responsibility plea results from an ‘abnormality of mind 
(whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded 
development of mind or any other inherent causes or induced 
by disease or injury)’ rather than merely from a serious 
emotional upset. This definition does not, on the face of it, 
apply to women who can see no escape from violence except 
through their own use of diminished responsibility.” 740 
 
Furthermore, pleading diminished responsibility presupposes an admission of mental 
abnormality.741 However, some English courts have treated battered woman syndrome 
as evidence of a temporary personality condition, caused by abnormal circumstances, 
rather than a form of mental abnormality.742 
 
3.6.3 Pleading Provocation and Diminished Responsibility together 
In certain cases, such as those of cumulative provocation, the accused may be able to 
plead a combined defence of provocation and diminished responsibility. 743  The 
practical effect of this would be the reduction of the offence from murder to 
manslaughter 744 if the accused is found to be suffering from an abnormality of mind  
                                               
740 McColgan supra (n 39) 513. 
 
741 One of the arguments against the retention of diminished responsibility defence has been highlighted 
by the Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 290 of 2004 at par 5.43: “Logically, since 
diminished responsibility reduces the accused’s responsibility for the killing, it ought to be viewed 
as a mitigating factor rather than a partial defence in a case where, by definition, the accused’s level 
of culpability is established by reference to traditional concepts of conduct and mens rea.” The Law 
Commission further notes that issues which are supposed to be addressed by mitigation are 
“artificially forced into the straightjacket of substantive liability. The defence was supposed to be 
introduced to sanitize the worst aspects of capital punishment.” 
 
742 Nicolson and Sanghvi supra (n 641) at 737. In Ahluwalia supra (n 602) Hobhouse J made it clear that 
his acceptance of the accused’s manslaughter plea was based on the evidence of diminished 
responsibility and not provocation. However, the Court of Appeal’s recognition of battered woman 
syndrome took place not in the context of diminished responsibility, but solely in relation to the 
objective condition of provocation. Moreover, the fresh evidence of diminished responsibility 
involved endogenous depression and not battered woman syndrome.  
 
743 Cf Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Offences Against the Person, August 1976, 
para 53. 
 
744 According to Williams supra (n 715) 544-545: “Success in the combined defence of provocation and 
diminished responsibility has an advantage for the accused in respect of sentence: it may result in a 
more lenient outcome than a defence of provocation alone; and it is virtually free from the risk of life 
sentence that attends a defence of diminished responsibility by itself.” 
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and was provoked to lose her self-control.745  
 
One of the reasons for pleading provocation and diminished responsibility together 
pertains to the uncertainty that surrounds the application of the objective test in 
provocation. This is result of the difficulty in distinguishing between individual 
characteristics of the accused that may be taken into account as modifying the 
reasonable person test and those characteristics that lie outside the scope of the test. 
Therefore, a combined plea would be a better strategy in case where it is unclear 
whether the reasonable person may be endowed with a particular mental characteristic 
of the accused or not.746  
 
One of the main advantages of pleading diminished responsibility and provocation 
together is that once expert medical evidence is admitted it may become virtually 
impossible to disentangle the issues of loss of self-control, abnormality of mind and 
substantial impairment of mental responsibility. Furthermore, there seem to be 
indications that when the two pleas are run concurrently, the jury may be prepared to 
adopt a liberal approach towards each.747 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
745 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 172.  
 
746 Mousourakis supra (n 544) 174. In the New Zealand case of Taaka [1982] NZLR 198, the Court of 
Appeal adopted the view that the obsessively compulsive personality of the accused should be 
regarded as a characteristic relevant to the issue of provocation and, as such, it should be taken into 
account by the jury in applying the objective test. In Gordon (1993) 10 CRNZ 430, post-traumatic 
stress disorder or battered woman syndrome may be regarded as a “characteristic” for the purposes 
of the provocation defence. However, Mousourakis supra (n 544) at 174 notes that these cases 
suggest a departure from the traditional jurisprudence of provocation, as the position adopted 
indicates that mental peculiarities may be viewed as a discrete exculpatory factor in defining 
provocation law. Furthermore, New Zealand law does not provide for a separate defence of 
diminished responsibility and this may explain the more liberal approach to the application of the 
objective test adopted in these cases. 
 
747  Mackay “Pleading Provocation and Diminished Responsibility Together” (1988) Criminal Law 




However, a combined plea can prove problematic in that on the one hand, the defence 
of provocation concerns a loss of self-control in an ordinary person with a normal mind, 
while on the other diminished responsibility requires an accused to be suffering from an 
abnormality of mind. A verdict of manslaughter on both grounds is illogical, since the 
defence of provocation presupposes a reasonable person driven to killing, whereas 
unreasonableness is endemic in the case of diminished responsibility.748 
 
3.6.4 Conclusion 
Given the current ideal model of self-defence, it is clear that attention has to be drawn to 
its inequitable application to women who kill to defend themselves. In the absence of 
challenges to the common assumptions about when force is necessary in response to 
actual or threatened violence, and about the level of force which a woman might 
reasonably use against an unarmed abuser, such women will be unable to successfully 
plead self-defence. 
 
The development of self-defence in English law clearly illustrates this trend. In the case 
of battered women, a plea of self-defence is only available if the force used by the 
women is reasonable and necessary to protect them from an imminent attack. It is, 
therefore, not available to an abused woman who fears violence in the future and kills her 
abuser, when for example, he is asleep or has his back turned to her.749 It is submitted that 
an abuser should not be allowed to benefit from the law of self-defence by making the  
                                               
748  Mackay supra (n 747) 417. The Law Commission’s final recommendation for a defence of 
diminished responsibility was held as follows: “A person, who would otherwise be guilty of murder, 
is not guilty of murder but of manslaughter if, at the time of the act or omission causing death, (1) 
that person’s capacity to: (a)understand events; or (b) judge whether his actions were right or wrong; 
or (c) control himself, was substantially impaired by an abnormality of mental functioning arising 
from an underlying condition and (2) the abnormality was a significant cause of the accused’s 
conduct in carrying out or taking part in the killing. “Underlying condition” was defined as meaning 
a pre-existing mental or physiological condition other than of a transitory kind (at par 5.47). 
 




battered women wait until she is being attacked before engaging in physical resistance. A 
strict view of imminence, then should not on the authority of Palmer, 750  cause an 
“otherwise arguable plea of self-defence to be jettisoned where there is no realistic 
alternative open to the abused woman.” 751 
 
The concepts of proportionality and necessity, through which reasonableness is to be 
judged have also developed at common law largely through cases involving male 
accused. The jury will of necessity focus on an idealized model of what is reasonable 
and assess the accused’s conduct against such a standard. The relative scarcity of 
female killers has resulted in a paradigmatically male ideal model and this together with 
the incompatibility of aggressive force with stereotypical feminity, means that the 
apparently gender-neutral concept of reasonableness is actually prejudicial to the 
battered woman.752 For example, to assess if the battered woman’s use of force is 
reasonable, the court will need to establish if the use of force was necessary.753 Where 
an abused woman kills her abuser during the course of an attack by him, it is likely that 
her only alternatives to the use of force would consist of submission or flight.754 While 
the law does not require the abused women to flee her home, it would appear that 
failure to notify law enforcement authorities would indeed count against her at a trial. 
The law also does not take into account the fact that abusers tend to retaliate when law 
enforcement authorities are involved or where the abused woman leaves the home, the 
abuser tends to track her down and bring her home. Without investigating the  
 
                                               
750 Palmer supra (n 531). 
 
751 McColgan supra (n 39) 519. 
 
752 McColgan supra (n 39) 516. 
 
753 For a discussion of the requirement of reasonableness see 116-118. 
 




psychological aspects of battered woman syndrome, it is clear that viewed from the 
woman’s perspective her use of force, even if considered excessive, might be the only 
way to escape an escalating spiral of violence, which she believes will eventually end in 
her death. 755  The proportionality requirement, which has developed through cases 
concerning male accused, and is generally taken to demand parity between the attack 
and defence and which is unfair were the attacker is male and the defender is female, it 
is clear that where the force used is judged to be excessive in relation to the harm 
threatened, neither section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 nor the common law will 
assist her and she’s liable to be convicted of murder.756 However, the harshness of this 
rule is mitigated in practice by the recognition that a person defending herself “cannot 
weigh to a nicety the exact measure of her necessary defensive action.” 757 
 
The application of self-defence too many abused women who kill does not involve any 
alteration or extension of the defence, rather a rethinking of the way in which the 
requirement that the accused’s use of force be reasonable is applied to cases other than 
those involving the traditional model of a once off adversarial encounter between 
strangers. Self-defence is regarded as a justificatory defence, and it is this aspect of it 
perhaps which underlies the unease which is expressed about its application in cases 
other than those in which it has traditionally been accepted.758 
 
In terms of English common law, judges used to rule as a matter of law on the question 
of what could amount to provocation. The relevant conduct needed to be inherently  
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objectionable.759 In terms of section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, there is no limit as to 
what conduct could constitute provocation.760 Therefore, any legitimate conduct such as 
a baby crying, could be treated as provocation. This would remove the possible 
justification for allowing the defence. Further, the defence encourages a culture of 
blaming murder victims for their own deaths. Where the issue of provocation is raised, a 
trial risks focusing on the accused’s behaviour rather than the deceased’s conduct. 761 
 
Women are more likely to kill their abusers as a result of the abuse they suffered. In the 
past provocation would not be available to abused women since there is often a time 
gap between the last provocative act of the victim and the killing. The case of 
Ahluwalia 762 was adapted to take into account the time delay. Despite these legal 
developments, the defence of provocation may still not be available to abused women, 
since they may not have reacted under the requisite loss of self-control. Instead, the 
killing may have been planned and deliberate. 763 
 
The objective test for provocation requires that a reasonable person would also have 
lost her self-control and killed in reaction to the provocation. This test seeks to impose 
a requirement that, even under provocation, the accused’s conduct should not have 
fallen below a minimum standard expected in society.764 The problem with this test is 
that in today’s society, a reasonable person never kills.765 Therefore, if a strictly  
                                               
759 For a discussion of the English common law see 127-131. 
 
760 For a discussion of section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, see 130. 
 
761 Elliot supra (n 53) 255. 
 
762 Ahluwalia supra (n 602). 
 
763 For a discussion of the requirement of loss of self-control, see 131-135. 
 
764 For a discussion of the objective test of provocation see 135-144. 
 
765 Elliot supra (n 53) 257. 
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objective test were to be applied, the defence would never be successful. For this reason 
the courts have watered down this objective standard, and will take into account certain 
of the accused’s characteristics when applying the reasonable person test. However, 
case law suggests that the courts have had difficulty in determining which 
characteristics to take into account. While the court in Smith (Morgan) 766 held that the 
jury is sovereign in determining which characteristics to take into account, this 
approach has not been strictly adhered to. The courts have vacillated between the 
objective and subjective approach. In Smith (Morgan) 767 the standard of self-control 
required to trigger the provocation defence is not a constant standard. The jury should 
apply the standard one could expect of the particular individual with her particular 
characteristics. Such a standard would be beneficial for battered women, but was not 
adhered to for long.768 In Luc Thiet Thuan, 769 the court adopted a constant, objective 
standard of self-control. The jury must ask themselves whether a reasonable person, 
with ordinary powers of self-control and subject to the same provocation, would have 
reacted as the accused did.770 In Holley,771 the court again changed its mind a decided 
to return to an objective standard of self-control as expounded in Luc Thiet Thuan.772 
The application of provocation must be considered in the context of diminished  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
766 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). The Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 173, 2003 at par 4.150 
held that the effect of this decision was to substantially lower the threshold of self-control and that 
leaving the decision to the essentially subjective judgment of individual jurors is wrong since it is 
likely to lead to idiosyncratic and inconsistent decisions. 
 
767 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). For a discussion of this case see 144-147. 
 
768 This would not, however, be based on sound policy reasons. In this regard see Heaton’s criticism of 
the provocation defence at n 659. 
 
769 Luc Thiet Thuan supra (n 643). 
 
770 For a discussion of this case see 143-144. 
 
771 Holley supra (n 678). 
 




responsibility. One should not distort the other. 773  However, this standard remains 
problematic in that juries must still grapple with the distinction between subjectivity 
and objectivity. 774  If nothing else, this case is a reminder that the law relating to 
provocation is flawed to an extent beyond reform by the courts. It would appear that the 
retreat to objectivity in Holley 775 will remain the orthodox approach, at least until the 
government completes its review of the law relating to provocation.776 
 
Diminished responsibility may provide the legal basis for dealing with cases of 
cumulative provocation that cannot be treated under the provocation defence. Where 
the accused has been subjected to a long period of abuse, she may claim that she was 
experiencing such distress or depression so as to substantially diminish her capacity for 
self-control, and therefore her moral responsibility for her actions. 777  Pleading 
diminished responsibility in such a case would seem more appropriate where no final 
provocative incident occurred immediately prior to the killing, or where the battered 
woman’s retaliation was preceded by planning and deliberation. The same approach 
could be adopted where the conduct that triggered the abused women’s fatal response is 
not regarded as being capable of amounting to provocation (i.e. on the basis of the 
objective test as it applies to the circumstances of cumulative provocation). In this case 
the circumstances of cumulative provocation may provide a sufficient basis for 
supporting a plea of diminished responsibility. This is so even in cases where there is 
no clear evidence of an abnormality of mind.778 
                                               
773 Holley supra (n 678). For a discussion of this case see 154-156. 
 
774 Martin supra (n 659) 1364. 
 
775 Holley supra (n 678). 
 
776 Martin supra (n 659) 1364. 
 





However, such cases can put a strain on the law of diminished responsibility since 
strictly speaking, the requirements for the defence are not satisfied. The Law 
Commission notes that there appears to be some inconsistency in the willingness of 
psychiatrists to testify on the diagnosis of the accused’s mental health. Furthermore, 
some experts may not be comfortable with classifying as an “abnormality of mind” 
what essentially may be ordinary reactions to highly stressful situations such as an 
abusive and violent relationship.779 Furthermore, labelling abused women as mentally 
ill also plays up to negative stereotypes by pathologizing a woman’s actions and 
implies that had her mental faculties not been impaired she would have continued to be 
a “happy punch bag.” There is also a further problem that if the accused is robust, she is 

























                                                                                                                                       
 
779 Elliot supra (n 53) 258, noting the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper No. 173 of 2003 arguments at 
par 10.78.  
 












In the United States there is no single law of self-defence or provocation. This so since 
the federal system allows each state to define and understand the law relating to those 
defences differently. Due to the variety and discrepancy of understandings of these 
defences in each state, it would prove difficult to draw meaningful comparisons. For 
this reason it is necessary to consider these defences by virtue of broad substantive 
topics, discussing the general nature of self-defence and provocation and then 
illustrating and critiquing, some of their dominant variations. This is done since it 
makes little sense that counsel will set out to change the law. Rather, counsel is 
required to represent their client within the bounds of law in each jurisdiction. 781  
 
This chapter seeks to critically examine the concept of “battered woman syndrome” and 
the impact that such evidence would have, if any, on the defences currently utilized by 
battered women, specifically self-defence and provocation. The emergence and 
increasingly widespread acceptance of new subjective standards marks an extremely 
important development in the doctrines of self-defence and provocation. This is 
particularly pertinent in cases where the defendant killed her abuser in a 
nonconfrontational situation in the case of self-defence or in the case of provocation 
where there was no direct provocatory act on the part of the abuser before the 
defendant’s homicidal act. This chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive discussion on 
the development self-defence and provocation, with specific emphasis being placed on 
the type of test utilized for both defences, notably the objective test, subjective test, 
particularizing standard as well as the Model Penal Code standard. This discussion will  
                                               




include providing a general definition of each standard of reasonableness, and will 
identify its basic rationale as well as the case law which has formed the basis for such 
tests. A brief critique will be given for each test in both defences to establish whether 
the subjectivized standards for self-defence and provocation are superior to the 
objective standard. Furthermore, a critique will be made of the other elements relating 
to the defences: in the case of self-defence emphasis will be placed on imminence, 
proportionality and duty to retreat. In the case of provocation the elements of focus will 
be “reasonable time to cool off” and “actual cooling off time.”  
 
4.1 Self-defence 
4.1.1 Early development of the defence 
The importance of the legal concept of self-defence determines the scope of its 
application. Self-defence is justified to the extent that the natural law of self-
preservation recognizes the inherent right to prevent the infliction of grievous bodily 
harm upon one’s person and to preserve one’s property, but the infliction of any harm 
upon others in the course of acting in self-defence is only excusable. As Bassiouni 
notes, “the right itself justifies the use of defensive means, whenever these means takes 
a material form causing harm to others; the original justification gives way to a 
personal defence in the nature of a condition which exonerates its beneficiary from 
criminal responsibility for acts arising out of the defence, providing these acts are 
properly performed within the scope of the defence”. 782 
 
Modern theories are concerned with the social policy of the question, so that social 
interest to be protected is weighed against the social harm which is to be prevented. The 
result of this balancing act will establish the means necessary to exercise protective  
                                               




rights without infringing upon various social interests. For this reason emphasis is thus 
placed on the use and exercise of the means available to the actor rather than upon the 
legal nature of the privilege itself. Social importance is therefore no longer placed on 
the source of the privilege. Rather it is placed upon the material conditions, which, by 
proper or improper application warrant or deny exoneration. The external manifestation 
of the privilege is what provides exoneration and not the legal nature of the concept. 
One consequence of this concept is to place all aspects of self-defence within the 
domain of a single test, distinguishing them only by means of the degree of the use of 
force utilized.783 
 
From 1860 onwards, the common law in respect of self-defence held that it could be 
either justifiable or excusable under the following conditions. 784  In respect of 
justification, there must be a reasonable,785 apparent danger of imminent 786 death or 
grievous bodily harm.787 In respect of excuse, the danger does not have to be real, but 
on reasonable grounds, it must be believed to be real. In the case of both justification 
and excusable self-defence, where there is an altercation, the defender must retreat 788  
                                               
783 Bassiouni supra (n 782) 463. 
 
784 Clarke and Marshall A Treatise on the Law of Crimes 7th ed (1967) 478-479. 
 
785 Goodall v State, 1 Ore335, 80Am Dec 396 (1861). 
 
786 The danger must be imminent, impending, not prospective, not even in the near future (Dolan v State 
81 Ala 11, 1 So 1707). 
 
787 Minor assaults not endangering life will not justify or excuse his killing his attacker or using a deadly 
weapon. (Clark and Marshall supra (n 784) 485). The homicide will be manslaughter (Reg v 
Hewlett, 1 F & F 91, (1858), Creighton v Com., 84 Ky 103, 7 Ky L Rep 785, 4 Am St Rep, 193 
(1886)), although a person’s right to kill in self-defence cannot be limited to his ability to distinguish 
between felonies and misdemeanors (State v Sloan, 22 Mont 293, 56 P. 364 (1921)). 
 
788 The defendant need only retreat where he is able to do so in safety (Clarke and Marshall supra (n 
784) 490; Allen v United States 164 US 492, 17 SCT 154, 41 L Ed 528 (1896)). According to certain 
common law authorities the retreat rule need not apply in the case of justifiable homicide. This 
distinction was recognized at both common law and some of the later authorities (Clarke and 
Marshall supra (n 607) 491-492; Rowe v United States 164 US 546, 17 S Ct 172, 41 L Ed 547 
(1896)). In Erwin v State 29 Ohio St 186, 23 All Rep 733 (1896) the court held that a man who is 
without fault is not obliged to flee from his attacker. However, other courts have refused to 
recognize this distinction and have held that the assaulted person must retreat in all cases if he can do 
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as far as is necessary to safety before killing his attacker. Lastly, the person accused of 
the killing must not have been the aggressor or caused the provocation.789 
 
4.2 Test for self-defence 
Since the test utilized by the court will determine which kinds of evidence are 
admissible to support proof relevant to it, it becomes necessary to analyze some cases 
to understand how each of these tests operates. Case law illustrates how the law is 
changing in ways that allows battered women more latitude in presenting the facts of 
their cases.790 It is necessary to consider each test in turn. Self-defence can thus be 
defined as follows: “a person may use force upon another when she reasonably believes 
such force is necessary to protect herself or others from bodily harm and to protect her 
property from destruction or loss. Therefore, a person is relieved from criminal 
responsibility when, during the exercise of this lawful right in a reasonable manner, she 





                                                                                                                                       
so in safety (Brewer v State, 160 Ala 66, 491(1909) So 336; State v Donelly, 69 Iowa 705, 27 NE 
369, 58 Am Rep 234 (1886); State v Gardner, 96 Minn 318, 327,104 NW 971 (1905), 2 LRA (NS) 
49). According to the castle doctrine a man is not bound to retreat from his house but may not justify 
a homicide to prevent a trespasser who has no intention to commit a felony (Clarke and Marshall 
supra (n 784)) 493; Carrol v State, 23 Ala 28, 58 Am Dec 282 (1853); State v Patterson 45 Vt 308, 
12 Am Rep 200 (1873)). However when defending your home a person must act on appearances and 
if he acts in a bona fide and reasonable belief that the attacker intends to commit a felony against 
him and kills him the homicide is excusable because of mistake of fact (Clarke and Marshall supra 
(n 784) 493-494); State v Patterson supra; State v Terell, 55 Utah 314, 186 P 108, 25 ALR 497 
(1919)). 
 
789 However, if he was at fault with or without intent, the homicide may be excusable provided he 
withdraws from the conflict in a bona fide and unequivocal manner. But where his attacker pursues 
him or attempts to, he may kill him.  
 
790 Ogle and Jacobs supra (n 781) 106. 
 




4.2.1 The objective test 
Self-defence is regarded as a justification by most theorists. 792  For this reason, 
emphasis is placed on the self-defensive act, as opposed to the person who acted in self-
defence. Further, some practical mechanism is required for distinguishing between 
justified and unjustified self-defensive acts. Traditionally, this mechanism was the 
objective standard. In People v Goetz  793 it was held: 
 
“[W]e have frequently noted that a determination of 
reasonableness must be based on the “circumstances” facing a 
defendant or his “situation”... Such terms encompass more 
than the physical movements of the potential assailant... 
[T]hese terms include any relevant knowledge the defendant 
had about the person. They also necessarily bring in the 
physical attributes of all persons involved, included the 
defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s circumstances 
encompass any prior experiences he had which could provide 
a reasonable basis for a belief that another person’s intentions 
were to injure or rob him or that the use of deadly force was 
necessary under the circumstances. The jury would have to 
determine in light of all “circumstances”... if a reasonable 
person could have had these beliefs.” 794 
                                               
792  Dressler “Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale” (1982) Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 421 at 437. For a discussion of the test employed in the South 
African law of self-defence see chapter 2 at 35-41 supra; for the test employed in English law see 
chapter 3 at 113-116 infra. 
 
793 66 N.Y 2d 96, 506 N.Y.S 2d 18, 497 N.E. 2d 41 (1986). Goetz shot four men on a subway station 
when one of them approached him to ask for $5. Goetz said he feared for his life and therefore shot 
in self-defence. 
 
794 Goetz supra (n 793) 506. For an example of a battered woman case illustrating the objective test see 
State v Stewart, 763 O.2d 572, 579 (Kan. 1988). The Stewart marriage consisted of a long history of 
mental and physical abuse and on the day of the killing, although the defendant had access to two 
vehicles to make her escape, she proceeded to kill him. The trial court allowed the introduction of 
testimony relating to the abusive history of the marriage to allow the trier of fact to determine 
whether the defendant’s perception of danger was reasonable. The appellate court criticized the self-
defence instruction of the trial court gave because it was not sufficiently objective. The jury had 
been instructed: “A person is justified in the use of force against an aggressor when and to the extent 
it appears to him and he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or 
another against such aggressor’s imminent use of an unlawful force. Such justification requires both 
a belief on the part of the defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable 
person to that belief. You must determine from the viewpoint of the defendant’s mental state, 
whether the defendants belief in the need to defend herself was reasonable in light of her subjective 
impressions and the facts and circumstances known to her” (at 579). The Kansas Supreme Court 
further stated: “Our test for self-defence is a two-pronged one. We first use a subjective standard to 
determine whether the defendant sincerely and honestly believed it necessary to kill in order to 
defend. We then use an objective standard to determine whether the defendant’s belief was 
reasonable - specifically, whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances would have 
perceived self-defence is necessary.” The language utilized by the court could lead to the conclusion 
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The requirement that an individual’s self-defensive act must be objectively reasonable 
in order to be justified, however, raises two important questions: (1) if the individual’s 
act was not reasonable could the individual have acted otherwise? 795 and (2) how does 
a jury determine whether an individual’s act is “objectively” reasonable? 796 
 
In State v Cramer 797 it was held that the unique perceptions of the battered woman as 
affected by battered women syndrome should not be taken into account in the objective 
test since this would change this test into a completely subjective test.798 The objective 
test requires that a “reasonable person” would have acted in the same way as the 
defendant, had they been confronted with the same circumstances and that the force 
used was reasonable in those circumstances.799  
                                                                                                                                       
that not an entirely objective test was set out, but rather blended standards by suggesting that a 
comparison be made by comparing the defendants conclusion to that reached by a reasonable person 
who had a history of abuse and one who had suffered abuse on the day of the killing” (Ogle and 
Jacobs supra (n 781) 109-110). 
 
795 Heller in his article “Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use 
of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases” (1998) 
American Journal of Criminal Law 1 at 12 raises this point stating that: “Since self-defence 
justification version of the objective standard necessarily presumes that individuals possess free will. 
This standard does not ask whether a defendant in self-defence case could have avoided committing 
her self-defensive act; it asks only whether the defendant should have. The latter however, implies 
the former, because it is morally unjust to punish individuals for not living up to a standard of 
conduct they cannot, in fact live up to”. 
 
796 Heller supra (n 795) 12.  
 
797 17 Kan. App 2d 623, 841 P.2d 1111 (1993). In this case it was held that: “[O]ur reading of the 
Supreme Court decisions concerning battered women reveals no requirement that a jury be advised 
that it must employ an objective test based on how a “reasonably prudent battered woman” would 
react to a threat. Indeed, to employ such language would modify the law of self-defense to be more 
generous to one suffering from battered woman’s syndrome than to any other defendant relying on 
self-defence” (at 1118). 
 
798 Goldman supra (n 67) 7. However Dubin has noted that: “since a battered woman due to her long 
history with the deceased possesses a unique knowledge about his temperament and violent 
propensities which the jury does not possess, contextual information regarding the context from 
which she acts is crucial in order to make an equitable determination that she was acting 
unreasonably” (“Note: A woman’s cry for help: why the United States should apply Germany’s 
model of self-defence for Battered Women” (1995) ILSA Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 235 at 243-244. 
 
799 As Maguigan notes, the choice of definition of reasonableness influences the rulings on admissibility 
of evidence of the social context in which the defendant acted and instruction regarding the 
significance of that evidence. It does not solely determine those questions and the most impact is 
from the jurisdiction’s definition temporal proximity of danger (“Battered Women and Self-Defense: 
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4.2.2 Subjective standards of self-defence 
4.2.2.1 The subjective test 
The subjective standard eliminates the objective reasonableness requirement in totality. 
In State v Leidholm 800 the test was set out: 
 
“The issue is not whether the circumstances attending the 
defendant’s use of force would be sufficient to create in the 
mind of a reasonable and prudent person the belief that the use 
of force is necessary to protect himself against immediate 
unlawful harm, but rather whether the circumstances are 
sufficient to induce in a defendant an honest and reasonable 
belief that he must use force to defend himself”. 801 
 
The court by allowing consideration of the unique physical and psychological 
characteristics of a defendant, does not hold the defendant to an unrealizable standard 
of conduct.802 By definition, this standard requires a jury evaluating a plea of self-
defence in the context of a battered woman’s situation. This would entail considering  
                                                                                                                                       
Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals” (1991) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 413. 
 
800 334 N.W. 2d 811 (N.D. 1983). But see chapter 5 at 37-42 infra (South African law of self-defence 
evincing a move towards a subjective test). 
 
801 Ibid at 818. See also Smith v State Ga. 196, 486 S.E 2d 819 (1997), quoting Bechtel v State 840 P.2d 
1 (Okla Crim App 1992); State v Garland, 694 A. 2d 564 (N.J. 1997) 575. Washington and Ohio 
also use a subjective test although their tests tend towards some objective elements. In State v Daws 
104 Ohio App. 3d 448, 662 N.E. 2d 805 (1994) it was held: “In any case involving self-defense, the 
trier of fact is called upon to determine whether the defendant had an honest belief that she was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the use of force was her only means of 
escape. This test is subjective and the jury must consider the circumstances of the defendant and 
determine whether her actions are reasonable given those circumstances (at 810-811). See also State 
v Sallie 81 Ohio St. 3d 673, 693 N.E. 2d 267 (1998). See further the comments by Horowitz in 
“Justification and Excuse in the Program in the Criminal Law” (1986) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 109 at 126: “[E]xcuse is very much the product of the modern mind, as justification is not. 
Justification is at home with authority, including the pre-modern feudal and royal authorities. 
Excuse, on the other hand, calls out for individuation and is indeed linked to the growth of 
individualism as well as to the later growth of psychology, that preeminently individualist science”.  
 
802 Goldman supra (n 67) 204, as opposed to the completely objective standard. The subjective standard 
is thus determinist, and unlike the objective standard it does not have to assume that individuals 
freely determine their actions. In its view, an honest belief necessitates an individual to commit a 
self-defensive act, even if that belief was caused by a nonuniversal personal characteristic (Heller 
supra (n 795) at 62). Heller supra (n 795) suggests that even if it is impossible to maintain that an 
individual could have avoided acting on an honest belief that she needed to act in self-defence, once 
she was in the threatening situation that triggered that belief, it is still possible to maintain that she 
could have avoided getting into the triggering situation in the first place. Regardless of when during 
the battered woman’s history, she made the critical choice to kill her abuser, alternative courses of 
action must have been based on pre-existing principles and of course those pre-existing principles of 
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the history of battering and taking into account the abusive relationship as evidence to 
be presented at the trial.803 With this understanding, the appellate court said it would 
never be necessary to include reference to battering in the jury instructions, providing 
the standard is properly set out for the jury. While psychological characteristics and 
BWS 804 can expand the temporal measure of imminence from the moment the abuser 
raised his hand based on subtle change in his manner that signals an imminent beating, 
the value society places on human life should not expand imminence to when the 
abuser is sleeping, thus allowing pre-emptive strikes. 805 
 
4.2.2.2 Greater Particularization 
The particularizing standard asks whether a reasonable person with the defendant’s 
particular non-universal characteristic(s) would have both perceived the situation as the 
defendant perceived it and would have reacted to that perception by committing the  
                                                                                                                                       
choice, thus taken to its logical conclusion would excuse all criminal acts satisfying the “honest 
belief” requirement (at 62). 
 
803 The court in Leidholm supra (n 800) gave this instruction, citing State v Hazlett 16 N.D. 426, 113 
N.W. 37 4 (1907): “A defendant’s conduct is not to be judged by what a reasonably cautious person 
might or might not do or consider necessary to do under the circumstances, but what he himself in 
good faith honestly believed and had reasonable ground to believe was necessary for him to do to 
protect himself from apprehended death or great bodily injury” (at 380). When reasonableness is 
measured objectively, a self-defense instruction is warranted whenever there is some evidence of the 
defendant’s subjective belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great 
bodily harm. The critical question for the jury is whether the defendant’s decision to use lethal force 
was reasonable. The jury is entitled to get to that question whenever the defendant achieves the 
threshold of showing that she actually believed it was necessary. If she actually believed it was 
necessary, the jury then decides if that belief was reasonable in the judgment of the jury, she may be 
declared to have acted in self-defense (assuming the other requirements of the defense are also met). 
See also People v Scott 424 N.E. 2d 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) at 72. 
 
804 For a detailed discussion of the poor fit between Walker’s syndrome theory and traditional elements 
of self-defence see chapter 5 infra at n 803 (altering traditional standard of self-defence to 
accommodate actor’s personal psychology undermines notion of self-defence as a justification); n 
832 (battered woman syndrome does little to support the claim that her perception was objectively 
reasonable); n 891 (the fact that the battered woman acted, does little to explain the break from 
helplessness). 
 
805 Goldman supra (n 67) 207. Goldman supra (n 67) is further of the view that the use of syndrome 
testimony leads exactly to such a result, since there is no objective, external constraints on the 
imminence of the harm sought to be averted. Thus the necessity of killing is determined solely by the 
credibility of the defendant’s testimony concerning her unique perception. This may work to the 
defendant’s detriment in that the jury may infer dishonesty from her unreasonable actions, and the 




defendant’s self-defensive act. If yes, then the act is considered reasonable.806 Heller 
notes that the subjective standard eliminates the category of intentional self-defensive 
acts that satisfies the “honest belief requirement on the ground that if the defendant 
honestly believed she had to act in self-defence or she could not have acted otherwise, 
no matter how objectively unreasonable her act might have been.” The particularizing 
standard makes the assumption that, individuals freely choose how they perceive and 
respond to threatening situations. However, it also acknowledges that certain kinds of 
non-universal characteristics (for example, suffering from battered woman’s syndrome) 
exercise such a powerful causal force on an individual’s perception and actions that it 
would violate the voluntary act requirement when holding individuals who possess such 
a characteristic to a standard of conduct that does not take that characteristic into 
account.807 
 
Courts adopting this position are in agreement that in establishing objective 
reasonableness, a jury should be allowed to view the situation from a defendant’s 
perspective. The extent to which American courts have used a particular characteristic 
to particularize the objective standard has varied. Characteristics approved by the courts 
have include “battered woman syndrome” and “specific cultural background”. 808 
According to the “reasonable battered woman” standard, the jury should be instructed 
to measure the defendant’s actions against those of the reasonable battered woman: 
 
                                               
806 Heller supra (n 795) at 57. Heller supra (n 795) at 57 goes on to note that “the particularizing 
standard applies an objective standard of reasonableness to defendant’s perceptions and actions, but 
particularizes that standard to take into account certain non-universal characteristics that a judge 
decides are morally and causally relevant to the defendant’s self-defensive act. Since that decision is 
case specific, it is impossible to formulate a general definition of the particularizing standard. In 
general the definition is ‘the reasonable battered woman’; the ‘reasonable Laotian immigrant’ etc.” 
 
807 Heller supra (n 795) 58. 
 




“One who is acting in self-defense may take the life of an 
aggressor if the aggressor poses a serious risk of serious 
bodily injury or death. The risk of serious bodily injury or 
death must be imminent, that is it must be such that a 
reasonable and prudent person standing in the shoes of the 
defendant (reasonable and prudent battered woman), knowing 
what the defendant knows and seeing what the defendant sees, 
would believe that serious bodily injury or death would result 
immediately if the aggressor were not killed.” 809 
 
This is done since: 
 
 “[T]he battered woman perceives danger faster and more 
accurately as she is more acutely aware that a new or escalated 
violent episode is about to occur. What is or is not an overt 
demonstration of violence varies with the circumstances. 
Under some circumstances slight movement may justify 
instant action because of reasonable apprehension of danger, 
under other circumstances this would not be so. And it is for 
the jury, and not for the judge passing upon the weight and 
effect of the evidence, to determine how this may be.” 810 
                                               
809 State v Burtzlaff 493 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1992) 9. See also State v Thomas 77 Ohio St. 3d 323, 673 
N.E.2d 1339 (1997) at 1346. In People v Humphreys 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 921 P.2d 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
142 (1996) the question on appeal in this case was whether evidence of battering and BWS could be 
used to establish the reasonableness of the defendant’s perceptions as well. The Californian Supreme 
Court held that both kinds of evidence are admissible since: “although the ultimate test of 
reasonableness is objective, in determining whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position 
would have believed in the need to defend, the jury must consider all of the relevant circumstances 
in which the defendant found herself” (at 1083). 
 
810 Kinports “Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims” (1988) Oregon Law Review 393 at 
451-452. However, Rosen supra (n 21) is of the view that: “by instructing the jury to consider the 
psychological traits characteristic of battered women, the inquiry shifts from justification to excuse 
because it can no longer be said that anyone who acted as the defendant did behaved inappropriately. 
Rather the jury is being asked to acquit the defendant because she “suffered from an identifiable 
psychological syndrome that caused her to assess the dangerousness of the situation in a different 
manner than an average, ordinary person...[A]cquittal is dependent upon proving that [she] had... a 
disability that caused a mistaken, but reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances that would 
justify self-defence” (at 42). It should be noted that the particularizing standard is not completely 
determinist, since the standard does not take all of an individual’s nonuniversal characteristics into 
account. If all nonuniversal characteristics causally influence perception and action, not 
particularizing the “reasonable X’s standard to take all of an individuals nonuniversal characteristics 
into account would, in practice hold that individual to an unrealizable standard of conduct, in 
violation of the voluntary act requirement”. The particularizing standard is thus required to make a 
second philosophic assumption: namely, that individuals can, in fact, control the causal influence of 
their nonuniversal characteristics that are not used to particularize the objective standard. Only then 
can the particularizing standard plausibly maintain that, when a jury concludes that a battered 
woman’s self-defensive act was not the conduct of the hypothetical “reasonable battered woman,” 
the battered women could have perceived and acted as the “reasonable battered woman,” but chose 
not to (Heller supra (n 795) 84). However, Heller also recognizes that there are four major problems 
with the particularizing standard. First, since it is partially determinist, the particularizing standard is 
unable to explain why politically disfavoured characteristics such as racism or excessive irascibility 
should not be taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of a defendant’s self-defensive 
act. Second, the particularizing standard is unable to explain why the objective standard should be 
particularized to take into account only one of a defendant’s personal characteristics, instead of two, 
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4.2.2.3 Model Penal Code 
The MPC standard assesses the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s self-
defensive act. It does not assess the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s 
perceptions; rather it asks whether “under the circumstances as she believed them to be, 
the defendant’s self-defensive act was reasonable.” 811  
 
                                                                                                                                       
three, or all of them. Third, because it is partially intentionalist, the particularizing standard’s 
determinist claims are vulnerable to broad time-framing. Fourthly, jurors cannot correctly apply the 
particularizing standard, because it requires them to assess the reasonableness of a defendant’s self-
defensive or provoked act in a manner that is cognitively impossible. For an in-depth discussion of 
these problems see Heller supra (n 795) 89-98. 
 
811 Model Penal Code and Commentaries ss 210.3 (1) (b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1982). 
Ogle and Jacobs supra (n 781) at 119 have noted that in the most recent revision of the MPC 
formulation of self-defense, ss 3.04 contains no reference to reasonableness on its face. The Code 
sets out self-defense in the following way: “(1) Use of Force Justifiable for Protection of the person 
subject to the provisions of this section and of section 3.09, the use of force upon or toward another 
person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose 
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present 
occasion... (b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor believes 
that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or 
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if: (i) the actor, with the purpose 
of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same 
encounter; or (ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete 
safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right 
thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take, 
except that (1) the actor is not obliged to retreat form his dwelling or place of work, unless he was 
the initial aggressor is assailed in his place of work by another person whose place of work the actor 
knows it to be...(c) except as required by paragraph...(b) of this subsection, a person employing 
protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as he believes them to 
be when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which has 
no legal duty to do or abstaining from an unlawful action.” This self-defence provision must be read 
in conjunction with section 3.09 which provides: “(2) When the actor believes that the use of force 
upon or toward the person of another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such belief 
would establish a justification under section 3.03 to 3.08 but the actor is reckless or negligent in 
having such belief or in acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief which is material to 
the justifiability of his use of force, the justification  afforded by those section is unavailable in a 
prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to 
establish culpability”. The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v Bowen 532 A. 2d 215 (N.J 1987) 
referred to this uncertainty in the Code but concluded that the legislature in expressly repealing the 
word “reasonable” abolished imperfect self-defence. The Nebraska Supreme Court in State v Eagle 
Thunder 226 N.W. 2d 755 (Neb. 1978) held that although the term “reasonableness” is absent from 
the Model Penal Code, its drafters made it clear that they did not intend that the defence of 
justification would be good if the actor behaved unreasonably in defending himself. Rather the 
drafters were trying to ensure that convictions for mere negligence did not occur. Thus the Model 
Penal Code structure provides a defense when the requisite culpability for the offense is purposeful, 
or knowing behaviour and imperfect when the requisite culpability is negligence or recklessness and 
perfect self-defence would not be available if a defendant’s belief was honest but negligent or 
unreasonable. Rather the accused will be entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser crime of 






In State v Wanrow 812 it was held: 
 
 “[t]he jury should have been allowed to consider the 
defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s reputation for 
aggression in making the crucial determination of the ‘degree 
of force which...a reasonable person in the same 
situation...seeing what (s)he sees and knowing what (s)he 
knows, then would believe to be necessary, the respondent [is] 
entitled to have the jury consider her actions in the light of her 
own perceptions of the situation.” 813 
 
The MPC standard is based on a partial determinist account of human action. MPC 
standard divides an individual’s personal characteristics into two categories: 
characteristics that have causal influence that individuals can, and therefore must, 
control, and characteristics that have causal influence that individuals cannot, and 
therefore need not, control. The MPC stand distinguishes between characteristics which 
affect perception and nonuniversal characteristics which affect behaviour. Heller notes 
Williams’ argument in this respect: 
 
“The question asked by the [MPC] test is whether, assuming 
the facts to be as the defendant believed them to be, those 
facts would come within the legal categories of provocation, 
or would be provocation for an ordinary man. What the 
objective test discountenances is unusual deficiency of self-
control, not the making of an error of observation or 
inferences of fact.” 814 
                                               
812 S v Wanrow supra (n 94). 
 
813 Ibid at 557. See also State v Dunning, 506 P.2d 321, 322 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973); and State v 
Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989) holding that the belief in the necessity of self-defence must 
be reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant would create such a belief 
in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness. 
 
814 Heller supra (n 795) 70-71, citing Williams “Provocation and the Reasonable Man” (1954) Criminal 
Law Review 740 at 752. The MPC standard is thus only partially determinist. It assumes that 
although an individual’s perceptions are determined, how an individual reacts to her perceptions is 
the product of free will. Thus, the MPC standard must, in order to avoid running afoul of the 
voluntary act requirement, take all of an individual’s personal characteristics into account. It is 
difficult to imagine a personal characteristic that has no effect on either perceptions or actions. If this 
is the case there is no difference between the MPC standard and the subjective standard (Heller supra 
(n 795) at 75-76). For an example of how the MPC standard can collapse into the purely subjective 
standard see State v Leidholm supra (n 800) at 817-818: “The finder of fact must view the 
circumstances attending the defendant’s use of force from the standpoint of the defendant to 
 187 
 
The MPC standard thus particularizes its reasonableness standard to take into account 
some nonuniversal characteristics - namely, those nonuniversal characteristics that 
affect how the defendant perceives the world. Heller notes Creach’s remarks in this 
regard: “the more particularly and narrowly the jury defines the relevant reasonable 
person, the more likely it will be to find her response reasonable.” 815  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that the Model Penal Code adopts a standard of “reasonable” 
belief i.e. non-universal characteristics that affect how the defendant sees the world. In 
this respect it should be noted that similar developments have also taken place in the 
Canadian law of self-defence, where evidence of “battered woman syndrome” was 
admitted to determine the bounds of self-defence or at least the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s beliefs that she was about to be attacked. It is now necessary to briefly 




                                                                                                                                       
determine if they are sufficient to create in the defendant’s mind an honest and reasonable belief that 
the use of force is necessary to protect himself from imminent harm. The practical and logical 
consequence of this implication is that a defendant’s action is to be viewed from the standpoint of a 
person whose mental and physical characteristics are like the defendant’s and who sees what the 
defendant sees and knows what the defendant knows. For example, if the defendant is a timid, 
diminutive male, the fact-finder must consider these characteristics in assessing the reasonableness 
of his belief. If, on the other hand, the defendant is strong and courageous and capable female, the 
fact, finder must consider these characteristics in judging the reasonableness of her belief”. 
 
815 Heller supra (n 795) 71, citing Creach “Note: Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The 
Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why” (1982) Stanford Law Review 615 at 620. Heller supra (n 795) at 
76-78 notes that the MPC standard assumes that a defendant’s self-defensive act could be found 
unreasonable even if it were viewed from a defendant’s perspective, under the circumstances as she 
found them to be. Irrespective of how the defendant perceived her circumstances, her reaction to that 
situation must still satisfy the formal requirements of self-defence: immediate danger, reasonable 
force, nonaggressor status and duty to retreat before using deadly force. The problem is that in order 
to work, the MPC standard must assume that the defendant’s perception of the circumstances gave 
rise to her self-defensive act did not encompass a perception that she was in immediate danger etc. If 
her overall perception of her external circumstances did encompass such perceptions, the jury would 
have to assume that those perceptions were correct, and thus could not find her self-defensive act 
unreasonable. To do otherwise would be to substitute its perception that her act did not satisfy the 





4.2.2.4 The Canadian approach 
The Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Lavallee 816 has been hailed as a landmark 
decision insofar as the court admitted expert testimony relating to “battered woman 
syndrome.” In this case the accused was acquitted on the basis of self-defence after she 
shot dead her common-law husband, Kevin Rust in the back of the head as he left the 
room. 817 
 
On appeal, 818 the Supreme Court considered the question of whether expert testimony 
from a psychiatrist, concerning the defendant’s state of mind and “battered woman 
syndrome” was admissible to support a defence of self-defence.  
 
In respect of the hypothetical reasonable man, the defendant’s perception of imminent 
harm and the need for deadly force do not appear to rest on reasonable and probable 
grounds. The reason proposed for this was that the defendant shot her unarmed husband 
in the back of the head as he was leaving the room. However, Wilson J argued that the 
court could not appreciate the defendant’s perspective without consideration of expert 
evidence on “battered woman syndrome.” The judge went on to note that battering 
relationships were subject to many myths and stereotypes and were, therefore, beyond 
the comprehension of the average juror. Thus, the importance of the majority judgment 
on this issue lies in its explanation of why such expert evidence may be helpful and  
 
                                               
816 R v Lavallee supra (n 153). 
 
817 The deceased had regularly abused the defendant over the years. On the night in question, an 
altercation ensued after a party held at the couple’s home. The deceased told the defendant that once 
everyone left “she would get it.” Handing her a rifle, he told her that if she didn’t kill him first, he 
would kill her. When the deceased turned to leave the room, the defendant shot him in the back of 
the head, killing him instantly. 
 
818 Struesser in “The ‘Defence’ of ‘Battered Woman Syndrome’ in Canada” (1990) Manitoba Law 
Journal 195 at 197 notes that in Canadian law, once self-defence is rejected, there is no middle 
ground and this leads to a verdict of murder and a mandatory prison term of ten years. Manslaughter 






“Expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering of 
wives and common-law partners must, it seems to me, be both 
relevant and necessary in the present case. How can the 
mental state of the defendant be appreciated without it? The 
average member of the public (or the jury) can be forgiven for 
asking: why would a woman put up with this kind of 
treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? 
How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of 
requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to 
pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does 
she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the 
reaction of the average person confronted with so-called 
‘battered wife syndrome.’ We need help to understand and 
help is available from trained professionals.” 819 
 
Therefore, expert evidence of the psychological effects of battering was relevant and 
necessary in this case to assist the court in determining the mental state of the defendant 
and ascertaining whether her belief in imminent harm and the need for lethal defensive 
force was reasonable: 
 
“The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to 
circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world 
inhabited by the reasonable man.” 820 
 
                                               
819 R v Lavallee supra (n 153) 112. Cf R v Lavallee supra (n 153) at 111: “Judges and juries are not their own 
experts on human behaviour.” Boyle in “The Battered Wife Syndrome and Self-Defence: Lavallee v R” 
(1990) Canadian Journal of Family Law 171 at 173-174 notes that expert evidence is useful in assisting 
fact finders to avoid unwarranted assumptions. This recognition is important in terms of legal method on 
two levels: “First, feminist writing in general – and feminist analyses of law in particular have revealed, 
concern about issues being addressed in the abstract, divorced from the real experiences of women. One 
popular way of expressing this is to say that issues should be contextualized, that is, addressed in a 
context which includes an inquiry into the position of the women in a given situation. While not stated in 
so many words, the judgment does emphasize the need for decision-makers to be receptive to evidence 
about women’s experience of abuse as part of the context in which decisions about self-defence should 
be made. This judicial willingness to be open to perspectives and research which challenge intuitive 
views of the facts is clearly important not only to the issue of self-defence, but other issues as well. 
Second, judgment is methodically important in its gender specificity. The case seems to be part of a trend 
at the Supreme Court level toward recognizing the fact that people do not experience the world in gender 
neutral ways.” 
 
820 R v Lavallee supra (n 153) at 114. The court at 114-115 referred with approval to the case of State v 
Wanrow supra (n 94) which held that women seldom have the necessary skills to defend themselves 
against a male attacker, without resort to weapons. Furthermore, the reasonableness of the action taken in 




Wilson J held that expert evidence on “battered woman syndrome” was needed to assist 
the court in applying two specific elements of the law of self-defence in the Canadian 
Criminal Code: the imminence requirement (section 34(2) (a)) and the necessity 
requirement (section 34(2) (b)).821 To satisfy these two requirements, the defendant 
must demonstrate that she reasonably believed that she was in imminent danger of 
grievous bodily harm at the time she shot her husband and that she reasonably believed 
that lethal force was necessary to avoid this harm.822 
 
The reasonableness requirement imposes an objective standard on the defendant’s 
subjective apprehension of danger and the need for deadly force and it places in issue 
her state of mind at the time when she acted in self-defence and therefore asks whether 
her perceptions were based on reasonable and probable grounds. 823  The rationale 
behind the imminence requirement is that defensive force can only be justified if the 
defendant faces an uplifted knife or pointed gun, making it reasonable for her to 
suppose that there is no time to escape or to get help.824 On this reading of the law, the 
defendant’s defensive act would appear to be unjustified since her husband had turned 
his back on her, and it would appear that his threat to kill her was not imminent.825 
 
                                               
821 The provision relating to self-defence in section 34 of the Canadian Criminal Code (1985) reads as 
follows: “(2) Everyone who is unlawfully assaulted and who causes death or grievous bodily harm in 
repelling the assault is justified if (a) he causes it under reasonable apprehension of death or grievous 
bodily harm from the violence with which the assault was originally made or with which the 
assailant pursues his purposes; and (b) he believes, on reasonable grounds, that he cannot otherwise 
preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm.” 
 
822 R v Lavallee supra (n 153) at 113. 
 
823 In relation to this question, the court cited Reilly v The Queen (1984) 15 C.C.C (3d) 1 at 7-8 which 
considered the interactions between the subjective and objective components of the law of self-
defence in section 34(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code 1970. 
 
824 Kazan “Reasonableness, Gender difference and Self-Defense Law” (1997) Manitoba Law Journal 
549 at 553. Cf Reilly v the Queen supra (n 639) at 10; R v Baxter (1975), 27 C.C.C (2d) 96 (Ont. 
C.A.) and R v Bogue (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 403 (Ont. C.A.) 
 




Despite this, Wilson J was of the view that the evidence of Dr. Shane, a psychiatrist 
cast doubt on this conclusion by providing an explanation for why the defendant 
reasonably feared imminent danger from her husband in her situation. The psychiatrist 
testified that the abuse suffered by the defendant was in accordance with Walker’s 
cycle theory of violence.826 Wilson J maintained that the cyclical aspect of battering 
relationships begets a degree of predictability to the violence that is absent in isolated 
encounters between two strangers. This predictability of the battering cycle confers a 
special power of “heightened sensitivity” 827  on battered women which imparts the 
unique ability to detect subtle changes in her abuser’s usual pattern of violence that 
may signal an increase in the escalation of danger.828 
 
Wilson J was of the view that a woman who has developed this “heightened sensitivity” 
to her abuser’s behaviour need not wait until an attack was in progress before she could 
defend herself. 829 Wilson J went on to explain: 
 
“[D]ue to their size, strength, socialization and lack of 
training, women are typically no match for men in hand-to-
hand combat…therefore a battered woman need not wait until 
the physical assault is ‘underway’ before her apprehensions 
can be validated…it would be tantamount to sentencing her to 
‘murder by installment.’” 830 
 
Wilson J went on to state that expert evidence on “battered woman syndrome” can 
show how the defendant meets the necessity requirement in self-defence law. To satisfy  
 
                                               
826 Kazan supra (n 824) 556. 
 










this requirement, the defendant needs to show that she reasonably believed that 
shooting her husband was the only way to avoid grievous bodily harm or death.831 
 
To assist the court understand why the defendant stayed with her abusive husband, Dr. 
Shane testified that repeated exposure to abuse had induced a psychological condition 
which caused her to believe that she was powerless to escape: 
 
“[a]lthough there were obviously no steel fences keeping her 
in [the defendant felt] there were steel fences in her mind 
which created for her an incredible barrier psychologically 
prevented her from moving out.” 832 
 
On this view, the defendant suffered from a form of “learned helplessness” 833 which 
caused her to: 
 
“[lose] the motivation to react and [become] helpless and… 
powerless… paralyzed with fear.” 834 
 
Wilson J was of the opinion that this evidence suggested that the defendant’s exposure 
to repeated abuse had made her a kind of psychological hostage to her husband. When 
Rust threatened to kill her on the night of his demise, her situation was not unlike that 
of a hostage who had just been informed by her captor that he would kill her in three 
days. Wilson J concluded that it would be reasonable for persons who found themselves 
in such a situation, to seize the first opportunity to kill their captor, rather than wait  
 
 
                                               
831 R v Lavallee supra (n 153) 121. 
 
832 R v Lavallee supra (n 153) 124. 
 
833 R v Lavallee supra (n 153) 121. 
 




until he makes his attempt to kill them instead. 835 The judge emphasized the point that 
it is inappropriate that a woman’s failure to leave her own home should be used to cast 
doubt on her plea of self-defence: 
 
“[it] is not for the jury to pass judgment on the fact that an 
accused battered woman stayed in the relationship. Still less is 
it entitled to conclude that she forfeited her right to self-
defence for having done so… the traditional self-defence 
doctrine does not require a person to retreat from her home 
instead of defending herself. A man’s home may be his castle 
but it is also the woman’s home even if it seems to her more 
like a prison in the circumstances.” 836 
 
Therefore, it had to be decided by the jury, 
 
“whether, given the history, circumstances and perceptions of 
the accused, her belief that she could not preserve herself from 
being killed by Rust that night except by killing him first was 
reasonable.” 837 
 
As the appeal on issues of law were dismissed, the finding of the jury was upheld, and 
the defendant was acquitted on the basis of self-defence. It is evident that the 
importance of this case lies in the fact that Lavallee 838  case acknowledged that 
women’s experiences were not captured by the hypothetical construct “the reasonable 
man” and therefore proposed the admission of evidence of “battered woman syndrome” 
to counter this. Such expert testimony is relevant because (1) it reinforces the 
defendant’s credibility; (2) it goes to state of mind of the defendant to show she 
honestly believes she was in imminent danger; and (3) it goes to the reasonableness of  
 
                                               










defendant’s belief that she was in danger of death or grievous bodily harm. Evidence of 
an expert on battered woman syndrome assists the trier of fact in understanding the 
situation by dispelling any myths and misconceptions that the judge or jury may have 
about battered women.839 
 
4.3 Elements of self-defence: 
4.3.1 Imminence 
For a battered a woman to successfully rely on self-defence, she has to prove that she 
perceived a threat of imminent harm from her abuser which requires defensive action. 
Imminent harm means more than fear and requires some overt act, gesture or spoken 
word at the time the homicide occurred.840  
 
The question that now remains is what is meant by the term imminent harm and  
                                               
839 Struesser supra (n 818) 198. 
 
840 Bechtel v State supra (n 801) 28. Ogle and Jacobs supra (n 781) 451 note that battered women learn 
to distinguish subtle changes in the tone of the defendant’s voice, facial expression, and levels of 
danger and is therefore in a position to know, with greater certainty than someone attacked by a 
stranger, that the abuser’s threats are real and will be carried out (Bechtel supra (n 801) at 12) See 
also 141 supra for a discussion of this case. Ogle and Jacobs supra (n 781) at 123 give examples of 
cases with overt demonstrations of violence of an abuser which include the “look on his face” and 
“his heavy walk” as shown in People v Humphrey supra (n 809). In People v Garcia, 1999 WL 45 
9470 (Colo. App. 1999) the cues were more subtle. In this case the defendant’s husband had 
attempted to sexually assault her and threatened to kill her. She initially fought him off but then gave 
her a “look like he used to give me in Missouri and Kansas when I messed up, and I was going to get 
hurt pretty bad and... I just snapped” (at 5). Ogle and Jacobs are of the view that it is not clear to 
what extent these factors will be taken seriously and will be understood by judges. The courts clearly 
differ in their approaches and conclusions. In Bechtel v State supra (n 801) the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals recognized that because of her intimate knowledge of the batterer, the abused 
woman perceives danger more quickly and accurately than others would and is more acutely aware 
that a new or escalated violent episode is about to occur. However, in State v Stewart supra (n 794) 
the court held that self-defence requires confrontation, and long-term abuse is no substitute for 
imminence as traditionally understood. See also State v Gallegos supra (n 830) at 1268, which 
followed the line of reasoning in State v Stewart supra (n 794) but was reversed on appeal and on 
remand the trial court was directed to give a self-defence instruction “whenever a defendant presents 
evidence sufficient to allow reasonable minds to differ as to all elements of the defence” (at 21). 
Furthermore, neither trial nor appellate courts ruled on whether these descriptions of clues are 
sufficient to justify the use of deadly force (Ogle and Jacobs supra (n 781) 123). For a discussion of 
the imminence standard in South African law see chapter 2 at 46-48 supra; for a discussion of 
imminence requirement in English law see chapter 3 at 113-116 supra. For a criticism of this 
element in relation to battered women see chapter 5 at 275-277; 290-292 infra. For alternatives to 





whether this term adequately provides for situations in which battered women find 
themselves. In State v Hundley 841 the question was posed as to whether imminent harm 
was the same as immediate harm. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that “imminent” 
is broader and more inclusive term than “immediate” and that a jury focusing on 
“imminent” harm will not necessarily be bound by the time limitations that are 
associated with “immediacy” requirement: 842 
 
“Under the facts of this case, Betty finally became so 
desperate in her terror of Carl she fled. Her escape was to no 
avail. Her fear was justified. He broke through the locked door 
of her motel room and started his abuse again. Carl’s threat 
was no less life threatening with him sitting in the motel room 
tauntingly playing with his beer bottle than if he were 
advancing toward her. The objective test is how a reasonably 
prudent battered wife would perceive Carl’s demeanor. Expert 
testimony is admissible to prove the nature of wife beating just 
as it is admissible to prove the standard mental state of 
hostages, prisoners of war, and those under long-term life-
threatening conditions. Thus, we can see the use of the word 
‘immediate’ in the instruction on self-defence places undue 
emphasis on immediate action of the deceased, and obliterates 
the nature of the buildup of terror and fear which had been 
systematically created over a long period of time, ‘imminent’ 
describes the situation more accurately. Appellant aptly makes 
the following analogy under a more normal situation which 
further demonstrates the difference in the definition of 
‘imminent’ and ‘immediately’. An aggressor who is 
customarily armed and gets involved in a fight may resent an 
imminent danger, justifying the use of force in self-defence, 
even though the aggressor is unarmed on the occasion. There 
may be no immediate danger, since the aggressor is in fact 
unarmed, but there is a reasonable apprehension of danger. In 
other words, the law of self-defence recognizes one may 
reasonably fear danger but be mistaken.” 843 
 
                                               
841 236 Kan 461, 693 P. 2d 475 (1985). In this case the defendant had endured ten years of abusive 
marriage. Abusive acts included her husband diluting her insulin medicine, choking her into 
unconsciousness, harassing her and threatening to kill her and members of her family. When she 
eventually left her abuser, he tracked her down to a motel where she was staying. He broke the door 
down and raped her. He then pounded a beer can on the nightstand next to her bed and demanded 
she buy him cigarettes. Instead she killed him with a gun she had purchased previously for her 
protection. 
 
842 Ogle and Jacobs supra (n 781) 124. 
 




While the Kansas Supreme Court based its decision on the distinction between 
subjective and objective, other courts have used the terms interchangeably.844 Section 
3.04 [1] of the Model Penal Code allows a reasonable solution to this problem by 
requiring that the defensive force be “immediately necessary on the present occasion”. 
Such a standard addresses the relationship between the time of the defensive force and 
the time which it must be utilized to prevent such harm.845 This will operate in a fair 
manner in battered women cases: 
 
“The central question involves the appropriate relationship 
between the necessity and imminence requirements. A 
standard allowing defensive force only when immediately 
necessary to prevent unlawful harm treats imminence of harm 
as a factor regarding necessity. That is, the defensive force is 
justified only if necessary to prevent an unlawful harm, and 
the imminence of that unlawful harm contributes to, but does 
not completely determine, the judgment of necessity. In 
unusual circumstances such as those confronted by the 
battered women, defensive force may be immediately 
necessary to prevent unlawful harm, although that harm is not 
yet imminent. In these cases, imminence of harm does not 
serve as a decisive factor in the determination of necessity. A 
standard allowing defensive force necessary to prevent 
delayed unlawful aggression, even if the present situation 
represents the last opportunity to prevent such harm.” 846 
 
 
                                               
844 People v Humphrey supra (n 809); State v Anderson, 785 S. W. 2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v 
Gallegos supra (n 830). Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan argue that the law does not distinguish between 
these two terms. These authors use the terms interchangeably and find no theoretical or statutory 
reason to dwell on a categorically imposed difference (“Battered Women Syndrome, Expert 
Testimony, and the Distinction between Justification and Excuse” (1994) University of Illinois Law 
Review 45 at 126). 
 
845 Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan supra (n 844) 67.  
 
846 Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan supra (n 844) 67-68. The merit of this proposition is best shown by 
contrasting it to the courts black –and –white declarations in People v Humphreys supra (n 809) and 
State v Stewart supra (n 794) in that the imminence requirement of traditional self-defence can never 
be met when a man is sleeping. See also State v Norman supra (n 813). The Model Penal Code 
(section 3. 04 of the Official Draft 1962) reflects this provides that self-defence may be employed 
when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting 
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. Thus the 
Code provides solid support for the position taken here that necessity is critically important element 
in determining the propriety of self-defense on a given occasion. The reference to the “present 
occasion” broadens the time frame enough so that a person who has good reason to believe that an 




Bechtel 847 held that not only must an individual be confronted with an imminent threat, 
but also that the perception of the threat must be a reasonable one. The court discussed 
the implications of this traditional understanding in respect of battered women:  
 
“For the battered woman, if there is no escape or sense of 
safety, then the next attack, which could be fatal or cause 
serious bodily harm, is imminent. Based on the traditionally 
accepted definition of imminence and its functional 
derivatives a battered woman, to whom a threat of serious 
bodily harm or death always imminent, would be precluded 
from asserting the defense of self-defense... Thus... an abused 
woman may kill her mate during the period of threat that 
precedes a violent incident, right before the violence escalates 
to the more dangerous levels of an acute battering episode. Or, 
she may take action against him during a lull in an assaultive 
incident, or after it has culminated in an effort to prevent a 
recurrence of the violence. And so, the issue is not whether the 
danger was in fact imminent, but whether, given the 
circumstances as she perceived them, the defendant’s belief 
was reasonable that the danger was imminent.” 848 
 
The court recognized that what was of crucial importance was the circumstances as the 
battered woman perceived, thus enabling her to rely on self-defence, where ordinarily 
no such defence would be available. This results in a more subjective test for 
imminence. One problem with such an approach is that the battered woman could 
always perceive herself to be in danger and therefore kill at any time. 
 
Ogle and Jacobs are of the view that “emphasis on the defendant’s reasonableness 
enables the fact-finder to be released from the binding temporal quality that surrounds 
the imminence requirement and on the prosecutorial side emphasis on the  
 
                                               
847 Bechtel v State supra (n 801). 
 
848 Bechtel v State supra (n 801) 12. See also State v Gallegos supra (n 830). Thus the battered woman 
need not show evidence of an actual physical assault on the day she claimed defensive action. Thus 
the history of violence does not justify killing but is one element that should be available to prove 




reasonableness, enables one to question whether the response was one reasonably 
calculated to be defensive, even if the threat was immediate”.849 
 
Furthermore, in establishing self-defence, the battered woman who kills her batterer in 
a non-confrontational situation must demonstrate not only that she reasonably believed 
that an attack was forthcoming but also that she reasonably believed that deadly force 
was necessary and proportionate to the impending attack.850  
 
4.3.2 Duty to retreat 
The majority 851  of jurisdictions hold that a defendant (who was not the initial 
aggressor), does not have to retreat even where she can do so in safety,852 before using  
                                               
849 Ogle and Jacobs supra (n 781) 129. 
 
850 Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan supra (n 844) 20-21. Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan supra (n 844) at 21 
go on to note that while case law does admit evidence of the abused woman’s history to establish 
reasonable belief in the necessity of deadly force in the case of confrontational or non-
confrontational situations, non-confrontational cases are generally the most problematic. Expert 
testimony on battered woman syndrome can be introduced on the following basis. Evidence of past 
abuse could be admitted to support the battered woman’s exercise of deadly force in the 
circumstances and this would describe severe and continuous abuse. Thus some courts may exclude 
such evidence as relevant but inadmissible since highly prejudicial. But a well-established exception 
to the general rule against character evidence allows evidence regarding past abuse by the victim in 
homicide cases when there is controversy regarding the question as to who initiated the aggression. 
Lastly, the relative weight of the probative value and prejudicial effect will vary from case to case. If 
the former outweighs the latter in a particular case, then this evidence of past abuse should be 
admitted for the reasons stated. If the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value in a particular 
case, then the evidence could not be admissible, but calling it part of a battered woman syndrome 
renders it no less prejudicial and no more probative. Thus, in each case, either the evidence be 
admitted under ordinary law or it should be precluded as overly prejudicial. Either conclusion 
depends on the relative weight of the probative and prejudicial effects of the evidence of past abuse 
without regard to the battered woman’s syndrome.  
 
851 People v Gonzales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 P. 783 (1887); Runyan v State, 57 Ind. 80. 26 Am. Rep. 52 
(1887); Haynes v State, 451 So. 2d 227 (Miss 1984); Culverson v State, 106 Nev. 484, 797 P.2d 238 
(1990).  The minority of jurisdictions hold that the defendant must retreat before using deadly force 
if she can do so in safety. King v State 233 Ala. 198, 171 So. 254 (1936); State v Marish, 198 Iowa 
602, 200 N.W. 5 (1924); State v Cox, 138 Me. 151, 23 A. 2d 634 (1941); State v Austin, 332 N.W. 
2d 21 (Minn. 1983) Compare Gillis v United States, 400 A.2d 311 (D.C. App. 1979), purporting to 
adopt a middle position: there is no duty to retreat, but the failure to retreat may be considered by the 
jury in determining “whether a defendant, if he safely could have avoided further encounter by 
stepping back or walking away, was actually or apparently in imminent danger of bodily harm.” 
 
852 State v Anderson, 227 Conn. 518, 631 A.2d 1149 (1993); State v Abbott, 36 N.J 63, 174 A.2d 881 
(1961) quoting with approval from what is now the Model Penal Code ss 3. 04 (2)(b)(ii) (deadly 
force is not justifiable if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with 
complete safety by retreating) even in those jurisdictions which require retreat the defendant need 
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deadly force against someone whom she reasonably thought would kill her or cause her 
grievous bodily harm. If retreat is to be preferred over the use of deadly force, then it 
could be argued that alternative steps which could terminate the dangerous encounter 
should likewise be required in lieu of self-defence with deadly force. 853 
                                                                                                                                       
not retreat unless she can do so in complete safety and need not retreat from her home. ((Beard v 
United States, 158 U.S. 550, 15 S.Ct 962, 39 L. Ed. 1086 (1895) (attacked on own land 50-60 yards 
from his house, but the case is not clear whether the defendant need not retreat wherever he is on his 
own land; State v Baratta 242 Iowa 1308, 49 N.W. 2d 866 (1951) (attacked in place of business); 
Burch v State, 346 Md. 253, 696 A.2d 443 (1997) (the defendant’s dwelling)). As for the application 
of the rule where a defendant is outside his house, compare State v Pugliese, 120 N.H. 728, 422 A.2d 
1319 (1980) (statute construed to adopt common law rule, and thus no retreat needed outside house 
but within curtilage) with State v Bonano, 59 N.J. 515, 284 A.2d 345 (1971) (reasoning “better rule” 
is to require retreat into the dwelling). The rule has even been held applicable to attack in one’s 
social club, State v Marlow, 120 S.C. 205, 112 S.E. 921 (1922); his automobile, State v Borwick, 
193 Iowa 639, 187 N.W. 460 (1922); and when a guest in another’s house, 145 So. 816 (1933). 
Where the defendant was the original aggressor, see United States v Peterson, 483 P.2d 1222 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973); “the law is well settled that the ‘castle’ doctrine can be invoked only by one who is 
without fault in causing the conflict.” Where the assailant is the occupant of the premises, see State v 
Shaw, 198 Conn. 372, 441 A. 2d 561 (1981); State v Bobbitt, 415 S.o.2d 724 (Fla. 1982); State v 
Grieson, 96 N. H. 36, 69 A.2d 851 (1949); State v Gartland, 149 N.J 456, 694 A2d 564 (1971) 
(upstairs bedroom in which wife slept not a separate dwelling within meaning of statute requiring 
retreat and thus wife has duty to retreat from husband’s assault there before using deadly force). In 
Gartland supra, the court invited the state legislature to reconsider application of the retreat doctrine 
in the case of a spouse battered in her own home. Thus, the dispute regarding whether the battered 
woman syndrome renders the defendant unable to exercise the alternative of retreat is irrelevant to 
cases that occur in the home. Regardless of whether she could retreat, there is no legal reason why 
she should do so before using defensive force. Ordinary self-defence doctrine allows one to exercise 
defensive force, including deadly force, in one’s own home when one has no safe alternative except 
retreat. (Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan supra (n 844) 22). The Model Penal Code ss 3.04 (2)(b)(ii) 
expressly provides that deadly force is not permissible if the actor knows he can avoid the necessity 
for its use “by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by 
complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take. The court 
went on to hold that there was no duty to retreat where the wife was charged with murder in killing 
of husband in their joint abode. The court reversed the murder conviction since the trial court had 
erroneously charged that the wife had duty to retreat (Hutcherson v State, 170 Ala. 29, 54 So. 119 
(1910); a wife was convicted of first-degree murder in killing of her husband who had beaten her 
over a lengthy period of time and the instruction given regarding no duty to retreat was accurate but 
errors were made in handling of Battered Woman Syndrome necessitating the reversal of the 
conviction (Bechtel v State supra (n 801). For a discussion of this requirement in South African law 
see chapter 2 at 53-55 supra; English law chapter 3 at 116-117 supra. For a discussion of whether the 
duty to retreat condition be maintained in South African law see chapter 5 at 246-251. infra. 
 
853 Case law seems to suggest unequal treatment of men and women who kill their assailants who have a 
history of assaulting and threatening them. See for example the cases of Brown v United States 256 
US 335, 343, 41 S Ct 501, 65 L Ed 961, 18 ALR 1276 (1921) and State v Hundley supra (n 841) See 
further Dubin supra (n 798) who makes an in-depth comparison between these two cases (at 8). For 
examples of case law dealing with battered women where there is a duty to retreat see further S v 
Bobbit supra (n 852). In this case the wife was convicted of manslaughter in the killing of her 
husband. The Florida Supreme Court, in upholding the conviction, quashed the decision of the 
district court which had reversed the conviction. The district court had held that the privilege of non-
retreat should be applicable despite the fact that the husband was not an intruder. However, the 
Supreme Court held that the privilege of non-retreat was not applicable where both the husband and 
wife had equal rights to be in the castle. The court emphasized the sanctity of human life should be 
preserved, wherever possible. However, the court noted that this decision does not leave the 
occupant of the home defenseless against the attacks of another legitimate co-occupant because any 
person placed in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm to himself by wrongful attack of 
another has no duty to retreat if to do so would increase his own danger of death or great bodily 
 200 
 
4.3.3 The requirement of proportionality 
A defendant’s claim of self-defence will only be successful if the degree of force used 
was reasonably related to the degree of harm threatened. As a result, proof that a 
battered woman used more force than necessary to protect herself will undermine her 
claim of self-defence.854 Battered women accused of killing their abusers have almost 
invariably used “deadly force” - that is, force which is intended to cause death or 
grievous bodily harm. Deadly force is not justified unless the abused woman reasonably 
believed that her abuser was about to kill her or inflict grievous bodily harm.855 Thus 
the proportionality requirement “serves as another way in which traditional self-defence 
law requires the defendant’s acts to be objectively reasonable”.856 
 
As a general rule deadly force may only be used against deadly force. Since a battered 
woman’s husband is often unarmed at the time she kills him,857  this doctrine has 
defeated battered women’s self-defence claims.858 
                                                                                                                                       
harm. In S v Leidholm supra (n 800) where the defendant asserted that the trial judge had instructed 
the jury improperly as to the duty to retreat doctrine insofar as the judge imposed a duty to retreat on 
the wife. Under N.D Cent. Code ss 12.1-05-07 (2) (b), a person has no duty to retreat from his 
dwelling unless he was the original aggressor or is assailed by a person who he knows also dwells 
there. Therefore, stated the North Dakota Supreme Court the trial judge did state the law correctly in 
instructing that the wife had a duty to retreat under the circumstances of this case. The court found 
no merit in the defendant’s arguments that the statute violated the equal protection and due process 
clause of the United States Constitution in that it made an individual duty to retreat depends on 
status of assailant. See further S v Pontery N.J. 457, 117 A. 2d 473 (1955) where wife convicted of 
homicide. The court held that the instruction given by the trial judge that wife was under duty to 
retreat if possible was correct since common-law doctrine provided that a home owner need not 
retreat to the wall before acting in her defence was not applicable in a case in which the home where 
shooting occurred was jointly owned by husband and wife and both had equal right to be there. 
 
854 Kinports supra (n 810) 428. 
 
855 Kinports supra (n 810) 428-429. 
 
856 Lee “The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual Requirement Theory of 
Justification” (1998) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 191 at 204. For a discussion of this requirement 
in South African law see chapter 2 at 56-58 supra. For a discussion of the proportionality 
requirement in English law see chapter 3 at 118-120 supra. For a discussion of the suitability of this 
requirement for battered women see chapter 5 at 242-245 infra. 
 
857 See for e.g., Mullis v State, 248 Ga. 338, 339-340, 282 S.E. 2d 334, 337-338 (1981); People v Davis, 
33 Ill, App, 3d 105, 110, 337 N.E. 256, 260 (1975). 
 
858 Kinports supra (n 810) 429. 
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Such a statement may lead to the conclusion that it would never be permissible to use a 
firearm against an unarmed aggressor. But as Lee notes “the proportionality 
requirement is concerned not only with the means of force (or the instrument of force), 
it is also concerned with the degree of force and the gravity of the harm threatened”.859 
For example, if a small woman is threatened by a bigger unarmed man who is trying to 
choke her, the smaller woman may use a firearm against her attacker as long as the 
threatened attack is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm. The use of deadly 
force in such a case meets the proportionality requirement since the small woman is 
using deadly force, defined as force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, to 
combat deadly force. 860  Thus while the law is concerned with the defendant’s 
reasonable perception 861 of the threatened force, it is not a controlling factor.862 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
859 Lee supra (n 856) 203. 
 
860 Ibid, citing the case of State v Wanrow supra (n 94). This case involved a woman who shot an 
unarmed man whose reputation for aggression was known to her. The Washington Supreme Court 
held that the level of force available to her had to be assessed under two social context criteria: one 
specifically relevant to the facts on appeal and the other generally relevant to women confronting 
male aggression. First, the court held that a jury should be allowed to consider evidence of the 
attackers’ history of violence in determining whether the defendants force was proportional to the 
threat she perceived: “under the law of this state, the jury should have been allowed to consider 
[information about the appellants knowledge of the attackers reputation for aggressive acts] in 
making the critical determination of the degree of force which... a reasonable person in the same 
situation... seeing what [s]he sees and knowing what [s]he knows, then would believe to be 
necessary” (at 557) quoting State v Dunning supra (n 813). Secondly, the court noted the social 
reasons underlying the necessity for use of a weapon by a woman who is confronted with a male 
attacker: “In our society women suffer form a conspicuous lack of access to training and the means 
of developing those skills to effectively repel a male assailant without resorting to the use of deadly 
weapons ( State v Wanrow supra (n 94) 558). 
 
861 Kinports supra (n 810) at 433 submits: “since the battered woman, based on her prior experience with 
her husband’s brutality and the disparity in size, strength, may reasonably conclude that her husband 
can kill her or cause serious bodily harm without using a weapon, and that her only means of 
defence is to arm herself”. See further State v Lynch, 436 So, 2d 567, 569 La. (1983). 
 
862 Lee supra (n 856) 205. Lee makes use of an example to illustrate this point: “If D comes across a boy 
waiving a toy gun at him, D may perceive that he is being threatened with deadly force and respond 
by shooting the boy with his own real gun. If we add the fact that the toy gun is pink, then D’s 
perception of being threatened with deadly force cannot be deemed reasonable. D’s use of a real gun 
(deadly force) to respond to the boy’s pink toy gun (non-deadly force) would fail the proportionality 




Most jurisdictions recognize that in at least some circumstances the attacker’s fists can 
constitute deadly weapons, thus permitting the victim to attack using deadly force. One 
appellate court noted, “[i]t is a firmly established rule that the aggressor need not have a 
weapon to justify one’s use of deadly force in self-defence, and that a physical beating 
may qualify as such conduct that could cause great bodily harm”. 863 This approach is 
appropriate where the parties’ size, strength or physical condition differ substantially. 
As the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals noted: 
 
“[I]t cannot be said to be true in all cases where fists are used 
in making an attack upon another that the person attacked 
would not be legally justified in the use of a deadly 
weapon…There may be such a difference in the size of the 
parties involved or disparity in their ages or physical condition 
which would give the person assaulted by fists reasonable 
grounds to apprehend danger of great bodily harm and thus 
legally justified in repelling the assault by the use of a deadly 
weapon. It is conceivable that a man might be so brutal in 
striking a woman with his fists as to cause her death”. 864 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The difficulties encountered by battered women in meeting a strict standard of self-
defence has led to the introduction of lay and expert testimony to assist the trier of fact 
in understanding the context in which the crime was committed. Self-defence in non-
confrontational situations, even with the introduction of expert testimony remains  
                                               
863 See for e.g., People v Reeves, 47 Ill, App, 3d 406, 411, 362 N.E.2d 9, 13 (1977). 
 
864 Easterling v State, 267 P. 2d 185, 188 (Okla, Crim, App, 1954), cited in Kinports supra (n 633) 431. 
As Kinports supra (n 810) at 431-432 notes, while not all injuries are immediately life-threatening, 
the law considers them severe enough to constitute serious bodily harm, that may be repelled by 
deadly force. See for e.g., People v Burroughs, 35 Cal, 3d 824, 831, 201 Cal, Rptr, 319, 323, 678 
P.2d 894, 898 (1984) (defining serious bodily injury for purposes of setting penalties for various 
batteries as “[a] serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to the following: 
loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any 
bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement”). See 
also People v Reed, 695 P.2d 806, 808 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), cert, denied, 701 P.2d 603 (Colo. 
1985) (defining serious bodily harm for purposes of self-defence to include injuries that involve 
substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the 





questionable and creates controversy as to whether self-defence is indeed a viable 
option. 
 
Various theorists have noted that battered women are “stretching the boundaries of self-
defence beyond its acceptable limits”. 865  They have noted that self-defence was 
designed to protect the sanctity of human life and to limit self-help which is 
accomplished by the doctrine’s strict requirements of necessity, proportionality and 
imminence.866 
 
While a complete defence to killing an abuser would be preferable, several theorists 
hold the view that some form of voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to self-defence, is 
the appropriate legal response to the killings. They argue that extenuating 
circumstances such as a history of abuse, may be acknowledged in order to reduce a 
charge of murder to manslaughter. 867  Smith notes that “as a balanced approach 
classifying the offense as voluntary manslaughter recognizes both crimes in context in 
which they occur: categorizing the abuse as a mitigating circumstance, while at the  
                                               
865 Smith “Abused children who kill abusive parents: moving towards an appropriate legal response” 
(1992) Catholic University Law Review 141 at 158-159. Smith at n 119 makes reference to theorists 
such as Creach supra (n 638) to support her contention: see Creach supra (n 815) at 627-630 
(arguing that acquittal despite a lack of sufficient evidence to support self-defence is contrary to the 
rule of law). 
 
866 Smith supra (n 865) at 159. See also Smith supra (n 865) n 120 noting Creach’s comment (supra (n 
815) at 628) comment: “restricting of self-defence doctrine is meant to deter self-help and require a 
genuine fear of imminent harm”; See Mihajlovich “Comment, Does plight make right: The Battered 
Woman Syndrome, expert testimony and the law of self-defense” (1987) Indiana Law Journal 1253 
at 1269-1273: “the social goal of self-defense doctrine is to preserve human life and [t]o erode the 
proportionality and necessity components... is to broaden the range of circumstances under which a 
life can be legally taken without criminal sanctions”. 
 
867 Smith supra (n 865) 160. See also Smith supra (n 865) n 130. For example, Creach supra (n 815) 
argues for expansion of the doctrine of imperfect self-defence to include killings in response to 
external forces sufficient to put defendant in genuine fear (at 635-638); Mihajlovich supra (n 866) at 
1278-1281 explaining various strategies for categorizing murders by battered women of their 
attackers in non-confrontational situation as manslaughter where the defendant’s status as a battered 
woman would be recognized as an extenuating circumstance, arguing that such classification will 
allow battered women defendants to include their true emotions such as anger and fear in their 




same time preserving the intent of self-defence doctrine by stressing the sanctity of 
human life and discouraging self-help”.868  
 
4.5 Provocation  
4.5.1 Development of the defence  
Initially provocation was an evidentiary matter at a time when the word “aforethought” 
was assumed to have actual significance as used in the definition of murder. Intentional 
killing without any apparent motive must have been due to a concealed motive.869 
However, a killing in sudden affray (initially referred to as “chance medley”) 870 
brought about its own explanation and did not leave room for imputation of 
premeditation and for this reason the offence was manslaughter. When it was 
acknowledged that murder required no actual premeditation a killing in a sudden rage 
brought about by an altercation was still held to be manslaughter but a different 
explanation for this was needed.871 Such circumstances are so mitigating that the  
                                               
868 Smith supra (n 865) 160-161. See also Smith supra (n 865) n 131. This balanced approach avoids the 
extreme outcomes of self-defence doctrine – convict of first degree murder or acquit. See further 
Creach supra (n 815) at 635: “Self-defences polar model is inadequate, while manslaughter provides 
a middle ground”.  
 
869 Lombard Eirenarcha (1619), cited in Perkins Criminal Law 2nd ed (1969) 53. As Perkins supra at 34-
35 has noted, the word “aforethought” was added to “malice” in the older cases to indicate a design 
thought out well in advance of the fatal act. But since many cases came before the courts for 
determination involving killings under a great variety of circumstances, less emphasis was placed 
upon the notion of a well-laid plan. Thus the only requirement in this regard was that it must not be 
an afterthought. Killing with malice is sufficient of itself to negative any possible notion of an 
afterthought, and apart from the historical background the word “aforethought” would not be 
needed. Perkins supra at 35 goes on to state: “the use of the word aforethought, however, must not 
be permitted to obscure the result. As a matter of law a killing may be with malice aforethought 
although it is conceived and executed ‘on the spur of the moment’. For example, if one should find 
himself alone with a political opponent, and should suddenly slay the other with a heavy iron bar 
which happened to be at hand, the slayer would be guilty of murder even if no such thought had ever 
entered his mind before, and he carried out the idea as rapidly as thought can be translated into 
action.”  For a discussion of South African treatment of provocation/emotional stress see chapter 2 at 
67-102 supra. For a discussion of the treatment of the provocation defence in English law see 
chapter 3 at 131-159 supra. 
 
870 The term is sometimes employed to refer to homicide in a causal altercation but more properly refers 
to the altercation itself. See Blackstone supra (n 506) at 184, cited in Perkins supra (n 869) 53. 
 
871 East did not clearly distinguish the new theory from the old saying: “Herein is to be considered under 
what circumstances it may be presumed that the act done, though intentional of death or grievous 
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killer’s state of mind could not be properly characterized as “malicious”.872 
 
In order for murder to be reduced to manslaughter under the “rule of provocation” there 
are four requirements: 
 
(1) There must have been adequate 873 provocation.874 
                                                                                                                                       
bodily harm, was not the result of a cool deliberate judgment and previous malignity of heart, but 
imputable to human infirmity alone.” 1 East P.C. 232 (1803), (cited in Perkins supra (n 869) 53). 
 
872 Such a killing “is regarded as done through heart of blood or violence, of anger and not through 
malice..” Commonwealth v Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 308 (1850) “There can be no such thing in law 
as a killing with malice and also upon the juror brevis of passion; and provocation furnishes no 
extenuation unless it produces passion. Malice excludes passion. Passion presupposes the absence of 
malice. In the law they cannot co-exist.” State v Johnson, 23 N.C. 354, 362 (1840). 
 
873 To be adequate it is not necessary that the provocation would cause a reasonable man to commit 
intentional homicide but only that it would so inflame his passion as to tend to cause him from that 
moment to act from passion rather than reason, that, is to deprive a reasonable person of self-control 
(Perkins supra (n 869) 54). See also State v Watkins, 147 Iowa 556, 126 N.W. 691 (1910); State v 
Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 70 P. 2d 1113 (1937). If an alleged provocation was so slight, or an actual 
provocation so great, as to leave no possible room for doubt as to the characterization it is not 
necessary for the court to ask the jury to make the only finding of fact possible under the 
circumstances. See also Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] 2 All ER 124. Special 
circumstances are not ignored, even if they apply directly to the actor himself. Negligence, for 
example, is tested by the reasonable-man standard. But a blind man for example can’t be expected to 
exercise the care of one with normal vision. In the case of a fire, a Fire Marshal who has been 
without sleep for 36 hours cannot be expected to act with the same judgment as someone who hasn’t. 
But the fact that the standard is one of ordinary reasonable man precludes consideration of the innate 
peculiarities of the individual actor (cited in Perkins supra (n 869) 55-56). 
 
874 It has been held that a wordy altercation will not itself be sufficient to mitigate to manslaughter a 
killing that is otherwise murder. See also State v Lee, 36 Del. 11, 171 A. 175 (1933). On the other 
hand a mutual encounter which goes beyond words to actual blows or to a manifestation of intent to 
use immediate and violent force may constitute adequate provocation; and in determining the 
adequacy of the provocation in such a case the entire quarrel, including the words, will be taken into 
consideration (Perkins supra (n 869) 57); see Regina v Smith, 4 F & F. 1066, 176 Eng. Rep 910 
(1886)). In the case of battery not every technical battery is sufficient to constitute adequate 
provocation, but a hard blow inflicting considerable pain or injury will ordinarily be sufficient 
(Perkins supra (n 869) 60; see also Stewart v State, 78 Ala. 436 (1885)). In the case of words they 
are not recognized as adequate provocation to reduce a willful killing to manslaughter, however 
abusive, aggravating, contemptuous, false, grievous, indecent, insulting provoking or scurrilous they 
may be (see also People v Russel, 322 Fll. 295, 153 N.E. 387 (1926); State v Nevares, 36 N.N. 41, 
71. 2d. 36 933 (1932); Commonwealth v Gelfi, 282 Pa. 434, 128 A. 77 (1925)). The soundness of 
this rule has been questioned (see e.g., Commonwealth v Hourgian 89 Ky. 305, 313, 12 S.W. 550, 
552 (1889), State v Jarrott, 23 N.C. 76, 82 (1840). But cf Sawyers v Commonwealth, 18 Ky. L. re[. 
657, 38. S.W 136 (1896); State v McNeill, 92 N.C. 812 (1885)). Insulting gestures alone are not 
adequate provocation (Perkins supra (n 869) 63; see also Coleman v State, 149 Ga. 186, 99 S.E. 627 
(1919). Gestures indicating an intent to attack with deadly force may be adequate provocation in a 
mutual encounter (see Hall v State, 177 Ga. 794, 171 S.E. 274 (1933)) and under other 
circumstances may completely justify or excuse a homicide under the self-defence privilege (Perkins 
supra (n 869) 63; see also State v Mason, 115 S.C. 214, 105 S.E, 286 (1920)). Certain other 
outrageous acts may be found to constitute adequate provocation to reduce a voluntary homicide to 
manslaughter. These include a husband killing his wife whom he caught sleeping with another man 
(Dabeny v State, 113 Ala. 38, 21 So. 211, 212 (1897)) seduction of the defendant’s infant daughter 
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(2) The killing must have been in the heat of passion.875 
(3) It must have been a sudden heat of passion - the killing must have followed the 
provocation before there had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to 
cool.876 
(4) There must have been a causal connection between the provocation, the passion, 
and the fatal act.877 
 
Many American jurisdictions maintain the old distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary manslaughter, and award less severe punishment for involuntary than 
voluntary manslaughter. Some modern American statutes have discarded the adjectives 
(voluntary and involuntary) and instead divide manslaughter into degrees, reserving a  
                                                                                                                                       
(State v Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 47 S.W. 1058 (1898); Toler v State, 152 Tenn 1, 260 S.W. 134 (1924)), 
rape of his close female relative (State v Cooper, 112 La. 281, 36 So. 350 (1904); State v Flory, 40 
Wyo. 184, 276 P. 458 (1929)), murder or serious injury of his close relative (People v Rice, 351 Ill. 
604, 184 N.E. 894 (1933)) or the act of sodomy with his young son (Regina v Fisher, 8 Car. & P. 
182, 173 Eng. Rep. 452 (1837)). Any effort to classify provocative acts into adequate and inadequate 
would be to substitute the early view in place of modern law (Perkins supra (n 869) 65). 
 
875 “[P]rovocation furnishes no extenuation, unless it produces passion” (State v Johnson supra (n 872)). 
“Passion does not necessarily mean rage or anger. It includes any violent, intense, highly wrought or 
enthusiastic emotion.” (Perkins supra (n 869) 66); see also People v Borchers, 50 Cal 2d 321, 329, 
325 P. 2d 97, 102 (1958)). Terror is one of the passions which may dethrone judgment and mitigate 
a killing to the level of voluntary manslaughter (see also People v Otwell, 61 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Cal. 
App. 1967). The present requirement is measured by a subjective test, the question is whether the 
defendant killed in the actual heat of passion (Perkins supra (n 869) 66; see Green v State, 195 Ga. 
759, 25 S.E. 2d 502 (1943)). To constitute the heat of passion in this requirement it is not necessary 
for the passion to be so extreme that the defendant does not know what he is doing at the time (see 
People v Freel, 48 Cal. 436 (1874); Dye v State, 127 Miss. 492 90 So. 180 (1922)). But it must be so 
extreme that for the moment his action is being directed by passion rather than by reason (Perkins 
supra (n 869) 66; see also Hannah v Commonwealth, 153 Va 863, 149 S.E. 419 (1929)). 
 
876 Saunders v State, 26 Ga. App 475, 106 S.E. 314 (1921). If time has elapsed before the fatal act the 
defendant does not have the benefit of the rule of provocation even if his own mind is still inflamed 
by passion at the time of the killing. See also State v Robinson, 353 Mo. 934, 185 S.W. 2d 636 
(1945); State v Lee supra (n 874). It has been recognized that one who controls his temper time after 
time, following repeated acts of provocation, may have his emotion so bottled-up that the final result 
is an emotional explosion, and that in such a case the “cooling time” begins to run not form earlier 
acts but form the “last straw” (Perkins supra (n 869) 67); see also Baker v People, 114 Colo. 50, 160 
P. 2d 983 (1945); Ferrin v People, 433 P. 2d 108 (1967); People v Borchers, supra (n 875)). Passion 
may be suddenly revived by circumstances that bring the provocation vividly to mind (Perkins supra 
(n 869) 68; State v Florry, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 P. 458 (1929)). If the defendant’s passions did cool, 
which may be shown by such circumstances such as completing a transaction etc then the length of 
time intervening is immaterial (Perkins supra (n 869) 69; see also in re Fraley, 3 Okl. Cr. 719, 722, 
109 P. 295, 296-297 (1910)). However, the greater the provocation the longer the cooling time (State 
v Connor, 252 S.W. 713 (Mo. 1923)). 
 




harsher penalty for first degree manslaughter. However, the modern trend demonstrated 
in the majority of recent recodifications, is for these to be but one single manslaughter 
crime.878 
 
In American law provocation is a mitigating defence rather than a complete exculpatory 
defence. Provocation has the effect of mitigating the punishment for intentional 
homicides by reducing the crime from murder to voluntary manslaughter.879 It serves as 
an excuse, albeit a partial one.880 The central question in respect of the provocation 
defence is: when is an actor not personally accountable for being provoked to kill? The 
answer to this is that the actor is not liable for her provoked act if she could not have 
acted otherwise, that is, if she could not have avoided responding to the provocative act 
by killing her provoker.881 In order for a defendant to have her intentional killing  
 
                                               
878 LaFave Criminal Law (2003) 775. This is also the approach in the Model Penal Code ss 210.3.  
 
879 The crime of voluntary manslaughter covers other situations as well, but in some of the modern codes 
the crime is limited only to the present situation. In State v Bradford, 618 N.W. 2d 782 (Minn. 
2000), the court concluded that because “the domestic abuse murder statute evinces a legislative 
intent to increase the penalty for homicide that in some circumstances might be considered heat-of-
passion manslaughter when the homicide occurs as part of a pattern of domestic abuse,” it 
necessarily follows “that heat-of-passion manslaughter is not a lesser-included mitigating offense of 
first-degree domestic abuse murder.” Except for this reasonable emotional condition, the intentional 
killing would be murder. In Commonwealth v Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 200 A. 632 (1938), it is said: “The 
law regards with some tolerance an unlawful act impelled by a justifiably passionate heart, but has 
no toleration whatever for an unlawful act impelled by a malicious heart.” For a discussion of the 
South African defence of non-pathological incapacity which includes factors such as provocation 
and emotional stress see chapter 2 at 67-102. 
 
880 Heller supra (n 795) 22. 
 
881 Heller supra (n 795) 22. See further arguments noted by Heller at 22-23: Dressler says, “[t]he true 
reason for the law’s ‘concession to human weakness’-the reason why, if A kills P in sudden rage at 
his actions, the law will likely allow A to argue that the jury should reduce the homicide to 
manslaughter-is that the homicide is the result of an understandable and excusable loss of self-
control arising from his anger” (“When ‘Heterosexual’ Men kill ‘Homosexual’ Men: Reflections on 
Provocation Law, Sexual Advantages, and the ‘Reasonable Man’ Standard” (1995) Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 726 at 746). Furthermore, the emphasis on the actor’s “loss of self-
control” is the logical implication of the fact that that provocation is an excuse. As Fletcher states: “ 
Th[e] rationale of excuses rests on the assumption that either internal pressures... or external 
pressures...might so intrude upon the actor’s freedom of choice that the act committed under 
pressure no longer appears to be his doing. The act is attributable more to the pressure than to the 
actor’s free choice. If the act is not his, he cannot be blamed for having committed it” (“The 




reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter, the test for provocation must be met: 
(1) an objective standard (the adequacy of the provocation without a cooling-off period 
as would be found by a reasonable person); and (2) a subjective standard (the accused 
was in fact provoked and acted in response to the provocation).882 
 
4.5.2 Reasonable provocation 
What the law considers as reasonable provocation changes as society evolves.883 As a 
result of this, there may be a future trend away from the usual practice of placing the 
various types of provocatory conduct into pigeon-holes. 884  Conduct constituting 
provocative conduct includes battery, 885 mutual  
 
                                               
882 Littman supra (n 68) 1157. 
 
883 Littman ibid. See also Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions supra (n 873) for a suggestion that 
notions of what constitutes a reasonable provocation may change with the evolution of society from 
one age to the next. England followed up this suggestion by its Homicide Act of 1957, ss 3, providing 
that the jury should, in every case of a killing while actually provoked, determine whether the 
provocation was under the particular case reasonable. 
 
884 LaFave supra (n 878) 778. See also Brown v United States, 584 A.2d 537 (D.C.App.1990) discussing 
this trend. 
 
885 A light blow cannot constitute reasonable provocation. See Commonwealth v Rembiszewski, 363 
Mass. 311. 293 N.E.2d 919 (1973) (scratches on defendant’s face insufficient provocation for killing 
with deadly instrument); Commonwealth v Cisneros, 381 Pa. 447, 113 A. 2d 293 (1955). But a 
violent blow, with fist or weapon will suffice: People v Harris, 8 Ill.2d 431, 134 N.E.2d 315 (1956) 
(victim beat defendant severely with night stick); State v Ponce, 124 W.Va. 126, 19 S.E. 2d 221 
(1942) (victim hit or shoved accused into a rock pile). Even where the defendant killed in response 
to a violent blow, he may not have his homicide reduced to voluntary manslaughter if he himself by 
his prior conduct was responsible for that violent blow: Lizama v United States Parole Comm’n, 245 
F. 3d 503 (5th Cir.2001) (commission properly found that federal offence most analogous to 
defendant’s Mexican crime was second degree murder rather than voluntary manslaughter, as violent 
blow defendant received from person he killed was prompted by defendant’s attack upon a woman 
who other person then defended; State v Gaitan, 131 N.M. 758, 42 P.3d 1207 (2002) (not sufficient 
provocation here, as the defendant “intentionally and vigorously start[ed] the fracas with an 
aggravated battery”); State v Ferguson, 2 Hill (S.C.) 619, 27 Am. Dec. 412 (1835) (victim, trying to 
stop quarrel started by defendant, threw defendant against wall; defendant killed victim with knife). 
A comparison of the weapon used by the victim to inflict the blow upon the killer and the weapon 
which the latter used in retort should also be taken into account, (see Holmes v Director of Public 
Prosecutions supra (n 873). Likewise, it is relevant to consider whether the killer, in responding, 
actually intended to kill or only intended to do serious bodily harm: State v Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132 
(1868) as where a dagger is used in retaliation for a blow with a fist (Mancini v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, supra (n 704); see also State v Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J. 265, 508 A. 2d 167 
(1986) (stabbing in response to a light kick)) or five lethal slashes with a straight razor for one wifely 





combat, 886 assault, 887 illegal arrest, 888 adultery,889 injuries to third  
                                               
886 Where two people engage in mutual combat, and during the fight one kills the other as the result of 
an intention to do so formed during the struggle the homicide has long been held to be manslaughter 
(see State v Smith, 123 N.H. 46, 455 A.2d 1041 (1983); the acts which have resulted in sufficient 
provocation in mutual combat cases have generally been unlawful in themselves; “a lawful act 
cannot provide sufficient provocation”. It is not necessary that the accused have been acting out of 
passion when the fight started: State v Inger, 292 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1980)) the notion being that the 
suddenness of the occasion rather than some provocation by the victim mitigates the intentional 
killing to something less than murder. Cases of intentional killings in mutual combat are generally 
treated on the basis of provocation in batteries. It is generally accepted (even in jurisdictions 
specifically listing “sudden quarrel” as a type of provocation) that a general heat-of–passion 
instruction, unaccompanied by a separate and distinct “sudden quarrel” instruction, is sufficient 
(United States v Martinez, 988 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v McRae, 593 F. 2d 700 (5th 
Cir. 1979); State v Coop, 223 Kan. 302, 573 P. 2d 1017 (1978); Commonwealth v Peters, 372 MAA. 
319, 361 N.E.2D 1277 (1977); overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v Aponte, 391 Mass. 
494, 462 N.E.2d 284 (1984)). 
 
887 Where one attempts but fails to commit a violent battery upon another (thereby committing a criminal 
assault there is a disagreement in the cases as to whether the assault can arouse in a reasonable 
person that passion which will mitigate to manslaughter an intentional killing of the assaulter by the 
one assaulted. (CF State v Kizer, 369 Mo. 744, 230 S.W.2d 690 (1950) (victim assaulted defendant 
with axe but did not strike him; held, not a reasonable provocation), with Sikes v Commonwealth, 
304 Ky. 429, 200 S.W. 2d 956 (1947) (accused entitled to voluntary manslaughter instruction after 
testifying that defendant did not strike him but was “acting like he was going to”). The better view is 
that an attack upon the accused which was unsuccessful may constitute adequate provocation in 
extreme cases, as where the attacker fires a pistol at him (Stevenson v United States, 162 U.S. 313, 
16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1869). 
 
888 The cases are in dispute concerning the effect of an illegal arrest upon the passions of a reasonable 
person - some taking the view that such an arrest might reasonably arouse a heat of passion in him 
(see John Bad Elk v United States, 177 U.S. 529, 20 S.Ct. 729, 44 L.Ed. 874 (1900) when arrested 
person kills an arresting officer, that which might be murder if the arrest is lawful might be nothing 
more than manslaughter if the arrest is unlawful, and in some circumstances, like self-defence, might 
become crime; People v White, 333 Ill. 512, 165 N.E. 168 (1929); State v Burnett, 354 Mo. 45; 188 
S.W.2d 51 (1945); Regina v Chapman, 12 Cox Crim. Cas. 4 (1871)), others are of the view that the 
reasonable person could not so be aroused (People v Bradley, 23 Cal.App. 44, 136 P. 955 
(Dist.Ct.App.1913); Alsop v Commonwealth, 4 Ky.L.Rptr. 547 (1882)). The notion here is that a 
reasonable man would submit to the illegal arrest and then take legal means to secure his release, 
rather than resort to killing.) If an illegal arrest may be a reasonable provocation in some 
circumstances, it would seem that these circumstances should include the fact the accused knew or at 
least believed that his arrest was illegal, and perhaps that the accused knew or believed he was 
innocent of the crime for which he was arrested, since an innocent man would more reasonably be 
provoked by an illegal arrest than a guilty one. In any event, a lawful arrest cannot constitute 
sufficient provocation. See State v Madden, 61 N.J. 377, 294 .2d 609 (1972). 
 
889 A husband who discovers his wife in the act of committing adultery is reasonably provoked, so that 
when, in his passion, he intentionally kills his wife or her lover, his crime is voluntary manslaughter 
rather than murder. ( See People v McCarthy, 132 Ill.2d 331, 138 Ill.Dec. 292, 547 N.E.2d 459 
(1989) (but court notes woman had terminated her relationship with the accused two months prior to 
the homicide); Rowland v State, 83 Miss. 483, 35 So. 826 (1904) (manslaughter when husband, 
upon discovery of wife committing adultery with lover, shot at lover and, missing, killed wife); 
Gonzales v State, 546 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977) (manslaughter where husband shot lover 
found in bed with his wife). Compare Palmore v State, 253 Ala. 183, 43 So.2d 399 (1949) (husband 
killed wife, but held murder because a reasonable husband would have cooled); Reed v State, 62 
Miss. 405 (1884) (husband killed paramour, but held murder because of cooling time). See also 
Burger v State, 238 Ga. 171, 231 S.E.2d 769 (1977) (husband’s testimony that he went blank upon 
finding wife with lover not sufficient evidence his killing of them was manslaughter)). So too a wife 
may be reasonably provoked into a heat of passion upon finding her husband in the act of adultery 
with another woman (Scroggs v State, 94 Ga.App. 28, 93 S.E.2d 583 (1956) (wife killed the other 
woman)) Thus it has been held that a reasonable though erroneous belief on the part of the husband 
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persons 890 and words.891 
                                                                                                                                       
that his wife is committing adultery will do (State v Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 50 A. 37 (1901); Maher v 
People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am.Dec. 781 (1862). Compare Commonwealth v Benjamin, 369 Mass. 
770, 343 N.E.2d 402 (1976) (mere suspicion of adultery insufficient)). One case holds that the 
sudden sight of his wife’s paramour in his mother-in-law’s home might reasonably cause the 
husband, who knew his wife had been having an affair with the man to lose his ordinary self-control, 
mitigating his killing to manslaughter (People v Bridgehouse, 47 Cal.2d 406, 303 P.2d 1018 (1956)). 
The rule of mitigation does not extend beyond the marital relationship (see People v McCarthy supra 
(but court notes woman had terminated her relationship two months prior to the homicide); People v 
Pecora, 107 Ill.App 2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 865 (1969) (defendant’s ex-wife told him she had been 
intimate with other men: held, not adequate provocation even if he “had not psychologically 
disengaged himself from the marital relationship since the divorce”). This limitation seems 
questionable in cases where there existed a longstanding relationship comparable to that of husband 
and wife. But in People v McDonald, 63 Ill.App.2d 475, 212 N.E.2d 299 (1965), where the 
defendant had lived with the woman he killed for some 25 years, the court ruled it would not apply 
the “exculpatory features of crime passionel to the killing of a mistress, regardless of the duration of 
the relationship.” 
 
890 A person may be provoked by conduct which causes injury to his close relatives (People v Rice, 351 
Ill. 604, 184 N.E. 894 (1933) (evidence that victim slapped defendant’s child and later quarreled 
with the accused held to support conviction of voluntary manslaughter); State v Grugin supra (n 673) 
(father, on learning that his son-in-law had ravished his young unmarried daughter, asked son-in-law 
why he did it and received reply, “I’ll do as I damn please”; father killed son-in-law; held, a jury 
question whether this is reasonable provocation for voluntary manslaughter); State v Copling, 326 
N.J.Super. 417, 741 A.2d 624 (1999) (while “persons can be provoked by conduct that causes injury 
to a relative,” here the defendant’s mother told him his younger brother had been attacked by person 
the defendant thereafter killed, mother also said brother “was uninjured” and thus there insufficient 
provocation here); State v Jones, 299 N.C. 103, 261 S.E.2d 1 (1980) (manslaughter instruction 
required where accused shot man trying to break into house of and threatening to defendant’s mother 
and siblings); State v Flory supra (n 673) (son-in-law, on learning that the father of his wife had 
raped her, killed him; held, jury could find this to be voluntary manslaughter). It has been held that 
the rule does not extend beyond close relatives to more distant relatives and friends (State v Madden, 
61 N.J. 377, 294 A.2d 609 (1972) (police officer’s use of excessive force on another not basis for 
manslaughter verdict where, as here, the other person not a close relative of the accused); 
Commonwealth v Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 69 A. 891 (1908) (victim, in defendant’s presence, severely 
beat defendant’s friend; accused requested instruction that this was manslaughter if the attack 
aroused defendant’s passion so as to destroy his self-control held properly refused, for the 
provocation rule does not extend to friends of the defendant. See also State v Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 
574 A.2d 951 (1990) (next door neighbour with whom the accused had close relationship and then a 
love affair)). 
 
891 Words alone will suffice (People v Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 169 P. 2d 1 (1946) (violent argument) 
where the court further found it important to reconcile the two following comments upon this aspect 
of the law contained in prior opinions: “[1] Nothing is more surely calculated to arouse the blood of 
someone to a heat of passion than grievous words of reproach, yet [2] no words are sufficient 
provocation to reduce an offense from murder to manslaughter, at least if the words are 
informational (conveying information of a fact which constitutes a reasonable provocation when that 
fact is observed) rather than merely insulting or abusive words”; State v Copling supra (n 890) 
(defendant’s mother told him the victim had attacked the defendant’s younger brother); Sells v State, 
98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162 (1982); Commonwealth v Berry, 461 Pa. 233, 336 A.2d 262 (1975) 
(defendant’s mother told him she had been assaulted by man and defendant then killed him)). Thus a 
sudden confession of adultery by a wife, or information from a third person that a wife has been 
unfaithful, has sometimes been held to constitute a provocation to the husband of the same sort as if 
he had made an “ocular observation” of his wife’s adultery (Paz v State, 777 So.2d 983 
(Fla.App.2000) (murder conviction reduced to voluntary manslaughter, as accused killed victim 
when defendant’s wife indicated victim “has sexually assaulted” her); Raines v State, 247 Ga. 504, 
277 S.E.2d 47 (1981) (defendant discovered wife carrying letter to her boyfriend, she admitted and 
taunted him with her adultery); Haley v State, 123 Miss. 87, 85 So. 129 (1920) (defendant’s wife’s 
sudden confession of adultery caused accused to kill her paramour; held, conviction of voluntary 
manslaughter affirmed); State v Flory, supra (n 890) (defendant’s father-in-law raped his daughter, 
defendant’s wife; wife told the defendant about it; defendant on seeing father-in-law a day later 
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In S v Guido 892 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that “a course of ill-treatment and 
oppression which closed in upon her so completely that her own death appeared for a 
while to be the only way out” could suffice for legal provocation.893 
 
4.5.2.1 The objective test 
The excuse version of the objective standard is determinist, but it is externally, not 
internally, determinist. In this view, the only actions that should be explained 
deterministically are actions not caused by an individual’s character – actions that 
because they result from overwhelming external circumstances, represent “a limited, 
temporal distortion of the actor’s character.” 894 It does not excuse every act caused by 
honest provocation; it excuses only those provoked acts in which the provocation was  
                                                                                                                                       
killed him; held, jury could find voluntary manslaughter. Compare Speake v State, 610 So.2d 1238 
(Ala. Crim.App.1992) (“The wife’s ‘threat’ to ‘find someone else to have sex with’ is not an 
admission of past adultery,” but rather “is a threat of future misconduct that does not even imply the 
present existence of a specific paramour,” and thus “was neither so imminent nor so certain that the 
suggestion of adultery lessened the appellant’s culpability for the intentional killing”). Words have 
also been relied upon in an effort to reduce an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter when the 
accused makes a claim of homosexual panic (“premised on the theory that a person with latent 
homosexual tendencies will have an extreme and uncontrollably violent reaction when confronted 
with a homosexual proposition. However here is no agreement on whether a nonviolent homosexual 
advance should ever qualify as reasonable provocation. Court decisions have reflected that there is 
no compelling reason why these homicides should be treated any differently than other “out-of-
control” that the criminal justice system “punishe[s] less severely than ordinary intentional 
killings.”) sometimes (e.g., Broome v State, 687 N.E.2d 590 (Ind.App. 1997); Thomas v State, 174 
Ga.App. 560, 330 S.E.2d 777 (1985)) but usually not (State v Ewing, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 285, 567 
N.E.2d 1262 (1991); State v Handy, 331 N.C. 515, 419 S.E.2d 545 (1992)) resulting in a jury verdict 
of voluntary manslaughter. 
 
892 40 N.J. 191. 211, 191 A 2d. 45, 56 (1963). In this case the wife killed her husband because of 
violence or ‘the constant threat of it’ from a man who had to have his way and who would not let go 
of a woman who had her fill (at 196). 
 
893 S v Guido supra (n 892) at 210. See further Hoyt v State, 21 Wis. 2d 284 291, 128 N.W. 2d 645, 649 
(1964). A wife killed her husband after a history of psychical abuse and humiliation; it was held that 
actions over a long period of time could have cumulative effect upon an ordinary person so that the 
provocation just before the shooting would be greatly magnified. See also Commonwealth v 
Stonehouse 521 Pa. 41; 455 A.2d 772; 1989 Pa. 42 where it was held that sufficient provocation to 
support a conviction for manslaughter may be established by the cumulative impact of a series of 
related events and the ultimate test for adequate provocation remains whether a reasonable man 
confronted with a series of events, became impassioned to the extent that his mind was “incapable of 
cool reflection”, citing Commonwealth v McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 389, 292 A.2d 286, 290 (1972). 
 
894 Fletcher supra (n 544) 802. For a discussion of the test utilized in South African law for non-
pathological incapacity see chapter 2 at 67-79 supra. For a discussion of the test utilized for 




such that “an ordinary, reasonable person [would] be overcome with emotion.” 895 Thus 
in determining whether to excuse the defendant’s provoked act, the question is whether 
the act is “attributable to the actor’s character or to the circumstances that overwhelmed 
his capacity for choice.” 896  In State of New Jersey v McClain 897  it was held that 
because the test for the existence of adequate provocation is objective, the “fact that the 
defendant possesses some peculiar mental or physical characteristic, not possessed by 
the ordinary person, which caused him, in the particular case to lose her self-control is 
not relevant”. Thus the contention that the defendant was provoked by the victim’s 
conduct solely from her point as battered woman,898 as opposed to the objective view of  
 
 
                                               
895 State v Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 172 (Wis. 1983). Donovan and Wildman “Is the Reasonable Man 
Obsolete: A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation” (1981) Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review 435 at 462-467 are of the view that when this standard is strictly applied, it prevents the 
consideration of relevant circumstances particular to an individual case.  
 
896 Fletcher supra (n 544) 801. The excuse-based objective standard’s uncritical distinction between an 
individual’s character and an individual’s external circumstances is troubling. That distinction 
necessarily implies that an individual’s character does not always causally influence how she 
perceives to her external circumstances. Heller supra (n 795) is of the view that if external 
circumstances are always mediated by an individual’s knowledge structures, the excuse-based 
objective standard cannot justifiably ask, as its external determinism requires, whether a particular 
provoked act is attributable to an actor’s character or circumstances that overwhelmed his capacity 
for choice, because all provoked acts are, in some sense attributable to an actor’s character (at 40). 
Since the excuse version of the objective standard cannot be based on external determinism since it 
is philosophically incoherent, the question remains as to whether there is an alternative. For a 
discussion on such an alternative and its criticisms, see Heller supra (n 795) 39-52. 
 
897 248 N.J. Super. 409; 591 A.2d 652; 1991 N.J. Super. 182. In this case the relationship was not always 
a happy one. The discord resulted from the decedent’s tendency to have affairs and the fact that he 
had fathered a child with another woman. His conduct would cause breaks in the relationship for a 
period of time. The decedent only assaulted her twice during her relationship, once in 1977 and the 
second time three to four years prior to his death. The defendant also understood the decedent to 
imply on several occasions that he would harm her if she ever elected to terminate the relationship. 
During the week preceding his death, the decedent did not physically assault nor verbally threaten 
the defendant (at 414). In fact she perceived his conduct as being detached. When he left the house 
to go to a bar, she followed him wanting to talk to him but he ignored her and she killed him. 
 
898 Dr Kleinman the psychiatrist for the defence admitted that she was attempting to understand and 
explain the defendant’s actions from the defendant’s perception and her experience of the behaviour 
(at par [421]). It didn’t matter to Dr. Kleinman whether defendant’s perceptions were accurate or 
inaccurate, because battered women do kill at a time when they are that the moment not under any 
imminent threat, but there has been an underlying threat through the relationship. The thrust of Dr. 
Kleinman’s test was not an objective criterion of provocation but rather how battered woman would 
subjectively perceive those events and how that perception would affect the woman’s ability to act 




a reasonable person under the same circumstances, was specifically rejected. 899 
 
4.5.2.2 Subjective standards of provocation 
In the past, subjective standards of reasonableness were seldom seen in provocation 
cases. However, questions have been raised concerning the fairness of a strictly 
objective reasonable person test for determining the adequacy of the provocation. It has 
been argued that at least some individual peculiarities should be taken into account 
“because they bear upon the inference as to the actor’s character that it is fair to draw 
upon the basis of his act.” 900 As Macklem states: 
                                               
899 Ibid at para’s [10]-[11]; State v Mauricio 117 N.J. 402, 411, 568 A.2d 879 (1990) at 411. Thus in S v 
McClain supra (n 897) the Supreme Court pointed out that the defendant’s attempts to rely on S v 
Kelly supra (n 94) was wrong: “We do not meant that experts’ testimony could be used to show that 
it was understandable that a battered woman might believe that her life was in danger when indeed it 
was not and when a reasonable person would not have so believed for admission for that purposes 
would clearly violate the rules set forth in S v Bess 53 N.J 10 247 A2d 669 (1989). Expert testimony 
in that direction would be relevant solely to the honesty of defendant’s belief, not its objective 
reasonableness”. (ibid at 204) Thus the defendant’s reliance on S v Kelly supra (n 94) and S v Guido 
supra (n 892) for the proposition that evidence of prior physical abuse by the decedent may be 
sufficient to establish a finding of provocation was taken out of context. In Guido supra (n 892) there 
was evidence that the victim was actually injured on several occasions, that the decedent was a man 
who constantly threatened the defendant physically in order to get his way and that such a threat 
actually occurred within a short time preceding the victim’s death (at 195-196). In Kelly supra (n 94) 
there was evidence, although disputed, that the defendant’s husband was assaulting her and that she 
stabbed him in self-defence, fearing that he would kill her if she did not act (at 187-188). In both 
cases the physical threats or use of force were closely related in time to defendant’s actions. There is 
nothing in either Guido supra (n 892) or Kelly supra to suggest that the purely objective test for 
provocation had been abandoned. 
 
900  LaFave supra (n 878) 784.Thus, it is quite uniformly held that the defendant’s special mental 
qualities such as for example because of sunstroke or head injury (People v Golsh, 63 Cal. App. 609, 
219 P. 456 (1923) (sunstroke); State v Nevares supra (n 874) (head injury) or whether he is 
particularly excitable are not to be considered (People v Steele, 27 Cal.4th 1230, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 
432, 47 P.3d 225 (2002) (defendant’s evidence “that he suffered various mental deficiencies, that he 
had a psychological dysfunction due to traumatic experiences in the Vietnam War, and that he just 
‘snapped’ when he heard the helicopter, may have satisfied the subjective element of heat of 
passion,” but “does not satisfy the objective reasonable person requirement”; “defendant’s evidence, 
if anything, shows diminished capacity, not heat of passion,” but legislature has abolished 
diminished capacity defence); State v Bailey, 256 Kan. 872, 889 P.2d 738 (1995); State v Shepherd, 
477 N.W.2d 512 (Minn.1991); State v Little, 462 A2d 117, 118 (N.H. 1983) (defendant not entitled 
to instruction that reasonable man standard not applicable “if you find that the defendant is shown to 
have some peculiar weakness of mind or emotion not arising from wickedness of heart”); Jacobs v 
Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 586, 15 A. 465 (1888) (defendant proffered evidence that he had an 
excitable temperament held properly excluded; State v Rewolinski, 159 Wis.2d 1, 464 N.W.2d 401 
(1990)). See also People v Pecora supra (n 889) holding that the defendant’s “special traits,” 
including his “religious beliefs” and “mental disturbance,” are not to be considered. The defendant 
does not qualify for voluntary manslaughter where, because of intoxication, he easily loses his self-
control, that is to say he is to be judged by the standard of the reasonable sober man (LaFave supra 
(n 677) 784). See further Bishop v United States, passion”); Commonwealth v Knight, 37 Mass. 
App. Ct. 92, 637 N.E.2d 240 (1994); Warner v State, 56 N.J.L. 686, 29 A. 505 (Ct.Err. & App. 
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“[A]s a matter of principle, it would in my view probably be 
desirable if the existence of provocation were to be assessed 
by purely subjective standards. It seems both unfair and 
illogical to attempt to judge a defendant’s inevitable personal 
reasons for his loss of self-control in terms of the capacity for 
self-control of a hypothetical ordinary person.” 901 
 
Recent decisions such as Ferrin v People 902 indicate that courts have shown a greater 
willingness to consider subjective factors while still giving lip service to the reasonable 
person requirement. The subjective standard eliminates the objective reasonableness 
requirement completely. In Moor v Licciardello 903 it was held: 
 
“[A]ll that is relevant to the actor’s guilt is that he did honestly 
believe it was necessary to use force in his own defence.” 904 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
1894); Keenan v Commonwealth 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am.Dec. 414 (1862). For a discussion of the 
subjective test for non-pathological incapacity in South African law see chapter 2 at 64-77 supra. But 
see chapter 3 English law which vacillates between an objective and subjective test for provocation: 
129-150 supra. But see further Biship v United States 107 F.2d 297 (D.C.Cir 1939); People v 
Dooley, 944 P.2d 590 (Colo.App.1997) (rejecting defendant’s contention that the question is 
“whether another person possessing defendant’s personality traits - here, chronic mild depression 
and polysubstance abuse-would also have been provoked to act in a heat of would also have been 
provoked to act in a heat of passion”); Commonwealth v Knight, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 92, 637 N.E.2d 
240 (1994); Warner v State, 56 N.J.L. 686, 29 A. 505 (Ct.Err. & App. 1894); Keenan v 
Commonwealth 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am.Dec. 414 (1862). For a discussion of the subjective test for non-
pathological incapacity in South African law see chapter 2 at 67-79 supra. But see chapter 3 English 
law which vacillates between an objective and subjective test for provocation: 131-159 supra. 
 
901 Macklem “Provocation and the Ordinary Person” (1987) Dalhousie Law Journal 126 at 142. See also 
State v Hoyt, 128 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. 1964) urged the courts to adopt a purely subjective standard of 
provocation, because “[t]he objective, the ‘ordinarily-constituted man’ or the ‘reasonable man’ test 
leads juries and courts into inquires which are not relevant to the issue at hand. In assessing the 
manslaughter defense to a charge of a more serious homicide, we are not concerned with how most 
people would act under the circumstances of the case, nor are we concerned with what the accused 
‘ought’ to have done comparing him with the morally ideal response under the circumstances.” 
 
902 Ferrin v People supra (n 876) (held: voluntary manslaughter instruction should be given where 
psychiatric testimony was that 15-year-old accused killed younger brother because of “pent-up” 
anger and emotion” from being depantsed by playmates, from being teased by brother and others 
about losing on pinball machine and failing in school, and from actions of superiority by younger 
brother). 
 
903 463 A. 2d 268, 272 (1983). 
 
904 Ibid at 272. For a definition of the particularizing standard which is utilized both in the law of self-




The extent to which to which American courts have particularized the objective 
standard has varied. Characteristics that have been utilized include battered woman 
syndrome 905 and specific cultural background.906  
                                               
905 For an example of a jury instruction in a typical provocation case, see, e.g., State v Felton supra (n 
895) (“[T]he question is how an ordinary person faced with a similar provocation would react. The 
provocation can consist, as it did here, of a long history of abuse. It is proper in applying the 
objective test, therefore, to consider how other persons similarly situated with respect to that 
type...of provocation would react.”). Rosen supra (n 21) at 43 states: “The defence relies on 
persuading the jury that the defendant suffered from an identifiable psychological syndrome that 
caused her to assess the dangerousness of the situation in a different manner than an average, 
ordinary person including a woman who does not suffer from battered woman syndrome.” Dressler  
supra (n 680) at 752: “[A woman who suffers from battered woman syndrome] is so psychologically 
beaten down by her partner that she is emotionally paralyzed and, therefore does not perceive her 
world as an ordinary, non- battered woman (or battered woman not suffering from the syndrome) 
would view it. In a sense, a ‘reasonable woman suffering from battered woman syndrome’ is a 
‘reasonable unreasonable person.’” However, see a comparable case of People v Knee 2002 Cal. 
App (unpublished). One of the issues on appeal was whether the court was correct in allowing the 
prosecutions instruction that prevented the jury from considering the defendant’s character, in 
particular his sexuality in its assessment of sufficiency of provocation. The defence acknowledged 
that the objective standard is that of a reasonable person, not the reasonable homosexual or bisexual 
person (People v Washington (1976) 58 Cal. App. 3d 620, 625-626). Furthermore, the defendant 
relied heavily on the case of People v Humphrey supra (n 809). While this case involved self-
defence ie jury could consider defendant’s evidence as to whether defendant subjectively believed 
she needed to kill in self-defence, the jury was not instructed that it could consider this evidence in 
determining whether her subjective belief was also objectively reasonable (at 1084). The court 
clearly stated that their holding did not encompass the other situation namely that we are not 
changing the standard from objective to subjective or replacing reasonable person with the 
reasonable battered woman’s standard. The Evidence Code section 1107 is a rule of evidence only 
and makes no substantive change to the law (at 1087). Thus the court in Knee supra went on to state 
that there is a qualitative difference between a claim of self-defence and a claim of heat of passion. 
Thus in Humphreys supra (n 809) the defendant asserted self-defence under the Penal Code section 
197 of justifiable homicide and the evidence of BWS went to the issue of not only her belief in the 
need to kill but also as to whether that belief was reasonable under the circumstances. In that respect 
the Evidence Code section 12107 specifically allows for introduction of BWS evidence (at par [24]-
[26]). In this respect the quotation in People v Humphreys supra (n 809) at n 695 appears to be taken 
out of context. 
 
906 See People v Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d 998, 999 (N.Y. 1986) (finding expert testimony that “under 
Laotian culture the conduct of the victim wife in displaying affection for another man and receiving 
phone calls from an unattached man brought shame on accused and his family sufficient to trigger 
defendant’s loss of control” and was relevant to defendant’s provocation defence); People v Wu, 286 
Cal. Rptr. 868, 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that, in assessing defendant’s claim that “pre-
existing stress” provoked her to kill her son Sidney, “[t]he testimony related to defendant’s cultural 
background was relevant to explain the source of such stress, as well to explain how Sidney’s 
statements could have constituted ‘sufficient provocation’ to cause accused to kill Sidney in a ‘heat 
of passion’”). Another version of the particularizing standard is that of a cultural defence. The 
motivation underlying the affirmative defence position is that current criminal law defences fail to 
meet the needs of cultural defendants because the law does not reflect the social and moral norms to 
which they are accustomed. This would provide judicial fairness and prevent the majority culture 
from using the justice system to overpower and suppress a different culture or group (Chui “Beyond 
Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism” (1994) California Law Review 1053 at 1098). The 
question now arises as to how the law is to assess the liability of an individual who not only suffers 
from battered woman syndrome but also comes from another culture. Moore raises this issue: 
“While battered women in general must overcome myths involving psychological disabilities and 
images of victimization, African-American women for example must overcome stereotypes which 
are far more onerous. Specifically, African-American women are viewed as angry, masculine, 
domineering, strong and sexually permissive, characteristics which do not denote ‘victim’” (Moore 
“Battered Women Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to Support the Substance” (1995) Howard Law 
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4.5.2.3 Model Penal Code 
The American Law Institute (ALI), the author of the MPC, recognized the limitations 
of the common-law formulation of voluntary manslaughter. The ALI criticized the 
common law as “substantially deficient for failing to confront the major policy 
questions posed by the offense”.907 Furthermore, the ALI found the common law to be 
underdeveloped, claiming that the defence existed in only the “barest skeletal 
delineation.” 908   Miller has noted that “the ALI sought to unpack the elements of 
voluntary manslaughter and to rebuild a defence with solid public policy and doctrinal 
foundations”.909 The first innovation of the ALI releases voluntary manslaughter from 
the confinement of the “nineteenth century four,” eliminating the rigid rules that have 
developed with regard to the sufficiency of particular types of provocation. In place of 
the narrowly defined touchstone of “adequate provocation,” the ALI has broadened the 
applicability of voluntary manslaughter by utilizing extreme “emotional 
disturbance”.910  
                                                                                                                                       
Journal 297 at 302). For an in-depth discussion of the consequences of accepting such a cultural 
defence see further Sacks “An Indefensible Defense; On the Misuse of Culture in Criminal Law” 
(1996) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 523 at 545-546; Volp 
“(Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the ‘Cultural defense” (1994) Harvard Women’s Law 
Journal 57 at 57-58; Unikel “Reasonable Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in 
American Jurisprudence” (1992) North Western University Law Review 326 at 355). 
 
907 MPC and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1982) s 210.3. cmt. 2.  
 
908 Ibid. The ALI further indicated that the “skeletal delineation” of voluntary manslaughter statutes 
varied significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Miller supra (n 61) at n 74 notes that “one of the 
central goals of the MPC was to bring coherence, if not uniformity, to criminal law, and to put the 
house of penal jurisprudence into some kind of rational order.”  
 
909 Miller supra (n 61) at 674, discussing the MPC 210.3 cmt. 5(a). Since the Model Code did not 
recognize diminished responsibility as a partial defence, the drafters were prepared to accept a 
“substantial enlargement” (at 50) of the traditional plea of provocation, which would relax the “rigid 
objectivity of the common law doctrine” (at 72) and allow personal characteristics to be taken into 
account in applying the plea.  
 
910 Kirschener, Litwack and Galperin “Multiple Cases with a Policy and Program focus: The Defense of 
Extreme Emotional Disturbance: A Qualitative Analysis of Cases in New York County” (2004) 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 102 at 104. As stated in the MPC: “provocation has been a 
predominantly objective determination. It focuses on circumstances that would so move an ordinary 
person to kill that the defendant’s act of succumbing to that temptation, although culpable, does not 
warrant conviction for murder. It seeks to identify causes of intentional homicide where the situation 




The ALI was cautious: the extreme emotional disturbance (EED) had to be caused by a 
“reasonable explanation or excuse.” 911 Such a qualification would provide the outer 
parameter of the voluntary manslaughter defence and would theoretically prevent abuse 
of the doctrine. The ALI turned its attention to the parameters of a “reasonable 
explanation,” creating the second major innovation in the voluntary manslaughter 
doctrine. The ALI created a balance of objective and subjective factors for the jury to 
consider in determining whether the homicide should qualify as a heat of passion 
defence. The Model Penal Code went on to note that: 
 
“The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s 
situation under the circumstances as the actor believed them to 
be.” 912 
 
While perceptions do not have to be objectively reasonable in terms of the MPC 
standard; reactions to perceptions are still required to be reasonably objectively 
assessed. 913  The objective element of the inquiry remains fundamental, while the 
subjective element allows the jury to consider the individual defendant’s perceptions of  
 
                                               
911 MPC 210.3(1)(b) (1962). 
 
912 MPC ss 210.3(1)(b) 1980. Examples of provocation cases using the MPC standard include People v 
Cassassa, 404 N.E. 2d 1310, 1316 (N.Y) (1981): “[T]he determination whether there was reasonable 
explanation or excuse for particular emotional disturbance should be made by viewing the subjective 
internal situation in which the defendant found himself and the external circumstances as he 
perceived them at the time, however, inaccurate that perception may have been and assessing from 
that standpoint whether the explanation or excuse for his emotional disturbance was reasonable”.. 
See also State v Ortiz, 588 A.2d 127, 130 (Conn. 1991): “[T]he determination of whether there was a 
reasonable explanation or excuse for defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance... [is] to be made 
from the viewpoint of ‘a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant 
believed them to be”. 
 
913 While the language of the MPC avoids explicit sex bias of common law, it may have reinforced 
sexist norms. Nourse supra (n 60) has articulated the nature of the problem: “when they declined to 
judge the adequacy of provocation [the members of the ALI] rejected an approach that bestowed 
privileges on certain relationships. But getting rid of the categories, and forcing normative 
judgments on juries, did not prevent courts from deciding normative questions. It simply disguised 
these judgments by changing the ways we argued about them” (at 1379). Nourse goes on to state that 
it is more difficult to detect and correct procedures expressed in application rather than in the 




the circumstances.914 Miller notes that since “the special situation of the actor then 
becomes relevant but ‘idiosyncratic moral values’ should not play a part in the 
decisional calculus”. 915  In respect of the battered woman the MPC formulation of 
voluntary manslaughter does not require that her violent reaction be an immediate one. 
The result is that prolonged tension can serve as a reason for the defendant’s emotional 
disturbance.916 
 
Kirschener et al notes that the authors of the MPC, in formulating the EED defence, 
wanted to avoid the problems that were perceived to exist with both the provocation 
and diminished responsibility defences, at least in their extreme forms, while still 
recognizing that certain manifestations of provocation and diminished responsibility 
justified mitigating the punishment for homicide. As the Commentaries to the MPC 
notes: 
 
“The doctrine of diminished responsibility... has its cost. By 
evaluating the abnormal individual on his own terms, it 
decreases the incentive for him to behave as if he was normal.  
 
                                               
914 Thus virtually any reaction to any stimulus may be considered in an extreme emotional disturbance 
(EED) jurisdiction. For example, courts have allowed voluntary manslaughter instructions where the 
defendant was distressed about a restraining order that prohibited him from seeing his wife (Perry v 
Commonwealth, 839 S.W. 2d 268, 269 (Ky. 1992); and where a defendant was upset that his wife 
wanted to continue living separately (State v Little supra (n 900). However not every defendant 
receives an EED instruction. For example, a husband who killed his wife because she asked for a 
divorce did not receive the instruction (People v Patterson, 347 N.E. 2d. 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976). 
Courts have been reluctant to put a finger on the reason some defendants receive an EED instruction 
and others not. In the words of the Kentucky Supreme Court, “We find it unnecessary to define 
extreme emotional disturbance. It is sufficient [sic] to say that we know it when we see it” (Edmunds 
v Commonwealth, 586 S.W. 2d 24, 27 (Ky. 1979)). As Miller supra (n 61) at 674 suggests perhaps 
the reason for the distinction lies in whether the jury finds the defendant’s emotional disturbance was 
reasonable. This leads to a problem: juries have difficulties in understanding the ALI’s intended 
balance between objective and subjective enquiries into a defendant’s perception of alleged affront. 
Thus juries are asked to walk a line so fine it may be nonexistent. They must exercise independent 
moral judgment and at the same time adopt the defendant’s vantage point.  
 
915 Littman supra (n 68) at 1162, discussing MPC ss 210.3 cmt. 5(a).  
 
916 See for example People v Patterson, supra (n 914) where New York Court of Appeals explained: “It 
is sufficient that a significant mental trauma has affected a defendant’s mind for a substantial period 




It blurs the law’s message that there are certain minimal 
standards of conduct to which every member of society must 
conform...In short, diminished responsibility brings formal 
guilt more closely into line with moral blameworthiness, but 
only at the cost of driving a wedge between dangerousness 
and social control.” 917 
 
4.6 Actual Provocation 
The question remains whether the accused was in fact provoked by the victim’s 
conduct. If she is of cooler temperament than the reasonable person, and thus was not 
actually provoked, she is to be found guilty of murder.918 
 
4.7 Reasonable time to cool off 
If the victim’s conduct not only provokes, but reasonably provokes the defendant into a 
passion which robs her of her normal capacity for self-control, there still remains a  
 
                                               
917 Kirschener, Litwack and Galperin supra (n 910) at 103, discussing MPC (1980) p 71-72. Dressler 
supra (n 58) is of the view that: “The drafters of the MPC by allowing any reaction to any stimulus 
being considered have brought the defences of provocation and diminished capacity under one 
umbrella. Provocation deals with the emotions and actions of ordinary person, whereas diminished 
capacity relates to the thinking processes and actions of unordinary persons. Provocation deals with 
ordinary human weakness, while diminished capacity focuses on special weakness, or illnesses and 
pathologies” (at 459-460). For a discussion of the implication of a move toward a generic mitigation 
defence see Dressler supra (n 58) at 985-989. 
 
918 People v Gingell, 211 Cal. 53, 296 P. 70 (1931) (defendant, suspecting wife of adultery, decided to 
kill her, then found her in bed with paramour, then killed them both; held, murder, not 
manslaughter); People v Pouncey, 437 Mich. 382, 471 N.W.2d 346 (1991) (defendant’s testimony 
“he was not angry” a bar to voluntary manslaughter instruction); State v Merrill, 428 N.W.2d 361 
(Minn. 1988) (where the defendant only provoked into robbery of person he believed had raped his 
girlfriend and, in course of robbery, other robber killed that person, accused not entitled to 
manslaughter instruction); State v Robinson supra (n 876) (defendant, struck violently by victim, got 
a gun and stalked victim in a methodical and cold-blooded way; since there was nothing in 
defendant’s movements to indicate any heat of passion, defendant held not entitled to manslaughter 
instruction); State v Agnesi, 92 N.J.L. 53, 104 A. 299 (Sup.Ct.1918) (defendant, knowing of his 
wife’s adulterous relations with paramour, armed self with deadly weapon and went seeking the 
paramour, hoping to find him in the act, when he did, he killed paramour, held murder, not 
manslaughter); Fossett v State, 41 Tex.Crim. 400, 55 S.W. 497 (1900) (victim insulted defendant 
wife, which led to a fight in which defendant killed victim; instruction that it is manslaughter if 
defendant was so angered as to be incapable of cool reflection, but murder if he was capable, held 
proper; conviction of murder affirmed); Davidson v Commonwealth; 167 Va. 451, 187 S.E. 437 
(1936) (defendant, struck violently by victim, chased and stabbed him to death, then told a friend 
“take my knife, I used it on him, and believe me, by God, I used it”; defendant testified that he acted 
in self-defence and was not thrown into a passion by the blow he received; conviction of murder 
held affirmed; this case indicates that one who claims he killed in self-defence and loses cannot well 
succeed in showing that he killed in a transport of passion). For a discussion of this requirement in 




problem of reasonable time for the passion to cool whenever there is a time gap 
between the provocative act and the infliction of the fatal wound. According to the 
majority view, a provoked defendant cannot have her homicide reduced to voluntary 
manslaughter where the time elapsing between the provocation and the death is such 
that a reasonable person so provoked would have cooled, 919 and this is the case even 
although the defendant, who is slower to cool off than the normal person, has not in fact 
cooled off by the time she delivers the lethal blow.920 In People v Aris 921 the defendant 
asserted that in this case the fear built over a long period of time and therefore could to 
be subject to “a cooling off” period. However, the court was of the view that this 
characteristic of the case ignores the fact of the victim’s assault upon and threats to the 
defendant before victim fell asleep. Certainly it cannot be the position of the defendant 
that the assault and threats did not add to underlying fear she had of victim which had 
grown over the years. It proves too much to say that defendant’s underlying fear alone 
was sufficient to justify the killing, if that were so the defendant could have shot her 
husband to death at any time and not be guilty. A reasonable inference from the facts is 
that the defendant experienced a peak of fear while she was beaten and threatened  
                                               
919 LaFave supra (n 878) 786. 
 
920 Ibid. See Sheppard v State, 243 Ala. 498, 10 So.2d 822 (1942) (husband learned of wife’s adultery, 
several days later killed her; held, conviction of first-degree murder affirmed; LaLonde v State, 614 
P.2d 808 (Alaska 1980) (even if the defendant had not cooled, no manslaughter here because 
reasonable person would have cooled in the passage of several hours); State v Follin, 263 Kan. 28, 
947 P.2d 8 (1997) (not voluntary manslaughter even if defendant still in heat of passion, as interval 
of 10 hours meant “more time intervened between the provocation and the killing than it would have 
taken an ordinary person to regain reason”). 
 
921 215 Cal. App 3d 1178, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167. 1989 Cal. App 1187. In this case the defendant testified 
that her husband had beaten her, often severely and that she had left him many times during their 10 
year relationship. By a mixture of threats and cajoling, the decedent invariably convinced the 
accused to take him back. On the night of the killing, the defendant testified that her husband beat 
her and threatened her that he didn’t think he was going to let her live till morning. The defendant 
believed that he was very serious. She waited about 10 minutes to make sure he was asleep; she went 
next door to get ice to ease the pain of blows to her face. She found a handgun on top of refrigerator 
and took it for protection. She testified she thought she needed it for protection because she felt that 
when she went back... he would probably be awake and would start hitting her again. Walking back 
to her house she was thinking that she was tired of it and had had it. She denied intending to kill her 
husband at that time. When she returned to bed she sat down and felt that she had to do it. It would 
be worse when he woke up. She felt that he was going to hurt her badly or even kill her and she shot 




which must have subsided somewhat after the assaults and threats ended.922 Therefore, 
while a lag in time could indicate that the defendant had time to cool and that he/she 
acted with intention, in Fennel v Goolsby and AG of State of Pennsylvania, District, 
Attorney of Montgomery County 923 the court held that while intent was an element of 
murder in the first degree and did not exclude intent from the definition of voluntary 
manslaughter, the court distinguished the two in the following manner: “It is a sudden 
and intense passion provoked by the victim which negates the malice required in 
murder and reduces the crime to voluntary manslaughter”.924 
 
The minority view eliminates the reasonable-time test, submitting that if there is 
reasonable and actual provocation, the defendant’s crime is manslaughter, if, because of 
his peculiar temperament, he has not cooled off, though a reasonable person’s passion  
 
                                               
922 People v Aris supra (n 921) at 183. The court concluded by saying that while the instruction about 
“cooling off” was necessary to direct the jury’s attention to the issue of whether fear was attributable 
to the last round of beatings and threats and subsided by time defendant returned with the gun, the 
jury could be expected to understand that the cumulative fear could not have subsided during any 
“cooling off” period because it had not been produced by provocation that preceded the cooling off 
period (at 1203). See also Spinks v Money 1995 U.S. App. 16581. In this case the defendant was 
involved in abusive relationship with Williams from June 1987 till January 1989. On the day the day 
of the murder, the decedent accused the defendant of seeing another man and threatened to bang her 
head on the pavement until she was dead (at 686). The victim then struck her several times and she 
stabbed him with a knife she purchased at a drug store after the altercation, killing him. Jones J. 
wrote in a separate opinion that he challenged the premise that a few minutes is a sufficient cooling 
period to abate fears, passions and emotional stress that are often reacted by sustained involvement 
in an abusive relationship. He went on to state that there is mounting evidence that battered woman 
often react to cumulative passion built from past experiences of abuse when they kill their partners. 
(quoting Taylor “Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat of Passion Manslaughter 
and Imperfect Self-Defense” (1986) University of California Law Review 1679 at 1682). 
 
923 630 I. Supp, 451, 1958 U. S Dist 164 35. The defendant testified that during the last 3-4 years of 
marriage the abuse both physical and mental was almost constant. The decedent had a severe 
drinking problem and when drinking he became extremely violent and abusive. He threatened her 
verbally, pushed kicked, punched and tired to choke her, She claimed her husband often coerced 
sexual relations with her while drinking and stated that her husband did not allow her to sleep at 
night and often left to sleep in her daughter’s room, couch or bathtub. She claimed he frequently 
would not let her leave the house. She was eventually removed by the Pennsylvania Protection from 
Abuse Act but on her return, he phoned several hundred times a day. On the day the defendant killed 
her husband she drove her car to the service station where her husband was parked and struck his car 
while he was still in the car, she backed up and did it again and when he attempted to escape on foot 
she struck him down several times.  
 
924 Fennel v Goolsby and AG of State of Pennsylvania, District, Attorney of Montgomery County supra 




would have subsided.925  
 
What constitutes a reasonable cooling time will depend on the nature of the provocation 
and the circumstances surrounding its occurrence,926 a matter to be determined by the 
jury as a question of fact,927 unless the time is too short or so long that the court may 
hold that, as a matter of law, it was reasonable or unreasonable.928 
 
Sometimes it can occur that there is a considerable time lapse between the victim’s act 
of provocation and the defendant’s fatal conduct - enough time for the passion to 
subside. In the meantime an event occurs which rekindles the defendant’s passion. If  
 
                                               
925 Lafave supra (n 878) 786; State v Hazlett, supra (n 803) (the question of whether there was sufficient 
cooling time for the passion to subside and reason to resume its sway, should be governed, not by the 
standard of an ideal reasonable man” but rather “from the standpoint of the defendant in the light of 
all the facts and circumstances”; conviction of murder held reversed because of instruction on 
manslaughter requiring for cooling time the time in which an ordinary man in like circumstances 
would have cooled); State v McCants, 1 Speers 384 (S.C.App. 1843) (defendant, beaten by victim in 
a fight, thereafter killed him and was convicted of murder, conviction held affirmed; fact that 
defendant cooled off slowly because intoxicated irrelevant; dictum that, in determining reasonable 
cooling time, not only the nature of the provocation,  but also “the prisoner’s physical and mental 
constitution, his condition in life and peculiar situation at the time of the affair, his education and 
habits,” among other things, may be considered); Davis v State, 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W.2d 993 (1930) 
(defendant’s insane delusion that the victim had committed adultery with the defendant’s wife 
prevented defendant from cooling off; conviction of murder held reversed). LaFave supra (n 878) is 
of the view that in principle, if a reasonable person standard (without regard to the defendant’s 
mental and physical peculiarities) is required for provocation the same standard is equally applicable 
for cooling off purposes (at 786 n 92). 
 
926 People v Harris supra (n 885) (“what constitutes a sufficient ‘cooling-off period’ depends upon the 
extent to which the passions have been aroused and the nature of the act which caused the 
provocation and, for that reason, no yardstick of time can be used by the court to measure a 
reasonable period of passion but it must vary as do the facts of every case”); State v Mauricio, supra 
(n 899). 
 
927 LaFave supra (n 878) 787. In a few jurisdictions, however, reasonable cooling time is held to be a 
matter of law for the court to decide, e.g., Brewer v State supra (n 788). 
 
928 State v Ramirez, 116 Ariz. 259, 569 P.2d 201 (1977) (denial of manslaughter instruction proper 
where over four and a half hours passed since defendant’s learned of wife’s adultery and his action 
in interim showed cool state of mind); People v Pouncey, 437 Mich. 382, 471 N.W.2d 346 (1991) 
(sufficient “cooling time” as matter of law, and this time briefly included going to “a safe harbor” 
and then “deliberate and reasoned act” of retrieving a gun); In re Fraley, supra (n 876) (victim shot 
and killed defendant’s son; as a matter of law passion would cool in several months); State v 
Williford, 103 Wis.2d 98, 307 N.W. 2d 277 (1981) (no manslaughter instruction necessary where 




this new occurrence is such as to trigger the passion of a reasonable person,929 the 
cooling-off period should then start with a new occurrence 930 - a fact which the cases 
have not always recognized. 
 
The typical heat-of-passion manslaughter case is that in which one specific incident 
immediately produces a rage in the defendant. This could account for the fact that 
modern codes usually state that the defendant’s passion must be “sudden.” 931 However, 
a more realistic appraisal of how human emotions work compels the conclusion - which 
some courts have reached such as in People v Berry 932 that a reasonable provocation 
can be produced by a series of events occurring over a considerable period of time. 
When this is the case, the measurement of the cooling time as was held in People v 
Borchers 933 should commence with the occurrence of the last provocative  
                                               
929 LaFave supra (n 878) 787. An event which, standing alone, would not suffice to act as such a trigger 
may nonetheless suffice to rekindle an earlier passion. See, e.g., People v Berry, 18 Cal.3d 509, 134 
Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777 (1976) (only event immediately before killing was wife’s screaming, 
which was sufficient to rekindle passion regarding her earlier confession of adultery). 
 
930 LaFave supra (n 878) 787; State v Flory supra (n 874) (victim, who was defendant’s father-in-law 
raped the defendant’s wife; when accused learned of it, he was in a reasonable passion, but he cooled 
off; next day he saw victim, who told him “I will keep the girl”; defendant killed victim; murder 
conviction held reversed, for  jury is to determined reasonable cooling time; here “a situation to 
determine reasonable cooling time; here “a situation arose by which past facts were clearly 
recalled.”)  
 
931 Lafave supra (n 878) 787. See for e.g., State v Gounagias, 88 Wash. 304, 153 P. 9 (1915) In this case 
the victim committed sodomy on accused. Later the defendant’s acquaintances ridiculed the 
defendant and subjected him to insulting words and gestures. Later that day, when the accused 
entered a coffee house, the ten men present began to make suggestive remarks and gestures, which 
caused defendant to rush off and kill the victim. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder 
and this was affirmed. The court held that the aforementioned evidence was inadmissible to reduce 
the homicide to voluntary manslaughter). In re Fraley supra (n 876) defendant, who killed victim 
who had several months earlier killed defendant’s son, argued without success, which, upon seeing 
the victim, the recollection of old wrong engendered in the defendant a new passion which 
overwhelmed him. But consider further Whitsett v State, 201 Tenn. 317, 299 S.W.2d 2 (1957), 
where sudden sight of the author of the wrongs to the defendant without words, seems to have 
reasonably rekindled the passions of the accused against his wife’s paramour. 
 
932 People v Berry supra (n 929). 
 
933  18 Cal. 3d 509, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777 (1976) (defendant’s rage produced by an 
“accumulative series of provocations” from July 13 to July 26, during which time his wife 
“continually provoked defendant with sexual taunts and incitements, alternating acceptance and 






4.8 Actual cooling off 
If the defendant has been reasonably provoked, and was actually provoked and a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have cooled off, the defendant 
cannot have her homicide reduced to voluntary manslaughter if, because her passions 
subside more quickly than those of the ordinary person, she has actually cooled off by 
the time she commits his deadly act.935 
 
4.9 Mistake as to provocation 
Mistake in provocation occurs where a defendant intentionally kills another in a 
reasonable, but erroneous, belief that the victim has injured him, for example where the 
defendant is of the opinion that his wife is committing adultery, when she is not. It 
would seem that the provocation is adequate to reduce the homicide to voluntary 
manslaughter if the defendant reasonably believes that the injury to him exists, although 




                                               
934 LaFave supra (n 878) 787; Ferrin v People, supra (n 876). Taylor supra (n 922) is of the view that the 
prevalence of female victims and male defendants in cumulative rage cases suggests that cumulative 
terror and cumulative rage are new provocation defenses whose use to date excuses different kinds 
of conduct and operates in different ways for different defendants. Cumulative terror should serve as 
an emotion adequate for heat of passion manslaughter and cumulative rage should not as in case of 
Berry supra (n 728) and Borchers supra (n 933). Affronts to dignity and sexual pride should be 
coped with over time. The common pattern of violence against women by their male intimates 
demonstrated that earlier trivial episodes of physical violence are reliable predictors of future 
violence and that the violence is likely to escalate until it becomes life threatening (at 1719). 
 
935 LaFave supra (n 878) 787. 
 







The concept of reasonableness has played a central role in cases of self-defence and 
provocation. The defendant could successfully rely on self-defence only if a 
“reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances would have perceived self-defence 
as necessary.” 938  A claim of provocation would only be successful only if the 
provocative act was such that “an ordinary, reasonable person [would] be overcome 
with emotion.” 939 Therefore, a defendant who committed a reasonable self-defensive 
act would be entitled to an acquittal, whereas a defendant who committed a provoked 
act in response to reasonable provocation is guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of 
murder.940 
 
The doctrines of self-defence and provocation, despite having their common emphasis 
on reasonableness, have failed to answer the critical question: who is the reasonable 
person? Heller poses the question: “is the reasonable person simply everyman, an 
individual without race class, gender or any other non-universal characteristics? Or is 
the reasonable person someone who resembles the defendant herself, possessing some 
or all of the defendant’s characteristics.” 941  These questions have important 
implications for self-defence and provocation since the test utilized by the different 
states will have an impact on every element of the defence relied on by the accused and 
subsequently will ultimately impact on the defendant’s liability.  
 
 
                                               
938 State v Stewart supra (n 794) 579. For a full discussion of the objective test of self-defence see 179-
180. 
 
939 S v Felton supra (n 895) 172. For a full discussion of the objective test of provocation, see 211-213. 
 
940 Heller supra (n 795) 3-4. 
 




The current trend in American courts is to adopt a purely objective standard of 
reasonableness in both self-defence 942  and provocation cases. 943  In such cases 
nonuniversal personal characteristics of the defendant cannot be imputed to the 
reasonable person. Such a position is rooted in the belief that subjective standards of 
reasonableness are antithetical to the fundamental principle of criminal law, that the law 
should be based on generally accepted standards of conduct applicable to all people. 
Since individuals necessarily differ in their personal characteristics, by definition a 
standard of reasonableness that takes such characteristics into account cannot apply an 
invariant standard.944  
 
It should be noted that despite the tension between the subjective standards of 
reasonableness, and the criminal law’s desire for general standards of conduct has not 
prevented courts from using subjective standards in both self-defence 945  and 
provocation cases.946 It would appear that in these cases the courts have come to accept 
that the formal neutrality of the objective standard is systematically biased against the 
self-defence and provocation claims of individuals from groups which lack “significant  
                                               
942
 Heller supra (n 795) at 109-119 notes that 30 American states have adopted this standard. 
 
943 Heller supra (n 795) 109-119 notes that 41 American states have adopted an objective test for 
provocation. However states such as New Jersey and Pennsylvania have vacillated between the 
objective standard and the particularizing standard. 
 
944 Heller supra (n 795) 4. 
 
945 Heller supra (n 795) 109-119 notes that only 4 states make use of the subjective test for self-defence. 
These include Delaware; Kentucky; North Dakota and Ohio. 13 States make use of the Model Penal 
Code standard. It should, however be noted that certain states have vacillated between the objective 
test and the particularizing standard. These include Alabama; Florida and Georgia; Kansas; 
Louisiana; Maine; Massachusetts; Minnesota; New Jersey; New Mexico; Oklahoma; New York; 
Rhode Island; South Carolina; South Dakota and Texas. 6 States have made use of both the Model 
Penal Code and the particularizing standard such as California; D.C; Maryland; Missouri; 
Pennsylvania; Texas and Vermont. Furthermore, it should be noted that some states make use of 
three standards of reasonableness: the objective test, the Model Penal Code and the particularizing 
standard. These states include Michigan; New York and Washington. 
 
946 Heller supra (n 795) 109-119 notes that in the case of provocation only 7 states make use of the 
Model Penal Code standard, whereas 2 states notably New Jersey and Pennsylvania make use of 




economic, political and social power in American society, particularly women, the poor 
and non-whites.947 
 
The courts now allow juries to consider a variety of the defendant’s personal 
characteristics when determining the objective reasonableness of her self-defensive or 
provoked act. Various courts have allowed evidence of battered woman syndrome 948 
and gender-specific responses.949 However, such a development in the law has not been 
without problems. Use of battered woman syndrome to support a claim of self-defence 
transforms the standard from an objective to a subjective standard, in most cases 
defeating both the deliberate statutory enactment and the underlying purposes of the 
narrow self-defence doctrine itself. 950  Beyond circumventing the statutory 
requirements in the overwhelming majority of states, the use of a subjective standard 
unacceptably expands the doctrine of self-defence. Such an expansion would infringe 
on the premise of the criminal law system that the preservation of life is an important 
value and that the taking a life will be exempt from criminality and punishment only in 
a narrow, societal-determined set of circumstances.951 Furthermore, consideration of the 
fact that a particular defendant suffered from a psychological defect such as battered 
woman syndrome is inconsistent with the theoretical framework of justification. A 
claim of justification must always be grounded in the value of the act itself, rather than 
in the characteristics of the actor.952 It should however, be noted that while expert  
                                               
947 Heller supra (n 795) 4. 
 
948 For a discussion of the particularizing standard in self-defence, see 182-184. For a discussion of the 
impact that battered woman syndrome testimony has on the provocation defence see 181-182. 
 
949 See for e.g.; the case of State v Wanrow supra (94) at 558. 
 
950 Goldman supra (n 67) 197. 
 
951 Goldman supra (n 67) 203. 
 




testimony concerning battered woman syndrome to support legal self-defence is 
unacceptable in nonconfrontational killings, it is nonetheless highly relevant to the laws 
treatment of these killings. The fact that the killing is not self-defence does not mean 
that it is punishable as murder. In nonconfrontational killings, the proper focus of 
battered woman syndrome testimony should be on the history of abuse and its resultant 
psychological effects on the defendant as either a total or partial excuse for the 
killing.953 Therefore the most obvious foundation for a subjective psychologically based 
excuse is the provocation defence, where the defendant would be convicted of a crime 
















                                               
953 Goldman supra (n 67) 218. 
 





Analysis of the defences available in South Africa to Battered 
Women who kill their abusers  
In this section it is proposed to examine, firstly whether a coherent rationale exists for 
the criminalization of the conduct which exceeds self-defence and secondly, the utility 
and functioning of the elements of the self-defence. The analysis will finally encompass 
an assessment of the findings in the context of suggested alternative models for the 
criminalization of the conduct included in the present justification ground. Despite the 
well-established nature of the defence of non-pathological incapacity, South African 
law has been thrown into flux by various decisions of the court which have constituted 
a serious erosion of the notion of criminal capacity with concomitant ripple effects on 
other topics.955 Furthermore, since the traditional rules relating to this defence do not 
adequately cater for the battered woman’s situation, the elements and functioning of the 
defence will be subject to critical examination, with the findings evaluated in the 
context of alternative models to establish which form the defence should take. 
 
5.  Analysis of the justification ground of self-defence 
5.1 Rationales of the defence  
The killing of another person and specifically intentional homicide (murder) 956 is  
 
                                               
955 See for example the case of S v Eadie supra (n 360) in chapter 2 supra at 77-92. 
 
956 The structure of the South African law of homicide has been derived from two traditions. Roman law 
(and less obviously Roman-Dutch law) is structured on the premises that only intentional killing is 
unlawful. On this approach the distinction between dolus and culpa is vitally important, since it 
distinguishes murder. English law, on the other hand had as its central premise the proposition that 
all homicides, whether intentional or unintentional, were unlawful. Such an approach attaches only 
slight significance to the distinction between dolus and culpa since that distinction does not express 
the differences in English law between murder and manslaughter. After a lengthy flirtation with 
English Law structure, South African law has now firmly opted for the Romanistic form, by 






universally regarded as the most serious crime meriting punishment.957 This in part is 
due to the fact that “human life is considered a unique kind of good because it is a 
necessary condition for the enjoyment of all other goods”. 958 It is also the result of the 
consequence of the Judeo-Christian concept of the sanctity of human life which forbids 
the taking of a life by another person.959 
 
Notwithstanding the respect for the sanctity of human life, certain types of intentional 
killing are not considered unlawful and therefore not punished as murder. In accordance 
with other Western legal systems, South African law has recognized that killing in self-
defence is justified and for this reason lawful.960 The justification ground of private 
defence is an old one, and in the historical development of criminal law never gained a 
place: rather it maintained its place. Since it forms part of the universally recognized 
natural-law requisites for upholding a legally ordered society, it can be said that this 
defence has no history.961 Since the classical times, the right to defend oneself against 
an unlawful attack was considered to be an ancient right, expressed in the maxims  
 
                                               
957 See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report 3: Our Criminal Law: “…In truth, the criminal law 
is fundamentally a moral system. It may be crude, it may have faults, it may be rough and ready, but 
basically it is a system of applied morality and justice. It serves to underline those values necessary, 
or else important, to society. When acts occur that seriously transgress essential values…society 
must speak out and reaffirm those values. This is the true role of criminal law…” (at 16). 
 
958 See further Kadish “Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law” (1976) Columbia 
Law Review 871 at 871. 
 
959 Milton supra (n 117) 310. See also Fletcher supra (n 544) who states: “killing another human being is 
not only a worldly deprivation; in the Western conception of homicide, killing is an assault on the 
sacred, natural order. In the Biblical view, the person who slays another was thought to acquire 
control over the blood - the life force - of the victim. The only way that this life force could be 
returned to God, the origin of all life, was to execute the slayer himself. In this conception of crime 
and punishment, capital execution for homicide served to expiate the desecration of the natural 
order. The desecration, it is worth stressing, inhered in causing death, regardless whether the actor 
was fairly to blame for the killing; the expiation for the desecration worked by terminating the 
violation of the sacred order - namely the slayer’s control over the victim’s blood” (at 235-236). 
 
960 Milton supra (n 117) 312. 
 




naturalis ratio permittit se defendere (natural reason allows a person to defend herself 
against danger) and vim vi repellere licet (force may be repelled by force). 962 
 
Various rationales have been posited to explain the justification for defensive killings. 
In terms of the choice of evils theory, the defensive action is said to be justified when 
the harm avoided by the defender’s action is greater than the harm caused by such 
action (including death or injury of the aggressor).963 But there are threshold problems 
with such a theory. While it is assumed that all human lives are of equal value, and 
where interests of the defender are compared to the interests of the aggressor, it is 
difficult to determine how such a defensive killing would be justified. 964 One such 
response to this is that assuming the attacker is morally at fault in threatening the 
defender’s life, the interest the aggressor has in his own life has in some way to be 
discounted.965 However it has been submitted that the “question of justification in this 
instance is overly dependent on contingencies unrelated to the victim’s innocent or the 
aggressor’s culpability in a particular instance”.966 
 
One possible solution to such difficulties is to suggest that even if avoiding harm to the 
defender is not a greater good than avoiding the death of the aggressor in this particular 
instance, permitting the victim to kill in such cases is, in the long run, “justified as a 
means to preserving life, since such action will operate as a sanction against unlawful  
                                               
962 D 9 2 4: adversus periculum naturalis ratio permittit se defendere; D 9 2 45 4: vim enim vi defendere 
omnes leges, omniaque iura permittunt; D 43 16 1 27: vim vi repellere licere Cassius scribit idque 
ius natura comparator. See also Spendel in Strafgezetzbuch Leipziger Kommentar Vol 2 10ed 
(1985) comments on section 32 of the German Penal Code paras 15-16; H Jescheck and T Weigend 
Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil 5ed (1996) 336 (cited in Snyman supra (n 124) at 179). 
 






966 Green “Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the use of deadly force in defense of dwellings 




assaults”.967 Such a theory essentially converts an act-utilitarian approach to the lesser 
evils test into a rule-utilitarian approach.968 This approach has also been criticized.969 
 
Followers of a natural law or theologically-based theory of morality have developed 
what is known as the principle of double effect. Such a theory allows action “in pursuit 
of a good end, even though evil consequences will follow, provided [both that] evil 
consequences are not a means to the good end and that proportionality between the 
good sought and evil suffered is preserved”. 970  In terms of this theory, killing an 
aggressor is allowed since although killing such an aggressor is foreseeable, it is not 
truly intentional.971 Many criticisms of this principle focus on whether a meaningful 
distinction between the effects that are intentional and effects that are merely 
foreseeable actually exists. 972 
 
A further theory of law of justified homicide is the moral forfeiture theory. In respect of 
this theory the aggressor forfeits the inalienable right to life which every individual is 
endowed.973 But such a theory poses problems: even if the right to life were forfeited by  
 
                                               
967 Green supra (n 966) 20. 
 
968 See also Wasserman “Justifying Self-Defense” (1987) Philosophy and Public Affairs 356 at 360 who 
makes the same point. 
 
969 Green supra (n 966) 20. See further Kadish supra (n 958) who argues that if the deterrent rationale 
supports the use of deadly defensive force, it should then also support the use of deadly retaliative 
force, after the attack was thwarted (at 883). See also Green supra (n 966) n 87 who states that such 
retaliative use would obviously be contrary to the law of self-defence: “If two shipwreck victims 
were struggling for a plank capable of supporting only one, most of us would not regard one of them 
as justified in pushing the other off merely because the other had recently committed attempted 
murder” (quoting Wasserman supra (n 968) at 358-359). 
 
970 Green supra (n 966) 21-22. 
 
971 Green supra (n 966) 23. 
 
972 Green supra (n 966) 23. See for example Hart supra (n 105) 122-125. 
 




one who threatens another’s right to life, it does not necessarily follow that the right to 
life would be forfeited if an aggressor posed some lesser threat. The forfeiture theory 
entails some principle of proportionality. The defender’s response must compromise 
only those rights that the aggressor has forfeited. Given that the aggressor forfeits her 
rights as a result of criminal conduct, it follows that the gravity of the defender’s 
response can be no greater than the gravity of the aggressor’s wrongful conduct. The 
difficulty is this: determining when the right to life is forfeited by an aggressor who 
threatens a defender’s property or liberty, but not his life.974 
 
In respect of the protection theory the emphasis falls on the individual and her right to 
defend herself against an unlawful attack. Every person has a natural right to protect 
herself.975 In terms of an absolute form of the autonomy theory, proportionality would 
not play a role: when aggression has been used against a person (even where it does not 
threaten his life or physical health) her personal autonomy is violated, and for this 
reason she can use any force including deadly force to protect her autonomy. 976 
 
South African law also accepts the upholding of justice theory: people acting in private 
defence perform acts where they assist in upholding the legal order. Private defence is 
meant to prevent justice from yielding to injustice because private defence comes into 
play only in situations in which there is an unlawful attack. Persons acting in private  
 
                                               
974 Green supra (n 966) 21. 
 
975 A prominent advocate of the personal autonomy approach is George Fletcher: “Killing an aggressor 
is permissible if it is the only means available to prevent the invasion of even a minor interest. 
Shooting an apple thief is rightful and proper if there is no other way to stop her. The rationale of 
this theory is that those in the right should never yield to wrongdoers. The only question is: who is in 
the right and who in the wrong. The competing interests are irrelevant.” (“The Right to Life” (1979) 
Georgia Law Review 1371 at 1378). 
 




defence protect not only themselves but also the entire legal order.977 They act in place 
of the authorities since from a practical standpoint, it is impossible for the police always 
to protect all people in all places. The right to private defence therefore serves not only 
to protect the individual under attack but, at the same time, to maintain the legal order 
as a whole. The upholding of justice theory is important, since it influences the extent 
to which the right to private defence can be restricted by socio-ethical considerations.978 
 
The implication of these rationales has given rise to the view that self-preference is 
legitimate in the case of killing in self-defence since an unjust aggressor forfeits certain 
rights. Some theorists have rejected such an approach.979 Furthermore, the sanctity of 
life is further entrenched by the Constitution in the formal recognition of the right to 
life.980 Other theorists have suggested the forfeiture theory is necessary to the  
 
                                               
977 See for example Uniacke Permissible Killing: The self-defence justification of homicide (1994) who 
developed a theory called the right of self-defence: “When society emerges from a state of nature, 
the state recognizes a person’s fundamental right to self-preservation, and agrees to protect that right 
from violation by others. When the state is unable to fulfill its responsibility to the citizen the right to 
use deadly, defensive force remains with the citizen” (at 156-157). Thus the right of self-defence is a 
right to use necessary and proportionate force against an unjust immediate threat. For a discussion of 
the rationale underlying South African law see chapter 2 supra at 39-40. 
 
978 Lenckner and Perron Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, begrundet von A Schonke und H Schroder 24ed 
(2001) comments on section 32 of the German Penal Code para 1; Spendel supra (n 962) at par [11] 
(cited in Snyman supra (n 124) 180). 
 
979 See for example Kadish supra (n 958) at 884 (even if we can provide an account of how an aggressor 
forfeits the right to life, this will not give us a theory of justified homicide in self-defence). 
 
980 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 section 11: “Every person shall have the right to 
life”. As Ripstein in his article “Self-defense and Equal Protection” (1996) University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review 685 submits, it is important to both the law and morality of self-defence that the 
subjective and objective requirements not be combined in the wrong way. The two requirements are 
separate: one requires that the person claiming to have used force justifiably to have believed the use 
of force to be justified when using it; the other is a requirement that the force be justified - that it be 
reasonable in the circumstances (at 688). See further Fletcher “The Right and the Reasonable” 
(1985) Harvard Law Review 949 who submits that “mere belief cannot generate a justification” (at 
972). However as Ripstein supra suggests to combine the requirements in this way is no different 
from supposing that a true belief cannot justify an action. The fact that it is believed does not justify 
the action. Rather, the fact that it is true justifies the action, but the agent can only appeal to that 
justification if she was aware of it at the time of the act. In the same way, the fact that it is reasonable 
justifies the action, but the accused can only appeal to it if she was aware of its reasonableness at the 
time of the act. To discuss reasonableness in this way is not talk from the agent’s subjective point of 




justification since “the permissibility of one’s directly blocking unjust harm, even grave 
unjust harm such as the violation of one’s right to life has moral limits”.981 The two 
conditions of necessary and proportionate force do not exhaust such limitations. The 
equal rights 982 of other people limits the positive right to act directly to resist, or ward 
off the infliction of unjust harm.983 Furthermore, the right of self-defence is part of a 
wider permission to use necessary and proportionate defensive force against an unjust 
threat 984 itself and in this respect requires something akin to the theory of forfeiture.985 
The possession of the right to life is conditional. Thus the condition relevant to the 
justification of self-defence is that an individual not be an unjust immediate threat to 
another person. Provided it is acknowledged that the possession of the right to life is  
 
                                               
981 Uniacke supra (n 977) at 191 notes that Rawls’ distinction between rational and the reasonable 
elucidates this point. A person behaves rationally when they act effectively to promote their own 
system of ends. They behave reasonably when they interact with others on terms of equality: 
“[r]easonable persons [are moved by a desire for] a social world in which they, as free and equal, can 
co-operate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity should hold within that 
world so that each benefits along with the others (Political Liberalism (1993) at 50). As Ripstein 
supra (n 980) submits, on the basis of this Kantian view, reasonableness is tied to the idea of 
equality. The root idea is that the reasonableness standard provides a like liberty for all compatible 
with a fundamental interest in the security of those things that are essential to protecting and 
exercising one’s capacity for freedom. Thus reasonableness does not reflect an abstract or empty 
formalism (at 689). The reasonableness standard proves the idea against which terms of social 
cooperation are to be judged. 
 
982 Uniacke supra (n 977) 191. As Uniacke suggests: “self defence is widely regarded not simply as a 
moral and legal justification of homicide, but more strongly as a positive right, an exception to, 
rather than a justified infringement of the general prohibition of homicide” (at 228). 
 
983  The upholding of justice theory serves as basis for the rule that the attack must be unlawful. 
(Lenckner and Perron supra (n 978) par [19], cited in Snyman supra (n 124) 183). 
 
984 Theorists such as Fletcher supra (n 975) submit that the notion of forfeiture is inappropriate to the 
justification of self-defence. He submits that the idea of forfeit relates to material possessions and 
incorporeal goods of a kind that can be transferred such as citizenship. Legal rights can be forfeited 
voluntarily or involuntarily and are forfeited even with regard to persons unaware of the forfeiture. If 
your legal right to something has been forfeited, this simply means that you are no longer the owner 
of the particular interest and the knowledge or intentions of anyone depriving you of that interest are 
irrelevant to the legality of the deed. The original conception of an outlaw was someone who had 
forfeited the right to life (at 1379). But as Uniacke supra (n 977) submits, there is not as Fletcher 
argues a plausible analogy between aggressors and outlaws. In modern western legal systems self-
defence must be justified and this requires a proper intention, with knowledge of the circumstances, 
which would justify the conduct. If the aggressor really forfeited the right to life, such a justification 
would be irrelevant (at 199-200). 
 




conditional - that it depends on our conduct, there is no conceptual difficulty.986 Natural 
rights are grounded in human nature. They are conditional rights: their continued 
possession, by those who possess these rights in virtue of their nature is conditional on 
conduct.987 While it is submitted that justification of homicide in self-defence requires 
the scope of the right to life be specified by reference to conduct, an appropriate 
specification of the right to life might be explicitly rejected, rather than neglected, in 
accounts of justified self-defence on the assumption that such specification would 
require what has effectively been criticized as the moral specification of rights i.e. that 
moral specification of human rights is circular.988 Thus if the possession and content of 
human rights is determined by a prior viewpoint about what is and isn’t morally 
permissible, it is then circular to explain the permissibility of particular acts, such as 
homicide in self-defence, in terms of the non-violation of these rights. If such 
circularity cannot be eliminated, it would call into question the relevance in moral 
argument of an appeal to rights as independent permissions and constraints.989 
 
The moral specification of human rights can avoid circularity, provided it is specified 
the scope of such rights in terms of what is just and unjust treatment of, and 
interference with the particular individual who possesses these rights. 990  The 
appropriate specification of human rights, as reflecting what is just and unjust treatment 
of, and interference with, individual persons, cannot eliminate conflicts of rights.991 The 
circularity to which attention is drawn highlights the daunting task of providing an  
                                               
986 Uniacke supra (n 977) 210.  
 
987 Thomson Self-Defense and Rights (1986) 361-371, cited in Uniake supra (n 977) 211. 
 




990 Uniacke supra (n 977) 211. 
 
991 Uniacke supra (n 977) 212. 
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independent defence of the specification of human rights as reflecting what is just and 
unjust treatment of, and interference with, the particular individuals who possess these 
rights.992 
 
A unitary account of justified homicide in self-defence, as an exception to the general 
prohibition of homicide, requires that any unqualified right to life be conditional. The 
possession of an unqualified right to life (entailing the right not to be killed), depends 
on a person not being an unjust immediate threat to the equal rights of someone else. In 
other words, a person does not have an unqualified right not to be killed if they are an 
unjust immediate threat to another’s life or proportionate interest.993 A more stringent 
version of this specification holds that possession of any right to life is conditional on a 
person not being an unjust immediate threat to another’s life or proportionate 
interest.994 The former, less stringent, of these two versions allows someone who is an 
unjust immediate threat to have a qualified right to life, and can be wronged if killed.  
                                                                                                                                       
 
992 Ibid. This view is supported by Snyman supra (n 124): “The law cannot recognize a set of rules 
regarding private defence amounting to the attacked party bearing the risk of harm arising from 
possible reasonable mistakes that may be made in the course of the defensive action. It is the attacker 
who must bear the risk, because it is he or she who initiated the whole set of events by resorting to 
unlawful aggression or threats of aggression against the defender”. See further Zikalala supra (n 151) 
at 573a-b. See further Ripstein supra (n 980) who submits that one aspect of the reasonableness 
standard is the allocation of risks. To divide risks reasonably, some balance must be struck between 
the liberty and security interests that all can be supposed to share. Thus if the innocent party takes 
precautions as are justified by an appropriate balance between the interests in liberty and security 
that all are supposed to share (i.e. by ensuring that attack is imminent, using reasonable force) then 
the innocent party behaves reasonably (at 689-690). 
 
993 Uniacke supra (n 977) 213. This accords with the upholding of justice theory that there must be a 
reasonable relationship between the act and the defensive act. If one accepted the upholding of 
justice theory as the only basis for private defence it may be argued that the defending party may 
fend off imminent infringement of her rights without the defensive action necessarily being 
restricted in any way (Kuhl Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (1994) 185-186; Leckner and Perron supra 
(n 978) at par [1] cited in Snyman supra (n 124) 189). However, the legal order does not tolerate a 
gross disproportion between the interest protected by the defender and the interest she is attacking. 
 
994 Uniacke supra (n 977) 213. But see Segeve “Fairness, Responsibility and Self-Defense” (2005) Santa 
Clara Law Review 383 at 445: “Uniacke’s claim that there are two fundamental normative 
dimensions - what is justified overall and what is just in terms of rights - rather than one substantive 
normative category that takes account of all the relevant considerations, seems to reflect an 
explained assumption that there is something unique about rights in comparison to other normative 
facts. More specifically, it is difficult to find a convincing reason for considering the causal response 
of innocent aggressors and innocent threats as morally significant.  
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According to this less stringent specification, if a person is an unjust immediate threat 
to another’s life, then the aggressor does not have a right that the innocent party not use 
necessary and proportionate defensive force. If the required degree of force is lethal, the 
aggressor does not have a right against the innocent party that they not be killed. But, if 
the innocent party uses force beyond what is necessary to ward off the aggressor, then 
the innocent party is at fault, and has violated the aggressor’s right to life. According to 
the more stringent version of the specification, the aggressor is not wronged in going 
beyond what is necessary to ward off the threat posed. But, the innocent party’s act is 
wrongful because it inflicts unnecessary harm.995  Implicit in this conception is the 
requirement of proportionality, which serves as a limiting factor. 
 
The question remains as to whether there is any basis for justifying killing in self-
defence if the courts are to disallow the use of battered woman syndrome testimony.996 
Consider the remarks of Supreme Court Justice Harry Martin in his dissent in the 
Norman 997 case: 
 
“By his barbaric conduct over the course of twenty years, J.T 
Norman reduced the quality of the defendant’s life to such an 
abysmal state that, given the opportunity to do so, the jury  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
995 Uniacke supra (n 977) 213. Various theorists have submitted that it is wrong to accept only one of the 
two reasons for the theories as correct, and to reject the other one as wrong. Both reasons for 
existence are valid and necessary to serve as underlying principles of the specific rules relating to 
private defence – hence the reference in German legal literature to a “dualistic private-defence 
theory” (Leckner and Perron supra (n 978) par [1], 47; Kuhl “Notwher und Nothilfe” (1993) 
Juristische Schuling at 179, cited in Snyman supra (n 124) 181.) Most authors reject a monistic 
private defence theory that accepts only one of the above reasons for existence of private defence. 
Usually it is stated that that the protection theory is the corner stone of private-defence principles, 
but that this theory must be supplemented by the upholding-of justice theory (Kuhl supra at 180). 
 
996 Due to the problematic nature of battered woman syndrome (see chapter 1 supra at n 66 and n 70) and 
the courts’ inability to determine how the syndrome evidence should be used (see chapter 1 supra at 
n 71) 
 




might well have found that she was justified in acting in self-
defence for the preservation of her tragic life”.998 
 
Consider further the dissent in a battered child syndrome case, in which a teenager, 
after years of alleged abuse, killed his father by ambush as the father came home at 
night, and then sought to claim self-defence: 
 
“This case concerns itself with what happens - or can happen-
and did happen when a cruel, ill-tempered, insensitive man 
roams, gun in hand, through his years of family life as a 
battering bully - a bully who, since his two children were 
babies, beat both of them and his wife regularly and 
unmercifully”.999 
 
Dressler is of the view is that these two cases provide an implicit assertion of one 
potential argument for justification, namely the moral theory of forfeiture. Therefore, a 
person, who by his “willful, ongoing, egregious conduct may forfeit his right to life”. 
His death constituted no socially recognized harm to society. 1000 
 
Dressler rejects this moral forfeiture theory as morally unacceptable. In the context of S 
v Norman 1001  he argues that Judy Norman possessed a moral or natural right of 
autonomy, a right that J.T Norman violated on a daily basis. This entitled Judy to kill 
him to protect her autonomy. This theory of autonomy is preferable to the forfeiture 
theory since it does not require a claim that the abuser’s life is worth nothing. Rather, 
the focus is on the battered woman and her rights, and not on her abuser’s lack of 
rights. Furthermore, this theory adequately explains the normal self-defence situation:  
 
                                               
998 Ibid at 21. 
 
999 Jahnke v State, 682 P. 2d 991, 1011 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J. dissenting), overruled on other grounds by 
Vaughn v State, 962 P. 2d 149 (Wyo. 1998). 
 
1000 Dressler supra (n 30) 465.  
 




when a person, backed against the wall by an imminent threat, kills her deadly attacker, 
her right of autonomy entitles her, if necessary, to take his life.1002 
 
It is this author’s contention that the autonomy theory is the best justification for self-
defence, but only when it is narrowly circumscribed. Traditionally, there are both 
proportionality and necessity limits placed on the theory. The battered woman’s right to 
protect her autonomy by using deadly force is limited to cases in which such an 
extreme response is necessary.1003 Stemming from both South African and American 
common law, a core feature of the self-defence law is that every person, even that of an 
aggressor should not be terminated if there is a less extreme way of resolving the 
problem.1004 
                                               
1002 Dressler supra (n 30) at 466 also supports this contention. 
 
1003 Richards in “Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Establishing a Jurisprudential Foundation for a 
Right to Violence: Rights, Resistance, and the Demands of Self-Respect” (1983) Emory Law Journal 
405 at 426 notes: “[an] unqualified right of self-defence fails to accord to aggressors the modicum of 
respect that is, despite possibly wrongful or unprivileged aggression, their fair due. It introduces into 
the right of self-defence a punitive element which is alien to its justification not as an alternative 
form of punishment (which remains in the hands of the background state and its criminal justice 
system), but as a faute de mieux a form of private violence whose legitimacy rests completely on the 
circumstances of necessity and exigency in which it arises”. Cf Fletcher “Domination in the Theory 
of Justification and Excuse” (1996) University of Pittsburgh Law Review 553 at 570 who argues that 
self-defence as a justification cannot be understood on moral grounds of what we may justly punish, 
but on grounds of political theory i.e. the proper allocation of power between the state and the 
citizen. The right of self-defence in criminal law is based on one of the inalienable rights of the 
person (the right to life) that the liberal state must, as a condition of its legitimacy, protect. When the 
liberal state cannot protect one of these basic rights, the citizen retains her right of self-defence to 
protect her rights. 
 
1004 Ibid. See also 178 supra. In respect of South African law see chapter 2 at pages 53-55 supra. For a 
less extreme way of resolving the problem in American law see duty to retreat chapter 4 at 190-191 
supra and duty to retreat in English law in chapter 3 at 116-117 supra. But see Cohen “Self-Defense 
and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Regimes 
of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and For the Criminal Law” (1996) University 
of Pittsburgh Law Review 757 at 794 who states that the state’s failure to protect basic human rights 
is illegitimate. Legitimacy conditions of a liberal state crucially include protection of such human 
rights. This vacuum of legitimacy is a private tyranny, leaving a battered woman such as Judy 
Norman in a Lockean state of nature in which she is entitled to claim her right of self-defence: “A 
regime of private tyranny is a cruel mimicry of the role of the state, usurping its functions even as it 
distorts them in the service of a single, illegitimate end. That end is the gross maldistribution of the 
benefits and burdens of human existence, such that as in the case of the public tyrant, the private 
tyrant is benefited in whatever ways and to whatever extent he may choose. These burdens need not 
perfectly reinstate the tortures and terrors of the most extreme regimes of public tyranny to be 
violative of our most basic social and political norms: that each person has an equal right to the 
liberty of her person and property and to the legitimate pursuit of her own welfare, unless these 
rights have been overborne by the due process of the law”. As Cohen supra at 782-783 notes, it is 
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The traditional requirement of imminency - a temporal requirement, a relative closeness 
in time between the aggressor’s unlawful threat and the innocent person’s defensive 
efforts to repel it - serves an important, life-affirming, purpose. To suggest that a 
battered woman should be able to kill today because eventually the abuser will 
inevitably kill is not an acceptable contention. This is so since it is difficult to imagine 
that it is necessary to kill to prevent deadly force from being inflicted further down the 
time-line. The greater the time span between the defensive act and the predicted act 
being defended against, the greater the options available to the battered woman. Some 
reasonable temporal requirement is therefore needed. 1005 
 
The earlier the use of force is allowed, the greater the risk that the force used was not 
necessary. But, because deadly force is used - and the putative attacker is dead - it 
cannot be known for definite if the feared attack was going to occur and whether some 
other, less extreme, measure would have sufficed. There is also always the possibility  
 
                                                                                                                                       
not difficult to understand why the resolve of many subjects of regimes of private tyranny would not 
sustain a run for freedom that is dependent on the law or other institutions. First, the reluctance of 
police to intervene in “domestic disputes” remains, despite official changes in policy. Second, when 
the police do intervene, often they do not do so effectively. As a matter of fact, it may be somewhere 
between difficult and impossible to create an effectively individualized strategy of deterrence against 
either the recurrence of the escalation of violence in many if not most instances. Third, judges may 
or may not put teeth of any kind into restraining orders, even when they grant them, and the orders 
themselves are subject to mishandling by the policies. Fourth, shelters for the abused are vulnerable 
to funding shortages and therefore, to unavailability. Lastly, blanketing any assessment of the risks 
versus the rewards of such a move - a move to entrust her life and safety and that of her dependent 
loved ones to remote, impersonally motivated, imperfectly coordinated, under-funded and ultimately 
under - responsive public processes and institutions will be the brute fact that a closer, immediate 
and unrelenting force of law has come to fill all of the interstices of her life, all of those physical and 
psychic spaces where individuals ordinarily live on their own terms, separate from the demands and 
the requirements of others. In conclusion Cohen supra at 783 notes: “Short of physical bondage, no 
regime of government could exert the constancy of pressure on individual liberty and freedom of 
will that a regime persistently devoted to the domination of a human being by another can enforce 
through the immediacy of its presence and the intricacies of its carefully tailored design, For reasons 
on both sides of the equation, then, there may be, and appear, no conventional means to escape”.  
 
1005 Dressler supra (n 30) 467. See for e.g., Morse supra (n 66) at 12, who argues for the 
following standard: “If death or serious bodily harm in the relatively near future is a virtual certainty 
and the future attack cannot be adequately defended against when it is imminent and if there really 





that the abuser could have changed his behaviour, had he been allowed to live.1006 
Beyond this, there is also the possibility that some other event will intervene to render 
an apparent necessity to use deadly force inoperative.1007 
 
5.2  Theoretical Construct 
It is submitted that it has been shown that self-defence is deeply rooted within criminal 
law. Thus, it remains to examine the elements of the defence in turn, in order to 
establish their essentiality and functioning. 
 
5.2.1  Conditions relating to the attack 
5.2.1.1 An attack 
5.2.1.1.1 An objective test 
It is submitted that since the autonomy theory is the best justification for self-defence, 
narrowly circumscribed, the question as to whether the accused who relies on self-
defence, has acted lawfully, must remain objectively tested: “whether a fictitious 
reasonable person in the position of the accused and in light of all the circumstances 




                                               
1006 Dressler supra (n 30) at 467. See further Dressler supra citing Alschuler in Preventive Pretrial 
Detention and the Failure of Interest - Balancing Approaches to Due Process” (1986) Michigan Law 
Review 510 at 557: “even funnel clouds turn around because they possess free will and sometimes 
defy predictions”. 
 
1007 Dressler supra (n 30) 467 notes, perhaps the batterer will have a debilitating stroke or perhaps he 
will abandon the family, thus freeing the woman from further abuse, and rendering deadly, 
autonomy-protecting force unnecessary.  
 
1008 S v Motleleni supra (n 140) at 406C. For the full quotation see chapter 2 at 36. 
 




Furthermore, a person acting in self-defence may not benefit from prior knowledge that 
she has of her attacker, which the reasonable person would have have.1010 The reason 
for this position is that self-defence is regarded as a ground of justification in South 
African law.1011 The emphasis is placed on the act and not on the person who acted in 
self-defence. 1012  By requiring that a person’s self-defensive act be objectively 
reasonable does however raise an important question: if the person’s act was not 
reasonable could they have acted otherwise? 1013  This point is critical since South 




                                               
1010 For a discussion of this requirement in South African law see chapter 2 35-40 supra. 
 
1011 Beecher-Monas “Symposium on Integrating Responses to Domestic Violence: Domestic Violence: 
Competing Conceptions of Equality in the Law of Evidence: (2001) Loyola of Los Angeles 
University Law Review 81 submits that “The justification of self-defence reflects a moral 
entitlement to repel wrongful violence where there is no viable alternative. The liberal philosophy 
upon which this idea is based conceives of an original state of nature where life was a war of each 
against all “men who entered into a social contract in which the state (and the rule of law) replaced 
the necessity of war” (at 92). However, she submits that “contrary to the liberal philosopher’s 
insistence on neutral and rational rules as the most likely to achieve just results, relational scholars 
argue that consequences of rules are anything but just to half of humanity. The liberal view forming 
the dominant discourse of our legal system ignores the dominant experience for half of humanity, the 
experience of connectedness to give that experience voices, and the relational feminists argue that 
legal rules must accommodate the inequalities and interdependence of human beings. One way of 
putting this is that women suffer in ways that men do not, and that gender-specific suffering that 
women endure is routinely ignored or trivialized in the large (male) legal culture. To accomplish 
this, legal doctrine must accommodate the interplay between human agency and social structure. At 
the very least, if consequences of legal rules disadvantage women over men rules ought to be 
changed. Clearly, both visions of society, liberal and relational, have consequences for law, the way 
legal rules are justified depends upon the justification one views as legitimate” (at 94-95). 
 
1012 As Dressler supra (n 792) states: “[s]ociety either does not believe that the death of the human being 
was undesirable or that it at least represents a lesser harm than if the accused had not acted as he did” 
(at 473). 
 
1013 Heller supra (n 795) 12. 
 
1014 As Packer states: “[t]he idea of free will in relation to conduct is, in the legal system, a value 
preference having very little to do with the metaphysics of determinism and free will... [T]he law 
treats man’s conduct as autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to 
proceed as if it were” (The Limits of Criminal Sanction (1969) 74-75). This is of course the crux of 
the problem: as Packer suggests: “The criminal law’s intentionalism is an article of faith, not a 
philosophic claim” (at 74-75). Heller supra (n 795) at 31 submits that while it is possible to reject the 
justification-based objective standard of faith in free will, as with articles of faith we cannot disprove 




Since the concept of reasonableness necessarily entails the acceptance of the basic 
Hobbsean/Lockean 1015 proposition that equal individuals in a state of nature cannot 
exercise complete freedom of action without interfering with each other’s rights, in an 
attempt to mediate this inevitable conflict, reasonableness establishes an objective 
boundary between acceptable exercises of individual freedom and unacceptable 
interferences with the rights of others. This boundary is determined by looking to 
prevailing social norms.1016 To perform this function effectively, reasonableness must 
be facially neutral, so as to avoid protecting one individual’s or group’s interests at the 
expense of another’s: 
 
 “Thus by seemingly allowing individuals to pursue their self-
interest unless and until they interfere with the interests of 
others, …[reasonableness] seems to overcome this conflict 
between the individual and the group, protecting collective 
security without threatening individual freedom”.1017 
 
In a “conflict-sensitive plural law state such as South Africa, the reasonable person test 
could create problems of a special calibre”.1018 Consider the statement in Loabail Ltd v 
Bayfield Properties: 1019  
                                               
1015 For a discussion of these views see Hobbes Leviathan (1951) (reprint of 1651 edition) at 94-95 and 
Locke Two Treatises of Government (1960) (reprint of 1698 edition) at 309 and 346. For a 
discussion of the test utilized in South African law see chapter 2 35-41 supra. For a discussion of the 
test utilized for self-defence in English law see chapter 3 at 113-118 and American law see chapter 4 
at 179-180 supra. 
 
1016  Unikel supra (n 906) 329-330. As Unikel supra submits: “[t]he reasonable person is a 
personification of the community ideal of reasonable behaviour, determined by [the fact finder’s] 
social judgment. This personification possess[es] and exercise[es] those qualities of attention, 
knowledge, intelligence and judgment that society believes are required of its members for the 
protection of their own interests and the interests of others. So defined the reasonableness principle 
in general and the reasonable individual in particular, constrain judicial decision-making by forcing 
judges to consider the societal consensus embodied in the concept of reasonableness when deriving 
results” (at 329). 
 
1017 Unikel supra (n 906) 330. 
 
1018  Labuschagne “Onpartydige regspraak in ‘n Pluraal Regstaat: opmerking oor die 
geregtigheidsonvriendelike kant van die redelike persoon-toets” (2000) Obiter 142 (own translation). 
 




“It would be dangerous and futile to attempt to define or list 
the factors which may or may not give rise to a real danger of 
bias. Everything will depend on facts, which may include the 
nature of the issue to be decided”. 1020 
 
Surely such a statement is “idealistic and without basis in reality. Not only would it 
create an opening for abuse and manipulation, but in extreme circumstances it would 
lead to arbitrary decisions”. 1021 Nowhere is this more pertinent in the case of abused 
women. The objective test does not allow the court to acknowledge variations in the 
way different people may respond to similar circumstances and does not take into 
consideration the nature of the abusive relationship between parties involved and it 
denies the existence of years of abuse and the familiarity that exists between the actor 
and the victim. 1022  Any accused is entitled to have factors that are of particular 
relevance to their case taken into account, otherwise the objective test would be 
redundant.1023 However, it is submitted that in the case of abused women, the courts 
have gone too far in qualifying the “objective test” for self-defence.  
 
                                               
1020 Labuschagne supra (n 1018) 142-143. What was objectionable to Labuschagne was the court’s 
further statement that: “we cannot, however conceive of circumstances in which an objection could 
be soundly based on the religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, age, class, means or sexual 
orientation of the judge”. Clearly such information about the ethnic origin as well as cultural beliefs 
such as the belief in witchcraft would be of importance in determining whether the actor’s belief was 
reasonable. Delgado also supports this point: objective standard reflects the norms of the dominant 
cultural groups and excludes the values of other groups of society. (“Shadowboxing: An Essay on 
Power” (1992) Cornell Law Review 813). Other scholars have questioned the reasonable person’s 
standards neutrality in practice: “although the reasonable person standard is neutered, made 
politically correct and sensitized, the language of the law in an attempt to protect it from allegations 
of sexism, has not changes its content and character. Given that the reasonable person standard has 
evolved from the reasonable man who represented male norms and ideals, it still embodies many of 
the biases and male perspective inherent in the legal system as a whole.” (Brewer “Note, Missouri’s 
New Law on ‘Battered Spouse Syndrome: A Moral Victory, A Partial Solution” (1988) Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 251. 
 
1021  Labuschagne supra (n 1018) 143 (own translation). Hart supra (n 105) has argued that 
individualization of such standards of self-defence was a requirement of basic fairness (at 136). 
 
1022 Bjerregaard and Blowers “Chartering a New Frontier for Self-Defense Claims: The Applicability of 
the Battered Person Syndrome as a Defense for Parricide Offenders” (1994) University of Louisville 
Journal of Family Law 843 at 852. 
 
1023 Burchell supra (n 29) at 243 notes that this does not make the test subjective, it simply means that 




5.2.1.1.2  The impact of S v Engelbrecht on the objective test 
In the Engelbrecht 1024 case the court was correct in stating that “the reasonable woman 
should not be forgotten in the analysis and deserves to be part of the objective test of 
the reasonable person.” 1025 What was objectionable about Satchwell J’s finding was 
her statement that “the focus should be on the impact that the abuse may have over time 
upon the psyche, make-up and entire world view of an abused woman.” 1026 The terms 
“psyche” and entire world view of an abused woman” tend to relate to the issue of 
culpability. Any issue relating to culpability is dealt with in terms of putative self- 
defence, which is subjectively assessed. Therefore, from her perspective “she would 
have honestly believed [her] life was in danger but objectively viewed, [it was] not.”1027 
If this is what Satchwell J had in mind, it was not expressly stated. No mention is made 
at any point in the judgment of this defence. While it may be difficult to establish which 
subjective factors should be taken into consideration,1028 judges and defence counsel 
are expected to operate within the parameters set by the law: objective elements in 
criminal liability are objectively assessed in terms of actus reus and subjective or  
 
 
                                               
1024 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 
1025 Ibid at par [358].  
 
1026 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [343]. 
 
1027 S v De Oliviera supra (n 141) 163I-J (own emphasis). 
 
1028 Snyman in his article “The Normative Concept of Mens Rea- A New Development in Germany” 
(1979) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 211 at 213 notes that it is difficult to maintain 
the simplistic separation of the preconditions of criminal liability between the purely objective and 
purely subjective elements. The theorist goes on to give a practical example. For instance the 
intention or subjective knowledge of the offender may sometimes be of cardinal importance in 
ascertaining whether there has been actus reus. This is particularly the case when one deals with 
offences requiring some intention or ulterior to the ordinary intention to perform an act: the mere 
intentional entry into a building as a trespasser only becomes burglary once it is established that the 
trespasser further intends to steal once inside the building. This example demonstrates that the 
distinction between actus reus an outward manifestation, and mens rea as the inward or mental 
manifestation of the crime, is rather arbitrary, and affords a shaky foundation upon which to 




mental elements of the crime are transferred to the inquiry regarding the mens rea (state 
of mind) of the accused.1029  
 
The distinction remains important since altering the self-defence standard to 
accommodate the actor’s personal psychology undermines the very notion of self-
defence as a justification. Justification defences operate when the accused’s act is the 
morally preferred option. Because justified acts are viewed as objectively preferable, 
the psychological, subjective peculiarities of the accused are generally irrelevant to the 
application of the justification defence.1030 Therefore, advocates of the battered woman 
syndrome, who have argued that expert testimony is essential to help the reasonable 
person better understand the abused woman (i.e. whether the reasonable person in the 
position of the accused (i.e. abused woman) would have perceived a threat of imminent 
harm) are not correct in stating that such evidence merely contextualizes the objective 
test. Even under a contextualized objective test, the criminal law has never accepted the 
notion of a psychologically-individualized objective standard. Although an actor’s 
objective circumstances can sometimes be considered to determine whether a 
reasonable person would share the actor’s perceptions the law does not accept as 
reasonable a perception attributable to the accused’s own unique psychological 
abnormality.1031 
 
Assuming that Satchwell J is correct in incorporating the actor’s altered perceptions (i.e. 
abused woman’s psyche, make up and whole world view) into the objective test, it is 
submitted that this would still prove unworkable. Firstly, in cases of non-confrontational  
                                               
1029 Snyman supra (n 1028) 212. 
 
1030 Burke “Rational Actors, Self-Defense and Duress: Making sense not Syndromes out of the Battered 
Woman” (2002) North Carolina Law Review 211 at 242. 
 




killings, despite expert testimony explaining how battered woman’s syndrome affects 
individual perception, the judge (or the reasonable person) would have no meaningful 
way to determine whether a particular battered woman’s belief in the imminence of 
danger is reasonable, even if viewed from her distorted perspective.1032 In light of the 
three distinct phases of the domestic violence cycle, the cycle theory itself seems to 
require knowledge of where the abused woman’s allegedly defensive use of force fell 
within the cycle and how long each distinct phase typically lasted before one can 
determine the reasonableness of the perception of imminent harm. Therefore, if an 
abuser becomes contrite and apologetic immediately before he fell asleep intoxicated, it 
would follow from the cycle theory of violence that there was no imminent threat of 
harm – and no reasonable belief otherwise – until the contrition phase was complete 
and the tension-building phase was well under way. 1033 It has also been noted that even 
if the battered woman syndrome theory were helpful in supporting an abused woman’s 
account of her subjective perceptions, the theory does little to support a claim that such 
perceptions were objectively reasonable. When an abused woman subjectively but 
unreasonably believes that her use of force is justified, she at best has a claim of 
putative self-defence, which mitigates punishment but does not wholly exculpate the 
accused. 1034 
 
Secondly, even if the court were to disregard the source of perceptions as subjective 
psychological phenomenon,1035 the actual effect of the syndrome on an actor’s  
                                               
1032 Goldman supra (n 67) 200-201. 
 
1033 Burke supra (n 1030) 241. 
 
1034 Burke supra (n 1030) 142. 
 
1035 Kinports “Deconstructing the ‘Image’ of the Battered Woman: so much activity, so little change: A 
reply to the critics of Battered Women’s Self-Defense” (2004) Saint Louis University Public Law 
Review 155 at 170 notes that battered woman syndrome construct was not necessarily meant to 
connote a mental disease or defect, but was simply a convenient way of describing a set of 
characteristics that are common to many (but not all) abused women. Wallace “Beyond Imminence: 
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perceptions must be considered: 1036 
 
“the battered [woman] by feeling isolated and afraid may 
respond more quickly and intensely if acting in self-defense. 
Moreover, the [woman] may be even quicker to perceive 
danger and overestimate the danger once perceived. The 
[woman’s] initial extreme responses to abuse become over- 
generalized and may occur in situations where there is no 
objective danger. What emerges is an extremely hyper vigilant 
anxious guarded woman. Just as society does not allow a 
person to claim self-defense simply because [s]he is extremely 
nervous or cowardly, it should not allow, a battered woman to 
do so simply because she is hyper vigilant”. 1037 
 
 
5.2.1.1.3  Philosophical criticisms of subjectivized standards of self-defence 
Numerous philosophical criticisms can also be leveled against any objective test which 
is particularized to take the accused’s personal circumstances into account. It is 
submitted that such criticisms can be starkly illustrated in foreign jurisdictions such as 
the United States of America who have gone too far in qualifying the objective test to 
the extent that it has created a separate reasonable woman standard, 1038 while other  
                                                                                                                                       
Evolving International Law and Battered Women’s Right to Self-Defense” (2004) University of 
Chicago Law Review 1749 submits that battered woman syndrome has reinforced the familiar 
tendency to pathologize women’s behaviour, minimizing what seemed to be real issues. Obstacles to 
leaving violent relationship beyond the woman’s mental state, including economic, familial and legal 
barriers (at 1757). Dore supports this view: “[I]n practice the battered woman syndrome has created 
a paradigmatic battered woman who suffers from a psychological aberration that impairs her 
capacity to rationally assess or completely respond to an abusive situation. Instead of focusing on 
external social and economic factors that properly inform the battered defendant’s situation, the 
battered woman defense centers on internal capacity that renders her dysfunctional victims instead of 
rational survivors” (“Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress Defense of 
Battered Offenders” (1995) Ohio State Law Journal at 665 at 692). 
 
1036 Goldman supra (n 67) 201. 
 
1037  Goldman supra (n 67) 201. Whether the source of the perceptual defect is merely a personal 
idiosyncrasy or result of clinical syndrome, the result should be the same. 
 
1038 See Martin “Case Note” (1992) University of Cincinnati Law Review 877 at 891 (noting that under 
a wholly subjective standard, the actor’s state of mind is critical). As Goldman supra (n 67) notes 
“such a standard would incorporate perceptual irregularities caused by battered [woman] syndrome 
because it would allow the jury to judge the reasonableness of accused’s actions against the 
accused’s subjective impressions of the need to use force” (at 200). See further Hatcher “The 
Gendered Nature of the Battered Woman Syndrome: Why Gender Neutrality Does Not Mean 
Equality” (2003) New York University Annual Survey of American Law 21 at 31 who submits that 
the foundation of battered woman syndrome includes more than just the effects of battering itself, 
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courts have implicitly done this through further elucidation of a battered woman 
situation.1039  
 
Using such a standard conflicts with the basic principle of equality underlying the 
reasonableness standard in two respects. Firstly, because it relies exclusively on a 
specific group (women’s) norms for its definition, the reasonable woman standard 
inappropriately adopts a group-rights, rather than individual rights, perspective.1040 
However group-rights advocates misunderstand the basic premise of individualism. 
Such groups assume that individualism regards people as purely atomistic, unconnected 
individuals who do not possess and are consequently unaffected by any group 
membership. This assumption is not correct as suggested by Locke’s recognition of 
individual differences in a state of natural equality. Individualism recognizes the notion 
of a self-partiality constituted by group connection. 1041 
 
Secondly, the reasonable woman’s standard is, by definition, non-neutral. It establishes 
female values and perceptions as arbitrarily differentiating between individuals and 
thus ignores the impact of wrongful conduct on the individual by focusing exclusively 
on that conduct’s impact on the gender group of which the individual is a member.1042  
                                                                                                                                       
but extended further into the actor’s mind-state to consider other experiences that contributed to her 
feelings of powerlessness.  
 
1039 Toffel supra (n 3) at 373 notes that: “Battered woman syndrome would be more beneficial to women 
if it focused on the coercive control aspects of all battering relationships, rather than on supposed 
psychological traits that women develop from battering. The syndrome could then portray the 
accused as reasonable and account for the complexity of their domestic violence experiences. 
Hostage survival strategy and Graham’s Stockholm syndrome, which focuses on the victim’s 
behaviour in life-threatening situations instead of psychological traits have been applied in research 
to battered women. They characterize battered woman’s actions as survival strategies not learned 
helplessness”. 
 
1040 Unikel supra (n 906) 349. 
 
1041 Unikel supra (n 906) 351. 
 




An individual-rights perspective calls for vitiating the victim’s personal rights, while a 
group-rights approach subsumes the ‘victim’s’ rights under a diffuse claim of affront to 
all womankind. Such an approach, if, carried to its logical extreme, would make an 
individual a victim of every criminal act, thus vitiating the rights of the actual 
victim.1043 
 
The use of a particularizing standard is justified by the determinist assumption that 
there are certain non-universal characteristic (such as battered woman syndrome, 
history of battering) that have a causal influence on perception and action which is so 
strong that it would violate the voluntary act requirement to use a purely objective 
standard to assess reasonableness.1044 
 
By adopting such a standard there is no distinctively legal (in the nonpolitical sense) 
way of distinguishing characteristics that are “properly” particularizable from 
‘characteristics’ that are not.1045  One response to this is politically acceptable, but 
philosophically unpersuasive. The argument is that it is fair to refuse to particularize the 
objective standard to take into account all non-universal characteristics because only 
some non-universal characteristics exert a genuinely uncontrollable causal influence on 
perception and action.1046 
                                               
1043 Unikel supra (n 906) at 352. 
 
1044 Heller supra (n 795) 86. 
 
1045 Heller supra (n 795) 52-53. See further Donovan and Wildman supra (n 895): “[I]t may of course, be 
true that in many cases a jury’s judgment as to the moral culpability of the reasonable person in the 
accused’s situation will coincide with the actual personal culpability of the defendant. In other 
word’s the actual life experience of the individual defendant may correspond to the jury’s notion of 
the life experience of the reasonable person. In that event, justice will arguably be done by using a 
reasonable person standard”. 
 
1046 Heller supra (n 795) at 90. This position is supported by Fletcher supra (n 544) at 514. See further 
Kinports supra (n 810) at 419: “Unlike traits such as hotheadedness, drunkenness or cowardice, the 
traits or characteristics of a battered woman are not attributes that the woman can reasonably be 




This position suffers from two weaknesses. The first is epistemological. While it may 
be true that there are controllable and uncontrollable non-universal characteristics, it is 
impossible to objectively identify the partial category into which any particular non-
universal characteristic fits. Thus reasoned disagreement is always a possibility. 1047 
 
The second problem is ontological. The position that only some non-universal 
characteristics are uncontrollable is philosophically irreconcilable with the 
particularizing standard’s partial determinism. Determinism does not admit of degrees. 
Thus insofar as the particularizing standard holds that at least one nonuniversal 
characteristic is truly uncontrollable, it must accept the proposition that all nonuniversal 
characteristics are uncontrollable.1048 
 
There is a third response to the claim that it is impossible to objectively distinguish 
between nonuniversal characteristics that should be particularized and nonuniversal 
characteristics that should not be particularized. Even if it is true that all nonuniversal 
characteristics are causally uncontrollable at the time of the provoked acts, certain 
nonuniversal characteristics are part of an individual’s character because of decisions 
she made of her own free will prior to committing the act, while other nonuniversal 
characteristics are part of an individual’s character through no fault of her own. 
Excluding nonuniversal characteristics that fall into the former category from the  
 
 
                                               
1047 Heller supra (n 795) 90. 
 
1048 Heller supra (n 795) 91. As Morse supra (n 66) suggests: “[t]he fact that an accused may be able to 
pinpoint a cause for her use of violence i.e. history of abuse in the case of battered women - cannot 
give rise to a defense because presumably all phenomena of the universal are caused by the 
necessary and sufficient conditions that produce them. Allowing determinism or universal causation 
[to] underwrite responsibility threatens to undermine notions of personal responsibility that are vital 




category of particularizable characteristics, therefore, does not violate the voluntary act 
requirement.1049 
 
This response while consistent internally, is ultimately unpersuasive. First, insofar as it, 
no less than the previous response, leaves the particularizing standard’s determinist 
component unaffected, it is vulnerable to the same determinist critique. In a hard 
determinist world, using broad time - framing to identify moments of responsibility 
does not escape determinism. Since actions which were taken prior to a provoked act 
are not less determined than the provoked act itself, an individual cannot be held 
responsible for any of her actions, irrespective of when those actions took place. 
Second, even in a world of softer determinism - in which at least some actions are not 
causally determined - it is still not clear whether there are nonuniversal characteristics 
on the basis of which an individual can be held responsible.1050 
 
Further, if the objective standard is particularized to take into account two or all of an 
individual’s uncontrollable nonuniversal characteristics, applying a particularizing 
standard that does not take all of those characteristics into account necessarily violates 
the voluntary act requirement, since the standard would then require individuals to  
                                               
1049 Heller supra (n 795) 91. As Saitow notes: “The battered woman is not a reasonably prudent person. 
Her characteristics and personality have been severely affected by the abuse which she has endured. 
She should not be punished for being the victim of that abuse. Considering her acts only in the light 
of a reasonable person, when through no fault of her own, she does not qualify as one, is in essence 
condemning her for her suffering” (“Battered Woman Syndrome: Does the ‘Reasonable Battered 
Woman’ Exist?” (1993) New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement 329 at 367. Rosen 
supra (n 21) argues that in battered woman syndrome cases, “[b]ecause [the] defendant responded to 
internal and external pressures for which she was not responsible, but which were created by her 
social reality as a battered woman, she is not to blame for her conduct” (at 43). See also Fletcher 
supra (n 544) 513-514. 
 
1050  Heller supra (n 795) 92. Consider, for example excessive irascibility, the nonuniversal 
characteristics for which an individual can properly be held responsible. Do individuals really 
choose to be excessively irascible or is their situation more like the situation of the battered woman 
who perceives and acts as a battered woman, not of her own volition, but because another individual 
forced her to endure perception and action-modifying suffering? Thus what looks like freely chosen 
characteristics invariably come to look like a socially determined psychological pathology-the kind 




control the causal influence of characteristics that have an influence which cannot be 
controlled.1051 Take the reasonable battered woman’s standard: use of this standard 
assumes that using a purely objective standard to assess the reasonableness of provoked 
acts committed by battered women holds such women to an unrealizable standard of 
conduct. This standard also assumes that battered women react the same to their abuse. 
This is a doubtful proposition. Factors such race have an effect on how battered women 
perceive and react to the environment around them. The legal policies underlying the 
development of the reasonable woman’s standard dictates the creation of a multitude of 
highly specific reasonableness standards incorporating the norms and ideals of 
particular groups into the decision-making process.1052 Further since each individual is 
predictability a member of more than one group (for example “Caucasian” and 
“female”), in order for reasonableness standard to sufficiently reflect the entire range of 
group norms related to any situation, those standards must be drawn to include all of a 
person’s major group associations. As a result, a potentially endless number of 
specifically designed reasonableness standards are necessary in order to satisfactorily 
incorporate each individual’s relevant group association.1053 
 
Having numerous standards of reasonableness is problematic. Raising a cultural 
defence precariously shifts the relevant focus of the judicial enquiry away from the 
nexus between the actor’s state of mind and her act to the merits of her culture which  
 
 
                                               
1051 Heller supra (n 795) 93. 
 
1052 Unikel supra (n 906) 355. 
 
1053 Ibid. For example, a reasonable black woman’s standard, a reasonable Asian gay man’ standard etc. 
Thus an actor will state that she acted according to the dictates of her culture and therefore deserves 
leniency. However, there is no formal “cultural defence”; individual defence attorneys and judges 
use their discretion to present or consider cultural factors affecting the mental state or culpability for 




rely on group-rights perspective. 1054  Specialized reasonableness standards define 
individuals exclusively in terms of their specific group affiliations. 1055  Such 
differentiation violates both the concept of interchangeability which is central to 
individualism and implicitly allows biased actions by recognizing the legal and social 
importance of group membership. Secondly, specialized reasonableness standards are 
judicially impractical. Instead of leading to equality, adoption of such a cultural defence 
would promote prejudice and inequality. It may also raise the issue of unequal 
treatment, undermining the important tenet that the law should be applied 
uniformally.1056 This can occur in two ways. Use of the cultural defence may mean that 
immigrant would-be victims have less protection than non-immigrant would-be victims 
receive.  
 
Secondly, the distinction between an individual to whom the cultural defence is 
available and one to whom it is unavailable is blurry, problematic and at least partly 
unauthentic. A formal adoption of this defence would mean that the law will treat a 
member of one ethnic or cultural group more harshly than that of another group.1057 The 
cultural defence position also makes a fatal assumption. By designating culture as the 
operational factor for excusing the actor’s conduct, the position assumes that culture is  
                                               
1054 Chui supra (n 906) 1099. As Creach supra (n 815) notes: “The more narrowly the court defines the 
relevant reasonable person, the more likely it will be to find their response reasonable” (at 620). 
 
1055 Unikel supra (n 906) 355. For example, a “reasonable black woman” standard treats the individual 
for which it is designed as the member of both a particular racial group (“black”) and a particular 
gender group (“woman”). 
 
1056 Sacks supra (n 906) 545. There are several reasons for this. First, a number of definitional problems 
make it difficult to discern any systematic justification of or allowing members of some cultural 
groups but not others to use the defence. Moreover, if a principled basis did exist for determining 
which members of immigrant groups and U.S subculture could employ the defence, there seems to 
be no basis for considering others to have a culture at all while implicitly assuming the United 
States, and U.S. law, lack one. Further, proponents of the cultural defence offer no principled basis 
for determining which customs should fall under the rubric of this defence (Sacks supra (n 906) at 
543). 
 




a static element that can be qualified and neatly summarized. Rather, culture is a “lucid, 
constantly evolving concept”.1058 
 
The need to particularize the particularizing standard if taken to its logical conclusion, 
ultimately collapses into a purely subjective standard. The particularizing standard 
cannot satisfy the voluntary act requirement unless it takes all of the actor’s 
nonuniversal characteristics into account. But all characteristics are nonuniversal. For 
this reason the particularizing standard must take all of the actor’s characteristics into 
account to satisfy the voluntary act requirement - and given that “if every characteristic 
of the individual is taken into account, the case would be that they could not help doing 
as they did”. The particularizing standard is functionally the same as the purely 
subjective standard.1059 Since it is determinist, the purely subjective standard confronts 
the law with an intractable dilemma: either abandon punishment entirely on the ground 
that it is never retributively just; 1060 or justify punishment on solely utilitarian  
 
 
                                               
1058 Chui supra (n 906) 1099. It is interesting to note that the defence also essentializes culture by 
defining it as the exclusive province of particular groups. Some groups have culture, others do not 
(at 102). According to Chui, culture cannot be defined through bright line tests or concrete 
categorization because it is by nature ambiguous. Defining the parameters of a group who could 
raise the defence would require creating a rule that would take into account the innumerable 
permutations of race, ethnicity, language, education, religion, culture, gender, length of residence in 
the country and age. Use of these factors to measure behaviour assimilation would be a difficult and 
subjective task at best. 
 
1059 Heller supra (n 795) 94-95. See also Unikel supra (n 906) 371. As Lee suggests: “[W]e cannot... 
allow the perpetrator of a serious crime to go free simply because that person believed actions were 
reasonable and necessary to prevent some perceived harm. To completely exonerate an individual no 
matter how aberrational or bizarre his though patterns would allow citizens to set their own 
standards for the permissible use of force. It would also allow a legally competent defendant 
suffering from delusions to kill or perform acts of violence with impunity contrary to fundamental 
principles of justice” (quoting People v Goetz supra (n 793). Lee goes on to state: “It unacceptably 
expands the doctrine of self-defense infringing on the premise of our criminal law system that 
preservation of life is an important value and that the taking of a life will be exempt from criminality 
and punishment only in a narrow, societal-determined set of circumstances” (Race and Self-Defense: 
Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness” (1996) Minnesota Law Review 368 at 386). 
 






The third problem with the particularizing standard is the commonsense counterpart of 
the first two: insofar as the standard is partially intentionalist, it cannot justify its 
determinism and therefore collapses into the justification version of the objective 
standard. The particularizing stand assumes that the causal influence of some 
nonuniversal characteristics is so powerful that it violates the voluntary act requirement 
to use an objective standard to assess the reasonableness of a provoked act committed 
by an individual who possesses one of those characteristics that may well be true at the 
moment the provoked act was committed. Nevertheless, even if the individual could not 
have avoided being provoked to kill, once she possessed a particular uncontrollable 
nonuniversal characteristic, she could always have avoided developing that 
characteristic in the first place. By definition, actions that are not caused by an 
uncontrollable nonuniversal characteristic are, from the standpoint of the particularizing 
standard, freely chosen, and it can’t be said, that individuals are ever determined to 
develop uncontrollable nonuniversal characteristics, characteristics which will in 
certain instances, cause them to perform objectively unreasonable provoked acts - since 
those characteristics are always the end-products of actions that are themselves freely 
chosen. If this is the position, the particularizing standard cannot excuse an actor’s 
“unreasonable” provoked act on the ground that the actor could not have avoided 
committing it. If the relevant time-frame is broadened enough, it is evident that she 
could have. The particularizing standard thus collapses into the justification version of 
the objective standard. Deprived of the ability to excuse an actor’s provoked act on the 
ground that the actor could not have acted otherwise, the particularizing standard can  
                                               
1061 Heller supra (n 795) 105. A system that does not impose retributive limits on punishment risk 
devolving into what Morse has appropriated called a “purely consequentialist dystopia- a system 
where under certain circumstances, even innocent people can be legitimately punished” 




only justify such an act on the ground that she should not have been required to act 
otherwise. 1062 
 
Battered woman syndrome provides an excellent example of the force of this critique. 
Those who defend the use of the “reasonable battered woman” standard are certainly 
correct to argue that women suffering from battered woman syndrome cannot be 
expected to perceive and react to threatening and provocative situations in the same 
way as women who do not. Nevertheless, opponents of the standard are also correct to 
argue that in nearly every battered woman syndrome case it is possible to identify 
moments when, prior to the time the syndrome became firmly established, the battered 
woman could have acted to avoid developing the syndrome.1063 Therefore, battered 
woman syndrome does not explain why a woman initially becomes involved with her 
abuser, nor does it explain, why, after the initial beatings, she did not leave the 
relationship.1064 
 
Therefore, it is submitted that any reference to a standard of a “reasonable battered 
woman” should be rejected since it assumes that all battered women react the same to 
their abuse and would result in a potentially endless number of specially designed 
reasonableness standards. Such specialized reasonableness standards are problematic 
since they promote prejudice and inequality 1065 and ultimately collapse into a purely  
 
                                               
1062 Heller supra (n 795) 95-96.  
 
1063 See further Kelman “Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law” (1981) Stanford 
Law Review 591 at 594 who states: “[o]ften, conduct is deemed involuntary rather than freely willed 
because we do not consider the defendant’s earlier decisions that may have put [her] in the position 
of apparent choicelessness”.  
 
1064 Heller supra (n 795) at 96. A completely determinist account of human action can avoid such broad 
time framing; the partial determinisms that underlies the particularizing standard, however, cannot.  
 




subjective standard.1066 It is also submitted that there is no real principle on which a 
decision could be reached as to whether one subjective factor should be considered and 
another not.  
 
5.2.1.1.4  The impact of constitutional norms on limiting subjective factors 
One possible solution to this dilemma is to argue that Constitutional norms could at 
least provide a broad-based “principle” or set of principles on which to draw such a 
distinction. The concept of unlawfulness, which hinges on the legal convictions of the 
community, has not only found favour with South African courts,1067 but requires a 
judge not to impose his own subjective preferences onto the case but must seek the 
solution in the sentiments of “all enlightened individuals in society” or the “legal 
convictions of the community’s lawmakers.” 1068 The enquiry into reasonableness in the 
context of unlawfulness can accommodate only the generic facts or the physical act, 
assessed in terms of the constitutional rights, where the “reasonable man” test has 
become increasingly subjectivized to take into account a number of the personal 
qualities of the accused. Although there is a need for flexibility in the area of the 
justification grounds and this makes objectivity more elusive, there are has to be clear 
limits. Judges are expected to make value judgments in this context all the time, when 
they assess the extent to which an accused’s conduct falls within the limits of self-
defence. The realm of objectivity is in the recognition of pre-existing limits. The use of 
discretion in applying such pre-existing rules is well-established, but it needs to be 
established if it is adequately countenanced.1069 It is submitted that it is not. The  
 
                                               
1066 See 244 ibid. 
 
1067 See chapter 2 n 97 for examples of such cases. 
 
1068 Flack supra (n 97) 82. 
 




concept fails to be objectivized sufficiently, and furthermore, judges are granted too 
much discretion in this respect. The Engelbrecht 1070 case is a clear example of such 
unfettered discretion. While the Constitution does not establish a hierarchy of rights, 
judges and academics have acknowledged that some rights are more foundational, 
constituting a core of rights from which others are derived. The right to life is 
antecedent to all other rights in the Constitution.1071 Surely the abuser’s right to his life 
supercedes the abused woman’s right to dignity or bodily integrity. While it could be 
stated that all three rights are of great importance, from an objective standpoint, 1072 
these rights have limitations and to meet constitutional muster, must be linked closely 
to its purpose.1073 As Ally and Viljoen have noted “the use of violence especially lethal 
force, can only be justified if it is necessary (that is, if it is the only means to avoid 
death or grievous bodily harm).” 1074 Perhaps from the abused woman’s position 1075 
she was correct to kill her abuser. But it is submitted, that she had no way of knowing 
whether her abuser would have killed her at that very moment. Indeed the abuse had 
been going on for some time. Therefore, there was less restrictive means of extricating 
herself from her situation. She could have called the police or left. Although an abused 
woman is not expected to flee her home, in terms of the Constitution, it is submitted 
that the abuser’s life takes precedence over the accused’s right to remain in her home. 
Not only did Satchwell J in Engelbrecht 1076 not correctly identify whether the  
                                               
1070 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 
1071 S v Makwanyane supra (n 132) at par [326]. 
 
1072 S v Makwanyane supra (n 132) at par [144]. 
 
1073 Section 36(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. Ally and Viljoen supra (n 
128) at 133 note that an important factor in this evaluation is the question whether less restrictive 
means are available to obtain the stated objectives. 
 
1074 Ally and Viljoen supra (n 128) 133. 
 
1075 Utilizing the test set out in the Engelbrecht supra (n 143) case. 
 
1076 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 261 
 
limitation on the accused’s rights were justifiable, 1077  but the court failed to take 
cognizance of established precedence. Interpretation or development of the common-
law requires that the court must promote the spirit, purport and, objects of the Bill of 
Rights, it is meant to adapt or correct applicable the applicable law to reflect common 
law, not to change it in its entirety. 1078  While proponents of “battered woman 
syndrome” have attempted to introduce such evidence in cases (including the 
Engelbrecht 1079 case) to explain the circumstances that may have impacted upon the 
woman’s conduct, it is submitted that South African courts in any event, already do this 
to a limited extent as a matter of course. Various factors such as the nature of the harm 
threatened, the genders of the parties, the means that were at the accused’s disposal, and 
their relative strengths are factors which the court would consider in assessing whether 
the killing was a reasonable response to the harm threatened.1080 It is submitted that 
since no single profile of a battered woman exists, it would be inadvisable to expect the 
court to go to the point of assessing whether the killing was a reasonable response for a 
battered woman.1081 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
1077 S v Walters supra (n 126) at par [26]. 
 
1078 Ally and Viljoen supra (n 128). 
 
1079 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 
1080 For a discussion of the factors taken into account as well as case law indicating these factors see 
chapter 2 at 56-57.  
 
1081 Reddi supra (n 1) 273. See also S v Ferreira supra (n 141) where the court held that the first 
accused’s decision to have the deceased killed by persons hired for that purpose, instead of leaving 
him, was explained by expert witnesses as being in keeping with “what experience and research” has 
indicated to occur with abused women. This the court maintained, should not be judged from a male 
perspective or an objective perspective but by the court locating itself, to the extent that was possible 
in the position of the woman concerned. The abused woman should therefore be treated with due 
regard for gender difference in order to achieve equality of judicial treatment (at 468A-B). Reddi 
supra (n 1) at 274 notes that there is nothing innovative about this approach in assessing the 
accused’s moral blameworthiness. What is however, problematic, is the statement that the court 
should locate itself, in the exact position of the accused. If this is the case, the accused couldn’t have 





5.2.1.1.5  The distinction between self-defence and putative self-defence 
Another problem that could result if the objective test does not sufficiently retain its 
objective character is that it will become increasingly difficult to distinguish between 
self-defence and putative self-defence. Consider for instance, the developments in the 
Canadian law of self-defence. In section 34(2) of the Canadian Code,1082  the term 
reasonable is expressly stipulated when determining the existence of the self-defence as 
well as determining the parameters of the accused’s conduct. In R v Nelson 1083 the 
court held that the term reasonable does not exclude factors that are beyond the 
accused’s control. 1084 It went on to note:  
 
“If the young age of an accused is properly to be taken into 
account in applying the standard of reasonableness, then it 
would also be proper, in my view, to take into account a 
condition of arrested intellectual or mental development. Both 
situations can result in an accused having a mental age clearly 
below that of an adult and may equally affect his or her 
perception of, and reaction to, events. Both, too, are beyond 
the control of the accused.” 1085 
 
The court went on to refer with approval to the comments made in the Canadian 
Supreme court case of R v Hill: 1086 
 
“What lessons are to be drawn from this review of the case-
law? I think it is clear that there is widespread agreement that 
the ordinary or reasonable person has a normal temperament  
 
                                               
1082 Canadian Criminal Code (1985). 
 
1083 (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 449 (Ont CA). For a discussion of case law prior to 1992, see R v Lavallee 
supra (n 153), discussed in chapter 4 at 188-194. 
 
1084  Labuschagne “Noodweer, Die Redelike Man en Misdaadelementologiese Dinamiek” (1996) 
Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeinse-Hollandse Reg 666 (own translation). 
 
1085 R v Nelson supra (n 1083) at 468. 
 




and level of self-control. It follows that the ordinary person is 
not exceptionally excitable, pugnacious or in a state of 
drunkenness. In terms of other characteristics of the ordinary 
person, it seems to me that the ‘collective good sense’ of the 
jury will naturally lead it to ascribe to the ordinary person any 
general characteristics relevant to the provocation in question. 
For example, if the provocation is a racial slur, the jury will 
think of an ordinary person with the racial background that 
forms the substance of the insult. To this extent, particular 
characteristics will be ascribed to the ordinary person. Indeed, 
it would be impossible to conceptualize a sexless or ageless 
ordinary person. Features such as sex, age or race do not 
detract from a person’s characterization as ordinary. Thus 
particular characteristics that are not peculiar or idiosyncratic 
can be ascribed to an ordinary person without subverting the 
logic of the objective test…” 1087 
 
In R v Melaragni 1088  it was held that if the accused had private knowledge of his 
attacker, for example that the attacker is extremely aggressive, he is entitled to avail 
himself of such information when deciding whether or not to act in self-defence. 1089 
 
In R v Patel 1090 Lamer J (giving judgment on behalf of the majority) held that: 
 
“It can be seen from the wording of section 34(2) of the Code 
that there are three constituent elements of self-defence, when 
as here the victim has died: the existence of an unlawful 
assault; (2) a reasonable apprehension of a risk of death or 
grievous bodily harm, and (3) a reasonable belief that it is not 
possible to preserve oneself from harm except by killing the 
adversary. In all three cases the jury must seek to determine 
how the accused perceived the relevant facts and whether that 
perception was reasonable. Accordingly, this is an objective 
determination. With respect to the last two elements, this 
approach results from the language used in the Code…” 1091 
 
                                               
1087 Ibid at 468. See also R v Tutton (1989) 48 CCC (3d) 129 (SCC) 143, per Lamer J. 
 
1088 (1992) 76 (CCC) (3d) 78 (Ont. Court, GD). 
 
1089 Ibid at 82. 
 
1090 (1994) 87 (CCC) (3d) 97 (SCC). 
 




In light of section 34(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code, Lamer J went on to note: 
 
“There is thus no formal requirement that the danger be 
imminent. Imminence is only one of the factors which the jury 
should weigh in determining whether the accused had a 
reasonable apprehension of danger and a reasonable belief that 
she could not extricate herself otherwise than by killing the 
attacker.” 1092 
 
In R v Malott 1093 defence counsel argued that in light of previous abuse suffered at the 
hands of her husband, the accused had acted in self-defence. Although the accused was 
found guilty of attempted murder, L’Heureux-Dube’s separate finding (McLachlin J 
concurring) is of importance to abused women: “allowing expert evidence in 
connection with battered wife cases, can be considered as legal recognition that 
historically both the law and society may have treated women in general, and battered 
women in particular, unfairly.” 1094  L’Heureux-Dube went on to point out that by 
allowing such expert testimony, it is now accepted that a woman’s perception of what is 
reasonable is influenced by her gender and personal experiences.1095 She went on to 
state: 
 
“This legal development was significant, because it 
demonstrated a willingness to look at the whole context of a 
woman’s experience in order to inform the analysis of the 
particular events. But it is wrong to think of this development 
of the law as merely an example where an objective test – the 
requirement that an accused claiming self-defence must 
reasonably apprehend death or grievous bodily harm – has 
been modified to admit evidence of the subjective perceptions 
of a battered woman… The perspectives of women, which  
                                               
1092 R v Patel supra (n 1090) at 8. 
 
1093 R v Malott supra (n 156). 
 
1094 Ibid at 469. 
 
1095 Labuschagne “Die Mishandelde Vrou-Sindroom, Die Redelike Persoon-Standaard en die Grense 





have historically been ignored, must now equally inform the 
‘objective’ standard of the reasonable person in relation to 
self-defence.” 1096 
 
Later, L’Heureux-Dube goes on to stipulate that the reasonable woman standard as 
another component of the reasonable person standard, in such cases must be taken into 
consideration.1097 Regarding the inquiry into moral blameworthiness, the focus must be 
on the reasonableness of her actions within the context of her personal experience, as 
well as her experience as a woman, and not on her status as an abused woman and the 
fact that she suffered from battered woman syndrome. 1098 She went on to note: 
 
“By emphasizing a woman’s ‘learned helplessness’, her 
dependence, her victimization, and her low self-esteem, in 
order to establish that she suffers from ‘battered woman 
syndrome’ the legal debate shifts from the objective rationality 
of her actions to preserve her own life to those personal 
inadequacies which apparently explain her failure to flee from 
her abuser. Such emphasis comports too well with society’s 
stereotypes about women. Therefore, it should be scrupulously 
avoided because it only serves to undermine the important 
advancements achieved by the decision in Lavallee.” 1099 
 
Various factors within the social as well as other types of context in which the abused 
woman finds herself, can play a role in answering the question why she did not leave her 
abuser 1100  “which do not focus on those characteristics most consistent with 
stereotypes”.1101 These factors include her economic dependency, children that have to be 
looked after, pressure to keep the family unit in tact, protecting the children against 
abuse, being afraid that she may lose custody of the children, inability to access social  
                                               
1096 R v Malott supra (n 156) at 470-471. 
 




1099 R v Malott supra (n 156) 472. 
 
1100 R v Malott supra (n 156) 472-473. 
 




support and the fear that the abuse will continue despite the fact that the woman has left 
her abuser. 1102 L’Heureux-Dube goes on to conclude: 
 
“Where the reasonableness of a battered woman’s belief is at 
issue in a criminal case, a judge and jury should be made to 
appreciate that a battered woman’s experiences are both 
individualized, based on her own history and relationships, as 
well as shared with other women, within the context of a 
society and a legal system which has historically undervalued 
women’s experiences are generally outside the common 
understanding of the average judge and juror, and that they 
should be presented in such a way as to focus on the 
reasonableness of the woman’s actions, without relying on old 
or new stereotypes about battered women.” 1103 
 
By insisting on a reasonable woman standard and the (partial) practical realization 
thereof by means of allowing expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome in 
determining requirements and boundaries of self-defence by means of the 
reasonableness requirement, it would appear as if the reasonable person is starting to 
lose its objective nature: 
 
“The anthropo-legal universal process of deconcretisation is 
incessantly eroding the so-called foundation of private defence 
in criminal law. Reference in this regard is made to subjective 
factors pertaining to the person being attacked as well as 






                                               
1102 R v Malott supra (n 156) 473. 
 
1103 R v Malott supra (n 156) 473. 
 
1104  Labuschagne “Die Proses van Dekonkretisering van Noodweer in die Strafreg: ‘n 




A similar trend has been followed in American law 1105  and is beginning to be 
demonstrated in the South African law of self-defence. 1106 The end result of such an 
approach is that: 
 
“It is predicted that the legal requirements for private defence 
will eventually be equated with those currently required for 
putative private defence.” 1107 
 
Not only is this process of deconcretisation inevitable, but it will eventually result in the 
criminal law element of unlawfulness becoming redundant. 1108 
 
5.2.1.1.6  The impact of moving towards a normative concept of fault 
It is submitted that such an approach is to be avoided at all costs for the following 
reasons. Firstly, South African criminal law is traditionally connected with the 
psychological approach which separates the enquiry into criminal liability into two 
distinct components, each with their own focus: 
 
“The psychological theory is irreconcilable with the 
indisputable presence of subjective components in the concept 
of wrongdoing (definitional elements plus unlawfulness). The 
psychological theory’s premise is that culpability is the 




                                               
1105 For a discussion of a move towards subjective standards of self-defence see chapter 4 at 181-187. 
Similarly, the developments in the English law of self-defence are also demonstrating a move 
towards more subjectivized approach to self-defence. See chapter 3 at 116-120. 
 
1106 For a discussion of the more subjectivized reasonable person test see chapter 2 at 39-41. See also the 
case of S v T supra (n 151) in chapter 2 at n 151. 
 
1107  Labuschagne supra (n 1104) 68 (own translation). Labuschagne in “Geregtigheidse 
Misdaadelementologie en ‘n Subjektiewe Omskrywing van Noodweer: Opmerkinge oor Onlangse 
Ontwikkeling in die Engelse en Skotse Reg” (2003) Obiter 103 at 120 states that the whole objective 
test is excessive since the final question is based on what the person acting in self-defence thought. 
Therefore, why not just ask this question in the first place (own translation). 
 








“wrongdoing (the unlawful act) in turn comprises all the 
‘external’ (objective) requirements”. 1110 
 
According to normative theory of fault, culpability lies in the blameworthiness with 
which the unlawful act was committed. In this case the accused is personally blamed 
since he committed an act which met the definition of the proscription, despite being 
capable of acting differently. In terms of such an approach, “culpability is not a state of 
mind, but an evaluation of X’s intention. It is a “negative value judgment on the 
commission of an unlawful act.” 1111 Blame is based on the following presuppositions: 
(1) the accused knew or could have known the circumstances which made her act 
correspond to the definition of the proscription and rendered it unlawful; (2) she was 
capable of acting in accordance with the law; (3) despite this she proceeded with the 
act, (4) in the circumstances under which the law could have expected her to act 
differently.1112 
 
In determining whether the accused’s conduct complies with requirement (4), the 
question to be decided is whether somebody else in the accused’s position would have 
withstood the pressure to commit the wrongful act. If the answer is yes, then the 
accused is to be blamed and the culpability requirement is satisfied. The test is  
                                               
1109 Snyman “Private defence in criminal law - an unwarranted raising of the test of reasonableness - S v 
Dougherty 2003 (2) SACR 36 (W) (2004) Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
327. 
 
1110 Ibid. Snyman Criminal Law (4th ed) (2002) at 142 notes that it affords a sounder explanation of the 
culpability requirement as well as a sounder basis for an acceptable classification of the requirements 
for criminal law. 
 
1111 Snyman supra (n 25) 152 (own translation). 
 




normative. The accused is not measured by her own standards, for to apply such a test 
would mean that it would be very difficult to blame a bad person for her wrongful 
actions. The question is what the law would expect the average person in the accused’s 
situation to do.1113 
 
Necessity in the form of coercion provides a useful example of the application of this 
test. Z orders X to kill Y and threatens to kill him if he refuses to execute the order. If X 
does kill Y, he acts unlawfully (due to the fact that killing another person even under 
coercion is a violation of material legal norms), but without culpability, since 
considering that the average person is not willing to sacrifice his life for another, it 
cannot be expected of X to act differently. Since X killed Y intentionally and 
unlawfully, on the application of the psychological theory of culpability, X would have 
been convicted of murder, but in terms of the normative theory of culpability, X is not 
guilty since he is not blameworthy.1114 
 
Since intention forms part of the concept of wrongdoing, the object of the blame 
includes this intention. 1115  While X’s will or intention “plays” a role in the 
determination of blame, it is not, according to the normative theory, the essence of 
culpability, Rather, the essence of culpability is blameworthiness. While the 
psychological theory regards awareness the of unlawfulness as forming part of 
intention, 1116 the normative theory draws a sharp distinction between intention 1117 and 
awareness of unlawfulness: intention plays a role in determining both wrongdoing and  
                                               
1113 Ibid. 
 
1114 Snyman supra (n 25) 155. 
 
1115 Snyman supra (n 1110) 141. 
 
1116 Snyman supra (n 1110) 142. 
 
1117 In the sense of colourless intention. 
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culpability, whereas the awareness of unlawfulness comes into the picture only when 
determining culpability, and therefore forms one of the cornerstones of the concept of 
culpability. 1118 
 
A move towards a normative concept of fault would ultimately: 
 
“render South African criminal law heir to vagueness, 
complexities, controversy, and contradictions, but would also 
be inconsistent and irreconcilable with some of its 
fundamental tenets and notions.” 1119 
 
This would take the following form: 
 
“First, it confuses and identifies criminal fault with various 
other elements of the crime and the aims and objects of 
criminal punishment; secondly, it confuses and identifies 
criminal fault with criminal liability, thus rendering the fault 
requirement tautologous and redundant and leaving intention 
and negligence in the air, thirdly, it transforms and expands 
crimes of intention to crimes of negligence and substitutes the 
specific notions of intention and negligence with a general 
notion of fault; and finally it subverts or abandons the fault 
requirement by partially or wholly substituting it with policy 
considerations and general prevention. Insofar as intention has 
a purely psychological content while negligence has a 
predominantly normative content, forcing both intention and 
negligence under a single normative fault umbrella goes as 
much against the grain of South African criminal practice as 
forcing both intention and negligence under a single 




                                                                                                                                       
 
1118 Snyman supra (n 1110) 142. 
 
1119 Van Oosten “The Psychological fault concept versus the normative fault concept: Quo vadis South 
African Criminal Law?” (1995) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeinse-Hollandse Reg 369. 
 




5.2.1.1.7  Factors which should qualify the objective test for self-defence 
In respect of unlawfulness (i.e. private defence) the test is objective and should remain 
this way. The test to determine whether a defender’s defensive conduct is reasonable 
has never been a high 1121 or low standard but simply a reasonable one.1122 It is a 
relative concept depending on the circumstances of each case.1123 It is submitted that 
advocates of the battered woman syndrome have stretched the bounds of self-defence 
by asserting “that all the actor’s subjective peculiarities should be transposed upon the 
hypothetical reasonable person”.1124 The following factors should be utilized to qualify 
the objective test for self-defence in respect of battered women: 
 
• gender (the fact that she is female) 
• age 
• relative strength of parties (the fact that the woman is under normal circumstances 
the weaker sex and therefore may have to use weapons to defend herself) 
• nature of the threat 
 
 
                                               
1121 Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 SACR 197 (SCA); S v MacKinnon 1995 (2) 
SACR 1 (CC) and Exparte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters supra (n 126); S v 
Dougherty supra (n 223) 49h-i). 
 
1122 Rosen supra (n 21) at 409 submits: “[W]hile the criminal law does send out moral and, possibly, 
utilitarian messages, it is concerned primarily with determining fault after the fact. Thus one can 
reasonably say that an action is justified if it is an action that the law does not choose to punish”. See 
further Dressler “Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model 
Penal Code (1988) Rutgers Law Journal at 675 (who states that justified conduct is right, desirable, 
warranted, permissible, or at least tolerable conduct). Rosen supra (n 21) goes on to state that “[in] 
order to be justified the choice the actor makes need not be the best of all possible choices, or even 
the one choice that society prefers. It merely must be one that society believes should not be 
punished” (at 409). In this respect see further Fletcher “The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A 
Reply to Mr. Robinson” (1975) University of California Law Review at 306 (who states that self-
defence appears to be better conceived as necessary evil rather than as the bringing about of a state 
of affairs that is affirmatively desirable). 
 
1123 Snyman supra (n 1109) 330. 
 




• history of the violence between the abuser and the abused 
• persistence of the attack (the period of time over which the attack took place will 
play an important role, especially in determining imminence and proportionality) 
• location of the attack 
• attempts made to escape the abuse 
• value of the interest threatened 1125 
 
Any reference to mental and emotional characteristics, including recognized 
psychological disorder symptoms (such as “battered woman syndrome”, which is a 
subcategory of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) should not be included in qualifying the 
objective test. 1126 As Reddi has noted: 
 
 “It would be better for the court to ask whether a reasonable 
person in similar (but not all) of the circumstances would have 
considered the threat to be imminent. This is the standard that 
is already used in South African law. It is therefore submitted 
that no valuable purpose can be served in our law by admitting 
battered woman syndrome evidence with regard to the 
appraisal of harm aspect of self-defence under South African 
law”. 1127 
 
It is submitted that on the basis of the criterion set out above, a battered woman will not 
be able to successfully plead self-defence. In respect of the value of the interest 
threatened, 1128 it could be submitted that the abused woman is entitled to act to save 
her life where the threat is imminent. However in terms of the actio libera in causa  
 
                                               
1125 See chapter 2 at n 232 and n 233 for examples of case law that make use of these factors. 
 
1126 This view is supported by South African writers such as Burchell and Hunt supra (n 84) 276 and De 
Wet and Swanepoel supra (n 76) 69. 
 
1127 Reddi supra (n 1) 270-271.  
 




rule,1129 it is submitted that this constitutional right ought to be curtailed. Consider a 
factual situation similar to that of S v Norman.1130 In this case Judy Norman stayed with 
her abusive husband for 20 years. But now imagine that Judy killed her husband in a 
confrontational situation (i.e. where the attack was imminent). A woman who stays in 
an abusive relationship for 20 years, cannot, when an attack is taking place (that is to 
say, it is imminent in the traditional sense), state that she killed her abuser because she 
feared for her life. She had been attacked numerous times before. What makes this time 
different from the other times. She stayed, knowing that a future attack was a very real 
likelihood. The persistence of the attack (over 20 years) would militate against her 
claim of self-defence. In respect of putative self-defence, the abused woman’s 
perspective and what she knew is critical. If this is true, then she cannot reasonably 
claim that she knew her abuser would kill her. What would make this occasion, 
different from the others. If however, the abused woman “snapped” and really believed 
that her abuser would kill her, then she should be pleading non-pathological incapacity 
instead. 1131 
 
5.2.1.1.8  Implications of using an objective test in unlawfulness and negligence 
There are two shortcomings to utilizing an objective test in excluding unlawfulness in 
the case of self-defence. Firstly, this approach tends to be unrealistic, simply because a 
person’s life cannot be quantified in terms of pre-established formulas. 1132 Secondly, 
the very same test which is used to assess negligence in South African law (i.e.  
                                               
1129  Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) 109: “where a person through her own conduct, created a 
potentially dangerous situation, she is under a legal duty to prevent the danger from materializing.” 
 
1130 S v Norman supra (n 813). However, it should be noted that in this case, the jury was not allowed to 
consider the merits of self-defence, since she was not in a life threatening situation at the exact 
moment she killed her husband (at 594). Judy Norman was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 
 
1131 Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) 109. 
 




external, physical rather than internal, psychological circumstances) 1133 is now being 
utilized to determine unlawfulness. 1134  This leads to confusion between the fault 
requirement and unlawfulness, as well as causing the grounds which exclude fault to be 
associated with justification grounds. 1135 A further problem with utilizing the objective 
test, especially in the case of negligence fault criterion, is that in the case of all 
common-law crimes and statutory crimes require intention. This raises the point as to 
what the position would be if the accused in the case of acting negligently, intentionally 
killed his attacker. Therefore, must such negligence be reasonable for the accused to 
avail himself of self-defence. In such a case it could be argued that a reasonable person 
in the position of the accused would not have acted negligently and therefore the 
accused exceeded the bounds of self-defence. However, on the basis of what has just 
been said about the reasonable man, it is in no way convincing.1136 
 
Furthermore, it can be shown that should the accused’s negligence be considered a 
ground excluding fault, he can escape liability without his mistake of fact having to be  
                                               
1133 Burchell and Hunt supra (n 84) at 193: “the court enquires whether the reasonable man in the 
situation of the accused would have guarded against the consequence in question.” 
 
1134 Does this now mean that negligence would have to be tested subjectively? The case of S v Ngema 
(1992) (2) SACR 651 (D) illustrates that the strictly objective approach in cases of culpable 
homicide should not be followed: “[I]t is clear that the days of full-blown objectivism, as exampled 
by R v Mbombela supra (n 170) at 272) are past, and some evidence of subjectivizing the test for 
negligence is apparent… One must test negligence by the touchstone of the reasonable person of the 
same background and educational level, culture, sex and dare I say it- race of the accused. The 
further individual peculiarities of the accused alone must, it seems to me, be disregarded.” However, 
there are problems in testing negligence by means of a subjective test. Consider Milton’s supra (n 
117) statement at 386: “If a hot-tempered individual loses control of himself and (lacking intent to 
kill) causes death, he cannot be convicted of culpable homicide, for if we are to judge him by his 
own characteristics he has acted predictably and in accordance with the disposition which a variety 
of background influences have shaped.” But as Louw in “S v Ngema 1992 (2) SACR 651 (D) The 
reasonable man and the tikoloshe” (1993) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 361 at 364 has 
noted that: “[I]f further individual peculiarities of the accused alone must…be disregarded then the 
potential for unfairness remains…The accused’s conduct should be measured against what would be 
reasonable from him to do in the circumstances in terms of his own capabilities.”  
 







reasonable. 1137 Even if the reasonable man test is replaced with a subjective test for 
fault in respect of intent, and the accused is able to escape criminal liability on this 
basis, it only means that in terms of crimes requiring intention, there are various tests 
for establishing fault criterion at different stages.1138 
 
In terms of strict liability, the shortcomings of the reasonable man test are more 
apparent. Since fault in the case of strict liability is not a requirement for criminal 
liability, it is difficult to appreciate what applicability the reasonable man test would 
have here. With strict liability, the lawmakers specifically intended that there was a 
separation of fault as an element of the crime, and to now require a negligence test for 
justification grounds, would introduce fault via the “backdoor” and further confuse the 
meaning in that capacity.1139 In conclusion, not only have some courts considered it a 
step backwards in adopting an objective test for unlawfulness,1140 but it also impacts the 
question of whether self-defence is a ground excluding fault, but whether mistake of 
fact, if being a justification ground, whether it would lead to the question of 
unlawfulness being exempt from the reasonable man’s viewpoint or influence.1141 
 
5.2.1.2  Commenced or imminent 
5.2.1.2.1 Introduction 
The imminence requirement is at the heart of the justification of self-defence. The state 
is not always competent (whether through police or courts) to provide immediate and  







1140 S v Rabodila (1974) (3) SA 324 (O) 325; S v Ntuli supra (n 141) 436; S v Pretorius (1975) (2) SA 
85 (SWA) 89; S v Nyokong (1975) (3) SA 792 (O) 794 and S v Motleleni supra (n 140) at 406. 
 




necessary protection due to every citizen with respect to their legal rights and interests. 
In such a case it is that individual’s inherent right 1142 accepted by all law, both natural 
and civil 1143 to resort to private defence providing the attack is imminent or about to 
take place.1144 By requiring imminence, there is an intrinsic limitation on the scope of 
self-defence. 1145 However, specific self-defence cases dealing with battered woman 
scenarios have indicated that the traditional imminence requirement does not 
adequately cater for these situations. One of the most important problems faced by 
battered women who kill their abusers, is that they kill in non-confrontational situations 
where their claims are often rejected on the ground that it is unreasonable to believe 
that such an attack is imminent. Ossification of specific rules of self-defence have been 
predicated on what a reasonable response to deadly force might be, and this is based on 
the paradigm of an encounter between two men of roughly equal physical size and 
ability. The battered woman is clearly disadvantaged: a woman’s reasonable response 
to physical violence is likely to be different from a man’s because of her size, strength 
and socialization. 1146  In light of this consideration, it is not unexpected that the 
imminence requirement has been one of the central points of academic and judicial 
criticism and has led judges and legal commentators to blur the edges of self-defence 
law in order to defend women’s actions. 
                                               
1142 Cicero Pro Milone 4: “Natural reason permits one to defend oneself against danger”. 
 
1143 Van der Keessel supra (n 245) 48 811.  
 
1144  Early South African common law (see chapter 2 at 36-40) as well as modern case law (S v 
Mogolwane supra (n 193)) have expounded a coherent statement of the elements of self-defence 
including imminence as a core requirement. For a discussion of the imminence requirement in South 
African case law see chapter 2 at 46-48 supra. For a discussion of the imminence requirement in 
English law see chapter 3 at 122-125 and American law chapter 4 at 194-198 supra. 
 
1145 Rosen supra (n 21) 31. 
 
1146 See Mitchell “Note: Does wife abuse justify homicide” (1978) Wayne Law Review 1705 at 1725 
(arguing that in wife abuse cases, self-defence is “stretched beyond [its] legal limits.” See further 
Hatcher supra (n 1038) at 22 where a traditional understanding of the elements of self-defence do not 
fit with a battered woman’s experience in which imminence, reasonableness, proportionality, and 




While there have been calls for the abolition of the imminence requirement in this 
respect, 1147 the obvious problem with such an approach is that something must stand in 
its stead to distinguish legitimate cases of self-defence from illegitimate ones.1148  
 
5.2.1.2.1.2  Replacing imminence with necessity 
Some theorists have suggested that the way to solve the imminence dilemma is to focus 
on necessity. Schopp et al makes the case for necessity as follows: 
 
“The central question involves the appropriate relationship 
between the necessity and imminence requirements. A 
standard allowing defensive force only when immediately 
necessary to prevent unlawful harm treats imminence of harm 
as a factor regarding necessity. That is the defensive force is 
justified only if necessary to prevent unlawful harm, and the 
imminence of that unlawful harm contributes to but does not 
completely determine the judgment of necessity. In unusual 
circumstances such as those confronted by... some battered 
women, defensive force may be immediately necessary to 
prevent unlawful harm, although that harm is not yet 
imminent. In these cases, imminence of harm does not serve 
as a decisive factor in the determination of necessity. A 
standard allowing defensive force only when necessary to 
prevent an imminent harm, in contrast, treats imminence of 
harm as an independent requirement for justified force in that 
the force must be necessary to prevent delayed unlawful 




                                               
1147 Schulhofer “The Gender Question in Criminal Law” (1990) Society, Philosophy and Policy 105 at 
127 arguing that the distinctive features of battering situations render the imminence requirement 
irrelevant. Schulhofer notes that this is consistent with the work of Dr. Lenore Walker who posited 
the theoretical construct i.e. cycle of violence which refers to a three stage recurrent pattern – 
“tension-building”, “acute battering”, and “loving contrition” that characterizes these relationships. 
The recurrent, yet unpredictable, nature of violence of violence plays a key role in explaining why a 
battered woman may not leave an abusive relationship. In addition, Seligman’s theory of learned 
helplessness explains the woman’s sense of ‘psychological paralysis. That is given the repetitive, yet 
unpredictable, nature of violence, the woman is eventually reduced to a state of perpetual fear and 
perceives that there is little she can do to alter her situation (Schulhofer supra at 127, citing Walker 
supra (n 3) at 65-70). 
 
1148 Veinsreideris “The Prospective effects of modifying existing law to accommodate preemptive self-
defense by battered women” (2000) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 3. See also Robinson 
Criminal Law Defenses (1984) at ss 131 (C) 132 (which includes eliminating imminence as a 
condition in totality but then it would function as a factor to be considered but would possess no 




opportunity to prevent such harm.” 1149 
 
They go on to note: 
 
“[S]ome writers interpret necessity as the core of self-defence 
doctrine. Imminence of harm remains consistent with this 
theoretical foundation when it serves as a factor regarding 
judgments of necessity because in most circumstances the 
judgment that non-violent alternative will suffice is more 
likely to be accurate regarding imminent harm than a remote 
one. Imminence of harm can undermine these justificatory 
theories, however, if it is accepted as an independent 
requirement of the defence. In short, imminence of harm can 
promote the underlying justifications of self-defence when it 
serves as a factor to be considered in making judgments of 
necessity, but it can undermine those if it is accepted as an 
independent requirement in addition to necessity. For these 
reasons, the Model Penal Code and some commentators 
advocate some variation on the ‘immediately necessary’ 
formulation rather than ‘necessity and imminence.” 1150 
 
Replacing imminence with necessity would allow the judge to consider evidence about 
prior abuse and threats as well as testimony about battered woman syndrome not only 
in the context of why the woman did not leave,1151 but also in determining whether the  
                                               
1149 Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan supra (n 844) 67-69. Theorists have argued that imminence should be 
abandoned because the necessity requirement does all the moral heavy lifting. They argue that 
imminence just helps establish necessity. See for example Fletcher supra (n 1003) 553 at 561 takes 
the view that necessity should at least be an absolute requirement. See further Burke supra (n 1030) 
at 279 where she states that “because the requirement of imminence is an imperfect proxy to ensure 
that a defendant’s use of force is necessary, a better standard would require that the use of force be 
necessary”. Murdoch in his article “Is Imminence Really Necessity? Reconciling Traditional Self-
Defense Doctrine with the Battered Woman Syndrome” (2000) Northern Illinois University Law 
Review 191 at 217 states that: “whether a killing was necessary is a question of fact. Eliminating the 
imminence requirement from self-defense merely allows juries to realistically consider, given the 
totality of the facts of any given situation, whether the use of defensive force was necessary.”  
 
1150 Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan supra (n 844) 67-69. 
 
1151 Rosen “On Self-defense, Imminence, and Women who kill their abusers” (1993) North Carolina 
Law Review 387 at 406. Murdoch supra (n 1149) at 213-214 notes that in respect of non-
confrontational killings, necessity has two bases in these situations. First, learned helplessness, a 
characteristic of battered woman syndrome limits a battered woman’s ability to act. Second, 
society’s ineffectiveness in intervening in these situations makes reliance on outside assistance at 
least dubious. For example, the case of S v Norman supra (n 813) exemplifies these principles. In 
this case the defence presented expert testimony that Mrs. Norman exhibited characteristic of 
Battered Woman Syndrome including learned helplessness (at 11). Learned helplessness results in a 
loss by the battering victim of the ability to take steps necessary to protect herself from further 
abuse. This condition leads to passivity and the inability to realistically assess danger. Even if an 
opportunity to escape the situation presents itself, the victim of battering may fail to take advantage 
of it. This condition has important implications for the doctrine of self-defence. Necessity entails a 
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abuse and threats produced a reasonable fear of death. In appropriate cases, the judge 
would be allowed to consider evidence of the availability and efficacy of alternatives to 
the use of lethal force to kill a batterer in non-confrontational setting as well as the 
woman’s knowledge of these alternatives as these are indisputably relevant.1152 
 
However, such an approach could be problematic. Firstly, if the traditional justification 
of necessity replaces the imminence requirement, a typical battered spouse may not be 
able to escape liability in every case. The necessity defense provides that there must 
have been no adequate alternative to act. Thus Walker’s battered woman syndrome fails 
to provide an acceptable explanation for why the battered woman kills during a non- 
confrontational moment. If the cycle theory of violence is to be accepted, then it has to 
be accepted that the abused woman endures a continuous and heightened fear of abuse, 
even if her abuser is sleeping.1153 Furthermore, if the theory of learned helplessness is 
to be believed, then it has to be accepted that an abused woman not only lives in a 
constant state of terror, but also suffers from a cognitive incapacity to recognize any  
                                                                                                                                       
lack of feasible alternatives. If because of the condition of learned helplessness, a battering victim is 
unable to take measures to protect herself short of using deadly force, the alternative measures are 
not feasible. Furthermore, because learned helplessness occurs due to continued abuse, the batterer is 
responsible for creating the condition. The parallel to traditional self-defence situations is clear, 
when a threatened harm is imminent, the abuser has limited his intended victims choice of action to 
one option because that is the only choice available due to temporal considerations”. 
 
1152  Sebok in his article “Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense demand too much?” (1996) 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 725 at 748. 
 
1153 Sebok supra (n 1152) notes that: “while the battered woman’s ‘epistemic’ situation vis a vis her 
batterer due to privileged information she has on the batterer on the basis of an intimate relationship 
with him supports the claim that battered women are in a ‘good position to predict their batterers’ 
violence, but it does not support the conclusion that a battered woman’s position is good enough to 
predict that it is highly probable that the batterer will inflict grievous bodily harm on her. The reason 
the battered woman’s beliefs are held to be reasonable are based on her ‘extra knowledge’ not extra 
fear. Thus, if we believe that a battered woman can be wrong about her sincerely held beliefs, and 
we believe that an objective observer can determine either that battered woman’s sincerely held yet 
wrong belief was formed unreasonably, then there must be some empirically describable set of facts 
that would characterize the conditions under which an observer would find that the battered 
woman’s claim to epistemic privilege is warranted. One possible set of facts is the fact of her 
condition: her battery. But we must be careful about conflating a claim about injury with a claim 
about expertise (that the probable validity of a prediction by the battered woman about her husband 
inflicting harm is high). To accept such conflation without more evidence would simply reproduce a 
collapse into subjectivity Ripstein was trying to avoid when he rejected the claim that the proper test 




method of escape. It would then follow that the abused woman would remain passive 
even when her abuser is calm or asleep.1154 
 
5.2.1.2.1.3  An “immediately necessary” standard? 
If necessity remains part of the elements constituting self-defence, imminence which is 
merely intended as an exact expression of this standard does no work. Robinson has 
noted that: 
“although the word ‘imminent’ appears to modify the nature 
of the triggering conditions, it seems, and the drafters of the 
Model Penal Code agree, that the restriction is more properly 
viewed as a modification of the necessity requirement. That is, 
as a practical matter actions taken in the absence of an 
imminent threat may not be necessary”. 1155 
 
The correct application of this necessity element would appear sufficient to thwart 
possible abuse of self-defence in cases where the use of force is not imminent.1156 To 
fully appreciate the relationship between imminence and necessity, it becomes 
necessary to consider Robinson’s hypothetical hostage scenario: 
 
 “Suppose A kidnaps and confines D with the announced 
intention of killing him one week later. D has an opportunity 
to kill A and escape each morning as A brings him his daily 
ration. Taken literally, the imminence requirement would  
 
                                               
1154 While Walker supra (n 7) submits that a battered woman sometimes strikes back during a period of 
calm, knowing that the tension is building toward towards another acute battering incident, where 
this time she may die (at 142). Burke suggests this rebuttal to the argument does little to explain how 
women suddenly break from their helplessness. Furthermore, although it suggests why a battered 
woman may feel justified in using force in the absence of an imminent threat, Walker’s assertion 
undermines the argument that battered women reasonably perceive the coming threat as imminent 
(at 245-246). Further, Walker has difficulty explaining why the woman’s cognitive priority suddenly 
shifts from survival skills to escape skills. Thus, if battered woman has overcome her learned 
helplessness and can appreciate exit options, then the syndrome fails to explain why she exercises 
the option of deadly force. Additionally if Walker’s explanation for the shift from passivity to action 
is that the woman’s emotions have shifted to anger and disgust then the use of force would appear to 
be out of revenge rather than the need for self-protection (Burke supra (n 1030) 246-247). 
 
1155 Robinson supra (n 1148) 131 (b) (3) at 76. 
 




prevent D from using deadly force in self-defense until A is 
standing over him with a knife”.1157 
 
Robinson answers this question in the negative: 
 
“If the concern of the limitation is to exclude threats of harm 
that are too remote to require a response, the problem is not 
adequately handled by requiring immediacy of the threat but 
the immediacy of the response necessary in defense. If a 
threatened harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the 
intended victim waits until the last moment, the principle of 
self-defense must permit him to act earlier – as early as is 
required to defend himself effectively”. 1158 
 
In closing, Robinson notes that what is important is not the immediacy of the attack, but 
the immediate necessity of a response to an impending attack. Similarly, the MPC has 
offered its own version of the immediately necessary standard:  
 
 
“The issue of force upon another person is justifiable when the 
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the 
purpose of preventing the use of unlawful force by such other 
person on the present occasion” 1159 
                                               
1157 Robinson supra (n 1148) section 131 (c) (1) 78. Diamond in his article “To Have but not To Hold: 
Can ‘Resistance Against Kidnapping’ Justify Lethal Self-Defense Against Incapacitated Batterers” 
(2002) Columbia Law Review has suggested that the issue to address is not so much whether 
battered women must face an imminent threat of serious bodily harm before they kill, but how 
closely their situations resemble those of kidnap victims. To the extent that they do, the imminence 
requirement is already vitiated (at 758). This would offer a better theoretical basis for relaxing the 
imminence requirement than has existed and it would allow for distinctions between better and 
worse claims of justifications by focusing on the prime issue related to battering: control over 
another (at 760). Thus the significant benefit of applying a viable theory of self-defence to 
kidnapping in some battered woman cases is a subtle one: such a theory speaks directly to and 
requires evidence regarding the previous context of reactions between batterer and battered, for it is 
that context which must be relied upon to establish the presence of kidnapping. Where the limitation 
of the woman’s ability to escape from her batterer is at issue this defence cuts the knot which binds 
non-confrontational cases to the debate over imminence (at 771-772). While viewed from this 
perspective, the effects of coercive control are important, it is important to take into account other 




1159 MPC ss 3.04 (1) (1985). Some scholars are of the view that this formulation correctly casts the 
balance between defenders and aggressors. See for example Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan supra (n 
844) at 69, states that “Immediate necessity, not imminence of harm, should be considered essential 
to self-defense claims, including those asserted by battered women”. Schulhofer supra (n 886) at 127 
states that “Imminence is relevant only because it helps identify cases where flight or legal 
intervention will be impossible, so that violent self-help becomes truly necessary. The decisive 
factor is necessity, not imminence per se. Thus, the proper approach is to require, as proposed in 
Model Penal Code 3.04, that the use of force be ‘immediately necessary on the present occasion’”. 
 282 
 
The problem with such a proposal is that “removed from the issue of reasonableness, 
there is little practical difference between the two standards.” 1160  Further, the 
elimination of imminence and the implementation of the immediately necessary 
standard does not necessarily signify that a court will always disregard imminence in an 
abused woman’s case. Quite the opposite: “[e]liminating the imminence requirement in 
a specific case does not mandate a specific verdict... Nor does its elimination make the 
question of imminence irrelevant. Imminence remains, as do the other factors in the 
case relevant to the court’s core enquiry.” 1161 Furthermore, one theorist’s empirical 
research suggests that a move from “imminent” to “immediately necessary” could 
actually harm the abused woman’s chances of relying on self-defence: “[a] battered 
woman accused in a ‘imminent’ jurisdiction is more likely than her counterpart in an 
‘immediate’ jurisdiction to get a jury instruction specifically on the relevance of the 
decedent’s past violence”. 1162 
 
5.2.1.2.14  The “immediately necessary” standard and self-preferential acts 
Theorists such as Ferzan have submitted that the “immediately necessary” standard 
obscures the important distinction between self-defence and other self-preferential  
                                                                                                                                       
Time in terms of the MPC “immediately necessary” formulation depends upon a reasonable belief in 
time, and controversies about time become controversies about the reasonable person and his view 
of time, objective or subjective. This satisfies the liberal ideal but it does little to resolve the meaning 
of necessity. This is but a single example of more general trend in which the criminal law has sought 
to attain neutrality by avoiding difficult normative questions. But as Fletcher states, the Model Penal 
Code was an experiment in a criminal law that purports to be precise and neutral but is without 
content, a contentlessness driven by a naive desire to prevent injustice by positive prescription 
(“Dogmas of the Model Penal Code” (1998) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 7-10. 
 
1160 Veinsredieris supra (n 1148) 5. Schulhofer supra (n 1147) at 127 fails to explain how the two 
temporal requirements really differ. See also Vandenbraak “Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive 
Force to Prevent Extramarital Assaults” (1979) Rut-Cambridge Law Journal 643 at 652-653, who 
finds little difference in the MPC formulation from the traditional imminence formation. 
Furthermore, the MPC definition of imminence fails to explain when Robinson’s captive must act. 
How long must the hostage wait to attack? Similarly Robinson also views the Model Penal Code’s 
formulation as insufficient: “Under such a formulation, D may have to wait until his last chance to 
kill A, that is, on the morning of his impending execution” (supra (n 1148) at 131 (c) (2) at 79). 
 






acts. 1163 Consider Ferzan’s 1164 reference to the two versions of the Regina v Dudley 
and Stephens 1165  case. In the first version as it actually happened, four men were 
trapped in a life boat with no food to eat for twenty days. Dudley made a decision to 
kill and eat Richard Parker, a cabin boy, who had consumed considerable amounts of 
seawater, and was on the verge of death.1166 The men then proceeded with their plan but 
were rescued and charged with Parker’s murder.1167 In determining whether the men 
had committed murder, the court noted that Parker was not a threat to the men, and they 
were therefore not acting in self-defence.1168 Because their claim did not sound in self-
defence, the justificatory claim would have to be necessity – that the accused had 
chosen the lesser evil. However, the court did not allow necessity to be a defence to 
homicide, a limitation which remains the rule in many jurisdictions. 1169 
 
Now consider a hypothetical scenario where the accused in such a case claimed self-
defence: the use of defensive force is premised upon an assessment of the probabilities 
and alternatives. For defensive force to be necessary, the defender must reasonably 
believe that harm is likely and that there is no alternative to the use of force. The 
difference between the two cases is that the while the first is a self-preferential killing, 
the second is self-defensive. All self-defence cases are instances of self- preference, but 
not all self-preferential actions constitute self-defence. What is distinctive about the  
                                               
1163 Veinsreideris supra (n 1148) 5-6. 
 
1164 Ferzan “Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq” (2004) Arizona Law Review 213 at 
247. 
 
1165 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1894). 
 
1166 Ibid at 273-274. 
 
1167 Regina v Dudley Stephens supra (n 1165) at 274. 
 
1168 Regina v Dudley Stephens supra (n 1165) 273. 
 




self-defence case is that the act of force is employed to ward off an unjust immediate 
threat.1170 On the other hand, in the first scenario, the act was not defensive as Parker 
did not pose a threat to the men. Ferzan thus states that self-defence is treated 
differently from other necessary acts of self-preservation. Although the killing may be 
objectionable, the right to self-defence cannot be denied. Current law reflects this 
sentiment.1171 Further, while the argument for the abandonment of imminence is so that 
a defender should be able to act as early as is necessary to defend herself effectively, 
this can create problems since the “immediately necessary” standard operates 
independently of the intentions, capabilities, or actions of a putative aggressor.1172 
 
Finally, not only does the necessity standard not require any recent intention or 
culpability on the part of the “aggressor” but it also treats the probability of threat and 
the availability of alternatives as even trade-offs. Therefore, a defender’s need to act 
may arise prior to the formation of a culpable intention by an aggressor. If the right to 
self-defence is simply a right to act as early as is necessary to defend oneself 
effectively, then the need to defend may arise much earlier than the initiation of any 
aggression. The question is how the “immediately necessary” act of self-defence can be 
distinguished from actions premised on the general justification of necessity. Both 
defences seem to begin and end with an assessment of need based on probabilities and 
alternatives. The need to act is the only morally relevant feature for both. Thus, the 
“immediately necessary” standard collapses all instances of self-preference into self- 
 
                                               
1170 Ferzan supra (n 1164) 247-248. 
 
1171 Ferzan supra (n 1164) 249. 
 
1172 As Ferzan supra (n 1164) states, necessity is the least recognized justification and many recognize 
that necessity is not a defence to murder (at 249). While South African law of necessity is derived 
from the principles of the common law, it is available as a general defence to criminal liability, 
whether a common-law crime or a statutory provision is in issue. See S v Adams 1979 (4) SA 793 




defence. 1173 Furthermore, requiring that the action be “immediately” necessary will not 
prevent such a collapse. As Robinson notes, the immediacy requirement does little to 
resolve the question of whether his hostage may attack early or must wait until the knife 
is at his throat.1174 
 
5.2.1.2.1.5  Imminence as a translator for necessity 
Rosen submits that necessity is not a temporal concept; rather, it expresses the 
underlying concept of inevitability or unavoidability. A necessity rule would ask 
whether the abused woman had any choice to act as she did in order to avoid the grave 
risk of death or seriously harm at the hands of her husband.1175 In Engelbrecht 1176 the 
court followed a similar line of reasoning. It noted that the dictionary references to  
                                               
1173 Ferzan supra (n 1164) 250. But see Kaufman “Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered Woman” 
(2007) New Criminal Law Review 342 at 353: “While Ferzan is right to insist on the distinction 
between imminence and necessity, she is wrong about the moral basis for the imminence rule. While 
it is true that self-defense is justified because it is a response to an unjust aggression, the problem is 
that an act of aggression does not suddenly become unjust at the very moment of imminence. 
Someone who is planning and preparing an unjust attack on me is already in the wrong and therefore 
one has the high moral ground against them even before he commences his attack. It is not plausible 
to insist that I must in every case wait until the attack is about to happen in order to be morally 
justified in taking action. The earlier one intervenes, the more likely it is that one is mistaken about 
the purported attacker’s intentions (and the less chance an aggressor will have to change his mind 
and withdraw his defensive attack).” Kaufman goes on to criticize Ferzan’s thesis: “Even more 
damaging to her thesis is the fact that as she recognizes the state is not prohibited from acting 
preemptively in the use of its police power. But this would make no sense if she were right that 
morality requires compelling evidence against her argument that morality does not in fact require 
police to wait until an attack is imminent, nor do we think that the police thereby become immoral 
aggressors. Quite the opposite. We insist that the police intervene as early as possible, once it is 
determined that an unjust aggression is under way. Its failure to do so is precisely the reason that has 
been given for allowing the battered women to use the morality of preemptive force. And this only 
raises the same question on which the proxy thesis founders is based: why should what is morally 
permissible for the state be impermissible for the individual?” 
 
1174 Ferzan supra (n 1164) 250-251. Ferzan supra (n 1164) suggests that one way to prevent such a 
conceptual collapse is by stating that the ‘immediately necessary’ standard does not fully encompass 
the right to self-defence. Rather, the right to self-defence includes not only the need to act, but also 
more specifically, the need to respond to aggression. The first part of the test need not fulfill the 
requirements of the second. While we may certainly want to require not only that the defender’s 
action be necessary but also that the threat is of a certain type. But this is the important point. The 
trouble with the “immediately necessary” standard is that it is singularly focused on the needs of the 
defender, thus ignoring the defining aspect of self-defence – that self-defence is an action against a 
threat (at 251-252). 
 
1175 Rosen supra (n 1151) 387. 
 




“imminence” include not only something which is about to “happen” but also 
behaviour which is “expected” or “foreseen” especially where there is a pattern or cycle 
of violence.1177  The court endorsed the view that where the abuse is frequent and 
regular such that it can be termed a “pattern” or a “cycle” of abuse then it would seem 
that the requirement of “imminence” should be extended to encompass that which is 
“inevitable.” 1178 
 
Rosen notes that the best that can be made for the concept of imminence is that it is a 
fairly good “translator” for the concept of necessity even though the former is not the 
latter. 1179 Rosen further notes that because the imminence requirement is “merely a 
translator for the necessity requirement”, the imminence requirement should be relaxed 
or eliminated in cases where necessity and imminence conflict: 
 
 
                                               
1177 Thus, to the extent that her failure to leave the abusive relationship earlier could be used in support 
of the position that she had been free to leave at the final moment, expert evidence could provide 
useful insights. (S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [355] at 135E-G). Judge Satchwell made 
reference to the writings of Stark “Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman 
Syndrome to coercive control” (1995) Albany Law Review 973 when explaining the psychological 
impact to domestic violence on the battered woman. The judge stated that it was important to look at 
the pattern of overall coercive control present in the relationships, rather than specific instances of 
such control. Research reflects that it may be control more than violence that creates a psychological 
profile of a battered woman (at par [168]). The judge went on to quote Stark: “Work with battered 
women outside the medical complex suggests that physical violence may not be the most significant 
factor about most battering relationships. In all probability, the clinical profile revealed by battered 
women reflects the fact that they have been subjected to an ongoing strategy of intimidation, 
isolation, and control that extends to tall areas of a woman’s life, including sexuality; material 
necessities; relations with family; children, and friends; and work. Sporadic, even severe violence 
makes this strategy of control effective. But the unique profile of ‘battered woman’ arises as much 
from the deprivation of liberty implied by coercion and control as it does form violence-induced 
trauma” (at 986). 
 
1178 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143) at par [349].  
 
1179 Rosen’s necessity rule expresses the same “but for” condition that forms the core of Ripstein’s 
inevitability rule. Ripstein supra (n 980) argues that the conception of “imminent harm,” is simply an 
instantiation of the legal concept of “unavoidable” harm and that current American self-defence law 
is designed to guarantee that no one must endure an reasonable risk of unavoidable harm (at 698-
704). He goes on to say that if imminence is nothing more than an instantiation of unavoidability, 
then it follows that if a battered woman has a reasonable belief that she will be seriously assaulted 




“In self-defence, the concept of imminence has no significance 
independent of the notion of necessity... [s]ociety does not 
require that the evil avoided be an imminent evil because it 
believes that an imminent evil is the only type of evil that 
should be avoided not, because an imminent threatened harm 
is necessarily worse than a non-imminent one. Rather, 
imminence is required because, and only because, of the fear 
that without imminence there is no assurance that the 
defensive action is necessary to avoid the harm”.1180 
 
It has been suggested that if imminence is a translator of necessity principle, it 
translated two opposing views of necessity – necessity as an aversion to violence and 
necessity as a liberty and right. Theorists who support this do so based on a theory of 
self-defence that is heavily invested with pacifism and social responsibility toward the 
victim’s interest in life. 1181 The idea is that an accused’s act is justified when necessary 
means that the accused had no choice but to kill.1182 But, this is not the only existing 
view of necessity. Theories of self-defence which focus on autonomy do so on the basis  
                                               
1180 Rosen supra (n 1151) 387. This rationale is supported by writers such Kinports supra (n 1035) 182; 
Burke supra (n 1030) at 278 (observing that “as a factor acting independent of necessity, the 
immanency of the threat has no exculpatory value to a claim of self-defense”; LaFave and Scott 
Criminal Law (1986) ss 5.7 (d) (explaining that the rational for the imminence requirement is that 
without imminence alternative to the use of force would be available and force would not be 
necessary); Robinson supra (n 1148) at ss 131 (C) (1) (explaining that the imminence requirement 
acts as a test for necessity, ss 131 (b) (3) “[A]s a practical matter actions taken in the absence of an 
imminent threat may not be necessary”. See further Fletcher supra (n 1003) who grounds imminence 
in political, not moral theory and whose position is as sophisticated as imminence as a proxy for 
necessity: “The imminence requirement expresses the limits of governmental competence: when the 
danger to a protected interest is imminent and unavoidable, the legislature can no longer make 
reliable judgments about which of the conflicting interests should prevail...the police are no longer in 
a position to intervene... . The individual right to self-defense kicks in precisely because immediate 
action is necessary”, (at 570). Fletcher rejects battered women’s claims despite overwhelming 
evidence that battered women make significant attempts to receive help from the police. Yet, in the 
same vein he states that the right to engage in self-defence is contingent on the ability of the state to 
intervene. In this respect, Zipursky in his article “Self-Defense, Domination and the Social Contract” 
(1996) University of Pittsburgh Law Review criticizes Fletcher: “The most serious qualification of 
Fletcher’s argument is that it shows only half of what it purports to show. What it shows is that in 
cases where objective imminence exists, self-defense should be permitted. However, that proposition 
(suitably qualified) has not been seriously in question. The more difficult proposition is that in cases 
where objective imminence does not exist, self-defense should not be permitted. Fletcher has said 
little in support of this latter proposition” (at 586). 
 
1181 Nourse “Self-Defense and Subjectivity” (2001) University of Chicago Law Review 1235 at 1271. 
See further Fletcher supra (n 1003) at 560 (“discussing the social point of view’ that requires 
proportionality rule sensitive to the competing interest in life of the aggressor.) 
 
 
1182 See Fletcher supra (n 1003) at 559 (“necessity speaks to the question whether some less costly 




that “right never yield to wrong”.1183 The argument is that the killing is “necessary 
when it serves to right the wrong of a deadly attack.”  
 
These ideas of necessity, in turn present two contradictory theories of self-defence: 
pacifist and libertarian.1184 The pacifist theory emphasizes a view of necessity that 
“depends upon the need for the accused to avoid violence.” 1185 The libertarian suggests 
that self- defence protects the rights of citizens to respond to unlawful aggression. But, 
neither the libertarian nor the pacifist can assert that they have their own debate about 
self-defence. None of these positions actually describes the law of self-defence.1186 The 
law positively permits self-help remedies in the majority of jurisdictions which allow 
the accused to “stand his ground” against an attack. If necessity meant what the pacifist 
theory suggests, it would in effect require retreat in every jurisdiction. This is not in 
accordance with current doctrine. Thus the law’s necessity is not always as “necessary” 
as it appears. This is especially the case “if by necessary we mean that the accused must 
choose the least violent or most pacifist alternative.” 1187 
 
 
                                               
1183 Nourse supra (n 1181) at 1271, citing Fletcher supra (n 544) 865. 
 
1184 Nourse supra (n 1181) 1272. See further Robinson supra (n 1148) ss 131(a) at 69 (stating that 
“defensive force justifications rely on a balancing of evils”) The lesser evil approach assumes what 
Nourse is trying to put into question As Nourse supra (n 1181) puts it “it is the substance of the 
‘costs and ‘benefits’ at stake” (at n 86). 
 
1185 Nourse supra (n 1181) 1272. See Ashworth supra (n 532) 289 (“This might be termed the ‘human 
rights’ approach [and it] would result in a general duty to avoid the use of force where non-violent 
means of self-protection are reasonably open to the person attacked.”) This also has affinities with 
Fletcher’s “social variation of justifiable self-defense” to the extent that it recognizes the rights of 
the aggressor.  
 
1186 Nourse supra (n 1181) submits that in this sense it should not be surprising since both positions, one 
by emphasizing the accused’s relationship to society and the other the accused’s relationship to the 
victim, focus on different aspects of a defence. It also makes sense since these theories, when taken 
to their logical extreme, would require either a drastic curtailment of the defence (in the case of the 
pacifist theory) or an extraordinary expansion (in the case of the libertarian theory) (at n 188). 
 




The libertarian posits a different idea of necessity. This argument emphasizes the wrong 
inflicted to the accused and his right to respond. The implicit claim is that the self-
defence law must acknowledge society’s concern in preventing “private warfare” but 
that if the state goes too far in discouraging self-help, citizens will become the victims 
of violence. As with its pacifist opponent, the libertarian theory fails to describe current 
doctrine. The law in most jurisdictions refuses to look solely to the wrong of the 
victim/aggressor as the sole measure of self-defence. Instead doctrine has time after 
time conceived of the rules of self-defence in terms that require that citizens defer to 
government authorities. Most rules of self-defence can be reconceived not just as rules, 
that identify “real wrongs” but as rules which develop a system that protects society 
from vigilantism. Rules of proportionality, imminence and retreat require that in many 
cases the accused should retreat. Therefore, if the law never really embraced either the 
pacifist or libertarian vision of necessity, it is not unexpected to find both these ideas 
unresolved in doctrine, submerged in places, like imminence, where they are difficult to 
see or judge.1188 
 
If this is correct, then we cannot with assurance solve the problem of imminence by 
replacing imminence with necessity, or by claiming priority for necessity or by 
demanding that imminence means that pacifist rather than the libertarian version of 
necessity. Each of these positions simply poses the question, it does not answer it.  
 
5.2.1.2.1.6  Distinction between justification and excuse 
It is therefore submitted that if the imminence question cannot be answered by 
assuming one side of the necessity debate, then it cannot be answered by referring to 
the distinction  
                                               




between justification and excuse. In respect of doctrine, reformers have suggested that 
imminence is really a question of the “battered woman’s perspective on imminence i.e. 
that a battered woman because of her experience is more sensitized to the cues 
signaling violence”. Such an approach was appealing since it “unified criminal law 
theory’s focus on individuation of the criminal law (emphasizing the individual 
characteristics of defendants) with the needs of women”.1189 This move has led to what 
is known as the establishment of reasonable woman standard. 1190 The problem is that if 
imminence is viewed from a woman’s perspective her response to danger will always 
be reasonable and therefore imminent. It is submitted that not only has a subjectivized 
approach to self-defence proved problematic,1191 but to qualify the objective test for 
self-defence in South African law leads to problems, 1192 notably a normative concept 
of fault which has its own set of problems. 1193 Such an approach is untenable and is not 
to be accepted. 
 
5.2.1.2.1.7 Should imminence be a requirement in South African law 
Imminence and confrontation are concepts formed in the image of social, pre-legal, 
norms about the relative responsibility of the parties. Separated from their relational 
context, the battered woman cases often appear like their male counterparts – cases of  
                                               
1189 Nourse supra (n 1181) 1266. But as Gauthier “Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral 
and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: self-Defense and the Requirement of 
Imminence: Comments on George Fletcher’s Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse” 
(1996) University of Pittsburgh Law Review 615 at 618 suggests such a standard is contrary to the 
purpose of neutrality: “In restricting the scope of legitimate self-defense, it extends its protection to 
those who violate it, except where their violation deprives the victim of its protection, leaving her 
with no alternative to self-defense. Here the protection offered by the law assures, or is intended to 
assure, the transgressor that his violation will receive the measured response of society, and not the 
arbitrary response of the victim.” 
 
1190 For a discussion of such a standard see chapter 4 at 182-184 supra (American Law). 
 
1191 For a criticism of this standard see 249-259 op cit. 
 
1192 For a discussion of these problems see 246-249 op cit. 
 




weak threats in violent context. In the end, it is the battered woman cases that tell us 
that it is her relationship to the aggressor that is the most dominant influence, affecting 
whether the threat is viewed as imminent, the case as confrontational or her response as 
necessary. In other words, the abused woman’s relation completes the law’s claimed 
objectivity.1194 
 
It is submitted that “instead of viewing objectivity as not being able to account for 
battered woman’s situation – the opposite conclusion should be reached – that by 
rethinking certain situational factors as a set of relatively innocuous and perhaps 
necessary normative propositions 1195 then the abused woman’s situation is consistent 
with some very standard propositions in the law of self-defence. 
 
While it is obviously true that if a reasonable person were defined to be just like the 
accused in every respect, he would arguably do exactly what the accused did under the 
circumstances. This however, is an inherent difficulty self-defence law confronts 
whenever it tries to determine which of the accused’s characteristics are properly 
considered in making an objective inquiry: the perennial problem of “striking the 
balance between the defender’s subjective perceptions and those of the hypothetical 
reasonable person.” 1196 It is submitted that the traditional element of imminence should  
 
                                               
1194 As does Nourse supra (n 1181) at 1268. 
 
1195 Nourse supra (n 1181) at 1287. See for example State v Fuller, 297 SC 440, 377 SE 2d 328, 331 
(1989). The accused says that there was a “glint” of a gun, or it looked like the victim was reaching 
for the gun, or the victim’s hands were raised as if to attack. The factors to be taken into account are 
set out at 271-273 op cit. 
 
1196 Nourse supra (n 1181) 1287. In the U.S, if battered woman syndrome testimony is reduced to 
normative propositions (we imagine them to be jury instructions rather than expert testimony), then 
the syndrome is consistent with some very standard propositions in law of self-defence. For 
example, the proposition that prior threats and violence increase the credibility of a claim of future 
violence, since the 19th century, past threats and violence, including the victim’s character for 
violence, have been considered highly relevant to a claim of self-defense, on questions of 




remain in force. If the abused women is being attacked and the threat is imminent (in 
the traditional sense), then she should be able to avail to herself of self-defence, 
although it should be noted that the court should also consider the fact that the battered 
women placed herself in this dangerous situation.1197 However, the court would also 
have to take into consideration the difficulty that the abused woman faced in extricating 
herself from this position.1198 
 
5.2.1.3  Protected interest 
Private defence may only be resorted to in respect of any interest recognized and 
protected by the law. The South African Constitution does not establish a hierarchy of 
rights, but some are more foundational and constitute a core of rights: these include the 
right to life, the right to dignity and the right to bodily integrity. 1199  The case of 
Engelbrecht 1200 highlighted the interests of the abused woman which were attacked and 
which she was entitled to protect, utilizing self-defence. These included her life, bodily 
integrity dignity, quality of life, her home, her emotional and psychological wellbeing, 
her freedom as well as those interests of her child(ren). In short, she defended her status 
as a human being and/or mother.1201 
 
5.2.1.4  Unlawful 
The general proposition is that self-defence is not available against the lawful use of  
 
                                               
1197 In terms of actio libera in causa. See 272-273 op cit. 
 
1198 See n 1263 below. 
 
1199 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. For discussion of these rights in respect of 
battered women see chapter 2 pages 32-35 supra. 
 
1200 S v Engelbrecht supra (n 143). 
 




force.1202 The same is true of force that is itself justified as self-defence. The principle 
is that if force is exercised as a matter of right, it would be self-contradictory to 
recognize a right to resist the exercise of the right. The important corollary of this 
proposition is that if the attacker is merely excused and not justified, then the attack is 
nonetheless contrary-to-right and in this sense unlawful. 1203 
 
5.2.2  Conditions relating to the defence 
5.2.2.1  The defensive act must be necessary to avert the attack 
5.2.2.1.1  Introduction 
Various construals inform the question of whether proportionality should form a 
necessary requirement of self-defence in South African law. These include (i) the 
liberal aspiration to neutrality, (ii) constitutional norms and (iii) a duty of social 
solidarity to the state. It is now necessary to consider each point in turn. 
 
5.2.2.1.1.2  Liberal aspiration to neutrality 
Self-defence is considered a preeminent liberal right: it exists prior to the formation of 
the liberal state,1204 its persistence within the liberal state functions as a condition of the 




                                               
1202 For a general discussion of this requirement in the various jurisdictions see chapter 2 at 51 (South 
African Law). For a discussion of the requirement of unlawfulness in English Law see chapter 3 at 
113 supra and American Law in chapter 4 at 178 supra. 
 
1203 Per Fletcher supra (n 1003) 558-559.  
 
1204 See Gauthier supra (n 1189) 616 (“[A] legal system which failed to recognize the right...could have 
no valid claim on the allegiance or obedience of those it sought to bring within its sway”.)  
 
1205 Sepinwall “Defense of others and Defenseless ‘Others’” (2005) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 




the contours of this right,1206 and especially its proportionality requirement, are defined 
by liberals’ cherished aspiration to neutrality. Such an obligation to neutrality requires 
that the state refrain from using moral values to guide government action. Thus when 
an individual assumes the state’s role, she must abstain from allowing moral 
assessments of her attacker’s worth to stipulate her response. The proportionality 
requirement encompasses this neutral restriction insofar as it requires that a defender’s 
use of force not be greater than the force she faced.1207 In this manner, the doctrine 
requires that a defender use mathematics rather than morals to determine a suitable 
response. 1208 
 
The requirement that a defender’s use of force be proportionate admits of various 
construals. This requirement encompasses that only equal force may be used in 
response to a threat or that the loss one inflicts should be of equal degree to the loss 
faced. Such formulations can be problematic since they suggest that the degree of force 
is quantifiable, despite the fact that it is generally a normative inquiry, as opposed to a  
                                               
1206 Sepinwall supra (n 1205) suggests two reasons for the state to constrain the citizen’s right to self-
defence: “First, every invocation of self-defense overrides the state’s role in protecting its citizens. 
To ensure that this invocation is not a usurpation of state power, the state requires that the attack be 
impending, and the force used be necessary. Only when the imminence and necessity requirements 
are met can we be certain the defender did not improperly take matters into her own hands” (at 356). 
As Fletcher supra (n 1003) notes: “the elements that justify self-defense, are intended to exclude 
those who preemptively take the law into their own hands because such individuals exceed their 
authority as citizens, and in doing so, would subordinate others to their force” (at 570). Sepinwall 
supra (n 1205) suggests a second reason: the state circumscribes a citizen’s right to self-defense to 
ensure that the protective right that the citizen invokes is consonant with the right that the state could 
invoke on her behalf. Since the latter right is constrained by the state’s commitment to neutrality, the 
former right must be constrained in this way as well (at 356-357). See further Schneider supra (n 71) 
at 757 (arguing that the state also has an obligation to treat its citizens fairly, which may entail that 
the state act in a non-neutral regard insofar as it individualizes the constraints on self-defence for 
each accused.) In other words, the constraints on self-defence must reflect and “enforce requirements 
of political legitimacy”. As such, they must be objective and public, disallowing, on these grounds, 
the relevance of person’s beliefs (reasonable or not). But see Cohen supra (n 1004) at 757 (arguing 
that there is a countervailing legitimacy condition for the state-namely, that it protects human rights 
and that this condition is not always served by the state’s commitment to neutrality). 
 
1207 Sepinwall supra (n 1205) 350. Snyman supra (n 124) at 184 also supports this contention. 
 
1208  In this respect see Fletcher “Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette of 
Comparative Criminal Theory” (1973) Israel Law Review 367 (“the premise of criminal law that 




mathematical one. The fact that proportionality determinations are informed by moral 
assessments can be problematic since not only do they run foul of the liberal 
commitment to neutrality, but because they are not always accurate, and do not always 
operate uniformly in battered woman cases. 1209 
 
One possible problem with the proportionality requirement is that it is indeterminate: 
“even on the facially value-neutral construction of proportionality as equivalency, it is 
still unclear what elements ought to figure in the proportionality determination.” 1210 
This becomes evident where the normative dimension of the proportionality inquiry is 
made explicit in various jurisdictions requirement of reasonableness. Theorists have 
challenged the objective standard of reasonableness on grounds that it is based on a 
male stereotype which is insensitive to the different experiences and perspectives of 
battered women,1211 following the English and American law approaches would prove 
problematic.  
 
English law makes use of the test: “such force is reasonable in the circumstances”.1212 
Even in the circumstances where the right to self-defence was objectively present; case 
law has mitigated the objective test. Applying the test formulated in Palmer,1213 the  
                                               
1209 Sepinwall supra (n 1205) 358-359. See further Beecher-Monas supra (n 1011) at 105 who gives a 
practical example. Consider the disparate treatment that men and women receive under the 
proportionality requirement. While differences in size are often taken into account in cases where 
one man defends himself against another man, these differences are often discounted in cases where 
it is a woman who defends herself against a man. While the weaker defender uses force greater than 
that which the defender faced, the use of force is often deemed permissible where the defender is 
male but impermissible where the defender is female.  
 
1210 Sepinwall supra (n 1205) 361. 
 
1211 Kazan supra (n 824) at 550 submits that: “courts traditionally employ a standard of reasonableness 
modeled on the classic barroom brawl scenario, involving antagonists of equal size, strength and 
skill.” 
 
1212 As governed by the Criminal Law Act 1967 section 3 (1). 
 




Court of Appeal in Shannon 1214 has said that the jury must bear in mind the position of 
the appellant at the moment of the attack. The statement of Lord Morris in Palmer 1215 
was referred to: where self-defence is reasonably necessary, “... a person defending 
himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary defensive acts”. 
Where the accused had done what he “honestly and instinctively thought was necessary 
that was most potent evidence that his reaction was reasonable”.1216  The Court of 
Appeal in O’Grady 1217 has explained the interpretation of the objective test in these 
circumstances. Lord Lane, relying on the explanation given by McCulloch J and the 
decision in the case of Williams 1218 said: 
 
“..Where the accused might have been labouring under a 
mistake as to the facts he must be judged according to that 
mistaken view, whether the mistake was reasonable or not. It 
is then for the jury to decide whether the accused’s reaction 
was reasonable or not”.1219 
 
 
The circumstances then must be taken to be the circumstances perceived by the 
accused, and a jury must be directed in terms of the way in which a reasonable man 
would react, holding the same honest but unreasonable belief as the accused. This is the 
logic of the Lord Chief Justice’s statement. Combining this with the Shannon/Palmer 
direction on reasonable force, the test seems far from truly objective.1220 
                                               
1214 Shannon supra (n 532). 
 
1215 Palmer supra (n 531). 
 
1216 Shannon supra (n 532) at 1088. 
 
1217 [1987] 3 All ER 420. 
 
1218 Williams supra (n 523) 
 
1219 Ibid at 423. This approach was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Whyte supra (n 532) at 418. 
 




The distinction between the objective and subjective test when applied to the question 
of reasonable force in self-defence, although semantically clear, is unclear in practice. 
Firstly, the jury must determine whether an accused acted instinctively before the 
Palmer 1221 test can be applied. It is then an almost automatic assumption that this is a 
reasonable thing to do. The test also masks the extreme difficulty facing a jury asked to 
decide beyond reasonable doubt that an accused did not think something as opposed to 
deciding what he did think, and then going on to consider how a reasonable man, 
thinking the same, would have reacted. 1222 
 
Another problem arises when the objective test is combined with the subjective test as 
to the question of the right to defend oneself: if the accused has made an honest but 
unreasonable mistake as to the right to act, it stands to reason that any test would 
provide little advantage to the accused if section 3 is interpreted literally. 1223  It 
becomes clear that in cases invoking mistaken self-defence either a definitional or a 
defence approach will produce a largely subjective test of liability.1224 
 
In American law, attempts by feminists to judge the reasonableness of a woman’s act of 
self-help in a gender-neutral, individualized manner have proved problematic. The 
reasonable person should be placed in the position of the actor, in order to determine in 
terms of all the circumstances of the actor, including her history as an abused woman, 
the reasonableness of her belief in using deadly force. Expert testimony establishing 
this has proved to be a problem, not only because such an inquiry is inconsistent with 
the theory of justification, which necessarily assumes that any person who performs the  
                                               
1221 Palmer supra (n 531). 
 
1222 Giles supra (n 1220) 192. 
 
1223 Giles supra (n 1220) 193. 
 




same act under the same external circumstances has done the right thing, but because 
by including certain psychological traits 1225 of the individual in the circumstances, self-
defence has moved closer to the realm of excuse. 1226  
 
It is a fact that psychological symptoms associated with battered woman syndrome do 
seriously impair the cognitive abilities of battered women and when they do, South 
African courts correctly deal with the matter in sentencing. While it may be a true 
proposition that the symptoms associated with the syndrome are a “normal response to 




                                               
1225 Dutton in her article “Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of 
Battered Woman Syndrome” (1993) Hofstra Law Review 1191 at 1197 submits that battered 
woman’s syndrome was originally defined as the psychological sequelae to domestic violence. 
Kazan supra (n 824) submits that to establish why this is so, it is necessary to consider the way the 
syndrome is usually characterized: the battered woman syndrome consists of both interpersonal (i.e. 
cycle of violence) and interpersonal (psychological responses alleged to occur in women who are 
battered) components. According to Walker, these responses may include depression, anxiety, low 
self-esteem, heightened sensitivity, and learned helplessness. In her view, there is a direct 
relationship between battering and the development of these psychological symptoms: “Repeated 
battering, like electrical shocks [in Dr. Seligman’s experiments on caged dogs], diminish the 
[battered] woman’s motivation to respond. She becomes passive. Secondly, her cognitive ability to 
perceive success is changed. She does not believe her response will result in a favourable outcome, 
whether or not it might. Next, having generalized her helplessness, the battered woman does not 
believe anything she does will alter any outcome. Finally, her sense of emotional well-being 
becomes precarious. She is more prone to depression and anxiety” (Walker supra (n 3) 49-50, cited 
in Kazan supra (n 824) at 559). Clearly if battered women do develop the psychological symptoms 
described by Walker it is difficult to see how we can rely on their perceptions of reasonableness in a 
court of law (Kazan supra (n 824) at 558). Later the theory was reformulated in terms of human 
depression, and was eventually applied to victimization (Dutton supra at 1197). 
 
1226 Rosen supra (n 21) 41-42. As Rosen supra (n 21) submits: “[E]xcusable self-defense would imply 
that her response was typically and idiosyncratically emotional. The doctrine would perpetuate the 
views that the woman could not have been rational in assessing the danger and that the legal system 
must accommodate for her mental and physical weaknesses” (at 42).  
 
1227 The claim that the battered woman syndrome is a normal response to a traumatic situation might be 
interpreted to mean three different things: (i) that the symptoms associated with the syndrome are 
statistically normal, in the sense that they are commonly manifested by victims of battering; (ii) that 
the symptoms of the syndrome are understandable, in the sense that we can understand how someone 
subjected to abusive treatment might develop these symptoms; or (iii) that the symptoms are normal 
in the sense that an individual who manifests these symptoms is free of functional impairment 




suffering from these symptoms are reasonable.1228 
 
It is important to note that the fact that the abused woman is suffering from a mental 
illness does not denote that all of her perceptions are unreasonable. The claim that 
symptoms associated with the syndrome are consistent with a mental disorder does not 
by itself resolve the issue of whether the woman suffering from the syndrome can form 
reasonable beliefs about imminent danger and the need for defensive force. A possible 
reply to this question depends upon whether the abused woman suffering from 
symptoms consistent with the syndrome can satisfy the conditions necessary for the 
formulation of a reasonable belief. 1229  It could be said that a reasonable belief is 
formed and held on the basis of ordinarily reliable violence as acquired by unimpaired 
perception and evaluated through normally sound reasoning and judgement.1230 Such a 
consideration would suggest that a diagnosis of battered woman’s syndrome is 
inconsistent with both ordinary and legal accounts of reasonable belief - symptoms of 
the syndrome may interfere with a battered woman’s ability to exercise judgment and 
form reasonable beliefs. If women suffering from the syndrome are incapable of 
reasoning in a way that informs our ordinary conceptions of reasonableness, then it 
follows that attempting to characterize such women as reasonable invokes a different  
 
 
                                               
1228 Kazan supra (n 824) 560-561. As Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan supra (n 844) maintain the first two 
interpretations of what syndrome advocates might mean by the term “normal” are compatible with 
viewing the syndrome as a psychological disorder which impairs reasoning. The third interpretation, 
which means free from functional impairment, is incompatible with the view that the syndrome 
refers to a psychological disorder (at 96). Thus while syndrome advocates argue against interpreting 
the battered woman syndrome as evidence of a psychological disorder, they seem to be committed to 
the view that victims of the syndrome are free from psychological impairment. But as Kazan supra 
(n 824) maintains such a position is hard to square with accounts of how the syndrome affects the 
battered woman’s ability to accurately perceive, evaluate, and adaptively act upon her own situation 
(at 561). 
 
1229 Kazan supra (n 824) 562. 
 




standard of reasonableness for a battered woman. 1231  It is submitted that such 
subjectivized standards of self-defence which have developed in American law, as well 
as the increasing subjectivization of the traditional objective test in South African law, 
does little to inform the proportionality requirement, but merely leads to the total 
collapse of such standards: 
 
“[t]he particularizing standard must, therefore take all of the 
accused’s characteristics into account to satisfy the voluntary 
act requirement - in which case given that if every 
characteristic of the individual is taken into account... [s]he 
cannot help doing as [s]he did and the particularizing standard 
is functionally equivalent to the purely subjective standard.1232 
 
Proportionality thus becomes redundant: the use of force is proportionate if it aligns 
with an antecedent judgment about how much force she ought to have used. The 
proportionality requirement does not enlighten us as to whether the defender’s used 
force was proportionate or equivalent to the force that she faced. It merely demonstrates 
whether she used an amount of force warranted by her interests (i.e. normative inquiry). 
 
Such an approach also threatens to undermine the principles which sustain the law of 
self-defence. In self-defence, ensuring that parties face equal risks requires that we 
impose an objective standard of reasonableness on a person claiming self-defence.1233 
But in Engelbrecht 1234  the accused only had to demonstrate that her subjective 
perception of fear was grounded in facts about her situation. A claim of justified self-
defence in this case did not require that the defender be correct in her perception of  
                                               
1231 Kazan supra (n 824) 562. 
 
1232 Heller supra (n 795) at 94-95. 
 
1233 For a discussion of the objective test of reasonableness see chapter 2 at 35-41 supra. 
 





danger and the need for deadly force, since it is possible to reasonably but mistakenly 
believe in the need for self-defence. However, it is critical that the actor shows more 
than just an honest belief in the need for self-defence. Thus the claim by syndrome 
advocates that battered women’s psychologically impaired perception should count as 
reasonable effectively asks the alleged assailant to bear the risk of the woman’s 
perceived fear. This distributes the risks between the two parties unequally, making the 
battered woman’s fear the measure of her alleged assailant’s security and exposing the 
alleged assailant to unreasonable self-defence. Such a result conflicts with the idea that 
society should ensure that its members are protected against harm that may be inflicted 
to them as a result of another person’s unreasonable perceptions of fear and danger.1235 
 
One alternative to overcome such indeterminacy is to dispense with it altogether. 
Imminence and necessity would be sufficient to justify self-defence. This could have 
benefits for battered women since the cost of the victim’s relative harm ought to be 
borne by the individual who would attack her, and not imposed on her by limiting her 
ability to defend herself. In terms of the liberal theory, the court should treat threats to 
elements constitutive of oneself with special consideration because of the premium that 
liberalism places on an individual’s autonomy 1236  and because of the necessary 
connection between autonomy and self-authorship. Elements of individual’s lives have 
value because and to the extent they fit into concepts of the good. Threats aimed at 
identity strike at the source of value for everything else in our lives. Due to the  
 
                                               
1235 Kazan supra (n 824) 563-564. 
 
1236 Fletcher supra (n 544) states: “If person’s autonomy is compromised by the intrusion, then the 
defender has the right to expel the intruder and restore the integrity of his domain. The underlying 
image is that of a state of warfare. An aggressor’s violation of our rights is akin to an intrusion of 
foreign troops on our soil. As we are inclined to believe that any community has the absolute right to 
expel foreign invaders, any person attacked by another should have the absolute right to counteract 




foundational role of identity, a woman ought to be allowed to invoke a claim of self-
defence where some identity - defining feature of her self is imperiled.1237 
 
A consequence of the right to defend oneself against identity - based threats is the right 
to use deadly force to safeguard one’s dignity, which is a necessary precondition of the 
autonomous exercise of one’s powers of self - authorship. This does not suggest that 
any assault on dignity warrants self-defence.1238 It could be said that by synthesizing 
these two accounts, dignitary assaults justify self-defence only when they threaten to 
subordinate (or perpetuate the subordination) of the victim to her attacker.1239 
 
If self-defence were based wholly upon the rationale of individual’s autonomy which 
requires an individual to take reasonable measures, then retreat must be the means 
available for warding off an attack wherever possible. As a rule there is no duty to 
retreat in South African law.1240 Protecting the legal order is not limited to preventing 




                                               
1237 Sepinwall supra (n 1205) 37. 
 
1238 Sepinwall supra (n 1205) at 381-382 notes that Hobbes and Locke differ in the scope of self-defence 
that they would permit: Hobbes supra (n 1015) explicitly denies a right to self-defence when the 
attack threatens one’s dignity, rather than one’s body: “[A] man receive words of disgrace,... and is 
afraid, unless he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like 
injuries from others; and to avoid this breaks the law, and protects himself for the future...This is a 
crime: For the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall” (at 91). However Locke’s supra (n 1015) 
account is more permissive as he argues that anyone who risks subordination may avail himself of 
the right to self-defence: “I have reason to conclude that he who would get me into his Power 
without my consent, could sue me as he pleased, when he had got me there, and destroy me too 
when he had a fancy to it...To be free from such force is the only security of my Preservation... It is 
Lawful for met to treat him, as one who has put himself into a State of war with me, i.e. kill him if I 
can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself” (at 278). 
 
1239 Sepinwall supra (n 1205) 381-382. 
 




those of the assailant. The theory of forfeiture of rights is no longer accepted, and the 
assailant does not lose all of his rights in a situation of self-defence.1241 
 
Self-defence requires an unlawful attack, and it places the protection of autonomy of 
the abused woman and the protection of the legal order against the infringement of the 
autonomy of the attacker. Necessity does not require an unlawful attack, and places the 
protection of the defender’s autonomy against the infringement of the victim’s 
autonomy and injury to the legal order. If the victim has to relinquish a legitimate 
interest (to save an interest of greater value), then this indicates that the legal order does 
not provide complete protection for autonomous spheres. If protecting the legal order 
meant absolute prevention from infringement of autonomy, then the defence of 
justifiable necessity would not be recognized as a defence to criminal liability. On the 
other hand, harming a vital interest for the sake of preventing unlawful harm to a minor 
interest disrupts the legal order, as it expresses contempt for the vital interest. The 
rationale of protecting the legal order thus requires proportionality in self-defence. It 
would thus appear that self-defence is founded upon two rationales: protecting 
autonomy, which does not require proportionality, and protecting the legal order, which 
requires proportionality. It is submitted that in South African law, self-defence requires 
proportionality.1242 This approach would be consistent with the universal view of the 
proportionality requirement, as found in English law, American law and South African 
law.1243 
                                               
1241 Kremnitzer and Ghanayim “Twenty-five years of George P. Fletcher’s Rethinking Criminal Law: 
Proportionality and the Aggressor’s Culpability in Self-Defense” (2004) University of Tulsa Law 
Review 875 at 882-883.  
 
1242 Kremnitzer and Ghanayim supra (n 1241) 892-893. See also Uniacke supra (n 759) at 157 who 
stipulates that whether self-defence is permissible depends on whether the force used was necessary 
and proportionate.  
 
1243 For a discussion of the proportionality requirement see chapter 2 at 56-58 supra (South African 




5.2.2.1.1.3  A duty of social solidarity 
It should be noted that every individual in society is under a duty of social solidarity. 
This duty does not directly originate from the rationales of self-defence. But, such a 
duty does not constitute a legal policy consideration deriving from the nature of 
criminal law, but from a human law. The demand for proportionality in self-defence is 
necessitated by the humane nature of criminal law. Human criminal law cannot permit 
killing a thief. Any other approach would be inhumane, as it would not permit 
appropriate weight to the value of human life and would comprise the dangerous 
implication that property can be preferred over human life. The duty of social solidarity 
that leads to the narrowing of the scope of self-defence (i.e. by requiring 
proportionality) expresses social-ethics considerations and principles of human criminal 
law that apply to self-defence.1244 
 
Kremnitzer and Ghanayim illustrate this by means of the approaches of Kant and Hegel 
to self-defence and justifiable necessity. Kant does not recognize the utilitarian 
justifiable necessity as a defence to criminal liability. In a situation of necessity, the 
actor’s attack is wrongful, even where we are concerned with saving a life at the 
expense of damaging property.1245 Kant also does not recognize the duty of social 
solidarity that obliges every person to assist a person who is in danger. In a situation of 
necessity, the duty of solidarity derives from moral theory. Such an obligation is not 
legally enforceable. Kant views retreat as a form of relinquishing and negating self-
defence 1246 and the right to self-defence is not conditional upon proportionality, that is,  
 
                                               
1244 Kremnitzer and Ghanayim supra (n 1241) 894. 
 
1245 Kremniter and Ghanayim supra (n 1241) 894-895, discussing Kant The Metaphysics of Morals 
(1991) (reprint of original) 60. 
 




it cannot be lessened due to considerations of proportionality. If the legislature does so, 
the narrowing of the defence is unjustified. 1247 
 
Hegel accepts the duty of social solidarity imposed upon every citizen, and recognizes 
justifiable necessity. Because Hegel views man as a social being who is under a legal 
duty of social solidarity, the demand for proportionality in self-defence is consistent 
with his approach, even if not explicitly stipulated. Thus based on these two views, if 
Kant had recognized social solidarity as a general legal duty (and not merely a moral 
duty), he would have recognized justifiable necessity as a defence to criminal ability 
and opens the door to limiting self-defence by a proportionality requirement. 
Furthermore, Kant recognizes a moral, as opposed to a legal obligation of social 
solidarity since he assumes the viewpoint of a rational, intelligent person, who is 
willing to help his fellow man. Therefore, there is no need for a legal duty of social 
solidarity. Kant’s perspective is that of the ideal man, which does not reflect actual 
man.1248 It is submitted that from an ordinary person’s point of view (who does not 
necessarily constitute an ideal or rational being), a nominal obligation of social 
solidarity should be recognized as a general legal obligation, and thus utilitarian-based 
necessity and proportionality in self-defence should be recognized.1249 
 
5.2.2.1.1.4  Proportionality and constitutional considerations 
The demand for proportionality can also be based upon constitutional considerations. In  
 
 
                                               
1247 Kremnitzer and Ghanayim supra (n 1241) 894-895. 
 
1248 Kremnitzer and Ghanayim supra (n 1241) 896. 
 
1249 Kremnitzer and Ghanayim supra (n 1241) at 895, discussing Hegel’s viewpoint in Philosphy of 




South African law where a modern constitution has been adopted,1250  fundamental 
human rights are not limited to negative rights, but also positive rights in the sense that 
a person can demand that the state guarantee his fundamental rights, and the state is 
obliged not only to respect those rights, but also to actively protect them.1251 The more 
important a fundamental right, the more comprehensive the protection of that right.1252 
Thus the battered woman’s attacker does not lose his fundamental rights in a situation 
of self-defence.1253 Her attacker is entitled to the constitutional protections offered by 
the state. 1254 
 
In a case of self-defence, the main concern is the prevention of an unlawful harm to the 
legitimate interests of the abused woman by means of harming the interests of her 
abuser. From this standpoint (and that of the state), self-defence presents a conflict 
between the state’s duty to protect the legitimate interests of the battered woman and its 
duty to protect the interests of her abuser. Therefore, the right of the victim to defend 
himself, as a right derived from the state’s duty to protect the legitimate interests of 
individuals, cannot be unlimited. The choice presented by the state’s duty must find its 
expression in a compromise intended to supply reasonable protection of the legitimate 
interests of both the battered woman and her victim (with consideration given to  
                                               
1250 Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996. English law contains no constitutional declaration of 
fundamental rights. It is however a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
1251 Section 7 (2) of Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996 states: “The state must respect, 
protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights.”  
 
1252 See further Walters supra (n 126) which states that the rights to life, dignity and bodily integrity 
have been described as “collectively foundational to the value system prescribed by the 
Constitution” (at par [28]). Considered separately or as a cluster, they are the most important rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. See further chapter 2 at 33-36 supra. 
 
1253 Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 4th ed (2003) supports this view: “[T]here is little to commend 
the view that a criminal loses all his civil rights when he commits any offence (at 288). 
 
1254 As section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 stipulates: (1) “Everyone is 
equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. (2) Equality 




preserving the legal order). In terms of the actual constitutional protection of 
fundamental rights, it makes no difference whether we are looking at the assailant or 
the victim. However the scope of protection differs. Since the abuser is the one who 
unlawfully endangers the interests of the victim, and the victim is only warding off the 
assault, the unlawful attack is a consideration that weighs against the assailant. 
However, a consideration to the assailant’s detriment does not translate into a total 
abandonment of proportionality that grants the victim an unlimited right to protect his 
interests, regardless of the cost to the abuser. Self-defence thus requires proportionality 
in the sense that the harm caused must not be disproportional to the harm prevented. 
Where we are considering endangering the abuser’s life, we are concerned with 
preventing harm to the life or physical or sexual integrity of the victim. The demand for 
proportionality thus derives from the reasonableness requirements of a society’s 
constitution. 1255  Moreover, self-defence is intended to preserve the legal order by 
granting every individual the right to ward off unlawful attacks. To protect the legal 
order is the state’s duty, and it does so by means of its law enforcement agencies. The 
power to do so derives from the state’s complete monopoly over the use of force. The 
right to employ force in self-defence is a right that is derived from the state’s right and 
duty to maintain the legal order. Thus if the authority of state agencies to employ force 
is limited by the requirement of proportionality - then the right of an individual to 
employ force must similarly be limited in self-defence cases. 1256  
 
5.2.2.1.1.5  Is there still a requirement of proportionality in South African law? 
On the basis of the aforementioned discussion, proportionality should form an integral 
part of the requirements for self-defence. The test can be set out as follows: not only  
                                               
1255 See further Ashworth supra (n 1253) 142. 
 




must the defence be necessary but also the means used by the accused for the purpose 
of averting the attack must be reasonable in the circumstances.1257 This is in accordance 
with the autonomy theory. While it should be noted that South African law does not 
directly require that the defensive act be proportionate to the attack, it is qualified in the 
following manner: reliance on self-defence may fail in cases of extreme 
disproportionality.1258  Furthermore, although the requirement has been expressed in 
different forms,1259 the essence should remain the same: it is to be tested objectively. 
Therefore would an “ordinary, intelligent and prudent person in the accused’s situation 
would react to establish if the self-defence claim was reasonable?” 1260 
 
However, it is this author’s submission that unlike the above formulation, not all the 
characteristics of the accused should be taken into account. Only those “characteristics 
which have the most (or direct) bearing on the accused’s situation” should be 
considered. It is submitted that Burchell and Hunt are incorrect in their assumption that 
“no single test is satisfactory and therefore all the factors must be taken into account in 
deciding whether in the circumstances of the particular case, the means used by the 
accused were reasonable and hence justified.” 1261 The current objective test for self-
defence is not totally devoid of subjective considerations and does take an abused  
 
                                               
1257 This formulation is currently utilized in South Africa and is set out in Burchell and Hunt supra (n 
73) 277: R v Jack Bob supra (n 151) at 34; S v Mnguni supra (n 141) at 778; S v Van Wyk supra (n 
133) at 499; 510; 515. 
 
1258 Reddi supra (n 1) at 271, citing S v T supra (n 97) at 34; S v Van Wyk supra (n 133) 498B. 
 
1259 For instance De Wet and Swanepoel supra (n 76) at 70 states that the means must not be more 
harmful than was necessary to avert the attack: R v Koning supra (n 141) at 233; whether the bounds 
of reasonable self-defence were exceeded: R v Mathlau 1958 (1) SA 350 (AD) at 355; 360; whether 
the accused exceeded the justifiable limits of defence: Ntanjana v Vorster and Minister of Justice 
supra (n 214) at 407. 
 
1260 R v Patel supra (n 201); S v Van Antwerpen (1976) (3) SA 399 (T); S v Motleleni supra (n 140); S v 
De Oliviera supra (n 141).S v T supra (n 97). 
 




woman’s situation into account. For the purposes of this enquiry these factors will 
include the battered victim’s actual history of abuse (including physical force exerted 
by the initial aggressor at the time or any prior displays of force, physical 1262  or 
psychological,1263 made by the initial aggressor) 1264 as well as the prior conduct of the 
abused woman 1265 and the relative size and strength of the parties,1266 as well as other 
contextual factors. 1267 Furthermore, notice should be taken of the potential risks to the 
abused women in not acting as she did, and whether less drastic options 1268 were 
available to her at the time. In doing this, assessment must be made of the possibility 
that the initial aggressor would in fact have been stopped by a show of physical force  
 
 
                                               
1262 Rosen supra (n 21) submits that evidence of surrounding circumstances should not be limited to the 
time immediately preceding the killing. Prior specific acts of violence should be admissible as well 
as the victim’s general reputation for violence (at 38). Additional physical evidence or testimony 
confirming her account would be more persuasive. Emergency room records might confirm her 
claim of escalating violence or police reports (at 71-72). 
 
1263 Psychologist Harriet Goldhor Lerner has written about the ways in which people engage in see-saw 
games with each other, creating a potentially perpetual flow of angry reactions that never result in a 
positive change. Whenever one person makes a move to rebalance the see- saw, there is a 
countermove by the other party. The person who seeks to move to a new level of maturity, 
independence or self-assertion is almost certain to meet opposition from the other person in the 
relationship, who, no matter how well-intentioned, will feel anxiety about the change and the 
potential loss of the familiar. (Lerner The Dance of Anger (1985) 25-26, cited in Cook 
“Transforming the Story of Property Acquisition in Sexual Harassment Case into a Feminist Castle 
Doctrine” (1999) Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 200 at 306). 
 
1264 Ntanjana v Vorster supra (n 214) at 409. 
 
1265 Labuschagne supra (n 1132) 168 who notes that this is relevant to the question of whether the 
bounds of self-defence have been exceeded. Cf S v Van Wyk supra (n 133) at 500-501. 
 
1266 Rosen supra (n 21) stipulates a list of factors which include: (1) her smaller size, socialization 
regarding passive attributes of femininity, and poor physical training. Therefore, it is perfectly 
reasonable for a woman to believe an unarmed man may be able to kill her. (2) A woman may 
reasonably feel the need to use a weapon to protect herself form an unarmed assailant (at 38). 
 
1267 Dutton supra (n 1225) posits a list of specific contextual factors that influence the battered woman: 
(1) fear of retaliation; (2) the economic (and other tangible) resources available to her; (3) her 
concern for her children; (4) her emotional attachment to her partner; (5) her personal emotional 
strengths, such as hope and optimism; (6) her race, ethnicity, and culture and (7) and her perception 
of the availability of social support (at 1232). It is submitted that Dutton is wrong to include her 
emotional and mental vulnerabilities in this list.  
 




no greater than that exerted by him.1269 Therefore, if these avenues were available but 
were not resorted to, the abused woman’s conduct is unlawful and her defence will 
fail.1270 
 
If the abused woman exceeds the bounds of reasonable self-defence and kills her 
abuser, she may be found guilty of culpable homicide despite the fact that the killing 
was intentional.1271 But where the excess is immoderate, a verdict of murder will be 
returned.1272 
 
5.2.2.2  Duty to retreat 
On the basis of the two rationales underlying self-defence in South African law, the 




                                               
1269 Reddi supra (n 1) 271. 
 
1270 Proportionality could further be satisfied on the basis that she attempted to obtain help from the 
police and family and friends on numerous occasions, but to no avail (Schopp, Sturgis and Sullivan 
supra (n 844) 71-72). In situations where help was elicited but failed, and the battered woman 
decides to stay, Mahoney’s seminal article “Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue 
of Separation” (1991) Michigan Law Review 1 at 65-66 recognizing separation assault should be 
considered by the courts. This constitutes an attack on the woman’s volition and body where her 
abuser seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force her to return. It is an 
attempt to gain, retain, or retain power in the relationship. Thus separation tends to trigger escalated 
violence. While the issue of whether violence will ultimately follow the threat or departure will 
depend on the men with whom the women is involved with, such separation always carries with 
documented certainty a high risk (at 58). 
 
1271 Burchell and Hunt supra (n 84) 278. Cf R v Molife 1940 A.D 202 at 204-205; R v Koning supra (n 
141) at 232-233; R v Mathlau supra (n 1259) 350. Burchell and Hunt supra (n 84) at n 67 go on to 
note De Wet and Swanepoel’s supra (n 76) at 139 criticism in this respect: “South African common 
law does not justify a verdict of culpable homicide where the killing is intentional, and further it 
blurs the distinction between murder and culpable homicide.” 
 
1272 Burchell and Hunt supra (n84) 278. Cf R v Koning supra (n 141) at 233: “ ‘whether…the force used 
was so excessive, the shooting so premature’ that the crime was murder ‘or whether the facts show 





According to the upholding of justice theory, if in the event of an unlawful attack, it is 
possible for the defender to flee from the attacker without the defender giving up her or 
another’s protected interest, and without exposing herself to harm, the defender has no 
duty to flee.1273 A duty to flee negates the essence of private defence. Private defence 
deals with the defence of the legal order, that is the upholding of justice. Fleeing does 
not constitute a defence but a “capitulation to injustice”. Justice need not yield to 
injustice.1274 When acting in private defence, the defender acts as one who upholds the 
law, since the state authority is not present to protect her.1275 Thus the issue is not 
balancing the value of autonomy against the value of the aggressor’s life, but whether 
the defender enjoys autonomy at the outset. If this is the case, then the notion of 
autonomy entails a right forcibly to reassert one’s rightful position.1276 
 
Despite these rationales underlying self-defence, South African law is still not clear on 
whether the attacked party is expected to flee. Case law creates the impression that in 
such circumstances, the person should flee.1277 It may be that under the influence of 
Anglo-American law, our law expects the attacked party to flee, in order to avoid the  
 
                                               
1273 This view accords with the view propounded in German criminal-law theory. See Leckner and 
Perron supra (n 978) at par 40; Roxin Strafrecht Allegeiner Teil Band (1994) 553-554; Jakobs 
Strafrecht allgemeiner Teil Die Grudlagen und die Zurechnugslehre (2001) 395-396, cited in 
Snyman supra (n 124) 184. For a discussion of the duty to retreat in South African law see chapter 2 
at 53-55 supra, English law, chapter 3 at 120-122 supra; American Law, chapter 4 at 198-199 supra. 
 
1274 Snyman supra (n 124) 184. 
 
1275 This view is supported by authors such as Snyman supra (n 25) 107. 
 
1276 Snyman supra (n 124) 184, citing Fletcher supra (n 544) 865. 
 
1277 See R v Zikalala supra (n 151) 571-572; R v K supra (n 151) at 358g; R v Patel supra (n 201) at 123; 
S v Mnguni supra (n 141) at 779 A; S v Dougherty supra (n 223) at 50. Snyman supra (n 124) at n 
21 is of the view that the reason for this could be that the court did not believe that the threat was 
imminent. However, the author goes on to suggest that the latter case has been held to be wrongly 
decided as it was a classic case of self-defence. Furthermore, Roman-Dutch law supported the 
proposition that the duty to flee exists even if no danger in retreating. Matthaeus supra (n 244) 48 5 
37; Moorman supra (n 245) 22 n 13. But as the case of Bird supra (n 551) at 513 suggests “Although 




attack.1278 English law has expressed this sentiment well: in R v Julien,1279 the court 
held “duty to flee in reality amounts to a duty to demonstrate an unwillingness to fight.. 
to temporize and disengage and perhaps to make some physical withdrawal”. Smith and 
Hogan submit: “if the only reasonable course is to retreat, then it would appear that to 
stand and fight must be to use unreasonable force” 1280 and in R v Bird 1281 it was 
decided that in English law there is no rule that forces the attacked party to flee, but that 
the question whether she could have fled is one of several factors that are taken into 
account in deciding whether the defensive action was necessary, and whether the extent 
of the defence was reasonable. Snyman submits that in respect of American law: “[I]n 
some jurisdictions, a person may not use deadly force against an aggressor if he knows 
that he has a completely safe avenue of retreat. 1282  However, most states do not 
recognize such a rule to flee”. 1283 
 
 
                                               
1278 Snyman supra (n 124) 184. 
 
1279  [1969] 2 All ER 586.  
 
1280 Snyman supra (n 124) 184, citing Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (1999) 257.  
 
1281 Bird supra (n 551).  
 
1282 Snyman supra (n 124) n 22, citing Dressler Understanding Criminal Law (1995) 304. Nineteen 
states follow this rule. Similarly, the Model Penal Code sides with these states requiring actor using 
deadly force to believe such force is necessary to protect himself against death serious bodily injury, 
kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat (MPC Code and Commentaries ss 
3.04 (2) (b)). 
 
1283 Snyman supra (n 124) 184. Certain American states that do require a duty to retreat do recognize the 
castle doctrine exception: it is possible to stand your ground and fight when attacked in your home 
even if it is not known whether safe retreat is possible. Thus the castle doctrine recognizes the 
importance of the sovereign person’s ability to retain control of the single place in the world that is 
most clearly her own, not necessarily in the sense that the individual holds title to it, but rather in the 
sense that it is the place in which that person’s decisions and actions are least susceptible to intrusion 
from the requirements of others (See in Smith “State v Gartland: New Jersey Leaning Toward a 
more Lenient Application of the Duty to Retreat as it Affects Battered Women who kill their 
Partners” (1999) Women’s Rights Law Reporter 173 at 178. Aggergaard in “Criminal Law – Retreat 
from Reason: How Minnesota’s New No-Retreat Rule Confuses the law and cries for alteration” 
(2002) William Mitchell Law Review 657 at 665 suggests: “acting in necessity as a vindication of 




Blackstone’s view is that the state is the upholder of individuals’ rights has displaced 
the premise of personal autonomy as the appropriate defence of self-defence. 1284 
Blackstone did this by rejecting Locke’s analogy between combat and necessary 
defence.1285 Beale however, has noted that the law’s task is to provide the aggrieved 
party a remedy for the violation of their rights and this does not include protecting the 
aggressor’s rights. If the right to use force is derivative of the state’s control of force, 
then regulating the defence consistently reflects the interests both of the aggressor and 
the defender. 1286 
 
One suggestion in respect of the duty to retreat is to recognize putative self-defence. 
However, it is submitted that by recognizing battered woman syndrome as being 
pertinent to the question as to why the battered woman did not retreat, other factors will 
also have to be taken into account to satisfy the court that she had no option but to act 
in a particular way.1287 Such a standard is functionally equivalent to the subjective 
standard,1288 which is in clear contradiction to the view that reasonableness must be 
facially neutral.1289 
 
A comparable argument could be made for the fact that the duty to retreat must, from 
an objective viewpoint, be necessary. Where an attack is not imminent, the battered  
                                               
1284 Fletcher supra (n 544) 867. 
 
1285 Blackstone supra (n 506) 180-181; 185. To quote Blackstone supra (n 506) 185: “And though it may 
be cowardice, in time of war between two independent nations, to flee from an enemy; yet between 
two fellow subjects the law countenances no such point of honour; because the king and his courts 
are the vidices injuriarum, and will give to the party wronged all the satisfaction he deserves”.  
 
1286 Beale “Retreat from Murderous Assault” (1868) Harvard Law Review 567 at 581. 
 
1287 This refers to vis compulsiva as opposed to vis absoluta (i.e. automatism). 
 
1288 Heller supra (n 795) 94-95. 
 




woman is required to retreat. Such a position does not take into account the fact that a 
battered woman is more likely to be killed by her abuser when she leaves an abusive 
relationship 1290 and that women who flee often have no safe place to go.1291  
 
It is submitted that the duty to retreat requirement should be maintained in self-defence 
law. In the case of the battered woman it is submitted that a battered woman’s situation 
can be adequately catered for within the reasonableness neutrality perspective. Fletcher 
submits that since the requirement of imminence is political rather than moral, the 
element of self-defence known as an imminent attack must actually occur in the real 
world. This theorist has noted that the relationships between the parties, whether one is 
dominant and the other subordinate, should not matter. However, Fletcher goes on to 
note that where there is a gap between the theory of state protection and the abused 
woman’s reality of the police’s unresponsiveness, it essentially becomes more difficult 
to assess whether the courts should be required to recognize a broader than usual right 
of self-defence. The problem is to formulate a precise test of how poorly the police 
have failed in their duties and to determine a proportionate adjustment in the law of 
self-defence. On this basis, Fletcher’s admits that the contention that the underlying 
relationship of dominance and subordination should not bear on the analysis of self-
defence as justification is weak. 1292  
 
As has been submitted previously courts have difficulty in seeing confrontational cases 
as confrontational because of the normative assumptions about what parties’  
                                               
1290 Aggergaard supra (n 1283) 671.  
 
1291 Walker supra (n 3) submits that a woman who is repeatedly battered by her mate will eventually 
accept the situation and develop a feeling of learned helplessness (at 87). This psychological 
paralysis can be so severe that even if an avenue of escape presents itself the woman might be unable 
to act on it or unable to even perceive it exists.  
 




relationships entails, the structure of the parties’ relationships determines the post hoc 
view, the objective view not only of the temporal transactions but also of its 
confrontational character.1293 As Snyman suggests, the question on whether there is a 
duty to retreat is academic since in practice the question at issue will usually not be 
whether the person should have fled, but whether she was entitled to go to the lengths 
she did in defending herself, in light of the surrounding circumstances, such as the 
nature of the threat and of the attacker’s weapon (if he had one), the nature of the 
interest threatened and the ages and physical powers of the respective parties.1294 Thus 
by recognizing the number of attempts made to escape her abuser as well as the issue of 
separation assault, the court can view the threat as continuous, not from the abused 
woman’s view but objectively speaking.1295  
 
5.2.2.3 Defence must be directed against the attacker 
If the battered woman, defending herself against her abuser’s attack, accidentally 
assaults a third party in the process,1296 it is submitted that the battered woman could 
justify her act on the ground of necessity,1297 and furthermore could escape liability if  
 
 
                                               
1293 Nourse supra (n 1181) 1268. Schneider supra (n 71) at 523 submits: “[B]ut these cases challenge 
that dichotomy in fundamental ways, because they require us to understand a more complex version 
of social reality, a reality where choice is constrained by social experience, failure of state 
responsibility, and allocation of social resources. Traditional notions of individual agency and free 
will must be tempered by recognition of social circumstance, of situation, of the moral relations of 
domination”. The author goes on to state that: “A more textured and contextual analysis of the 
interrelationship between women’s oppression and women’s acts of resistance are crucial, for we 
must understand both social context of women’s victimization, or oppression, which shapes 
women’s choices and constrains women’s agency and resistance, and also recognize women’s 
agency and resistance in a more nuanced way”.  
 
1294 Snyman supra (n 25) 107-108. 
 
1295 See n 1035 supra. 
 
1296 See also chapter 2 at 58 supra. 
 




she lacked mens rea in respect of the assault upon another person.1298 
 
5.3  Conclusion 
The purpose of this enquiry has been to examine the development and the functioning 
of self-defence in light of a comparison with the means currently utilized to criminalize 
conduct falling outside the bounds of self-defence: by examining English law and 
American law on this subject. Threshold problems with some of the elements of the 
defence have led to theorists attempting to extend the bounds of self-defence so as to 
take an abused woman’s situation into account. It is submitted that since the autonomy 
theory (narrowly circumscribed) 1299  should be followed in South African law, the 
traditional elements for self-defence should remain in force. 
 
These include an objective test for self-defence. 1300 A move towards subjectivized 
standards has proved to problematic 1301 and taken to its ultimate conclusion, will result 
in a normative concept of fault. 1302  In respect of the imminence requirement, the 
problems created by this standard cannot be solved by replacing imminence with 
necessity 1303 or by claiming priority for necessity or by demanding that imminence 
means a pacifist rather than the libertarian version of necessity.1304 These positions pose 
the question but do not answer it. Furthermore, if the imminence question cannot be 
answered by assuming one side of the necessity debate, then it cannot be answered by  
                                               
1298 Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) 142-143. 
 
1299 In this respect see 242-254 op cit. 
 
1300 See 271-273 for an exposition of what this test would include. 
 
1301 For a criticism of these subjective standards see 246-261 op cit. 
 
1302 See 267-270 for a discussion of the implications of moving towards a normative concept of fault. 
 
1303 See 277-280 op cit. 
 




referring to the distinction between justification and excuse.1305 It is submitted that 
“instead of viewing objectivity as not being able to account for battered woman’s 
situation – the opposite conclusion should be reached – that by rethinking certain 
situational factors as a set of relatively innocuous and perhaps necessary normative 
propositions 1306  then the abused woman’s situation is consistent with some very 
standard propositions in the law of self-defence. If the abused women is being attacked 
and the threat is imminent (in the traditional sense), then she should be able to avail to 
herself of self-defence, although it should be noted that the court should also consider 
the fact that the battered women placed herself in this dangerous situation. However, 
the court would also have to take into consideration the difficulty that the abused 
woman faced in extricating herself from this position.1307 
 
On the basis of a discussion of the various construals that inform the question of 
whether proportionality should form a necessary requirement for self-defence, 
including (i) the liberal aspiration to neutrality,1308 (ii) constitutional norms 1309 and (iii) 
a duty of social solidarity to the state,1310 it is submitted that proportionality should 
form an integral part of the requirements for self-defence. The test can be set out as 
follows: not only must the defence be necessary but also the means used by the accused 
for the purpose of averting the attack must be reasonable in the circumstances.1311 This 
is in accordance with the autonomy theory. Therefore would an “ordinary, intelligent  
                                               
1305 See 289-290 op cit. 
 




1308 For a discussion of the liberals aspiration to neutrality see 293-303 op cit. 
 
1309 For a discussion of the impact of constitutional norms see 259-261 op cit. 
 
1310 For a discussion of the duty of social solidarity see 304-305 op cit. 
 
1311 Burchell and Hunt supra (n 84) 277. 
 318 
 
and prudent person in the accused’s situation would react to establish if the self-defence 
claim was justifiable. 1312 However, it is this author’s submission that unlike the above 
formulation, not all the characteristics of the accused should be taken into account. 
Only those “characteristics which have the most (or direct) bearing on the accused’s 
situation” should be considered. 1313 
 
Despite the rationales underlying self-defence,1314 it has not been entirely clear whether 
an abused woman is expected to flee.1315 It is submitted that there should be a duty to 
retreat. In the case of the abused woman, her situation is adequately catered for within 
the reasonableness neutrality perspective.1316 
 
5.4  Analysis of the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
5.4.1  Introduction 
The question concerning what the precise effect of provocation will be on an accused’s 
criminal liability is not entirely clear. One of the reasons for this uncertainty is the fact 
that since 1971 there are no correctly reported cases in which the South African courts 
have expressly answered this question: it has to be assumed that provocation is 
currently dealt with by means of the general principles approach to criminal 
liability.1317 According to this approach, provocation is nothing more than a set of facts 
which has to be assessed by means of ordinary principles of liability. The question  
                                                                                                                                       
 
1312 See n 1260 op cit. 
 
1313 See 271-273 for a discussion of which factors ought to be taken into account. 
 
1314 For a discussion of these rationales see 311-312 op cit. 
 
1315 See 310-315 op cit. 
 
1316 For a discussion of this point see 313-314. 
 
1317 Snyman “Die erkenning van objektiewe faktore by die verweer van provokasie in die strafreg” 
(2006) Tydskrif vir Regwetenskap 57 at 58 (own translation). 
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which has to be asked is whether, in spite of the provocation, the accused has 
committed an unlawful act which complies with the definitional elements and 
furthermore, whether she has criminal capacity and intention or negligence. Only once 
these requirements have been satisfied, can an accused be convicted of a criminal 
offence.1318  
 
One of the main problems underlying the defence of non-pathological incapacity is the 
issue of lost self-control. According to South African law, capacity is absent when an 
accused lacks self-control.1319 However, it is far from clear in our law when self-control 
is absent: 
 
“[t]he lack of clarity (surrounding lost control) has been 
exacerbated by confusing decisions of our courts. This is 
partly a result of the defence of incapacity, particularly it’s 
extension to cases involving provocation and mental stress, 
and partly a result of it’s application in practice.” 1320 
 
It is submitted that the main reason for the problems surrounding this term has been the 
courts equation of the defence of automatism with non-pathological incapacity (or loss  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
1318 Snyman supra (n 25) 235 (own translation). 
 
1319 S v Chretien supra (n 97) 1104; 1106F-G. 
 
1320 Louw supra (n 28) 207. Even theorists have differing views on what constitutes lost self-control. 
Visser and Vorster supra (n 197) submit that provocation may cause a person to become so angry 
that he: “loses all self-control and becomes so blind with rage that he cannot distinguish between 
right and wrong or act in accordance with such a distinction. In such a case… the accused will not be 
criminally accountable” (at 397). These writers seem to adopt the view that self-control is not an 
independent prerequisite for a defence of provocation but rather that a loss of self-control is 
indicative of a lack of imputability on the part of a provoked person. Similarly Burchell and Milton 
supra (n 26) employed the term “loss of self-control” in the context of provocation, but do not 
clearly set out the meaning of this term. Ackermann in A comparative Examination of the extent to 
which the South African and English legal systems recognize the Defence of Provocation in 
Homicide Cases (1993) LLM 40 suggests that since these textbook writers dealt with the issue of 
provocation under the heading of “capacity” it may be that in their view loss of self-control is 
equated with lack of imputability. Burchell supra (n 29) makes no reference to the term loss of self-




of self-control). This trend is clearly demonstrated in our case law and is now to be 
examined. 
 
5.4.2  “Loss of self-control” and current South African case law 
Consider the way case law has defined capacity: according to the formulation in section 
78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1321 namely the ability to act in accordance with 
the distinction between right and wrong. 1322  Others have adopted Joubert JA’s 
formulation of the notion of capacity in Laubscher,1323 which states that this ability is 
premised on the fact that the actor had the capacity for self-control 
(“weerstandskrag/wilsbeheervermoë) such that he can resist the temptation to act 
unlawfully.1324 Joubert JA also submitted another way of describing the capacity: the 
ability to exercise a free choice to act lawfully or unlawfully.1325 The notion of capacity 
for self-control or ability to exercise a free choice to act lawfully or not, derived from 
the Rumpff Commission Report forms the basis for the description of conative capacity  
 
 
                                               
1321 Act 51 of 1977.  
 
1322 Hoctor supra (n 242) 159. See further Hoctor supra (n 242) at n 401 who makes reference to the 
cases of S v Lesch supra (n 309) at 823B; S v Campher supra (n 320) at 966D-E; S v 
Kalogoropoulos supra (n 337) at 17C; S v Els 1993 (1) SACR 723 (O) at 735C; S v Shapiro supra (n 
68) 123E-F; S v Pederson 1998 (2) SACR 383 (N) at 397, 399-400A; S v Kali [2000] 2 All SA 181 
(Ck) at 204H. 
 
1323 S v Laubscher supra (n 68) 166I-J. 
 
1324  Hoctor supra (n 242) 159-160:“…that he had the self-control to avoid the temptation to act 
unlawfully”. deurdat hy die weerstandskrag (wilsbeheervermoë) het om die versoeking om 
wederregtelik te handel, te weerstaan’ (ibid) (“he had enough self-control to avoid the temptation to 
act unlawfully”) (own translation). 
 
1325 The full expression is “hy het die vermoë tot vrye keuse om regmatig of onregmatig te handel, 
onderworpe aan sy wil” (“he had free will to choose whether to act lawfully or unlawfully). Hoctor 
supra (n 242) 49 at n 403 submits that the concluding phrase “onderworpe aan sy wil” (“subject to 
his will”) is redundant, and if incorrectly regarded as making reference to the voluntariness 
requirement, may further be the source of some confusion. The statement is entirely clear in 
meaning, and does not require any further qualification-after all, if the accused’s acts are not subject 




in many judgments. Some judgments cite the dictum in Laubscher,1326 others employ 
the terminology of “weerstandskrag”,1327 others make reference to “wilsbeheervermoe 
(of weerstandsvermoë)”,1328 and others make use of “die vermoë…om ooreenkomstig 
daardie onderskeidingsvermoe to handel deur die versoeking om wederegtelik op to 
tree te weerstaan”.1329 Various judgments have also worded the description of conative 
capacity a little differently, focusing on whether the accused had the capacity to 
exercise restraint or control over his actions.1330  
 
Such definitions create the impression that battered women can only rely on the defence 
of non-pathological incapacity if they lacked total capacity/or totally lost self-control. 
This is problematic for battered women since response patterns demonstrated by these 
women suggest that they did not lose self-control when acting: 
 
“[B]attered women appear calm during and after the killing 
and they generally use a weapon to strike the victim in stealth. 
Furthermore, the method of killing may be influenced by 
gender specific norms. For instance, their superior physical 
strength and training is more likely to make men use their fists  
                                               
1326 Hoctor supra (n 242) 160, who cites the cases of S v Wiid supra (n 333) at 563F-J and S v Van der 
Sandt supra (n 337) at 635E-I in this regard. 
 
1327 Hoctor supra (n 242) 160, citing S v Lesch supra (n 309) 823H and S v Campher supra (n 320) 
949G, 950H-I, 951F-G, 956B. 
 
1328 Hoctor supra (n 242) 160, citing S v Van der Merwe 1989 (2) PH H 51 (A). 
 
1329 Hoctor supra (n 242) 160, citing S v Calitz supra (n 330) 128E-F.  
 
1330 Hoctor supra (n 242) 160. See also Hoctor supra (n 242) at n 410: S v Ingram 1995 (1) SACR 1 (A) 
at 4F, 7B-C, 8B-C. In S v Van Vuuren supra (n 26) at 17G the court cites Chretien supra (n 97) 
dictum at 1106, where the enquiry is whether the accused’s inhibitions had “wesenlik verkrummel” 
(“essentially crumbled”); in S v Adams 1986 (4) SA 882 (A) at 903D the court holds that “the 
accused’s inhibitions were completely disintegrated”; in S v Nursingh supra (n 339) at 338H-I) that 
the accused’s rage was “irrational, unthinking and blind to all restraint”; and in S v Moses supra (n 
347) the court accepted the expert the expert evidence that the accused’s rage had “collapsed his 
controls” (at 709G-H) and impaired his “capacity to retain control” (at 710H-I) In S v Campher 
supra (n 320) at 957H-I, Viljoen JA refers to the accused’s defence as “onweerstaanbare drang” 
(‘irresistible urge or impulse’), which he elaborates on at 958I: “..die remmende effek teen of 
inhibering van die drang om die monster…te vernietig, heeltemal meegegee het” (“the braking effect 
against or inhibition of the urge to destroy the monster completely gave way”) A more generic loss 
of self-control is referred to in S v Kalogoropoulos supra (n 337) at 24A, 26A; and S v Gesualdo 




when angry. Women act with stealth because of smaller size, 
lesser physical strength and lack of physical training in 
fighting with their hands”. 1331 
 
The way that case law has developed in South African law suggests that any goal-
directed activity on the part of the accused militates against a loss of self-control and 
for this reason an accused’s defence would fail if such activity was present. 
 
In S v Lesch 1332 the accused held in evidence that while he knew he was shooting the 
deceased, that he realized this to be wrongful but that he was too angry to act in 
conformity with that realization.1333 The defence failed on the facts. Hattingh AJ held 
that the behaviour of the accused had been too rational throughout for the court to 
accept that the accused could not have refrained from killing the deceased had he 
wished to.1334 
 
The set of facts in Campher 1335 also suggest (despite prior abuse of the accused by her 
husband (the deceased) that goal-directed behaviour took place. The accused had to 
help the deceased fit a bolt-lock to his pigeon coop while he bored a hole in the wooden 
doorframe. Since she was in an extremely uncomfortable position, the hole was not 
bored straight which enraged the deceased, who threatened the accused with a 
screwdriver. She fled to their house, but he followed her to prevent her from locking  
                                               
1331 Yeo supra (n 636) 453. 
 
1332  S v Lesch supra (n 309). In this case the accused had an unusually offensive neighbour (the 
deceased) who made a habit of threatening and insulting the accused and more particularly his 
daughter, towards whom the accused had exceptionally tender feelings (at 817H-818A). On the day 
of the crime the deceased insulted and threatened the accused’s daughter. She informed the accused 
of this telephonically. He came home, armed himself with a firearm, and went to the deceased to 
confront him concerning his behaviour. The deceased spoke rudely and aggressively to the accused. 
The accused fired one shot at the deceased. The deceased fell. The accused fired three more shots. 
The deceased died, and the accused asked a neighbour to take him to the police. 
 
1333 S v Lesch supra (n 309) 819A-B. 
 
1334 S v Lesch supra (n 309) at 825A-G. 
 




him out. She armed herself with a pistol. Despite this, the deceased forced her back to 
the pigeon coop. She went there still armed with the pistol and after the deceased had 
berated her, she fired a shot at a distance of 20 centimeters from the deceased, and the 
bullet entered his heart from behind. The problem with this case is that Viljoen JA was 
prepared to make a finding despite the fact that no expert evidence regarding the 
accused’s mental condition when she killed the deceased had been led. While Viljoen 
JA concluded that a defence of non-imputability is not restricted to conditions 
stemming from mental illness or defect, but includes cases where accused suffered from 
a temporary mental aberration as a result of fear or emotional stress, the problem is the 
time period when she shot the deceased.1336 Why did she not shoot the accused once 
she had the firearm on her person, instead of waiting and taking the firearm with her 
back to the pigeon coop? This indicates she had deliberated about whether to arm 
herself or not, hence indicating a choice and therefore militates against a loss of control. 
 
In the case of Wiid 1337  (which is one of the few cases in which an accused was 
acquitted on the basis of non-pathological incapacity), the accused had suffered abuse 
at the hands of her husband over a period of time. It was shown that just before 
shooting her husband several times, she had been seriously assaulted by him and there 
was evidence to the effect that she might have been concussed. However, the acquittal 
in this case is problematic since, the facts of the case were arguably strong enough to 
lead one to the conclusion that not even the voluntariness of her conduct had been 
proven beyond reasonable doubt. 1338 
 
                                               
1336 Ibid at 958. For a full discussion of this case see chapter 2 at 69-71 supra. 
 
1337 S v Wiid supra (n 333). 
 




In the cases of Nursingh 1339 and Moses 1340 the problem of goal-directed behaviour was 
a major obstacle to the accused. In Nursingh 1341 it was held: 
 
“The State’s real argument was that there were sufficient signs 
of deliberate conduct in such evidence as there is of the actual 
shooting, to show that the accused must have been capable of 
ordered, rational thought and action, which belies his claim 
not to have known what happened until his friend Soni, 
intervened. Without going into details of that case, it is enough 
to say that he professes he was unable to remember anything 
more than red rage. But Mr. Macadam pointed to the accuracy 
‘of’ the shooting, the different situation in the room of the 
three deceased, the instruction to Soni to keep the grandfather 
quiet, the decision to leave the house, dispose of the pistol and 
then concoct and execute a plan to divert suspicion for the 
deed elsewhere. That all showed a train of conduct that 
required a conscious awareness of what was going on and an 
ability to respond to circumstances. That showed, so it was 
argued, that his intellect was working, that is to say his 
cognitive function of the brain, and if that was the case, he 
was not incapable of knowing what he was doing and that 
what he was doing was wrong.” 1342 
 
Although the accused was acquitted in this case, the court had great difficulty in 
distinguishing the defence of non-pathological incapacity from automatism and 
intention. It becomes clear that the court conflated the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity with intention as well as automatism: 
 
 “The primary issue in the matter is whether, at the time and in 
the circumstances, in which he fired those ten shots, he had 
the mental ability or capacity to know what he was doing and 
whether what he was doing was wrongful. If he did, then a 
second issue falls to be considered, which is whether he could 
have formed the necessary level of intention to constitute the  
 
 
                                               
1339 S v Nursingh supra (n 339). 
 
1340 S v Moses supra (n 347). 
 
1341 S v Nursingh supra (n 339). 
 




offence of murder” 1343 
 
Clearly, the court was incorrect in its formulation of the capacity test: the capacity of 
the accused to know what he was doing, and the capacity to know that what he was 
doing was wrongful. Nothing in South African law resembles the capacity test in this 
format.1344 At the outset the court did distinguish between intention and capacity, but 
did not maintain this distinction for long: 
 
“Now, although the onus is on the state to show that the 
accused had the necessary criminal capacity to establish and 
found the mens rea necessary to commit an offence, where an 
accused person relies on non-pathological causes in support of 
a defence of criminal incapacity, then he is required to lay a 
factual foundation for it in evidence, sufficient at least to 
create a reasonable doubt on the issue as to whether he had the 
mental capacity.” 1345 
 
Although courts have in the past made reference to the capacity to form an intention, the 
current trend is to deal with capacity as a distinct element of liability (or more specifically, 
as a prerequisite for liability). It could be suggested that not to much should be made of the 
conflation here, but it is submitted that the court’s other references to the capacity test are 
too problematic to ignore: 1346 
 
“In our law a man is responsible only for wrongful acts that he 
knows he is committing. Before he can be convicted of an 
offence, he must have the intellectual or mental capacity to 
commit it. That means an ability to distinguish between right 
and wrong and act in accordance with that appreciation. If that 




                                               
1343 Louw supra (n 28) 208, citing S v Nursingh supra (n 339) at 332E-F. 
 
1344 Louw supra (n 28) 208. 
 
1345 Louw supra (n 28) 208, citing S v Nursingh supra (n 339) 334B-C. 
 




necessary capacity and it is for the prosecution to prove that 
he knew what he was doing.” 1347 
 
This statement leads to the following conclusion: once capacity is absent, the onus 
shifts to the state to prove intention. This is not correct since once capacity is absent, 
the accused must be acquitted.1348 The court then went on to conflate capacity and 
intention at its conclusion: 
 
“That explosion [the shooting of the three deceased] was not 
the result of a functioning mind, and so all its consequences 
can be regarded as unintentional.” 1349 
 
In Sv Moses 1350 complex goal-directed actions were taken by the accused: 
 
“then he reached for an ornament next to the door about a 
meter from the bed…. As he picked it up the ornament broke 
and he let it go. He was angry at the time because he hated the 
deceased for abusing his trust and not confiding in him that he 
had AIDS and for allowing him to go on something that was 
weak as it had happened to him in the past. The experience of 
that night reminded him of how he was sexually abused by his 
father in the past. When the [ornament] broke off as he picked 
it up, he then ran into the lounge and picked up the ….black 
cat ornament. He went back to the deceased in the bedroom 
and the deceased was trying to close the sliding door which 
could not close properly because it was broken. The accused 
pushed the door open and proceeded to the bedroom. At the 
time the deceased was motioning backwards towards the bed 
as the accused moved in. The accused hit him on the head 
with the cat…As he hit the deceased the thoughts were still 
flooding his mind. He was thinking about how he was to break 
the news at home, because many AIDS victims have 
difficulties in telling their families that they are HIV positive. 
He was also thinking of how he was going to die a horrible 
death and the fact that his future had now come to an end. He 
said all these thoughts were just flooding his mind at the same 
time. He even thought of not living anymore. He felt that he  
                                               
1347 S v Nursingh supra (n 339) 339A-B. 
 
1348 Louw supra (n 28) 209. 
 
1349 Louw supra (n 28) 209, citing S v Nursingh supra (n 339) 339D. 
 




was stupid and felt that he could not change things. He did not 
feel in control of things at that stage. He was not thinking 
properly. He could see what he was doing, but could not 
control himself. He was so furious.” 1351 
 
The court went on to discuss the accused’s actions: 
 
The accused testified that he had struck the deceased twice 
with [the cat]. The second blow was inflicted while the 
deceased was down. Thereafter the accused ran to the kitchen 
and got hold of a smaller knife… He ran back to the 
deceased’s bedroom. The deceased at the time was in the 
process of getting up. He said he looked at him and he hated 
him. The deceased moved his hand as if to strike him. The 
accused ran back to the kitchen and got hold of a big 
knife…Thereafter he ran back to the deceased’s bedroom and 
cut the deceased’s throat and wrists.” 1352 
 
It would appear as if the respective courts in the cases of Nursingh 1353 and Moses 1354 
accepted that in both instances a series of goal-directed acts constituted only one act in 
each case.1355 In Nursingh 1356 the court noted that: 
 
The psychiatrist identified the resulting mental state as a 
separation of intellect and emotion, with temporary 
destruction of the intellect, a state in which, although the 
individual’s actions might be goal-directed, he would be using 




                                               




1353 S v Nursingh supra (n 339). 
 
1354 S v Moses supra (n 347). 
 
1355 Louw supra (n 28) 213. This deduction was reached without any reasons behind the conclusions 
drawn. 
 
1356 S v Nursingh supra (n 339). 
 




The court went on to conclude that: 
 
 “it is not possible to distinguish between the three killings on 
the basis that the mother had caused, provoked the reaction 
more than the others. It was one and the same eruption that 
resulted in the three separate acts. It is really as though one 
explosion achieved all three deaths.” 1358 
 
In Moses 1359 the court also accepted that the accused committed only one act: 
 
“Mr. Yodaiken [defence witness] did not contend that the 
accused was acting in a state of automatism during the killing. 
On being asked to comment on the different weapons used to 
inflict injuries on the deceased, he stated that the two acts, 
namely the hitting of the deceased with a blunt object and the 
stabbings, were in fact one action. The accused was in an 
annihilatory rage, which tends to damage or destroy.” 1360 
 
This statement cannot be accepted. The court refers to two acts, hitting and stabbing. At 
the very least there were two stabbings as they involved two different knives.1361 But it 
is clear that the following suggests at least fourteen instances of goal-directed actions:  
 
• Attempting to pick up an ornament in the bedroom; 
• Running to the lounge to locate another weapon; 
• Picking up the black cat ornament; 
• Returning to the bedroom with the ornament; 
• Forcing open the door of the bedroom; 
• Striking the deceased twice with the ornament; 
                                               
1358 Louw supra (n 28) 213, citing S v Nursingh supra (n 339) 339C-D. 
 
1359 S v Moses supra (n 347). 
 
1360 Ibid at 709H-I. 
 




• Running to the kitchen to locate another weapon; 
• Picking up a knife in the kitchen; 
• Returning to the bedroom with the knife; 
• Stabbing the deceased with the knife; 
• Running back to the kitchen to locate yet another weapon; 
• Selecting another and larger knife in the kitchen; 
• Returning to the bedroom with the larger knife; 
• Cutting the deceased’s neck and both wrists (possibly constituting three separate 
acts).” 1362 
 
It is submitted that Louw is correct in his submission that: 
 
“To describe all the above as one act is, with respect, 
outrageous. However, once all acts are collapsed into one, the 
problem of goal-directed behaviour falls away. In my opinion 
the collapsing in both Nursingh and Moses is untenable and 
accordingly they were wrongly decided.” 1363 
 
One theory suggests that the presence of goal-directed activity in the cases of Nursingh 
1364 and Moses 1365 could be accounted for on the basis that the accused’s affective 
functions have been affected as opposed to his conative function: 
                                               




1364 S v Nursingh supra (n 339). 
 
1365 S v Moses supra (n 347). In acquitting Moses the court seemed to rely on the accused’s unstable 
personality, which, according to the psychological evidence, resulted in his flying into a rage very 
easily. This combined with the final “provocation” of the accused’s lover telling him that he was 
HIV positive, convinced the court that the accused possibly lacked the necessary self-control 
required for criminal capacity. The court thus found that the “killing was a crystallization of a 
number of factors (at 714F-H): “[s]uppressed anger relating to the accused’s dysfunctional family 
background and the sexual abuse by his father, equating the deceased with his father and the sense of 
betrayal, the accused’s vulnerability at the time of the killing and the provocation itself and the 
subjective belief that the accused was going to die a horrible death. It was a combination of these 
factors which led to the accused’s controls collapsing at the time of the killing…Although the 
accused might possibly have retained some measure of control over his actions by the time of the 
 330 
 
“The courts have conflated two different scenarios: where an 
accused owing to his volatile and emotional nature commits a 
crime due to a lack of sufficient self-control, and the situation 
where an accused, through a long series of events, finds 
herself in a state where there has been complete disintegration 
of her controls and therefore a concomitant lack of criminal 
capacity.” 1366 
 
The reason for such confusion could be traced back to the courts misinterpretation of 
the true nature of the second leg of the criminal capacity test (conative). The Rumpff 
Commission has defined the conative capacity as a person’s ability to control her 
behavior according to her insights. In other words unlike an animal, she is able to make 




                                                                                                                                       
infliction of the final wound, the state has nevertheless failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
his control even at that stage was not significantly impaired”. As Louw supra (n 28) at 215 suggests, 
the problem with this case is that the accused should not have been acquitted since there was no long 
term abuse preceding the killing either by the deceased or at all. In previous judgments, the final 
provocative act was, metaphorically speaking, the last straw in a long history of abuse. In all cases 
with the exception of the grandparents in Nursingh supra (n 339) the killing was directed against the 
abuser. While the accused in Moses supra (n 347) had a childhood history of physical and sexual 
abuse by his father, the relationship between him and the deceased was in fact a very good one. It 
was a single and isolated provocative act that sent the accused into a rage. It was furthermore, not the 
first rage he had experienced in his life (at 703F-I): Mr. Moses also gave evidence about his sexual 
orientation. It is no secret that he is a homosexual. He told the Court that when he was 21, he told his 
mother that he was gay. His mother was very upset about this and she told him to leave the common 
home and never come back. The accused was very angry and he felt that he had sacrificed his future 
for his family. Thereafter he went into a rage and literally smashed his mother’s house. He trashed 
his mother’s TV, crockery, the stove, the fridge, the washing machine, he pulled down the curtains, 
etc. He also tried to cut his wrists as he did not feel [like?] living anymore and he felt that his family 
did not appreciate what he had done for them. The police were called to the scene and they arrived 
after he had already trashed his mother’s house. The accused also told the court of another incident 
also involving an anger outburst. This was when he smashed his own car, the Toyota Cressida. His 
evidence was that he had an argument with his sister and he threw a plate of food on her and took a 
knife and the sister ran away and closed the door behind her. He was so upset thereafter; he took his 
car and drove at a speed that was excessive in the circumstances. The result was that the car was a 
write-off. 
 
1366 Cf the statement made in Eadie supra (n 360) highlighting this point: “Where an accused acts in an 
aggressive goal-directed and focused manner, spurred on by anger or some other emotion, whilst still 
able to appreciate the difference between right and wrong and while still able to direct and control 
his actions. Reduced to its essence it amounts to this: the accused is claiming that his uncontrolled 
act just happens to coincide with the demise of the person who prior to the act was the object of his 
anger, jealousy or hatred. As demonstrated, the courts have accepted such version of events from 




her insight into right and wrong reveals to the person.1367 Self-control in such a context, 
can be defined as “a disposition of the perpetrator through which her insight into the 
unlawful nature of the particular act can restrain her from, and thus set up a counter-
motive to, its execution”. 1368 De Vos goes on to explain that a lack of self-control can 
lead to a lack of conative capacity: 
 
“A lack of self-control can thus lead to a collapse of the 
conative functioning of the mind and hence criminal 
incapacity. Such conative function (which when affected 
excludes criminal capacity) must be distinguished from the 
affective function of the mind, which when affected, does not 
automatically have any influence on the criminal capacity of 
the actor. While there is volitional activity on the part of the 
actor, volitional control will be possible, unless the facts 
demonstrate that there was a disintegration of the other 
functions as well. Although the affective function of an 
individual’s mind may be impaired by provocation or other 
factors, this on its own will have no bearing on the finding on 




As the Rumpff Commission explained the point: 
 
                                               
1367 De Vos supra (n 349) 357, discussing Report paras 9.19: “The uncontrolled emotional outbursts to 
which some people are liable are sometimes adduced as a ground for non-responsibility, it being 
alleged that the person was acting on an irresistible, uncontrollable impulse. Admittedly severe 
emotional tension can evoke involuntary muscular reactions - trembling, palpitations, fainting fits, 
vomiting - but where there is volitional action, volitional control is possible, unless the facts prove 
that there was disintegration of the other functions as well. Emotional impulsiveness or liability 
therefore does not, in our opinion, exclude responsibility, especially if the behaviour of the person 
concerned gives or has given evidence of insight and volitional control”. See also S v Laubscher 
supra (n 68) at 166H-I; S v Calitz supra (n 330) at 126E; S v Wiid supra (n 333) 563H.  
 
1368 De Vos supra (n 349) 357. See further Snyman supra (n 106) at 15 who makes use of this definition 
of conative capacity. 
 
1369 De Vos supra (n 349) 357. As Morse “Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and 
Conceptual Review” (1998) Crime and Justice 384 at 359 states: “Clearly if an agent acts to satisfy 
such a desire, doing so will surely be an intentional act executed by an undeniably effective will, and 
there is no reason to believe that universal causation or determinism plays a special role in such 
cases. The agent may have strongly felt a need to satisfy the impulse, but why is this different from 
standard cases of people desiring to fulfill momentary, strong desires” Morse then goes on to pose 
the question what it would mean to say that such a desire was literally irresistible: “The lure of 
mechanism is clearly at work but should be resisted. After all, why should a powerful desire - really 
wanting something be assimilated to the patellar reflex? One possibility is that such impulses create 
hard choice, but if this is the case, hard choice analysis will do the work. Another possibility is that 
even if impulses do have coercive motivational force, it is impossible to differentiate irresistible 




“When a man kills his friend in a fit of rage, his behaviour 
does not spring from any blind, impulsive drive or 
uncontrollable emotion. He is performing a goal-directed act. 
In his (momentary) rage he has not controlled himself, but his 
action was by no means uncontrollable, as in cases of 
automatism”.1370 
 
On this basis then the cases of Nursingh 1371 and Moses 1372 were wrongly decided and 
the accused should have been found guilty instead of being acquitted. However, it is 
submitted that De Vos’s theory does little to explain the term “loss of self-control” in 
circumstances other than affective function. 
 
5.4.3  Implications of S v Eadie 
5.4.3.1  Automatism versus non-pathological incapacity 
In Eadie 1373  it was held that despite the law’s clear exposition on the law of 
automatism, it was that no distinction could be drawn between automatism and non-
pathological incapacity. If the two were distinct it would be possible to exercise 
conscious control over one’s actions (the automatism test) while simultaneously lacking 
self-control (the incapacity test).1374 The court took this to mean that the two tests have 
now merged. 1375  Furthermore, such an approach would require a fundamental 
reinterpretation of the formulation of the defence of non-pathological incapacity set out 
in Laubscher.1376 
 
                                               
1370 Report at par 9.26, cited in De Vos supra (n 349) at 358. 
 
1371 S v Nursingh supra (n 339). 
 
1372 S v Moses supra (n 347). 
 
1373 S v Eadie supra (n 360). See also S v Marx supra (n 108), discussed in chapter 2 at 95-102 where 
this court felt itself bound to the finding in Eadie. 
 
1374 Louw supra (n 28) at 210-211, noted at par [56] of the Eadie supra (n 360) judgment. 
 
1375 Louw supra (n 28) 211. 
 




This case has far reaching implications for South African law. Firstly, it had the effect 
of narrowing the defence. 1377  It is not at all clear whether the defence of non-
pathological incapacity continues to exist after Eadie.1378 The end result of this is that: 
 
“The question remains unanswered as to how a case will be 
handled where serious provocation is present. Would it be 
correct to suggest that provocation can reduce a charge of 
murder to manslaughter? It is clear that after the decision in 
Eadie, an accused can no longer rely on the claim that she was 
so angry that she lacked capacity and therefore should be 
found guilty.” 1379 
 
However, such an approach would prove problematic since: 
 
“Such a conclusion does not satisfy the sentiment in law. The 
most reasonable finding would be that the accused not be 
found guilty of the main charge of murder, but rather guilty of 
the reduced offence of culpable homicide. The question to be 
answered is on what grounds the court can reduce such 
liability. It would appear that in terms of the rules currently 
utilized by the courts, no grounds currently exist to reduce 
such liability.” 1380 
 
It is submitted that by accepting the general approach to criminal law, it must be 
accepted that extreme provocation can lead to a state of automatism.1381 It is not clear  
                                               
1377 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 138. See also chapter 2 at 82-83. 
 
1378 S v Eadie supra (n 360). Snyman supra (n 106) 22 notes that the uncertainty arises out of the fact 
that the court did not expressly answer this question. Clearly, Navsa JA’s judgment only makes 
sense if it is assumed that there are certain mental states in which an accused may suffer from non-
pathological incapacity without such incapacity resulting from provocation or intoxication. 
Examples of these mental states include certain manifestations of stress, shock or panic. The 
problem is that one cannot recall such mental states unconnected with provocation ever being 
reported in South African case law as a basis for the defence of non-pathological incapacity. The end 
result of this is that from a practical viewpoint, there is an extremely limited field of application for 
the defence. Its existence borders on the theoretical.  
 
1379 Snyman supra (n 1317) 60, citing Eadie supra (n 360) at para’s [57]-[58]. 
 
1380 Snyman supra (n 1317) 61. As Snyman states: “The finding of manslaughter is nothing other 
than a halfway station between murder and culpable homicide. It satisfies the sentiment in 
law that most people (although not all) have a measure of sympathy” (at 60) (own 
translation). 




then why the court in the Eadie  1382 case made reference to cases of automatism to 
support its contention that there is no distinction between the two defences. Clearly, the 
Eadie court was wrong to cite cases of automatism to highlight the fact that the two 
defences are not distinct: Potgieter,1383 Cunningham,1384 and Henry.1385 
 
Furthermore, the court added to this difficulty by criticizing the decisions of Arnold,1386  
 
 
                                               
1382 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
1383 S v Potgieter supra (n 337) at par [36]. The defence of non-pathological incapacity in the form of the 
term “irresistible impulse” was raised as an alternative defence in this case. The court’s judgment 
was focused on the defence of automatism (see the discussion relating to matters of proof: 73B-D; 
73I-74B; the expert testimony led on behalf of the accused and the state: 82C-84C; and Kumleben 
JA’s concluding remarks on the liability that he could not accept that the accused had acted 
“automatically”:84D. This is despite the fact that Kumleben JA cited Wiid supra (n 333) and 
Kalogoropoulos supra (n 337) in respect of evidential matters: 72H-73B; 73E-G. 
 
1384  S v Cunningham supra (n 362) at par [39]. In this case the court deals specifically with the 
automatism defence, which is rejected on the basis of a lack of factual foundation: 638J-639A. 
 
1385  S v Henry supra (n 363) at par [38], cited in Hoctor supra (n 242) at 134. Scott JA clearly 
distinguished between the defence of non-pathological incapacity from sane automatism, which was 
in issue: 19H-I. In Eadie supra (n 360) the court also made reference to two other cases which did 
not prove helpful: Francis supra (n 364) at par [40] and Kok supra (n 364) at par [41]. The court a 
quo in Eadie supra (n 360) referred to Francis supra (n 364) as authority for there being no 
distinction between sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity: Schutz JA begins by equating 
the two concepts by the placing of the term “sane automatism” in brackets after the term “non-
pathological criminal incapacity” (at par [1]), despite the clear indication that the plea related to 
whether “he was unable to control his actions”’ (ibid) Hoctor supra (n 242) 135 n 219 submits that 
this confusion becomes more evident at par [3] and [4], where it is clear that the learned judge is 
conscientiously discussing the evidential requirements of sane automatism, despite the plea of 
incapacity. Later (at par [25]) Schutz JA confirms that the nature of the matter at hand was “a case of 
‘sane automatism”’. Hoctor supra suggests that despite this categorization, in discussing the criminal 
liability of the accused, the language is exclusively that of capacity: “concerning his ability to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions…” (at par [27]), … “he could control himself…[a]lthough 
his powers of self-control were substantially diminished his actions show they were not lost…” (at 
par [30]). Hoctor supra suggest that perhaps it could be suggested that the court’s treatment of the 
accused’s “awareness of what he was doing” at par [26] indicates that it did canvass the actual 
content of the notion of sane automatism. Cf the case of S v Kok (n 364) where the court seemed to 
equate the concepts of incapacity and automatism without any justification for doing so (at par [25]): 
“the accused had the necessary criminal capacity and that the defence of so-called ‘sane automatism’ 
had to be rejected” since the accused had pleaded that he “lacked the necessary criminal capacity” 
(at par [3]). Furthermore, the judgment discusses the accused’s liability in the context of criminal 
capacity, despite the defence of automatism being dealt with exclusively in the court a quo (S v Kok 
supra (n 364). 
 
1386 S v Arnold supra (n 313) at par [46]. The reason perhaps that reference was made to this case was 
the puzzling feature of this judgment: while the court found as a reasonable possibility that the 
accused was acting in a state of sane automatism at the time of the shooting (at 263G-H) the court 
then proceeded to hold that it was reasonably possible that the accused was lacking capacity at the 




Moses 1387 and Gesualdo 1388 and concluded that the approach “adopted by this Court in 
the decisions discussed earlier” was not followed in these three cases.1389  
 
However, this approach is entirely consistent with the views expressed in the following 
cases which were cited by the court: Van Vuuren;1390  Campher;1391  Laubscher;1392 
Calitz;1393 Wiid 1394 and Kalogoropoulos.1395 If the Eadie 1396 case is correct and there is 
no difference between sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity, the accused 
must have acted involuntarily in order to rely on non-pathological incapacity as a 
defence.1397 The problem appears to be that the court in Eadie 1398 in adopting this 
approach does not always interpret the term “involuntary conduct consistently”,1399 and  
                                               
1387 S v Moses supra (n 347) at par [49].  
 
1388 S v Gesualdo supra (n 337) at par [50]. 
 
1389 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [51], cited in Hoctor supra (n 242) 134. 
 
1390 S v Van Vuuren supra (n 26) discussed at par [30]. 
 
1391 S v Campher supra (n 320) at par [31]. 
 
1392 S v Laubscher supra (n 68) at par [32]. 
 
1393 S v Calitz supra (n 330) at par [33]. 
 
1394 S v Wiid supra (n 333) at par [34]. 
 
1395 S v Kalogoropoulos supra (n 337), cited in Hoctor supra (n 242) at 136.  
 
1396 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
1397 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 142, discussing S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [57]. See further Snyman 
supra (n 106) at 14, who derives the same conclusion from the courts comments.  
 
1398 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
1399 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 142 n 279 makes reference to par [57] where the court refers to a persons 
who was unable to exercise control over his movements and aced as an automaton as a result of 
disintegration of the psyche as follows: ‘his acts would then have been unconscious and involuntary’ 
(court’s emphasis) The author is of the view that it is not clear how someone’s acts could be 
unconscious and yet be voluntary, or involuntary and yet be conscious. Hoctor further makes 
reference to Snyman supra (n 1100) at 55 which he submits is pertinent: “if X’s conduct is 
involuntary, it means that ‘X is not the “author” or creator of the act or omission; it means that it is 
not X who has acted, but rather that the event or occurrence is something which happened to X” 
(writer’s emphasis). Hoctor submits that this throws into relief a further puzzling comment by the 
court, that ‘the insistence that one should see an involuntary act unconnected to the mental element, 
in order to maintain a more scientific approach to the law, is with respect, an over-refinement’ (at 
 336 
 
yet if it is assumed that the words “not conscious” and “involuntary” are used as 
synonyms, rather than as distinct conditions then it is clear that the dictum in the case of 
Laubscher 1400 will have to be reinterpreted.1401  
 
It is submitted that by reading the second leg of the Laubscher 1402 test as applying to 
involuntary conduct, “one is simply subverting the clear meaning of the dictum. Joubert 
JA is plainly referring to the mental faculties (‘geestesvermoens’) or psychological 
condition (‘psigiese gesteldheid’) of the accused when he sets out the psychological 
characteristic of criminal capacity: the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, 
and the capacity to act in accordance with such distinction”. It is further submitted that 
there is no scope for argument that in this context the description of conative capacity 
as “[d]ie vermoë om ooreenkomstig daardie onderskeidingsvermoë te handel deurdat 
hy die weerstandskrag (wilsbeheervermoë) het om die versoeking om wederregtelik te 
handel, te weerstaan…” can refer to involuntary conduct, as opposed to capacity to 
control the urge to offend, subjectively assessed.1403 Thus the court’s statement that  
                                                                                                                                       
par [58]). Clearly if the conduct in question is not voluntary, by definition the mind is non-
functional.  
 
1400 S v Laubscher supra (n 68). 
 
1401 Hoctor supra (n 242) 142. See for instance par [42] and [58] of Eadie supra (n 360), referring to the 
dictum at 166G-167A of Laubscher supra (n 68) cited at par [32]. 
 
1402 S v Laubscher supra (n 68). 
 
1403 Hoctor supra (n 242) 143. Hoctor supra (n 363) at 202 discussed the terminological imprecision’s in 
the case of S v Laubscher supra (n 68) and S v Wiid supra (n 333). Joubert JA posed the question for 
the court to answer as follows: “The question is what the mental capacity of the accused was at the 
time of the commission of the alleged offence. He had a nervous breakdown or a disintegration of 
his personality which resulted in him acting involuntarily. In other words, did he act with self-
control during the course of the alleged commission of the crime?”(at 171D) (own translation). It is 
clear that the lack of conative capacity does not necessarily result in involuntary behaviour. A 
similar mistake was made later where the learned judge stated: “Despite the fact that the accused’s 
acts were irrational and not in accordance with his personality, it is submitted that he did act 
voluntarily since he did have the capacity as well as the powers of self-control which indicates that 
he did not lack capacity” (at 173B) (own translation). In Wiid supra (n 333) the error made in the 
case of Laubscher supra (n 68) was perpetuated in this case. Here Goldstone AJA cited the question 
formulated by the court in Laubscher and concluded that there was reasonable doubt about the 
question whether “die appellante willekeurig opgetree het”. However, as Hoctor suggests, the 
finding did not relate to voluntariness at all, but to a lack of capacity. In light of her “onbeheersde 
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there is no distinction between sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity based 
on previous dicta of the court is unfounded. 1404 Furthermore, the court’s insistence in 
Eadie 1405 of the retention of the two-stage form of the concept of criminal capacity 
where the judge of appeal stated that “I am however, not persuaded that the second leg 
of the test expounded in Laubscher’s case [viz the second leg of the traditional 
capacity” 1406 and the later statement that “whilst it may be difficult to visualizes a 
situation where one retains the ability to distinguish between right and wrong yet lose 
the ability to control one’s actions, it appears notionally possible”,1407  to solve the 
problem of the automatism versus non-pathological incapacity debate, 1408  is 
unworkable:  
 
“This is because the purported retention of the second leg of 
the test is nothing of the sort, since the negation of the second 
leg is effected by a totally different defence, viz. automatism, 
and thus the content of the notion of conative capacity, i.e. 
whether the accused was able to act in accordance with the 
distinction between right and wrong, is simply not assessed. 
Moreover, the subjective test for capacity is replaced by an  
                                                                                                                                       
optrede” (uncontrollable actions) there was doubt as to whether she could be found to be “criminally 
capable”. 
 
1404 Hoctor supra (n 242) 143. In par [57] Navsa JA refers to “highlighted parts of relevant dicta” in 
support of the statement that there is previous authority asserting the equivalence of the concepts. 
Hoctor supra (n 242) at 143 n 282 submits that all the indicated “highlighted parts” can be 
distinguished or explained: the passage from Chretien supra (n 97) at par [26] refers to evidential 
concerns; the inconsistency of the use of the highlighted term “willekeurig” (voluntary) found at 
173B of Laubscher (supra (n 68) cited at par [32]) with the test at 166G-167A indicates (it is 
submitted) sloppiness rather than a proper equation of the concepts; similarly the use of the term 
“willekeurig” (voluntary) at 569C-D of Wiid (supra (n 333), cited at par [34]) in light of the use of 
the Laubscher dictum setting out the test for criminal capacity, and the eventual finding of 
“ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid” (lack of capacity) 569G) should not be regarded as a true equation of 
the concepts; the judgments in Potgieter supra (n 337) 163, cited at par [36], Henry (supra (n 363), 
cited at par [38]) and Cunningham supra (n 362), cited at par [39]) dealt with automatism and not 
incapacity and all references to “willekeurig”/ “voluntary” conduct should be interpreted 
accordingly; and the interchangeable discussion of the concepts in Francis supra (n 364) testifies to 
more confusion than true equation of the concepts. 
 
1405 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
1406 Ibid at par [57]. 
 
1407 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [59].  
 




objectively assessed criterion, in the form of the test for sane 
automatism. If one accepts that the first stage of the (actus 
reus), and that any inquiry into whether there is a 
blameworthy state of mind is a futile quest until the presence 
of an unlawful act has been established, then it is clear that the 
same test - assessing voluntariness - will be employed twice: 
initially, to establish that the accused acted voluntarily (and 
that his conduct is thus legally relevant), and then once again, 
once cognitive capacity is established, in lieu of the test for 
conative capacity. In the result, there is unnecessary 
duplication and confusion”.1409 
 
The above discussion while helpful in illustrating the fact that automatism is a distinct 
from non-pathological incapacity and the fact that the second leg of the capacity test 
ought to be retained since it serves to distinguish the two defences, does little to explain 
what the term “loss of self-control” means or the fact that a lack of capacity does not 
necessarily mean that there is no voluntary conduct. While theorists 1410 have suggested 
that there is a difference between the two defences, the fact remains that the same test is 
used for both in the sense that goal-directed behaviour will militate against relying on 
either defence.1411 
 
5.4.3.2  Objective or subjective test for capacity? 
The practical effect of providing the accused who has killed her attacker with an 
acquittal has led to two major proposals: either openly embrace an objective (or 
normative) assessment of capacity and intention or resort to the initially objective 
enquiry implicit in the established, but mercurial domain of legal inference used to 
establish proof of subjective capacity.1412 Burchell has noted that “reasoning by  
                                               
1409 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 147. This conclusion is reached by writers such as Burchell supra (n 396) at 
35 and 37. 
 
1410 Such as Hoctor supra (n 242). In this respect see the discussion at 314-318. 
 
1411 Louw supra (n 28) at 208, citing Eadie supra (n 355): “…either the defences are distinct or they are 
the same: they cannot be both the same in some circumstances and distinct in others.” Louw supra (n 
28) at 208 then poses the question: “If the same test applies to both automatism and incapacity, how 
is it possible to distinguish between the two concepts?” 
 
1412 Burchell supra (n 396) 28. 
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inference” could be one possible interpretation of the Eadie 1413  judgment. In this 
judgment it was held that the court should not too easily accept the accused’s own 
evidence regarding provocation or emotional stress and is therefore entitled to draw 
“legitimate inferences, from what hundreds of thousands 1414 of other people would 
have done under the same circumstances” (i.e. looking at objective circumstances). 
Therefore, the issue refers to a process of inference; from what the accused’s mental 
processes ought to have been, to what they in fact were is crucial. It is submitted that 
this interpretation of Eadie 1415 is not to be accepted: 
 
“Relying on the readiness of judges to draw legitimate 
inferences could be regarded as at best a band-aid solution 
and, at worst, an alternative that could both obfuscate the 
general principles of the criminal law and expose judges to the 
criticism that unprincipled normative decisions could be made 
under the guise of inferential reasoning.” 1416 
 
In respect of the first point, it has been noted that: 
 
“Employing inferential reasoning is an uncontroversial 
standard practice in South African criminal law, where direct 
evidence of state of mind is lacking. Given that these are well-
established evidential principles, which have been applied for 
many years in respect of the defence of provocation, one may 
wonder why, if Burchell’s suggestion is followed, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal should see fit to engage in a lengthy 




                                                                                                                                       
 
1413 S v Eadie supra (n 360). For a discussion of this approach see chapter 2 at 86-92. 
 
1414 S v Eadie supra (n 360) at par [23]. 
 
1415 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
1416 Burchell supra (n 396) 32. 
 




Irrespective of the expert psychiatric testimony that is led on behalf of an accused, it is 
submitted that the court remains the final arbiter of the accused’s state of mind at the 
time of her unlawful act. 1418 Kreigler J in S v Makhubele 1419 explained in relation to 
the enquiry into mens rea: 
 
“It is, of course, a subjective enquiry. What is to be 
investigated is the accused’s state of mind at the time he 
inflicted the stab wound. That being the case, the accused’s 
evidence of what was going on in his mind, what his thoughts 
were, what emotions he felt, what urges or impulses, is of vital 
importance. That evidence is to be evaluated in the context of 
the evidential material as a whole, the ultimate objective being 
to establish as best as one can, from fallible data and with 
imperfect knowledge of the functioning of human volition, 
what the accused’s state of mind was at the time in 
question.”1420 
 
It is clear that the process of inferential reasoning would play a crucial role in 
establishing state of mind. In S v Ingram 1421 Smalberger JA held that: 
 
“[t]he longer the time lapse before the shooting, the more 
complex the intervening actions, the less likely it becomes that 
the accused acted out of control because of an inability to 
restrain himself.” 1422 
 
Hoctor notes that the confusion has arisen in the substantive law regarding the 
distinction between sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity: 
 
“has its roots in the indiscriminate use of evidential dicta, 
which has tended to deal with the defences in the same terms.  
                                               
1418 Hoctor supra (n 242) at 163-164. 
 
1419 1987 (2) SA 541 (T). 
 
1420 Ibid at 546F-G, discussed in Hoctor supra (n 242) at 164. 
 
1421 1995 (2) SACR 1 (A). 
 




Whilst the respective defences may well utilize similar 
evidential principles, it is important not to blur the crucial 
substantive distinction between the defences through 
undiscriminating citation of dicta relating to matters of proof. 
The fundamental distinction bears iteration in this context: in 
establishing the presence of automatism, the court resorts to an 
objective test focusing on the nature of the accused’s conduct, 
whereas in relation to non-pathological incapacity the test is 
subjective, notwithstanding the invariable use of inferential 
reasoning to seek to establish the accused’s state of mind.” 1423 
 
Another reason for not accepting “reasoning by inference” is a second point noted by 
Burchell, namely that “judges could make unprincipled normative decisions,” 1424 
Burchell goes on to explain this statement: 
 
“A potential problem with regarding inferential reasoning as 
supplying the answer, or at least a temporary answer pending 
legislative change, is that drawing inferences depends on the 
individual judge to ensure that reasoning of this nature 
successfully navigates the turbulent waters dividing subjective 
and objective tests. If negative inferences are too readily 
drawn, then the courts will expose themselves to the criticism 
that inferential reasoning is a mask for surreptitiously 
introducing into the criminal law objective, public-policy 
constraints, which should ideally be reflected in parliamentary 
consensus…At risk in an over-readiness to draw inferences 
from the facts of a case is not only blurring the thin line 
between subjectively and objective assessed elements of 
liability, but also infringing the principle of legality that places 
strictures of reasonable certainty on the scope of criminal 
law.” 1425 
 
A second possible interpretation of the Eadie 1426 case is that it is moving towards an 
objective assessment of capacity and intention. Burchell has proposed a new test for  
 
                                               
1423 Hoctor supra (n 242) 165. See for example Eadie supra (n 360) at par [2], where Navsa JA cited the 
cases of Potgieter supra (n 337), Cunningham supra (n 362), and Francis supra (n 364) as authority 
for the evidential matters relating to the defence of “temporary non-pathological criminal 
incapacity,” despite the fact that these cases dealt with the defence of sane automatism. 
 
1424 See Burchell’s quote at 267 cited at n 1130. 
 
1425 Burchell supra (n 396) 33-34. 
 




conative capacity, consisting of both a subjective and objective criterion. 1427 Such an 
approach, (even in cases where intention is the fault element required), would be closer 
to the Rumpff Commission approach (that severe emotional tension or impulsiveness 
should not be regarded as excluding volitional control) and the Roman-Dutch Law. 
This would lead to some of the finer distinctions drawn in English law.1428 
 
It is submitted that such an interpretation cannot be taken seriously as a rationale for the 
Eadie 1429 judgment. Not only was the Eadie court, by Burchell’s admission oblivious 
of this alleged teasing out of such as-yet-undiscovered objective aspect,1430 but it is 
further submitted that move towards an objective test for capacity is unable to work in 
practice. 
 
If the question to determine capacity now becomes what the ordinary person, in the 
same circumstances as the accused would have done, it is necessary to consider what 
characteristics would be attributed to such an ordinary person. At the outset the term 
“reasonable person” is problematic since: 
 
“[t]he reasonable person will never kill on the grounds of 




                                               
1427 For a discussion of this approach see chapter 2 at 92-94. 
 
1428 Burchell and Milton supra (n 26) 293. 
 
1429 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
1430 Burchell supra (n 396) 43. 
 
1431  Snyman supra (1317) 70, citing McSherry and Naylor Australian Criminal Law’s Critical 




The question now falls to what the ordinary person in the accused’s position would 
have done. It is submitted that this approach is problematic since it does not consider 
the personal characteristics of the accused:1432 
 
“[an attempt to generalize rule of conduct results in] losing 
variability, individuality, and meaning, and ending up with 
deceptively low correlations that relate more to mythical 
exemplar than any particular person” 1433 
 
but furthermore imposes dominant cultural values on others: 1434 
 
“Objective standards of behaviour are predicated on the 
existence of a community consensus about what constitutes 
reasonable and ordinary behaviour…In determining the 
reactions of an ordinary person of a particular cultural 
background, there is also a risk that judges and juries may 
draw on discriminatory generalizations about cultures of 
minority groups of which they have little or no 
understanding…” 1435 
 
Not only is the objective test problematic in it’s own right, but further problems arise 
when considering Burchell’s normative test for capacity. Firstly, emphasis will be 
placed on external circumstances which can be identified neutrally and applied to all 
claims, 1436 and the attributes of the individual are abstracted to those of the “average 
member of society”, thereby introducing an element of subjectivity into the enquiry.1437 
Secondly, where such a defence is raised, the capacity element will be found to be  
                                               
1432 Pather supra (n 393) 351. 
 
1433 Finkel supra (n 47) 767. 
 
1434 Louw supra (n 1134) 363. 
 
1435 Snyman supra (n 1317) 71. 
 
1436 Goldman supra (n 67) 199. See Goldman supra (n 67) at n 51 noting Harper et al The Law of Torts 
2nd ed (1986) statement at section 16.2 at 389 that the reasonable person represents the average of the 
community in terms of foresight, caution, courage, judgment and self-control. 
 
1437 Goldman supra (n 67) 199-200.  
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present, either directly or by inference, and then the next enquiry into fault can be 
made. The accused can be found guilty, depending on mens rea, where subjective 
intention and knowledge of unlawfulness is proved. If intention or knowledge of 
unlawfulness is not established, a conviction of culpable homicide could follow, if 
negligence in regard to the death, tested objectively, could be established. In this way, a 
similar middle course to that of the English law finding of voluntary manslaughter as a 
result of provocation could be achieved without compromising South African law.1438 
 
Burchell goes on to explain how such an approach would apply to battered women: the 
subjective test not only takes account of the accused’s subjective mental condition but 
also in determining the conative aspect of capacity, the court must determine whether 
the accused could reasonably be expected to have acted differently. Therefore a person, 
who in normal circumstances would have exercised self-restraint, kills the person who 
has abused her physically and mentally over a lengthy period of time, it could be said 
that she could not have acted any differently due to a characteristic (for instance, fear or 
depression) that is not rightly the target of criminal law.1439  
 
This approach is not unique but in fact applied in United States. While the doctrines of 
provocation and extreme emotional disturbance allow mitigation of the killing based on 
the subjective pressures faced by the accused, it also imposes secondary objective 
requirements. These requirements reflect the community values as to what degree of 
human weakness is understandable and therefore considered deserving of leniency. An 
accused would have to show not only that she lost self-control but given the nature of  
                                                                                                                                       
 
1438 Burchell supra (n 396) 46. 
 
1439 Ibid. Goldman supra (n 67) at 200 notes that other factors that would be taken into account by the 
court would include not only the battered woman’s size, age and strength, but also her prior 




the provocation experienced, losing control was a reasonable response.1440 In almost all 
jurisdictions, physical abuse would clearly constitute reasonable provocation. In the 
case of the Model Penal Code, an accused must demonstrate that there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse for the extreme mental or emotional disturbance experienced at 
the time of the killing. The reasonableness of the mental or emotional disturbance is 
“determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the 
circumstances as she believes them to be. 1441 In English law provocation is also tested 
both objectively and subjectively.1442 
 
The problem with these approaches, whether following the objective/subjective 
approach of English law or applying the particularizing standard followed in the United 
States remains ultimately how far the courts should go in qualifying the test to include 
an abused woman’s characteristics. Examining English case law provides a practical 
example of why a Burchell’s subjective/objective test for capacity cannot work. In that 
jurisdiction, the courts have vacillated between an objective and subjective approach 
for provocation, and it has subsequently been considered “a game of jurisprudential 
tennis”.1443 In Smith (Morgan) 1444 the self-control required to trigger the provocation 
defence is not a constant standard. The jury should apply the standard one could expect 
of the particular individual with her characteristics.1445 In Luc Thiet Thuan 1446 the court  
                                               
1440 For a discussion of provocation defence in American law see chapter 4 at 204-224. 
 
1441 For a discussion of the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance defence see chapter 4 at 
216-219. 
 
1442 For a discussion of the provocation defence see chapter 3 at 130-159. 
 
1443 Martin supra (n 659) 1364. 
 
1444 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 40). 
 
1445 For a discussion of this finding see chapter 3 at 144-147. 
 




adopts a constant, objective standard of self-control. A jury would have to ask 
themselves whether a reasonable person, with ordinary powers of self-control and 
subject to the same provocation, would have reacted as the accused did. 1447 In the case 
of Holley 1448 the court returned to an objective standard of self-control, as expounded 
in Luc Thiet Thuan.1449  The application of provocation must be considered in the 
context of diminished responsibility. One must not distort the other. This is problematic 
since a jury would still have to grapple with the distinction between subjectivity and 
objectivity. 1450  A further problem with the defence of provocation in determining 
whether certain subjective factors should be taken into account in the objective test, is 
that in that jurisdiction, an abused woman can use her situation to plead either 
provocation 1451 or diminished responsibility 1452 or both in the alternative.1453 Surely if 
there is medical evidence to suggest that an abused woman killed because her powers 
of self-control were reduced as a result of a condition such as battered woman 
syndrome or post-traumatic stress disorder, the proper defence to run is diminished 
responsibility.1454 This is just another example of how the courts have confused the 
issue relating to including subjective elements into the provocation test. This would 
also explain why the English courts were wrong in extending the requirement of loss of  
                                               
1447 For a discussion of this case see chapter 3 at 141-147. 
 
1448 Holley supra (n 678). See also Law Commission Consultation Paper (2004) in chapter 3 at n 687 
which advocates an objective test. No mention is made of any subjective factors. 
 
1449 For a discussion of this case see chapter 3 at 154-156. 
 
1450 Martin supra (n 659) 1364. 
 
1451 For a discussion of the provocation defence see chapter 3 at 130-159. 
 
1452 For a discussion of the defence diminished responsibility see chapter 3 at 160-166. 
 
1453 For a discussion of pleading provocation and diminished responsibility together see chapter 3 at 
166-168. 
 
1454 Toczek supra (n 645) 835. Thus English Court of Appeal decisions of Ahluwalia supra (n 602); 
Thornton supra (n 601) are wrong because they are based on the discredited McGregor supra (n 619) 




self-control to include “slow-burn” anger where there is no immediate trigger for the 
provocation.1455 Therefore, in English law the defence of provocation should only apply 
to cases where there is a sudden and temporary loss of self-control.1456 
 
Further problems arise when considering Burchell’s formulation. Firstly, the court has 
no meaningful way of determining whether the battered woman lost self-control: 
 
“[it] is impossible to establish certain mental capacity by 
asking what capacity she ought to have had”. 1457 
 
Secondly, Burchell’s theory suggests that if intention or knowledge of unlawfulness is 
not established, a conviction of culpable homicide could follow, thus establishing a 
middle course similar to that in English law.1458 it is submitted that this submission is 
not correct. The problem with this formulation is that it is merely question-begging: 
“how material needs the effects of the abnormality/and or disturbance be?” Formulated 
in this manner, the test is entirely circular: the standard necessary to mitigate murder to 
culpable homicide can only be established by reference to a class of cases which are 
appropriately labeled culpable homicide rather than murder.1459 This is problematic for 
battered women since it is clinical commonplace that not all syndrome sufferers act the 
same. If the particular syndrome causes rationality problems or internal hard choice, not 
all syndrome sufferers will be equally irrational or face hard choices. Some whose  
 
                                               
1455 In this respect see R v Ahluwalia supra (n 602) in chapter 3 at 133-135. 
 
1456 In this respect see chapter 3 at 131-135. 
 
1457 Snyman supra (n 1317) at 69 (own translation). 
 
1458 For a discussion of this point see chapter 2 at 92-93. 
 
1459  Chalmers “Merging Provocation and Diminished responsibility: Some reasons for skepticism” 




behaviour is affected by the syndrome may be sufficiently irrational to warrant an 
excuse, but others may not be.1460 
 
The Model Penal Code’s formulation of the extreme emotional disturbance (EMED) 
plea has given rise to similar problems and could give rise to the same problems in 
South African law: 
 
“Ad hoc determination means that similar cases are likely to 
be treated differently, the law will be unpredictable, and that 
there is created the possibility of abuse of discretion by 
decision-makers, judge or jurors…the individualization of 
objective person decisions may seem principled but are in fact 
the product of unguided and disclosed discretion. The results 
may depend more on who the accused gets as a trial judge 
than on whether he deserves an extreme emotional disturbance 
mitigation”.1461 
 
It is submitted that Burchell’s theory would provide judges with an unacceptable 
amount of discretion. This can lead judges to feel sympathetic for acts committed by 
individuals sociologically similar to themselves and will discriminate precisely against 
those individuals it was designed to protect.1462 Heller notes Ward’s comment that such 
“projective empathy” is unable to work: 
 
“If the self is inseparable from its social circumstances…it 
follows that when I employ projective empathy to understand 
someone else’s circumstances, I inevitably bring the 
foundational part of my ‘self’-my own intelligence, self-
esteem and courage, as well as my gender, race, and socio-
economic background-to the experience in a way that prevents  
                                               
1460 Morse supra (n 1369) 384. As Morse supra (n 1369) at 385 suggests: “mens rea will be present and 
legal insanity or a generic equivalent will obtain because the syndrome sufferer’s normative 
competence might not be fully undermined. Nonetheless, the syndrome might still sufficiently 
compromise the accused’s rationality to warrant mitigation”. 
 
1461 Robinson The Modern General Part: Three Illusions in Shute and Simester Criminal Law Theory: 
Doctrines of the General Part (2002) at 75, cited in Chalmers supra (n 1459) 205. 
 




any deep understanding of the other. Only if the person is 
substantially the same as I am - that is share my social 
circumstances -is there no distortion of understanding”.1463 
 
It is submitted that the approach taken by the Model Penal Code may be unavoidable. 
In South African law this amounts to maintaining a purely subjective approach for the 
capacity test: 
 
“Unfortunately, while the Code purports to solve the problem 
of tailoring an objective standard to the accused, the solution it 
offers masks an illusion. Behind that illusion criminal law 
theory has yet to find a principle that will convincingly 
distinguish the characteristics that ought to be included from 
these that ought to be excluded when individualizing the 
reasonable person standard. In the absence of such a theory, 
let alone a workable provision implementing a theory, it is 
hard to see any approach other than the uncontrolled ad hoc 
discretion the Model Penal Code drafters have adopted”.1464 
 
Therefore, since there is no principle that will convincingly distinguish factors that 
should be included from those that ought not to be, Burchell’s approach (which in 
essence is the particularizing standard) collapses into a purely subjective standard.1465 
On this basis, and due to the fact that South Africa is a multicultural society, 
considerations of fairness and human reality demand an “open door” policy as being the 
only reasonable alternative: 
 
“In general it can be said that the standards underlying the 
term ordinary person embodies the civilized norms which 
people are expected to comply with in society. These norms  
                                               
1463  Heller supra (n 795) 97, citing Ward “A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in 
Feminist and Communitarian Literature” (1994) University of Chicago Law Review 929 at 944. See 
further S v Elliot 411 A.2d 3 (Conn. 1979) where the Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that it 
could be appropriate to leave the question to the jury in this way: “The Chief Reporter for the Model 
Penal Code has noted that ‘(t)he purpose [of the Codes formulation] was explicitly to give full scope 
to what amounts to a plea in mitigation based upon a mental or emotional trauma of significant 
dimensions, with the jury asked to show whatever empathy it can’…Those comments may be the 
rationale of the draft made but they ignore the realities of the courtroom” (at 7-8). 
 
1464 Chalmers supra (n 1459) 206, noting Robinson’s supra (n 1461) comment. 
 




must be compatible with the rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. Therefore, the court must take the context 
surrounding the accused into account: the history of the 
relationship between X and Y, especially if they are married to 
each other or had a long relationship. This is especially 
relevant where X, the woman has been abused over a period of 
time by her husband.” 1466 
 
It is submitted that on the basis of the above discussion the Eadie 1467 case was wrong to 
introduce an element of objectivity into the capacity test. Just as the enquiry into 
establishing whether an accused had fault requires a subjective test, so the enquiry into 
establishing whether the accused had criminal capacity also requires a pure subjective 
test. Therefore, the issue of criminal capacity deals with the question of whether the 
accused (at the crucial time period) had the necessary mental capacity.1468 
 
5.4.3.3  Conclusion 
The discussion of South African case law relating to non-pathological incapacity, 
especially in relation to the case of Eadie,1469 demonstrates that there are fundamental 
problems with the defence of non-pathological incapacity. Notably that the test for 
automatism and capacity tend to be the same in practice, despite the fact that they are 
two distinct defences, each with their own set of rules. Secondly, the court in the case 
of Eadie 1470 attempted to introduce an element of objectivity into the capacity enquiry. 
What the court had in mind was narrowing of the defence on policy grounds. It is 
submitted that the court was correct in acknowledging the fact that non-pathological 
incapacity should not be a complete defence. However, it went about doing this in the 
wrong way.  
                                               
1466 Ibid. 
 
1467 S v Eadie supra (n 360). 
 
1468 Snyman supra (n 1317) 69 (own translation). 
 






5.4.4  Specific-intent doctrine 
It is submitted that there are two reasons why South African courts have not been able 
to properly distinguish between the defences of automatism and non-pathological 
incapacity. Firstly, the way the capacity test is set out in our law will inevitably lead 
courts to duplicate the voluntary conduct requirement (i.e. capacity is treated as a 
distinct element of liability or more correctly, as a prerequisite for liability): 
 
“In terms of South African laws established general principles, 
it is already required that actus reus entails proof that the 
conduct of the accused is voluntary. It is normally stated that 
the accused’s conduct be subject to his conscious will. It is 
submitted that it is not necessary to ask the same question 
twice.” 1471 
 
Secondly, the fact that a lack of capacity (i.e. non-pathological incapacity) can lead to a 
total acquittal. 1472 This places the outcome of the defence on the same footing as 
automatism. In both cases it creates the impression the accused could not control 
themselves and therefore in both cases the accused is deserving of an acquittal. This 
creates an anomaly. Once the accused is proved to have been acting voluntarily (i.e. not 
in a state of automatism), they can still lack capacity. However, there will still be goal-
directed activity, and any goal-directed activity militates against a loss of self-control or 
a defence of automatism for that matter. 1473 
 
It is submitted that where an accused is acting voluntarily, there will be a measure of 
goal-directed conduct. Where goal-directed conduct is present, it necessarily implies  
                                               
1471 Louw “The End of the Road for the defence of Provocation?” (2004) South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 200 at 204. 
 
1472 S v Chretien supra (n 97). 
 
1473 For examples of case law where goal-directed actions on the part of the accused militate against loss 
of self-control see 303-318. While in some of these cases, the accused were acquitted, it is submitted 




that there must be a level of capacity present in the case of the defence of non-
pathological incapacity.1474 In other words, the question is not whether capacity present, 
but to what extent it is present.1475 This point is not acknowledged by our courts: the 
concept of psychological fault underlying South African law offers no explanation for 
the fact that culpability is capable of gradation.1476 It is recognized and accepted that 
criminal capacity may range from full capacity to diminished capacity, intention may 
range from dolus directus to dolus eventualis and negligence may range from culpa 
levis to culpa lata. 1477 
 
A shortcoming of advocating a normative theory of fault is that the argument that has 
been advanced in its favour may have merit in the single-phase German criminal justice 
system which treats issues of criminal liability and criminal punishment as part and 
parcel of the same enquiry, but it lacks merit in South African law which treats criminal 
liability and criminal punishment as two separate and distinct enquiries. As Van Oosten 
has noted, during the former enquiry, the existence of criminal fault is in issue. During 
the latter the degree of criminal fault is in issue. 1478 
 
 
                                               
1474 In this respect Reilly supra (n 707) at 325-326 has noted that: “Since there is an element of choice, 
there may never be a complete loss of self-control. If a person’s reaction in an extreme emotional 
state is chosen, the element of excuse may disappear altogether. With no loss of self-control, there is 
only a state of violence which is at all times connected in a complicated way to a series of choices: a 
choice to get angry; a choice whether or not to translate the anger into aggression; a choice whether 
or not to enter a state corresponding to a loss of self-control in which one can act upon the 
aggression without restraint; and once in this state, a choice whether or not to act with homicidal 
violence”. 
 
1475 See further De Vos supra (n 349) at 358 notes this point about the Moses supra (n 347) case. In this 
case the court pointed out that the accused’s controls were significantly impaired, not completely 
absent (714H-I).  
 








It is submitted that the problem with taking diminished capacity into account at 
sentencing is that if the effects of battering renders the abused woman less than “wholly 
moral agent” and therefore, less deserving of punishment,1479 it is not really fair that it 
is taken into account only at sentencing.1480 Snyman makes the use of the following 
example to illustrate this point. In Anglo-American systems, intent is divided into two 
groups. In the first group, X kills Y execution style, with premeditation. In such a case, 
X is deserving of the harshest punishment. In the second scenario, despite the fact that 
the X is shown to have killed Y with intention, X is deserving of a more lenient 
sentence where for example, it can be shown that Y reasonably provoked X. In such 
legal systems, acknowledgment is given to the moral blameworthiness in respect of the 
manner in which the deaths were caused, in that murder is acknowledged only in the 
first category. In the second scenario, X would not be found guilty of murder but of a 
less serious offence. 1481 As Snyman has noted: 
 
“In the legal systems (mentioned above) it has been 
acknowledged that not all intentional deaths need be treated in 
the same fashion. It has been noted that there are different 
gradations within the concept of intentional killings. The 
moral reproach of intentional causing of death can differ from 
case to case”.1482 
 
The problem is that South African law does not treat the distinction between crimes in 
the same way: we only have two crimes, that of murder and culpable homicide: 
 
                                               
1479 Goldman supra (n 67) 234. 
 
1480 Goldman supra (n 67) at 234-235 notes La Fave and Scott’s supra (n 878) argument on this point: 
“[t]he rehabilitation theory rests upon the belief that human behaviour is the product of antecedent 
causes, [and] that these causes can be identified (section 1.5(a) (3) at 24). Goldman supra (n 67) goes 
on to stress this point notes: “where the criminal act is the killing of an [abuser] by a [battered 
woman], an inextricable link between the history of severe, chronic abuse in the home and the act of 
deliberate killing of the abuser seems undeniable” (at 235). 
 
1481 Snyman supra (n 1317) 66 (own translation). 
 




“This has created a void in our law. The distinction between 
murder and culpable homicide is an oversimplification of a 
much more complex distinction. This oversimplification 
indicates a clear relationship to the question of the effect of 
provocation in respect of liability. If our law had three as 
opposed to two categories of crimes, it would be much easier 
to organize provocation: an accused would not be found guilty 
of murder or culpable homicide but a category between these 
two, which in the Netherlands or Germany is simply called 
manslaughter or intentional manslaughter. This is the 
relatively easy route that the Anglo-American jurisdictions 
have followed”.1483 
 
Perhaps, then it could be suggested that in cases such as Moses 1484 and Nursingh 1485 
the courts were correct in acquitting the accused despite the fact that there was goal-
directed activity indicating that the accused’s capacity in those cases were diminished, 
not absent. The way the law is structured in South African leaves the court with two 
options: acquit or convict. To classify these accused as murderers is not only unfair but 
undesirable.1486 
 
It is my submission that a diminished level of capacity should be recognized in South 
African law. The case of S v Schwarz 1487 illustrates how such a defence would apply in 
our law. In this case, the accused a police officer, acknowledged that he had stabbed the 
deceased (his wife) with a knife and chopped her with an axe with “direct intent to kill  
 
                                               
1483 Snyman supra (n 1317) 66 (own translation). See for instance LaFave and Scott supra (n 878) at 
179-324 where the distinction is made between first degree murder, murder in the second degree and 
manslaughter. In English law there is a distinction between murder  (malice aforethought), voluntary 
manslaughter (where X kills Y intentionally but there were circumstances where X was provoked 
leading to lesser liability) and involuntary manslaughter (negligent killing) In this respect see Smith 
and Hogan Criminal Law 10th ed (2002) 353-388, Allen Textbook on Criminal Law 7ed (2003) 292-
322. 
 
1484 S v Moses supra (n 347). 
 
1485 S v Nursingh supra (n 339). 
 
1486 Snyman supra (n 1317) 67. 
 
1487 (1999) JOL 5626 (A) (unreported). See also S v Marx supra (n 108) in chapter 2 at 95-96, which 




her.” 1488 The accused further submitted that he committed these crimes in a state of 
emotional stress 1489 and that it lead to a state of diminished capacity. 1490  
 
The court was correct to reject the accused’s version of events: namely that his wife did 
finally admit to an affair. 1491  Grosskopf JA was of the opinion that the stressful 
circumstances in which the deceased found herself in at the time shortly before her 
death would not have been conducive to making such a confession.1492 
 
Although the accused was convicted of murder, it is submitted that the importance of 
this judgment lies in the fact that the State accepted the accused’s plea that he 
committed the murder due to emotional stress which resulted in diminished capacity 
and therefore argued their case on this basis. Such an approach would bring South  
 
                                               
1488 Ibid at par [3]. 
 
1489 In the weeks leading up to the murder, the accused was suffering from depression, and had on more 
than one occasion, assaulted his wife. He also suspected her of having an affair. The deceased had 
furthermore told the accused that she wanted to divorce him. The week before the murder, the 
accused, due to his mental state (depression), stayed away from work and went to see his psychiatrist 
Dr. Taylor, whom he told that he needed urgent help and that he be booked into hospital. However, 
no beds were available at that time (at par [7]). On the night in question, the accused organized a 
family get together, not only as a means of reconciliation, but also to get his wife to admit that she 
was having an affair. The accused had tape recordings which he alleged proved that his wife was 
having an affair. However, other family members, who heard these recordings, disputed the fact that 
it proved she was having an affair. When the other family members had left, the accused phoned his 
sister in law to ask if his brother was on his way, and confided in her that he was suicidal. According 
to the accused’s version of events, his wife called him one side and admitted that she was having an 
affair and wanted to talk about it. At this point the accused experienced a “red hot” sensation in his 
head and moved quickly in her direction. When she got up, he saw the knife and grabbed it and 
stabbed her. After this incident, the accused alleged that he didn’t remember what happened due to 
memory loss (amnesia). He did however recall his son tugging on his leg and then recalled seeing 
the axe in his hand (at par [13]). 
 
1490 S v Schwarz supra (n 1487) at par [3]. See also S v Sibiya (1984) SA 91 (A) at 95H-96C; S v 
Laubscher supra (n 68) at 168A-C; S v Calitz supra (n 330) at 129B; S v Smith supra (n 68) at 135F-
G and S v Ingram supra (n 1330) at 8C-D. 
 
1491 S v Schwarz supra (n 1487) at par [16]. 
 
1492 The accused was in a highly emotional state at the time, and was on his way to hospital to be booked 
in for psychiatric treatment. Furthermore, the deceased had suffered abuse at the hands of the 




African law into line with other jurisdictions and would move away from recognizing 
non-pathological incapacity as a complete defence: 
 
“In both English and American law the provocation defence is 
structured in a way that suggests that people are not totally at 
the mercy of their emotions. The defence requires a 
diminished level of self-control rather than, as the test is 
literally expressed - a loss of self-control. A literal loss of self-
control would entitle the accused to an acquittal. It would be 
more in line with human reality to suggest that loss of self-
control is not a single mental condition but can vary in 
intensity over a spectrum.” 1493 
 
This still leaves the extent of lost self-control for the defence unclear, other than the 
loss need not be complete. 
 
In Schwarz 1494 the accused stated that on the advice of his advocate he changed his 
plea to guilty of murder with direct intent to kill. The problem that the court had with 
this contention was that the accused maintained throughout his trial that despite his 
plea, he suffered from memory loss and that he did not have the intention to kill her. 
The court was of the opinion that these two statements clearly contradicted each 
other. 1495  It is this author’s submission that the accused’s counsel was correct in 
pleading diminished capacity, and that the accused had acted with intent. The New 
South Wales court R v Croft: 1496 also set out the provocation defence as requiring 
intent: 
                                               
1493 Yeo supra (n 538) 48. See further Phillips v R supra (n 599) at 137: “there is an intermediate stage 
between icy detachment and going berserk.” Cf chapter 2 at 78-79 for a discussion of the Moses 
supra (n 347) case where the defences witness implied that the accused’s controls might only have 
been diminished. See also S v Marx supra (n 108) where defence counsel wanted a pronouncement 
on diminished responsibility at the merit stage of the case. For a discussion of this case see chapter 2 
at 95-102. 
 
1494 S v Schwarz supra (n 1487). 
 
1495 Ibid at par [15]. 
 




“It is of course, obvious that such a history must be taken into 
account in determining whether the provocative incident was 
such as could have caused an ordinary person, placed in all the 
circumstances in relation to the deceased as the accused then 
stood, to have so far lost self-control as to have formed an 
intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm to the accused and 
that the accused did in fact so lose self-control”.1497 
 
The concluding words in this case indicate the extent of actual loss of self-control 
required for provocation. It comprises the mental state of a person who as a result of 
passion, becomes so emotionally charged as to form a murderous intention.1498 Actual 
loss of self-control is therefore assessed by means of the mental element of murder.1499 
Therefore, any formation of intent on the part of the accused would indicate to the court 
that capacity was present to a certain extent.1500 
 
In the case of an abused woman, she should be able to to use the effects of battering to 
support a defence of diminished capacity 1501  which focuses not on the mitigating 
circumstances 1502 of the act, but rather on the actor’s inability to form the requisite  
                                               
1497 Ibid at 321. 
 
1498 Yeo in “Case and comment: Peisley” (1992) Criminal Law Journal 197 at 199. 
 
1499 Yeo supra (n 538) 49.  
 
1500 This is in accordance with my earlier submission at 350-351. 
 
1501 Goldman supra (n 67) at n 153 has noted that expert testimony concerning the psychological effects 
of chronic abuse can support the battered woman’s claim of diminished capacity: see Mihajlovich 
supra (n 866) at 1280-1281 (noting that a battered woman may argue that due to years of abuse, she 
is psychologically incapable of fully and completely considering her actions preventing her from 
forming the necessary intention for murder). See also Davidson “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” A 
Controversial Defense for Veterans of a Controversial War” (1988) Western Massateussets and 
Mary Law Review 424-425 (noting that evidence of post-traumatic stress syndrome may frustrate 
the prosecutor’s attempt to prove sufficient mens rea or specific intent). Goldman supra (n 67) at n 
147 has further noted that some scholars appear to use the terms diminished capacity and diminished 
responsibility interchangeably: see Robitscher and Huynses “In Defense of the Insanity Defense” 
(1982) Emory Law Journal 9 at 28 (referring to diminished capacity and two sentences later to 
“diminished responsibility” without making any distinction) But see further Sendor “Crime as 
Communication: An interpretive Theory of the insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime” 
(1986) Georgia Law Review at 1430-1431 (distinguishing between diminished capacity which 
involves an accused’s inability to form a specific mens rea, and diminished responsibility, which 
involves the accused’s inability to act according to the law). 
 
1502 Alternatively, the effects of battering may support a diminished responsibility claim (taken into 
account at sentencing) which focuses on the accused’s inability to guide her conduct according to 
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mens rea for the offence charged. 1503 
 
“Diminished capacity recognizes that because the accused 
suffered from some abnormal mental condition not rising to 
the level of legal insanity, she lacked the capacity to act with a 
certain mental state. Thus, the accused’s culpability for the 
killing is lessened and she should be convicted only of a 
reduced offense. Typically, this involves evidence that an 
accused, because of her mental condition could not act with 
premeditation or deliberation  required for murder” 1504 
 
In such a case goal-directed behaviour by an abused woman would not militate against 
her claim that her capacity was diminished and therefore should be convicted of a lesser 
offence, providing that there is no evidence of premeditation, or “extensive planning” 
of the murder.1505 
 
The problem with the accused’s defence in Schwarz 1506 was that although a diminished 
capacity defence does require “murderous intent,” the accused must be shown to be 
acting with intent other than direct or specific intent. In other words, he must not act 
with premeditation, to be convicted of a lesser offence. However, the facts of the case 
clearly illustrate that he did act with premeditation: (1) the manner in which the accused 
managed to get his uncle and aunt to leave the house at the crucial time period, on the  
 
                                                                                                                                       
relevant moral and legal factors. It recognizes that mental conditions less severe than those which 
qualify as legal insanity can impact upon the accused’s cognitive or volitional capacities in a manner 
that necessarily bears on criminal culpability (Goldman supra (n 67) at 277). 
 
1503 Goldman supra (n 67) 226. But some American jurisdictions do not allow any evidence of mental 
abnormality short of insanity. See for e.g., State v Gachot, 609 So. 2d 269, 276-278 (La. Ct. App. 
1992) (stating that the accused could not present evidence of allegedly severe mental abuse by his 
parents, the murder victims, absent a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, since the state does not 
recognize the diminished capacity doctrine) cert denied, 114 47.8 (1993). 
 
1504 Goldman supra (n 67) 226-227. 
 
1505 In this respect see 321-322 for a discussion of battered women’s response patterns. 
 




pretext of sending them to a bank ATM to withdraw money for him and (2) the fact that 
the two murder weapons coincidentally happened to be in the bedroom.1507 While it 
could be suggested that the requesting a relative to withdraw money from an ATM is 
not an unusual request, the fact that two deadly weapons were present in the bedroom, 
are more difficult to explain.  
 
It is my submission that the introduction of a defence of diminished capacity as 
advocated by S v Marx 1508 and Schwarz,1509 could only be achieved in South African 
law by returning to the rules relating to provocation followed in South Africa prior to 
1971.1510 According to the specific intent doctrine, policy considerations require that an 
accused should not be completely acquitted.1511  However, these considerations also 
require that an accused not be convicted of murder but of culpable homicide.1512 This 
compromise solution (of culpable homicide) can only be reached by treating 





                                               
1507 Ibid at par [18]. 
 
1508 S v Marx supra (n 108). 
 
1509 S v Schwarz supra (n 1487). 
 
1510 For a discussion of this approach see chapter 2 at 59-63. 
 
1511 Therefore, the law must treat all people on equal footing. In S v Kensley supra (n 337) at 658G-I this 
sentiment was expressed: “Criminal law for purposes of conviction…constitutes a set of norms 
applicable to sane adult embers of society in general, not different norms depending on the 
personality of the offender. Then virtue would be punished and indiscipline rewarded: the short-
tempered man absolved for the lack of self-control required of his more restrained brother. As a 
matter of self-preservation society expects its members, even when under the influence of alcohol, to 
keep their emotions sufficiently in check to avoid harming others and the requirement is a realistic 
one since experience teaches that people normally do.” 
 




general principles relating to culpability (mens rea).1513 Rather, it must be treated as a 
special defence with its own rules.1514 
 
How would such approach be applied practically in the case of battered women? If it 
can be shown that the abused woman (as result of provocation) was not acting 
voluntarily, and there was no goal-directed activity on her part, she can rely on 
automatism (according to the general principles approach, provocation can cause 
automatism). But where the effects of battering were of such a nature that the abused 
woman can be shown to be acting with a diminished level of capacity (this would 
necessarily entail a level of goal-directed activity on her part and possibly intention), 
she would be convicted of a lesser offence. Therefore, instead of convicting the battered 
woman who kills her abuser with intent, for a specific intent offence,1515 she will now  
                                               
1513 Snyman supra (n 1317) 57. Snyman supra (n 25) at 235 sets out the general principles approach 
currently followed in South African law: “Provocation is nothing more than a set of acts which must 
be assessed like any other set of facts (such as a motor accident): one simply applies the ordinary 
principles of liability by asking whether, in spite of the provocation, x has committed an act which 
complies with the definitional elements and which is unlawful, and whether he had criminal capacity 
and intention or negligence. Only once all these requirements have been satisfied can X be convicted 
of the crime with which he is charged.” 
 
1514 Snyman supra (n 1317) 57.  
 
1515 Ashworth in Principles of Criminal Law 5th ed (2006) at 212 notes that in English law, where the 
crime charged is one of specific intent, intoxication may amount to a defence if it is sufficient to 
negative intention. This is the rule that has been established by the case of DPP v Majewski [1977] 
AC 443. This case divides crimes into offences of specific intent and offences of basic intent. 
Furthermore, it allows intoxication as a defence to the former but not to the latter. Burchell in 
“Intoxication and the Criminal Law” (1981) South African Law Journal at 177 notes that in the this 
approach in English law found its way into South African law through section 141 of the Transkeian 
Penal Code 1886. The English specific-intent rule was followed by South African courts in an 
attempt to reconcile the application of the maximum actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea with the 
demands of public policy in protecting society from harmful conduct. For example, voluntary 
intoxication of a degree sufficient to negative the relevant “specific intent” is a good defence in that 
the accused is found not guilty of the crime charged but rather guilty of a less serious crime for 
which such a verdict is competent. Cf chapter 2 at 61-62 supra. Kotze J.A. in R v Jolly 1923 A.D. 
177, the locus classicus of the objective approach said: “it is a rule or presumption of law that a 
person is taken to contemplate and intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts” (at 
183). Pain in “Some reflections on our Criminal Law” (1960) Acta Juridica 289 at 298 notes that the 
presumption has been considered one of law by jurists such as Moorman supra (n 245) 2.1.18, 
textbook writers such as Gardiner and Lansdown South African Criminal Law and Procedure 6th ed 
(1957) at 53 and members of the bench. Authority for the specific intent rule can be found in the 
cases of R v Fowlie 1906 TS 505 at 508-509 and an obiter dictum in R v Innes Grant 1949 (1) SA 
753 (A) at 765. Burchell supra at 178-179 notes that certain post Johnson (supra (n 301)) provincial 
decisions create the impression that the specific intent rule was applied where the accused was 
charged with assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm and was intoxicated to a degree 
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only be convicted of basic intent offence due to the effects of the battering on mental 
state. 1516 
 
There are possible shortcomings to treating provocation as a special defence. Van der 
Merwe has noted that:  
 
“With the advent of the specific intent theory, the formal 
process of reduction in the verdict of the accused to a lesser 
crime was automatic. This had the effect of eliminating the 
difficult problem of proving that that the accused had the 
necessary dolus for the main offence for which he was 
charged. But what was problematic about this approach was 
that because sentence reduction was automatic, the normal 
deductions with reference to the accused’s conduct could not 
be made” 1517 
 
Secondly, there is difficulty in determining which crimes require “specific intent” and 
those that do not. 1518 Thirdly, it is submitted that people who cannot form specific 
intent cannot form basic intent either.1519 Lastly, there has never been a clear division of 
crimes into specific intent and general intent. 1520 In response to the second argument, 
Ashworth has noted that various theories have been advanced in English law to explain 
why offences of murder and wounding together with theft, handling, and all crimes of  
                                                                                                                                       
sufficient to negative such “specific intent”. A conviction of assault was reached in these cases 
without any investigation into whether the accused had the mens rea required for that crime (S v 
Johnson supra (n 301) 205 D-E; S v V 1979 SA 656 (A) 664 H. But as Pain supra notes, the 
presumption is one of fact, doing no more than shift an evidential burden to the accused. In this 
respect see R v Nsele 1955 (2) SA 145 (AD) at 151 and Beadle J in R v Ncetendaba 1952 (2) SA 
647 at 652-653.  
 
1516 This would be in accordance with the Mokonto supra (n 282) decision at 327B-C where it was held 
that provocation far from negativing an intention to kill contributed to such intention. 
 
1517 Van der Merwe “Toerekeningsvatbaarheid v ‘Specific Intent’ – die Chretien-beslissings” (1987) 
Obiter 142 at 150-151 (own translation). 
 
1518 Burchell supra (n 1515) 178. 
 






attempt are crimes of specific intent whereas, others are not. For instance, to argue that 
all these crimes require some form of further intent is unconvincing, since that is not 
true of murder. Moreover, many crimes contain some elements for which only intent 
will suffice and others for which recklessness is sufficient. 1521 To quote Ashworth: 
 
“This rather ramshackle law has proved workable. The courts 
have thus restricted the operation of the ‘inexorable logic’ of 
mens rea to the few offences of specific intent and, since most 
of them are underpinned by a lesser offence of ‘basic intent’, 
no great loss of social defence has occurred.” 1522 
 
In response to the third criticism, the problems posed by the specific intent doctrine can 
be resolved by examining case law. In the case of Chretien 1523 the accused put in issue 
the question of whether he intended to knock down some pedestrians with his Combi. 
According to his version he had only been negligent and had not foreseen that his 
vehicle would possibly hit any of the people. The question before the court then became 
the question whether he had the (specific) intent to apply force to the person of his 
victims. Although it had been accepted that common assault was not a crime of specific 
intent, it became evident that on the issues raised at this particular trial it was. The 
question of how a person who cannot form a specific intent can form a general intent 
can be answered by referring to the Chretien: 1524 “It goes without saying that according 
to our law a court may find that because of the influence of liquor a person could not 
foresee a specific result which he would have foreseen had he been sober and that he is 
therefore guilty of a less serious crime” 1525  
                                               













“The issue is a matter of foresight. A person not fully in 
possession of his faculties may not be able to foresee a more 
remote consequence of his conduct, for example, the infliction 
of serious injury, but he might be readily capable of foreseeing 
an immediate consequence of his conduct, for example, the 
application of force to the person of another. Here common 
assault, the intentional application of force to the person of 
another, could be regarded as a crime of general intent, the 
specific intent in issue on these facts being the intent to bring 
about serious injury as a result of the application of force. 
What it really amounts to is that an intoxicated person who 
commits a serious assault may be able to cast doubt, because, 
because of his intoxication, on his ability to foresee that his 
conduct would result in grievous bodily harm to his victim. He 
may not be able to cast such doubt on his intention to apply 
force to his victim. This latter intention, after, all calls for less 
foresight than the former. Thus, on a fairly simple application 
of the rules relating to onus of proof, the ‘mystery’ of how a 
person who cannot form a specific intent can form a general 
intent is cleared up.” 1526 
 
Consider another example. Consider the case of Campher 1527 but adapt the facts. Lets 
assume that Mrs. Campher had fired the shot at a distance of two metres and that she 
had not admitted to having the desire to destroy the ‘monster’ who was breaking her 
down emotionally. Let it also be assumed that she had said that in her extreme distress 
caused by emotional torment, fear, degradation, the mockery of her religion and the 
unmitigated unreasonableness and hostility of her husband, she had suddenly felt that 
she should retaliate, drive back this “monster”, do something to bring an end to his 
horrid behaviour. Therefore she shot at him wishing to hurt him but not thinking, in her 
mental anguish and confusion, that she would kill him. Depending on what type of 
witness she was and taking into consideration the indisputable facts pointing at 
confusion, the clouding of clear judgment and normal foresight on her part, and her 
general emotional distress, there would have been fairly good prospect of her being  
                                               
1526 Du Plessis supra (n 326) 548. 
 




convicted of culpable homicide. The main issue before the trial court would have been 
whether she had had the (specific) intent to kill or only the (general) intent to do some 
harm to the deceased in a dangerous and unreasonable manner. On the actual facts, that 
she had hit the deceased in the centre of the back, the bullet penetrating his heart, with a 
shot that had traveled no more than 20 centimeters, the prosecution would probably 
have been able to establish an intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt had the 
hypothetical defence referred to above been raised. This analysis can be seen to resolve 
the question whether the prosecution can prove the intent it alleges, for instance, intent 
to kill or intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, in the face of the accused’s reliance on 
intoxication or mental confusion to bolster her assertion that she had no such (specific 
intent).” 1528 
 
The above suggested proposal would assist the court in dealing with cases involving a 
long history of abuse where no final provocative incident, occurring immediately prior 
to the killing, can be demonstrated, or where the accused’s retaliation was preceded by 
planning and deliberation.1529 Therefore from a practical viewpoint, a sudden loss of 
self-control would no longer be necessary, since the since the extension of the time 
element would take into account the “slow-burning” effects of prolonged and severe  
 
                                               
1528 Du Plessis supra (n 326) 548-549. 
 
1529 Horder supra (n 687) at 124 notes that recognizing the significance of a slow-burn response to 
provocation, has resulted in the English courts downplaying the significance of evidence that the 
accused armed herself and was set on revenge from the outset, evidence which ought to count 
against the possibility of an excuse. A classic example of this is the case of R v Ahluwalia supra (n 
602). Forearming oneself is not, ipso fact, inconsistent with an adequate spontaneity of response for 
the purposes of a provocation plea. It all depends on whether the forearming was part-and-parcel of 
the (ex hypothesi) spontaneous angry response, or showed that the accused was set upon revenge. 
Likewise, a desire for revenge in the simple sense of retaliation is not inconsistent with 
spontaneously lost self-control; indeed, typically, it is such a desire that one loses control of. 
However Horder supra (n 687) at n 6 is correct in his assertion that to be “set” upon revenge as a 
matter of practical reasoning, to have decided on it before one loses self-control, is inconsistent with 
a provocation plea: see R v Ibrams supra (n 500) and Gregory (1982) 74 Cr App R 154. Therefore, 




abuse, 1530 and this would retain the causal link between the provocative act and the 
reaction since the lapse of time sometimes heats rather than cools passions.1531 This 
would answer the question as to whether the accused’s behaviour during her loss of 
self-control is “uncontrollable” (indicating a lack of choice and thus a lack of conative 
capacity to a certain extent) rather than merely “uncontrolled” (indicating a choice to 
give vent to her passions or emotions).1532 
 
One further point should be made concerning the notion that since provocation is now 
to be treated as a special defence, the court must apply not only a subjective test to 
determine the accused’s culpability, but also an objective test, in order to satisfy policy 
considerations. 1533  It is submitted that this is not correct. As has been discussed 
elsewhere, there are practical problems in applying such a test, notably that it leads to 
indeterminancy 1534 and ultimately collapses into a subjective test. It is unclear how 
Snyman’s test would work: 
 
“It is impossible to establish whether X had certain intention 
or knowledge by asking whether she ought to have had the 
intention or knowledge.” 1535 
 
The test would be circular: unless the abused woman reacted as a reasonable abused 
woman would have, she won’t be convicted of a lesser offence.1536 It is clinical common  
                                               




1532 Ashworth supra (n 1253) 236. 
 
1533 Snyman supra (n 1317) 69 (own translation). 
 
1534 For a discussion of the problems in applying a subjective-objective test see 341-350 op cit. 
 
1535 Snyman supra (n 1317) 69 (own translation). 
 




place that not all abused woman suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (or the 
effects of battering) act the same. 1537 
 
The end result of this would be that: 
 
[I]t amounts to illogical confusion between the subjective and 
objective.” 1538 
 
It is submitted that since the test for intention is subjective,1539 it should remain so.1540 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
The question concerning what the precise effect of provocation will be on an accused’s 
criminal liability is not entirely clear in South African law. One of the reasons for this 
uncertainty is the fact that since 1971 there are no correctly reported cases in which the 
South African courts have expressly answered this question. It has to be assumed that 
provocation is currently dealt with by means of the general principles approach to 
criminal liability. 1541  One of the main problems underlying the defence of non-
pathological incapacity is the issue of lost self-control. According to South African law, 
capacity is absent when an accused lacks self-control.1542 However, it is far from clear 
in our law when self-control is absent. While theorists such as De Vos have suggested  
                                               
1537 Morse supra (n 1369) 384. 
 
1538 Snyman supra (n 1317) 69 (own translation). 
 
1539 As Snyman supra (n 1100) 239: “[T]he test is no longer how the ordinary or reasonable person 
would have reacted to the provocation, but how the particular accused, given his personal 
characteristics, such as quick temper, jealousy or a superstitious turn of mind, in fact reacted, and 
what his state of mind was at the crucial time.” 
 
1540 See chapter 2 at 64, including n 280 where the Appellate Division in Dlodlo supra (n 279) approved 
the subjective test for the intention to kill where the defence of provocation was raised. Furthermore, 
the rejection of the objective test in Mokonto supra (n 282) (chapter 2 at 65) illustrated that what is 
important is not the nature of the provocative act, but its effect on the accused’s mental abilities or 
state of mind.”  
 
1541 See 318-319 op cit for a definition of this approach. 
 




that the reason for the confusion could be traced back to the courts misinterpretation of 
the true nature of the second leg of the criminal capacity test (conative). According to 
this theorist, the courts have not clearly distinguished between conative function and 
affective function.1543 It is submitted that this finding does little to explain what the 
term loss of self-control means other than in the context of affective function. It is this 
author’s submission that the main reason for the problems surrounding this term has 
been the courts equation of the defence of automatism with non-pathological incapacity 
(or loss of self-control). This trend is clearly demonstrated in our case law.1544 By 
duplicating the voluntary conduct requirement under mens rea the courts have asked the 
same question twice. 1545  Furthermore, the courts have complicated matters by 
attempting to introduce an objective element into the subjective test for capacity. This 
creates problems of its own, notably that it leads to indeterminancy.1546 
 
It is submitted that where an accused is acting voluntarily, there will be a measure of 
goal-directed conduct. Where goal-directed conduct is present, it necessarily implies 
that there must be a level of capacity present in the case of the defence of non-
pathological incapacity. In other words, the question is not whether capacity present, 
but to what extent it is present.1547 This point is not acknowledged by our courts: the 
concept of psychological fault underlying South African law offers no explanation for 
the fact that culpability is capable of gradation.1548 
                                               
1543 For a discussion of De Vos’s theory see 329-332 op cit. 
 
1544 For a discussion of the case law in this respect see 322-338 op cit. 
 
1545 For a discussion of this point see 350-351. 
 
1546 For a discussion of a move towards an objective approach and its potential problems see 341-350 op 
cit. 
 
1547 See 351-352 op cit. 
 




It is my submission that the effects of battering could be used to support a defence of 
diminished capacity which focuses not on the mitigating circumstances of the act, but 
rather on the actor’s inability to form the requisite mens rea for the offence charged.1549  
 
However, the introduction of such a defence could only be achieved by returning to the 
rules relating to provocation followed in South Africa prior to 1971. According to the 
specific intent doctrine, policy considerations require that an accused should not be 
completely acquitted. However, these considerations also require that an accused not be 
convicted of murder but of culpable homicide. This comprise solution (of culpable 
homicide) can only be reached by treating provocation as a special defence, one which 
is not strictly adjudicated in terms of the general principles relating to culpability (mens 
rea). 1550  Furthermore, it is submitted that a subjective test must be applied, since 
Snyman’s objective-subjective test leads to an illogical confusion between the 










                                               
1549 For a discussion of this approach see 355-356 op cit. 
 
1550 For a discussion of the specific intent doctrine see 350-360 op cit. 
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